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Preface 
 
 
At the dawn of the third millennium governance of the seas and oceans is changing. 
This is especially attributable to the growing role of regional economic integration 
organizations. The EU, with its integrated maritime policy, the African Union, through 
its “Integrated African Strategy for the Seas and the Oceans – Horizon 2050”, ASEAN, 
through the creation of the Maritime Forum, are the principal examples of the current 
tendencies on this issue. 
The International Association of the Law of the Sea (AssIDMer) has been focusing 
on this particular topic for some time. The Proceedings of the fifth ordinary meeting of 
the Association, held in Venice on 20 and 21 November 2014, have just been published, 
under the title: “International Law and Maritime Governance. Current Issues and 
Challenges for Regional Economic Integration Organizations” (A. Del Vecchio, F. 
Marrella (eds), Editoriale Scientifica, 2016). The authors of this book place special 
focus on the impact that regional economic integration organizations have on the 
exploitation of natural resources, the relationship between human rights and the law of 
the sea and on what is known as the “Blue Economy”. 
 These issues were raised once again in this Volume in a context that is much more 
limited from the geographic perspective, that of the Adriatic and the Ionian Region, but 
extremely thorough from the scientific viewpoint. Indeed, the analysis is not limited 
simply to the economic and juridical aspects but also deeply covers historical 
backgrounds, as well as Governance of Biological Resources and Offshore Oil and Gas 
Exploration and Exploitation. 
It is no coincidence that Art. 123 UNCLOS envisages a “reinforced” duty of 
cooperation for coastal States bordering enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. The 
characteristic of the Mediterranean (the largest of the seas that may be defined as “semi-
enclosed” according to Art. 122 UNCLOS) is that it also comprises within itself marine 
spaces that are also considered as enclosed or semi-enclosed, and that consequently 
have aspects of greater “sensitivity” compared to the rest of the Mediterranean. The 
Adriatic and the Ionian seas are among them and are to be considered as “semi-enclosed 
seas in a semi-enclosed sea”. The Adriatic especially as it links together the territory of 
seven States: Italy, Slovenia, Croatia and Greece, member States of the EU; two nations 
that are candidate States, Montenegro and Albania; and a potential candidate, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, with a part of its territorial sea surrounded by the waters of Croatia. 
The absence of cooperation among the coastal States of the Mediterranean, which 
has led to unilateral initiatives extending coastal jurisdiction, certainly has not spared 
the Adriatic and the Ionian. The more limited the extension of water compared to the 
number of States bordering the basin, the more difficult is cooperation and the more 
complex are questions of delimitation of marine spaces. Maritime borders are therefore 
particularly fragile as it is difficult for a delimitation made bilaterally to escape 
challenges from third States that are, by necessity, located close to the delimited zone. 
Added to this are the technical difficulties caused by the presence of islands and islets 
and the conformation of generally highly indented coastlines. Even more problematic 
are the unilateral initiatives to extend jurisdiction in this marine space, a crucial factor 
given the need for close cooperation among coastal States. The Adriatic, a good part of 
which consists of high seas, has furthermore been constantly the subject of exploitation 
of its fishing resources by non Adriatic and non Mediterranean ships, often equipped for 
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industrial fishing. The absence of control and of enforceable measures to manage 
resources has fueled Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing. In addition, we 
have recently witnessed, in both the Adriatic and the Ionian, an acceleration of 
exploration activities and exploitation of off shore hydrocarbon and gas deposits, 
especially in light of the ongoing political crisis between Russia and the Ukraine, with 
consequent repercussions throughout Europe. These activities also require new 
regulations and especially greater cooperation among the States involved. As has 
happened in the past concerning the exploitation of fishing and environmental 
governance, in this area also coastal States proceeded unilaterally, using national laws 
and regulations and granting rights of exploration, exploitation and construction of 
offshore platforms. Several countries, such as Croatia, have initiated this “tendency”, 
while others, Italy for one, have adopted a “wait and see” approach, deciding to act only 
when it became inevitable in light of decisions made by other countries. Recent 
developments point to a rethinking concerning these decisions. It is clear that there 
exists an immediate issue of the sustainability, by a fragile ecosystem such as the 
Adriatic and the Ionian (and in more general terms perhaps the Mediterranean itself), of 
the activities currently being carried out and especially those anticipated over the next 
few years in order to access new energy sources. 
These concerns are part of a more general framework of management of the 
environment in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. The Adriatic is already suffering from 
anthropic activities, it requires a century for the complete exchange of its waters. How 
can we possibly ignore the impact that an incident as serious as what happened in the 
Gulf of Mexico in 2010 would have in such a circumscribed space! 
The problem is that the legal instruments in effect, on an international level and 
within the European Union, at times seem inadequate and obsolete. The general legal 
framework of reference doubtless remains the UNCLOS, ratified by all States bordering 
on this sea, but this Charter has now been in effect for more than twenty years and was 
originally drafted over thirty years ago, with many of its provisions applying to ocean 
spaces. Many other “regional” or “sub-regional” agreements regarding protection of the 
marine environment were later ratified by Adriatic States. Of these regional agreements 
we take particular note of the 1995 Barcelona Convention on protecting the 
Mediterranean from pollution, and its Protocols providing the general principles and 
institutional framework for protection of the marine environment. Recourse to the 
general principles of precaution, prevention and environmental sustainability 
nonetheless remain a constant, proof of the lack of any truly effective and 
comprehensive international laws.  
All these issues are thoroughly analyzed in this volume. A sincere thanks to the 
editor and to the individual authors for their contributions and for the completeness of 
information as well as the stimuli they provide to the progress and development of the 
scientific debate on governance of the seas in general and the Adriatic and Ionian 
Region in particular. 
 
 
GIUSEPPE CATALDI 
President, International Association of the Law of the Sea 
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ANDREA CALIGIURI 
 
THE MARITIME BOUNDARIES IN THE ADRIATIC AND IONIAN SEAS 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Geographic delimitation of the Adriatic and Ionian seas. – 2. Maritime delimitation in a 
semi-enclosed sea. – 2.1. Maritime delimitations between former Yugoslav States. – 2.2. Maritime 
Delimitation between Montenegro and Albania. – 2.3. Maritime Delimitation between Albania and 
Greece. – 3. Delimitation of sui generis maritime zones. – 4. Maritime disputes and governance of 
offshore shared natural resources. 
 
 
1. Geographic delimitation of the Adriatic and Ionian seas 
 
The Adriatic Sea forms a long but relatively narrow gulf, generally aligned from 
northwest to southeast, toward its only access, the Strait of Otranto. The International 
Hydrographic Organization (IHO) defines the boundary of the Adriatic sea on the South 
as a line running from the Butrinto River's mouth (39°44'N) in Albania to the Karagol 
Cape in Corfu, through this island to the Kephali Cape (these two capes are in latitude 
39°45'N), and on to the Santa Maria di Leuca Cape (39°48'N).1  
The Adriatic Sea connects the territories of seven States: Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania and Greece. The Adriatic Sea is 
undoubtedly a semi-enclosed sea under Article 122 UNCLOS.2 
The IHO defines the limits of the Ionian Sea as follows: on the North, a line running 
from the mouth of the Butrinto River (39°44'N) in Albania, to Cape Karagol in Corfu 
(39°45'N), along the North Coast of Corfu to Cape Kephali (39°45'N) and from thence 
to Cape Santa Maria di Leuca in Italy; on the East, from the mouth of the Butrinto River 
in Albania down the coast of the mainland to Cape Matapan; on the South, a line from 
Cape Matapan to Cape Passero, the Southern point of Sicily; and on the West, the East 
coast of Sicily and the Southeast coast of Italy to Cape Santa Maria di Leuca”.3  
The Ionian Sea connects the territories of three States: Italy, Greece, and Albania. 
Under Article 122 UNCLOS, the Ionian Sea could also be regarded as a semi-enclosed 
sea when its coastal States – Albania, Greece and Italy – will proclaim their exclusive 
economic zones; indeed, a semi-enclosed sea may consist “entirely or primarily” of the 
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more States. 
 
 
2. Maritime delimitation in a semi-enclosed sea 
 
Six coastal States of Adriatic and Ionian seas claim 12 nm breadth of territorial seas, 
which is consistent with UNCLOS. Bosnia and Herzegovina exercises its sovereignty 
                                                           
1
 See IHO, Limits of Oceans and Seas (Special Publication No. 28), 3rd Ed., 1953, 17. On the limits of the Adriatic 
Sea accepted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), see in this Volume, M. Grbec, ‘The Adriatic-Ionian 
Marine Region as a Space of Connectivity: Transport and Protection of the Marine Environment’, para 1. For 
information about physical characteristics of the Adriatic Sea, see B. Cushman-Roisin, M. Gacic, P.-M. Poulain, A. 
Artegiani (eds), Physical Oceanography of the Adriatic Sea. Past, Present and Future (Springer, 2001). 
2
 Under Article 122 UNCLOS, “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea” means “a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or 
more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the 
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States”. 
3
 See IHO, Limits of Oceans and Seas (Special Publication No. 28), III Ed., 1953, 17. 
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over the waters of the Bay of Neum and around Klek peninsula, enclosed within the 
Croatian system of straight baselines.4  
Two treaties define the delimitation of territorial sea5 and continental shelf6 
boundaries between Italy and the former SFRY. The delimitation was mostly based on 
the median line between the basic lines from which the territorial sea of former SFRY 
and Italy was measured. The delimitation line was 353 nm long, joining 43 points. The 
maritime delimitation line between Italy and former SFRY has been inherited by the 
post-Yugoslavia successor States; thus, sections of the Italy-Yugoslavia maritime 
boundary line now exist as boundaries between Italy and Slovenia, Italy and Croatia7 
and Italy and Montenegro. 
Greece and Italy concluded a continental shelf delimitation agreement in 1977.8 A 
continental shelf delimitation agreement was also concluded between Italy and Albania 
in 1992 which extends southwards of the Strait of Otranto and into the Mediterranean 
Sea.9 However, maritime delimitation in the Eastern Adriatic, among the former 
Yugoslav Republics, between Albania and Montenegro and between Albania and 
Greece still remains a largely unresolved issue.  
All these disputes should be solved according to UNCLOS’ general rules concerning 
delimitation between States with adjacent coasts.10 In particular, it must be emphasized 
that the law of the sea does not recognize special rules on the delimitation of marine 
spaces in enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. Recently, in a dispute with Ukraine over the 
maritime delimitation in the Black Sea, before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
Romania had suggested that “the enclosed nature of the Black Sea is also a relevant 
circumstance as part of the wider requirement to take account of the geographical 
                                                           
4
 Maritime boundaries between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are established in the Treaty on State Frontier of 
30 July 1999 (this Treaty is not ratified by Croatia, but it has been provisionally applied since the day of its 
signature). Article 4(3) states: “The state border on the sea stretches along the central line of the sea between the 
territories of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on 
Sea Rights. […]”. Although the legal regime of the waters in the Bay of Neum and around the Klek peninsula has not 
been defined in the Treaty, it is reasonable to assert that the waters inside the Bay of Neum are “internal waters” and 
waters around the Klek peninsula are territorial waters of the Bosnia and Herzegovina (see B. Vukas, ‘Maritime 
Delimitation in a Semi-enclosed Sea: The Case of the Adriatic Sea’ in R. Lagoni, D. Vignes (eds), Maritime 
Delimitation, Leiden / Boston, 2006, 205 ff., 215). It should also be noted that the enclosure of the maritime area of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina within the Croatian system of straight baselines is not in accordance with Article 7(6) 
UNCLOS, which states: “The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to cut 
off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an exclusive economic zone”. However, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina did not protest against such enclosure (see M. Grbec, Extension of Coastal State Jurisdiction in 
Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas. A Mediterranean and Adriatic Perspective (Routledge, 2014) 155-157). 
5
 Treaty on the delimitation of the frontier for the part not indicated as such in the Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947 
(so-called Osimo Treaty), 10 November 1975. 
6
 Agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two 
countries in the Adriatic Sea, 8 January 1968. See Map 1, infra, at 243. 
7
 Within the frame of the 1968 Agreement, Italy and Croatia signed the Technical Agreement in 2005 adopting the 
use of WGS 84 allowing an accurate determination of the delimitation lines of the Italian and Croatian continental 
shelves which were reviewed and the Technical Agreement in 2009 guaranteeing the exploitation of the Annamaria 
Gas Field in the Adriatic Sea which lies on both sides of the delimitation line between the continental shelves of the 
two States.  
8
 Agreement between the Hellenic Republic and the Italian Republic on the delimitation of the respective continental 
shelf areas of the two States, 24 May 1977. See Map 2, infra, at 244. 
9
 Agreement between the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Italy for the determination of the continental shelf 
of each of the two countries, 18 December 1992. See Map 3, infra, at 245. 
10
 See Article 15, concerning the delimitation of territorial sea, Article 74 concerning the delimitation of the 
Economic Exclusive Zone, and Article 83 concerning the delimitation of continental shelf. In UNCLOS there is no 
rule on the delimitation of the contiguous zone of States with adjacent or opposite coasts. 
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context of the area to be delimited”.11 According to Romania, “in considering the 
equitable nature of an equidistance line, the ‘general maritime geography’ of the Black 
Sea must be assessed. In Romania’s view, this geographical factor is to be considered 
together with any pre-existing delimitation agreements so that any new delimitation 
should not dramatically depart from the method previously used in the same sea 
between other riparian States in order not to produce an inequitable result”.12 On this 
specific point, however, the ICJ, which had established a provisional equidistance line 
between these two States, stated the irrelevance of these arguments.13 
Thus, in a case of maritime dispute between two or more States, delimitation of a 
single maritime boundary is defined according to the so-called three-stage approach. 
The first stage is to trace a provisional line of equidistance. As the second stage, all the 
relevant circumstances are to be examined, if any, for adjusting the provisional 
equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result. As final stage, it is necessary to 
verify whether the delimitation line does not lead to an inequitable result by applying 
the test of disproportionality.  
 
2.1. Maritime delimitations between former Yugoslav States 
 
The current borders between Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Montenegro were set in 1992 by the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference 
on Yugoslavia (the so-called Badinter Arbitration Committee). In its Opinion No. 3, this 
Commission stated that “Except where otherwise is agreed, the former boundaries 
[between adjacent former SFRY’s Republics] become frontiers protected by 
international law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial 
status quo and, in particular, from the principle of uti possideti iuris. […]”.14  
However, proclamation of this principle was not applicable on the issue of maritime 
delimitation. Indeed, the former SFRY has never introduced formal administrative 
maritime boundaries between its federal Republics.15 For this reason, at the moment of 
independence, it was unclear which Republic exercised de facto jurisdiction over a 
portion of the “federal territorial sea”.  
Although the problem was regulated by the principle each coastal Republic exercised 
jurisdiction over the waters in front of its coasts, claims have been made by each former 
Yugoslav Republic against neighbors. These maritime disputes concern Croatia and 
Slovenia over maritime delimitation in the Bay of Piran, Croatia and Montenegro 
concerning the maritime delimitation in the Bay of Bota Kotorska, and Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning the access of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 
Klek-Neum waters to the high seas. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
11
 International Court of Justice, Maritime delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), judgment of 3 
February 2009, para 169. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid, para 174. 
14
 See ‘Opinion No. 3’ in A. PELLET, ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee. A Second Breath for the 
Self-Determination of Peoples’, (1992) 3 European Journal of International Law 178, 185. 
15
 Opinion No. 3 makes an express reference to Article 5 of the SFRY’s Constitution to assert the respect of the 
principle of uti possidety. However, Article 5. 
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a) Croatia - Slovenia 
The dispute between Slovenia and Croatia concerns the demarcation of the territorial 
waters of the two countries as far as the Italian waters and the question of Slovenian 
access to the high seas.  
Since 1993 Slovenia has claimed sovereignty and jurisdiction over the entire Bay of 
Piran on the basis of historic title and other special circumstances.16 In particular, this 
country affirms to have exercised effective control and jurisdiction over the entire Bay 
of Piran during the times of the former SFRY. In the words of the Slovenian 
Constitutional Court, Slovenia bases its arguments on the doctrine of uti possidetis de 
facto.17 According to Slovenia, furthermore, this country has always had territorial 
access to the high seas. The Osimo Treaty should be crucial in this regard, since it 
would define the border between Italy and Slovenia up to point T5, which is the point of 
Slovenia's territorial access to the high seas. The Slovenian continental shelf would also 
start at point T5, as set out in the Agreement of the delimitation of the continental shelf 
between the former SFRY and Italy in 1968.18 
Croatia rejects the Slovenian position.19 According to Croatia, the border between the 
two countries runs along the median line in the Bay of Piran and then perpendicular to 
the middle of the line closing the Bay of Piran and up to the Osimo border. The result of 
this would be locking Slovenian territorial waters between Croatian and Italian 
territorial waters. However, this solution would not affect the right of innocent passage 
of Slovenian vessels through the Croatian territorial sea. Furthermore, Croatia denies 
that Slovenia has territorial access to the high seas.  
The dispute appeared to have been solved with the negotiation of a Treaty on the 
Common State Border, the so-called Drnovšek-Račan Treaty, initialed on 20 July 2001 
and afterwards not supported by Croatia.20  
The turning point in the dispute is only reached with the involvement of the 
European Union21 and the signature, on 4 November 2009, of the Arbitral Agreement 
between the Governments of Slovenia and Croatia. In particular, Article 3(1) of the 
Arbitration Agreement provides: “The Arbitral Tribunal shall determine: (a) the course 
of the maritime and land boundary between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic 
of Croatia; (b) Slovenia’s junction to the High Sea; (c) the regime for the use of the 
relevant maritime areas”. 
 According to Article 7(2) of the Arbitration Agreement, the “award of the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall be binding on the Parties and shall constitute a definitive settlement of 
the dispute”. 
However, in July 2015, the Croatian media published telephonic conversations 
between the arbitrator of Slovenian nationality and the Slovenian agent, which related to 
the deliberations of the Tribunal. This scandal could have serious repercussions for the 
                                                           
16
 On 7 April 1993, the Slovenian Parliament adopted a Memorandum on the Bay of Piran, which indicated the goals 
of Slovenia in the negotiation with Croatia. 
17
 Slovenian Constitutional Court, Opinion, Rm-1/09-26, 18 March 2010. 
18
 Although Italy does not have an official position of the Slovenian-Croatian dispute, it is significant to note that it 
considers Slovenia as a successor State in the 1968 Agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia concerning the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries in the Adriatic Sea. 
19
 See House of Representatives of the Croatian Parliament, Declaration on the State of Inter-state Relations between 
the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, 26 March 199, File No. 018-01/99-01/05. 
20
 For more details on the solutions contained in this agreement, see Grbec (n 4) 174-177. 
21
 A. UILENREEF, Bilateral Barriers or Good Neighbourliness?: The Role of Bilateral Disputes in the EU 
Enlargement. Process, Clingendael European Papers, The Hague, 2010, 
<www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20100600_cesp_paper_uilenreef.pdf>, 15-22. 
 The Maritime Boundaries in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas 
 
7
termination of the arbitration,22 but the Tribunal, in its Partial Award of 30 June 2016, 
stated there is no obstacle to the continuation of the proceedings under the Arbitration 
Agreement.23 
 
b) Croatia – Montenegro 
The maritime delimitation between Croatia and Montenegro is complicated by 
unresolved territorial disputes concerning the Prevlaka Peninsula, the resolution of 
which is an essential precondition to define the maritime boundary between the two 
countries in the Bay of Boka Kotorska. Thus, it is necessary to determine the terminus 
of the Croatia-Montenegrin land boundary on the coast and thus the starting point of 
any maritime delimitation. 
                                                           
22
 Following the revelation, the arbitrator of Slovenian nationality, Dr. Sekolec (23 July), the arbitrator of Croatian 
nationality, Professor Vukas (31 July), and the Judge Abraham (2 August) resigned from the Tribunal. By letter of 31 
July 2015, the Republic of Croatia informed the Arbitral Tribunal that Croatia “cannot further continue the process 
[of the present arbitration] in good faith”. Accordingly, Croatia stated that, “[i]n accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” it “informed the other Signatory to the Agreement of 
its intention to terminate” the Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the 
Government of the Republic of Slovenia signed on 4 November 2009, noting that “as of the date of the notification it 
ceased to apply the Arbitration Agreement”. However, on 13 August 2015, in its observations on the Croatian letter 
dated 31 July 2015, Slovenia informs the Tribunal that “Slovenia has objected to Croatia’s purported unilateral 
termination of the Arbitration Agreement”. In Slovenia’s view, the Tribunal “has the power and the duty to continue 
the proceedings” as it would otherwise be open to any party wishing to delay or prevent the making of an arbitral 
award to frustrate an arbitration agreement. Slovenia also argues that “Croatia has achieved its vital interest and 
joined the EU through the operation of Article 9 of the Arbitration Agreement it now wishes to terminate”. Finally, 
Slovenia states “it is a general principle of international law governing arbitration proceedings that any tribunal has 
the power to determine the scope of its own competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle)”, a principle that is in 
Slovenia’s view confirmed by Article 3(4) and Article 6(4) of the Arbitration Agreement and Article 34(2) of the 
PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States. Finally, on 25 September 2015, in accordance 
with Article 2(2) of the Arbitration Agreement, the President of the Tribunal has appointed two new arbitrators. After 
Tribunal reconstitution, the Tribunal decided “to consider the Parties’ positions carefully, including in respect of the 
effect of Croatia’s stated intention to terminate the Arbitration Agreement and in respect of the possible implications 
for the present proceedings of the events reportedly underlying Croatia’s decision” (see PCA Press Release of 25 
September 2015, www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1468). On the question of the Tribunal’s competence to decide 
on the validity of Croatia’s purported termination of the Arbitration, a part of scholars assert that “whilst the Tribunal 
is empowered to decide procedural matters of the arbitration (Articles 3(4) and 6(4) of the Agreement) it is not 
empowered to decide the validity of termination of the Arbitration Agreement. As termination of the arbitral 
proceedings is a procedural matter, the Tribunal is therefore competent to decide on the termination of the arbitration 
per its general power” (A. Sarvarian, ‘Arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia: Leaks, Wiretaps, Scandal (Part 4)’, 
EJIL: Talk!, 3 May 2016, <www.ejiltalk.org/arbitration-between-croatia-and-slovenia-leaks-wiretaps-scandal-part-
4>). 
23
 See Arbitral Tribunal, Arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia, Partial Award, 30 June 2016. In particular, the 
Tribunal, referring to decisions of the International Court of Justice, clarified that termination of a treaty due to a 
material breach under Article 60(1) of the Vienna Convention “is warranted only if the breach defeats the object and 
purpose of the treaty”. Thus, the decisive question was whether the violations of the Arbitration Agreement by 
Slovenia rendered the accomplishment of its object and purpose impossible. The Tribunal noted that, since Dr. 
Sekolec has resigned as arbitrator, the views expressed by him in prior deliberation meetings were of no relevance for 
the work of the Tribunal in its current composition. Furthermore, in any event, the Tribunal would be ready, after 
consultation with the Parties, to consider reopening the oral phase of the case and to give each Party a further 
opportunity to express its views concerning what it regards as the most important facts and arguments. In view of 
this, the Tribunal determined that the breaches of the Arbitration Agreement by Slovenia did not render the 
continuation of the proceedings impossible and, therefore, did not defeat the object and purpose of the Agreement. In 
his reaction to the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal, Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs issued a press 
release stating that it “considers the Arbitral Tribunal’s Partial Award as a missed opportunity for the Arbitral 
Tribunal to restore confidence in independence and impartiality of its own work, as well as confidence in 
international arbitration as such”. The Ministry added that Croatia is no longer a party to the arbitration process and 
that it shall not comment on the intentions or decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal, nor shall it consider itself bound by 
them (see Press release on Arbitral Tribunal’s decision 30 June 2016, <www.mvep.hr/en/info-servis/press-
releases/press-release-on-arbitral-tribunal%E2%80%99s-decision-,25852.html>. 
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The legal regime of the disputed territory and the provisional delimitation in the Bay 
of Boka Kotorska are defined according to the Protocol between Croatia and FRY on 
temporary border regime along the southern border between the two counties of 10 
December 2002. After its independence, Montenegro accepted the succession in this 
treaty. 
The Protocol is applicable only to an area of internal waters and territorial sea and 
does not apply to the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, or sui generis 
maritime zones. However, Article 1 of the Protocol provides that its legal regime is 
“just provisional pending the conclusion of a final delimitation agreement” and that its 
provisions “shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation”. 
The temporary solution adopted in the Bay of Boka Kotorska is that the entrance to 
the bay, as at the time of the former SFRY, is closed with a straight baseline linking 
Cape Oštro on the southernmost part of the Prevlaka Peninsula with Cape Veslo in 
Montenegro. Thus, the waters within the bay have the status of “internal waters” and the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured from the straight baseline closing the Bay.24 
Within the Bay of of Boka Kotorska, the Protocol draws a regime according which the 
bay is divided by these two States in such a way as to create on one side a ‘Zone’ 
formally under Croatian jurisdiction, but with strong limitations,25 while the other part 
of the bay is under the exclusive sovereignty of Montenegro.  
With regard to the lateral delimitation of continental shelf of these two adjacent 
states, it is noteworthy that from the period when the two States were federal Republics 
of the former SFRY, the line delimiting the jurisdiction of Montenegro and Croatia 
followed the line of azimuth of 231°. Consequently, their respective continental shelves 
should be separated by that line. This position is claimed by Montenegro, absent 
subsequent contrary agreement between the two States.26 Nevertheless, a number of 
unilateral acts and activities have been conducted or authorized by Croatia in the 
maritime area of the Adriatic Sea south of the line of azimuth of 231°.27 
 
c) Croatia – Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia concluded a Treaty on the State Border in 1999 
which included the delimitation of their maritime boundary. However, this agreement is 
not been ratified by Croatia and it is temporarily in force since the date of its 
signature.28 According to Article 22(3) of the Treaty each party can cancel it at any time 
                                                           
24
 Article 6 (1) of 2002 Protocol: “The temporary delimitation of the territorial sea shall proceed from the point three 
cables away from Cape Oštro at the junction Cape Oštro - Cape Veslo in a straight line of 12 nautical miles along the 
azimuth of 206 degrees to the high seas”. 
25
 See Articles 5 (prohibition to enter into the Zone to police and naval forces of both States), 7 (patrolling of the 
Zone is in charge of a mixed police boats, with a Croatian-Montenegrin crew and without flag), 8 (prohibition of 
commercial fishing, including artisanal fishing and aquaculture, while recreational fishing is allowed on a basis of 
specific licenses issued by competent authorities of one of the two States), 24 (both States are charged with the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment) and 15 (prohibition to enter into the Zone to Croatian naval 
forces, while only obligations for Montenegro are not to hold naval exercises between the line Cape Kobila – Cape 
Durov Kam and the straight baseline closing the Bay and for its submarines to sail in the Zone on the surface and 
flying the national flag) of 2002 Protocol. 
26
 Montenegro’s position is synthesized in Communication from the Government of Montenegro, dated 18 May 2015 
concerning exploration and exploitation of resources in the Adriatic Sea by the Republic of Croatia, available on 
www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/communications/MNG_note20150619en.pdf. 
27
 See para. 3 concerning the Croatia’s ecological and fisheries protection zone and para 4 concerning the licence for 
hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in Blocks 23, 26, 27, and 28. 
28
 Article 22(1) of the Border Treaty. 
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with prior written notice to the other party. Thus, the maritime boundary between 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia is a “provisional” delimitation.  
However, this maritime delimitation is geographically a peculiar case. Indeed, the 
Treaty does not regulate the regime of navigation for Bosnia and Herzegovina through 
waters qualified by Croatia as “internal waters”.29 Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
vessels should be subject to the authorization of the Croatian authorities to proceed 
along the Croatian internal waters30. 
Some scholars31 argue that Bosnia and Herzegovina could claim a right of innocent 
passage on the basis of two provisions of the UNCLOS:  
- Article 8(2) UNCLOS: “Where the establishment of a straight baseline in 
accordance with the method set forth in Article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal 
waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent 
passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters”; 
- Article 45(1) UNCLOS: “1. The regime of innocent passage, in accordance with 
Part II, section 3, shall apply in straits used for international navigation: […] (b) 
between a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a 
foreign State”. 
The first provision should be applicable because the dissolution of the SFRY would 
have to invalidate the system of straight baselines and consequently Bosnia and 
Herzegovina would have a direct access to the high seas. In this case, this corridor 
through the Croatian waters could also be qualified as “strait used for international 
navigation”, even in spite of the absence of a strong international shipping. 
There is another part of the doctrine that accepts the maritime delimitation inside the 
internal waters of Croatia as a consequence of the agreement between the two States.32 
 
 
2.2. Maritime Delimitation between Montenegro and Albania 
 
The only agreement concerning maritime delimitation between the two States is the 
Protocol concerning the frontier between Albania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes of 26 July 1926.33 This agreement states: “the boundary [between Albania and 
Yugoslavia] starting from the limit of the territorial waters in the Adriatic Sea follows 
first a straight line perpendicular to the general direction of the coast and ends up at the 
mouth of the principle arm of the Boyana”.  
Since then, no agreement between the two States was signed concerning the 
delimitation of their continental shelf. However, it should be noted that Albania has 
                                                           
29
 See 1994 Maritime Code of Croatia. 
30
 A dispute between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia concerned also the Pelješac Bridge, a bridge projected to 
connect two parts of Croatian coastline, across the Channel of Mali Ston between the village of Klek and the Pelješac 
peninsula, the construction of which had started in 2007. The construction of the bridge was opposed by Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, because it would complicate its access to high seas. In particular, the bridge, originally planned to be 
only 35 meters high, would have made it impossible for large ships to enter in the harbor of Neum. Although said 
harbor was not fit for commercial traffic, the Bosnian government declared that a new one might be built in the 
future, and that the construction of the bridge would compromise this ambition. Following the concerns of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Croatian Government changed the design of the bridge, but the project was stopped in 2012. 
31
 See Grbec ( n 4) 160-162. 
32
 T. Scovazzi, ‘Les zones côtières en Méditerranée: évolution et confusion’, (2001) 6 Annuaire du Droit de la Mer 
2000 95, 102 and n 27. 
33
 The existence of this Protocol is called into question by some international lawyers; see C.R. Symmons, ‘Albania 
and the Law of the Sea: An Analysis of Recent Practice’, (1996) 11 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
69, 72. 
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defined the northern limit of its offshore oil and gas exploration block system on the 
basis of equidistance. This system seems to be accepted by Montenegro.34 
 
2.3. Maritime Delimitation between Albania and Greece 
 
The regime and water borders between Albania and Greece was defined by an 
instrument signed by the Great Powers, under the jurisdiction of the Paris Peace 
Conference, in 1926.35 
Article 10 of this Protocol says: “various issues will arise for determining the 
boundary line, which are not provided for by this Protocol shall be the subject of direct 
agreements between governments”. However, only on 19 March 2009, in Tirana,  an 
“Agreement between Greece and Albania on the delimitation of continental shelf and 
other maritime areas belonging, according to the International Law” was initialized.  
Since its introduction, the agreement states that “the maritime borders between 
Albania and Greece, will be determined on the basis of equity distance expressed by the 
medium line”. This agreement was ratified by the Albanian parliament, but was 
unapproved by the Albanian Constitutional Court, arguing it conflicted with the 
Constitution of Albania and the UNCLOS. In particular, the Court considered “the 
failure to apply the basic principles of international law for the division of the maritime 
areas between the two countries for the purpose of reaching a fair and honourable 
result” and agreement did not take into account “islands as special circumstances in the 
delimitation of the maritime areas”.36 
At this stage, it is possible to underline some relevant aspects concerning the 
delimitation of territorial waters of two countries: 
- in Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice made the point that “One 
fact of importance is that the north Corfu Channel constitutes a frontier between 
Albania and Greece, that a part of it is wholly within the territorial waters of these states 
[…]”; 
- the Albanian Decree No. 7366 of 1990 indicates that a mid-channel line constitutes 
the Albanian claim as it proclaims that Albania's “territorial waters” to the south 
proceed “between the Albanian shore and the Greek islands up to the middle of the 
Corfu Channel”.37 
Concerning the delimitation of continental shelf of the two adjacent states, it is 
important to note that Italian-Greek and Italian-Albanian agreements on continental 
                                                           
34
 See Map in Annex I of the Decision on Defining Blocks for Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons, Official 
Gazette of Montenegro 17/11 of 28 March 2011. 
35
 Under the Treaty of London of 30 May 1913, ending the First Balkan War, the settlement of the status of the new 
Albania and the delineation of its boundaries were reserved for future decisions of the Great Powers. These 
boundaries was determined by the Protocol of Florence of 17 December 1913. After the First World War, the 
Conference of Ambassadors on 9 November 1921, under the jurisdiction of the Paris Peace Conference, confirmed, 
with certain modifications, the boundaries of 1913. The Commission internationale de delimitation des frontieres de 
l’Albanie composed of France, Great Britain, and Italy commenced demarcation in 1922, completing its work in 
Florence on 27 January 1925. The Act final of demarcation was signed by Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in Paris on 30 July 1926. 
36
 See Constitutional Court of Albania, Decision No. 15, 15 April 2010, para 113. For a commentary of this decision, 
see K. NOUSSIA, ‘The Decision of the Albanian Supreme Court Annulling the 2009 Maritime Delimitation Agreement 
between Albania and Greece’, (2010) 25 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 601; K. CENAJ, 
‘Albania - Greece Agreement on Setting Maritime Boundaries, According to International Law’, (2015) 4 Academic 
Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 143. 
37
 Decree No. 4650, as amended by Decree No. 7366, dated 9 March 1990, on the State Border of the People's 
Socialist Republic of Albania, Article 1. 
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shelf made provisions to take into account the accommodation of interests respectively 
of Albania and Greece:  
- in Italian-Greek agreement of 1974, according to Article 1(3), the Contracting 
Parties agreed that, for the present, the determination of the border should not extend 
beyond point 16 of division line (latitude North: 35° 34' 2", longitude East: 18° 20' 7"). 
The completion of the determination in the north beyond point 16 remains to be 
accomplished by later agreements respectively with the respective interested parties; 
- in Italian-Albanian agreement of 1992, according to Article 1(2), the Contracting 
Parties agreed that, for the present, the determination of the border should not extend 
beyond point 17 of division line (latitude North: 40° 07' 55", longitude East: 18° 58' 
38"). The completion of the determination in the south beyond point 17 remains to be 
accomplished by later agreements respectively with the respective interested parties. 
Thus, there presently remain two segments to fill in the Italian / Eastern Adriatic 
continental shelf line, that could be defined in the future on a trilateral, rather than 
bilateral, basis. 
 
 
3. Delimitation of sui generis maritime zones 
 
While costal States of the Adriatic and Ionian region did not proclaim an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ),38 some of them have established maritime spaces not defined in 
the UNCLOS, the so-called ecological protection zones (EPZs). An ecological 
protection zone can be described as an area aimed at protecting and preserving the 
biodiversity and fishery resources and / or the environment.39  
In Adriatic sea, three coastal States, Croatia, Slovenia and Italy, have adopted 
specific laws for establishing these EPZs. The analysis of these laws is only finalized to 
describe the boundaries of these zones and the criteria used to draw them.  
Croatia was the first coastal State to introduce a law on this issue. On 3 October 
2003, the Croatian Parliament adopted the Decision on the Extension of the Jurisdiction 
of the Republic of Croatia in the Adriatic Sea.40 In accordance with para. 6 of this act, 
the coordinates of the outer limit of the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone 
(EFPZ) of Croatia are provisional, pending the conclusion of the delimitation 
agreements with the States whose coasts are opposite or adjacent to the Croatian coast, 
once they extend their jurisdiction beyond their territorial sea in accordance with 
                                                           
38
 Note that Croatia (see Decision on the Extension of the Jurisdiction of the Republic of Croatia in the Adriatic Sea, 
3 October 2003, Article 1, and Croatian Maritime Code, Articles 32-41) and Montenegro (see Law on Sea of 2008, 
Article 26) have legislation in place that provides for the establishment of EEZs, but they did not implement those. 
39
 G. Cataldi, G. Andreone, ‘Sui generis zones’, in D.J. Attard, M. Fitzmaurice, N.A. Martínez Gutiérrez (eds), The 
IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law, vol I: The Law of the Sea (Oxford, 2014) 217 ff. 
40
 Decision on the Extension of the Jurisdiction of the Republic of Croatia in the Adriatic Sea, 3 October 2003, in 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia “Narodne novine”, no. 157/03. For a commentary of this decision, see D. 
Vidas, ‘Global Trends in Use of the Seas and the Legitimacy of Croatia’s Extension of Jurisdiction in the Adriatic 
Sea’, (2003) Croatian International Relations Review 32, 8 ff. The establishment of EFPZ also affected the 
negotiation for Croatia accession’s to the EU; for this reason, on 3 June 2004, the Croatian Parliament adopted a 
Decision on Amending the Decision on the Extension of the Jurisdiction of the Republic of Croatia in the Adriatic Sea 
of 3 October 2003 (in Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 55/2004, 31), where para 3 states: “With regard to the member 
states of the European Union, the implementation of the legal regime of the Ecological and Fisheries Protection zone 
of the Republic of Croatia shall commence after the conclusion of the fisheries partnership agreement between the 
European Community and the Republic of Croatia”. For more details on this point, see European Parliament, The 
Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zones (EFPZ) in Croatia, February 2008, 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2008/397233/IPOL-PECH_NT%282008%29397233_EN.pdf>. 
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international law. Pending the conclusion of these delimitation agreements, the limits of 
the EFPZ temporarily follow the delimitation line of the continental shelf between 
Croatia and Italy, and, in adjacent delimitation, the line following the direction of and 
continuing on the provisional delimitation line of the territorial seas between the Croatia 
and Montenegro.41  
Croatia emphasizes that the said proclamation is without prejudice to the yet to be 
delimited sea border with Slovenia. Indeed, according Croatia, the maritime area in 
question is beyond the area where the border at the sea between the two States should be 
determined, because Slovenia, neither as a part of the former SFRY nor as a sovereign 
State, has never had a direct territorial exit to the high seas nor has it acquired one since 
the dissolution of the former SFRY. Consequently, Slovenia has never had its own 
continental shelf nor has acquired the right to declare its own exclusive economic zone.  
Thus, the question of the EFPZ is directly linked to the maritime border dispute 
between Croatia and Slovenia in the Bay of Piran and to the accession of Slovenia to the 
high seas. 
The 2003 Croatian decision has met with the reaction by Slovenia.42 It is also 
important to note that by decree of 5 January 2006,43 this country established its own 
EPZ. Article 4 draws the provisional external border of the EPZ towards Italy following 
the delimitation line on the continental shelf as defined by the Agreement between 
SFRY and Italy on the delimitation of the continental shelf of 1968 (along the 
delimitation line on the continental shelf to the south of T5 point) and the provisional 
external border of the EPZ in the south running along the parallel 45°10'N latitude. 
However the final delimitation of the EPZ, according to Article 5(1), shall be effected 
by agreement with the neighbouring states in compliance with international law.  
Subsequently, Slovenia designated a ‘sea fishing area’ under its Marine Fisheries Act 
in 2006, consisting of three zones, one of which is defined as encompassing the EPZ 
and the high seas in the Adriatic Sea. Nevertheless, according to this definition, it is not 
clear if Slovenia claims a fisheries protection zone within its EPZ.44 
Italy also reacted to Croatian decision.45 In particular, in its note of 16 April 2004, 
Italian Government clearly argued against a single maritime boundary in the Adriatic 
Sea, affirming that “[…] the automatic extension of the delimitation of the seabed, 
agreed in [the 1968 Agreement concluded between Italy and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia], is not legally well founded because that limit was agreed on 
the basis of special circumstances that differ from the circumstances to be considered in 
the determination of superjacent waters. Furthermore, the 1968 delimitation was agreed 
in a moment in which the notion of exclusive economic zone was not well defined in 
the international law of the sea. That automatic extension is against Italian interests 
                                                           
41
 See List of geographical coordinates defining the outer limit of the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone, Text 
transmitted through Note verbale (No. 841/05) dated 2 September 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic 
of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in Law of the Sea Bulletin 
No. 59/2005, 28. 
42
 Note verbale dated 3 October 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations with reference to the note from the Permanent Mission of 
the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations dated 2 September 2005, in Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 59/2005, 33. 
43
 Ecological Protection Zone and Continental Shelf of the Republic of Slovenia Act, 22 October 2005, in Law of the 
Sea Bulletin, No. 60/2006, 56 ff. 
44
 Decree on designation of the sea fishing area of the Republic of Slovenia, in Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Slovenia, No. 2/06, 5 January 2006. 
45
 Note No. 1681 by Italy, dated 16 April 2004, concerning the declaration of an ecological and fisheries protection 
zone in the Adriatic Sea by the Republic of Croatia of 3 October 2003, in Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 54/2004, 129-
130. 
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because it does not take into account the change of relevant geographical circumstances 
that took place after the conclusion of the 1968 Agreement, which implies a 
consequential change of the objective parameter of the median line”.  
However, it is strange to note Italy does not refer to Article 4 of 1968 Agreement, 
which expressly provides that “[t]he agreement does not influence the juridical state of 
the waters or air space over the continental shelf”.  
In a note of 2006, Italy denounced Croatia for violation of Article 74 UNCLOS; 
indeed Croatia did not involve Italy in the setting of the provisional limit of EFPZ, 
despite the provision on the need for cooperation contained in the aforementioned 
article. It also specified its opinion with the following arguments: 
- First, it recalled that the 1968 Agreement was concluded when the Italian system of 
baselines on the territorial sea was profoundly different from today, since it did not 
contemplate the then new method of straight baselines; 
- Second, consideration should be given to the fact that the flow of detritus from the 
Po River from 1968 to today has led to a further lengthening toward the open sea of the 
Italian coastline; 
- Third, the constant jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice has 
consistently recognized that the delimitation of sea areas invokes “special 
circumstances” that differ by continental shelf and by superjacent waters which lead to 
different delimitation methods. In addition, international jurisprudence has always 
considered necessary the consent of the concerned States to the automatic extension of 
the seabed line of delimitation to superjacent waters.46 
On 8 February 2006, Italy also adopted a law on the EPZ beyond the outer limit of its 
territorial sea;47 however, for the present, it is not applied to the Adriatic Sea. Indeed, 
according to the Italian position, for coastal states bordering on enclosed or semi-
enclosed seas, there is the specific obligation to cooperate in determining the limits of 
the zone of functional jurisdiction. 
Finally, the question of Croatian EFPZ is also directly linked to the border dispute 
between Croatia and Montenegro.48 
 
 
4. Maritime disputes and governance of offshore shared natural resources  
 
It has long been recognized that the Adriatic and the Ionian are seas under stress; in 
particular, the Adriatic Sea especially in light of its semi-enclosed character with limited 
water exchange with the Mediterranean Sea. The marine environment of the Adriatic 
                                                           
46
 Note verbale dated 15 March 2006 from the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General in reference to note verbale 840/05 of 2 September 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the 
Republic of Croatia to the United Nations containing the list of geographical coordinates defining the outer limit of 
the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone of the Republic of Croatia, in Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 60/2006, 
127-128. 
47
 Law 61 on the Establishment of an ecological protection zone beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea, 8 
February 2006. According to Article 1 this law, outer limits of the EPZ are established through delimitation 
agreements with states whose territory is adjacent to or facing Italian territory (para. 2). Until the date when said 
agreements enter into effect, the outer limits of the EPZ follow the outline of the median line, each point of which is 
equidistant from the closest points on the baselines of the Italian territorial sea and of the states involved (para 3). For 
a commentary of Italian law, see T. Scovazzi, ‘La zone de protection écologique italienne dans le contexte confus de 
zones côtières méditerranéennes’, (2005) 10 Annuaire du droit de la mer 2004 209; G. Andreone, ‘La zona ecologica 
italiana’, (2007) 109 Il Diritto marittimo 3. 
48
 See Communication from the Government of Montenegro, dated 18 May 2015 concerning exploration and 
exploitation of resources in the Adriatic Sea by the Republic of Croatia (n 25). 
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and Ionian is mainly vulnerable for a worrying combination of factors: pollution from 
land sources and ships, litter, impact on biodiversity, overfishing and coastal 
degradation. 
Article 123 UNCLOS states “States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea 
should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance 
of their duties under this Convention. [...]”.49  
One of the most recent problems in the Adriatic and Ionian cooperation is related to 
exploration and exploitation activities of oil and gas by coastal States. There are two 
main reasons that make these activities a matter of direct confrontation rather than 
cooperation: the absence of delimitation agreements of the continental shelf between the 
States of the former Yugoslavia and the presence of oil and gas fields that are shared, 
because of geological and geomorphologic configuration of seabed and subsoil in the 
Adriatic Sea. 
In relation to the first element, an example of rivalry between States is a consequence 
of the decision of the Government of Croatia to give to some foreign leaseholders the 
right to explore and exploit the hydrocarbons in blocks 27, 28 and 29 of the Adriatic 
Sea, which are located in whole or in part in the maritime area claimed by Montenegro. 
The unilateral action of Croatia was stigmatized by the Government of Montenegro 
with two diplomatic notes in 2014.50 Montenegro asserted that the unilateral action of 
Croatia is in violation of the 2002 Protocol establishing an interim regime along the 
southern border between the two States, which, in its Preamble’s fourth paragraph, 
reads: “Departing from principles of respect for reciprocal obligations, non-acceptability 
of unilateral acts and bona fide implementation of the Protocol”; and it is in violation of 
the UNCLOS Preamble’s first paragraph which underlines that the Contracting States 
are “prompt by the desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, 
all issues relating to the law of the sea and aware of the historic significance of this 
Convention as an important contribution of the maintenance of peace, justice and 
progress for all peoples of the world”. Montenegro also stressed that “the Republic of 
Croatia should not establish any valid concessionary contract on exploration and 
exploitation of hydrocarbonates with any company in the world over disputed territory 
before the definitive delimitation and demarcation of the joint state border with 
Montenegro, or before two states reach a mutually acceptable agreement, based on 
equitable and just instruments that have been already applied in resolving similar 
disputes”.51 
Problems concerning the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas shared deposits 
could also arise between Italy and the States that face it, primarily with Croatia. 
                                                           
49
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It must be observed that the solution to this problem is not in the UNCLOS. This 
convention only states that “The coastal State exercise over the continental shelf 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources” 
(Article 77(1)).52 Therefore, the solution can only be through bilateral negotiations 
between concerned States. 
The 1968 Agreement between Italy and former SFRY concerning the delimitation of 
the continental shelf between the two Countries includes a provision establishing an 
obligation to cooperate to resolve disputes concerning the exploitation of shared 
resources. Article 2 states: “In case it is ascertained that natural resources of the sea 
bottom or under the sea bottom extend on both sides of the demarcation line of the 
continental shelf with the consequence that the resources of the shelf belonging to one 
of the contracting parties can be in whole or in part exploited from the part of the shelf 
belonging to the other contracting party, the competent authorities of the contracting 
parties will themselves be in contact with one another with the intention of reaching an 
understanding of the manner in which the aforesaid resources shall be exploited 
previous to consultations by the holders of any eventual concessions”.53 A similar 
provision is contained in the 1979 Agreement between Italy and Greece on the 
delimitation of the continental shelf.54 
Article 2 found application in the case of the exploitation of the Annamaria gas field, 
in the Northern Adriatic. This field is straddling the demarcation of the continental shelf 
of Italy and Croatia. With a technical agreement,55 the Governments of both countries 
agreed on the programs of gas exploitation signed between the two leaseholders (ENI, 
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for Italy, an INA, for Croatia);56 however, they have indicated some conditions for 
applying this arrangement. In particular, the yearly gas exploitation programs shall be 
approved by the competent authorities of both Italy and Croatia; any possible 
suspension of activities imposed by the competent authorities of one side shall be shared 
with the other side; the competent authorities of both sides will jointly approve 
measurement systems on both platforms; the competent authorities of both sides will 
periodically verify the functioning of measurement systems on both platforms and 
certify every three months production and withdrawal from both platforms in cross-
examination of ENI and INA. Finally, the two Governments have expected that 
modifications of the allocation of reserves and compensation plans on past production 
shall be approved by the Ministry of Economic Development of the Italian Republic and 
by the Ministry of Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship of the Republic of Croatia, 
each side referencing in its own acts the quantities to be compensated for past years. 
However, Article 2 of the 1968 Agreement establishes a basic cooperation 
mechanism, as the Annamaria gas field case shows; success in bilateral cooperation is 
based, de facto, on an arrangement between companies that have exploitation licenses 
for that deposit. 
Rather, it must be emphasized that, in practice, the bilateral agreements between 
States that have the same problem of shared resources in the Persian Gulf, the North 
Sea, the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico lay down rules more detailed which will 
condition the conclusion of an agreement between the companies that have exploitation 
licenses. 
In particular, the US-Mexixo Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, signed in 
2012, facilitates the formation of voluntary arrangements – “unitization agreements” – 
between U.S. leaseholders and Petróleos Mexicanos for the joint exploration and 
development of transboundary reservoirs. It also provides appropriate incentives to 
encourage the formation of such arrangements if a reservoir is proven to be 
transboundary and a unitization agreement is not formed. The agreement also provides 
that development may proceed in an equitable manner that protects each nation’s 
interests. Finally, the agreement provides for ongoing cooperation between the two 
Governments related to safety and the environment, and also provides for joint 
inspection teams to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Both 
Governments will review and approve all unitization agreements governing the 
exploration and development of transboundary reservoirs under the agreement, 
providing for approval of all safety and environmental measures.  
The US-Mexico Agreement “can potentially generate the same normative impact as 
the 1945 Truman proclamation on the continental shelf”;57 and it can certainly be an 
applicable model in Adriatic and Ionian region. 
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 M. H. Loja, ‘Who Owns the Oil that Traverses a Boundary on the Continental shelf in an Enclosed Sea? Seeking 
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SUMMARY: 1. The formation of the inter-Adriatic “economic system” in which Venice long wielded an 
undisputed primacy. – 2. The geopolitical role of the Ionian and Adriatic seas in the Great Napoleonic 
Empire. – 3. The formation of the nation in Giuseppe Mazzini’s Lettere slave. 
 
 
1. The formation of the inter-Adriatic “economic system” in which Venice long 
wielded an undisputed primacy 
 
“After such long and bitter wars, Venice finally found herself in harmony with the 
Turks, and in friendly correspondence with all Princes, and with all nations. The Lady 
of Istria and Dalmatia, Queen of Cyprus and Candia, she dictated laws from the Soča to 
the Adda, from the Alps to the Metauro. Within this period of peace she however 
maintained a flourishing trade”.1 These are the words used by Vittorio Barzoni in his 
work Rivoluzioni della Repubblica veneta, when describing the conditions of the 
Venetian Republic on the eve of the formation of the League of Cambrai promoted by 
Pope Julius II in the anti-Venetian function. The centuries-old tradition of trade between 
the coastal towns of both shores of the Ionian and Adriatic Seas had in fact created a 
dense network of commercial relations, an original “economic system”, in which 
Venice had always played a dominant role.2 With the Kingdom of Naples Venice 
boasted a long tradition of business relations, which dated back to the origins of the 
Kingdom itself, having been established during the Swabian, Angevin and Aragonese 
period.3 In the coastal towns of Abruzzo (Lanciano and Vasto), Apulia (Termoli, 
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 V. Barzoni, ‘Rivoluzioni della Repubblica veneta’ in Ibid, I Romani nella Grecia e altri scritti antinapoleonici (G. 
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adriatico del Regno nell’ultimo quarto del secolo XV: Trani, 1484-1488’, (1981) XCIX Archivio Storico per le 
Province Napoletane 221; A. Leone, ‘Caratteri dell’economia mercantile pugliese’ in A. Leone, Mezzogiorno e 
Mediterraneo. Credito e mercato internazionale nel secolo XV, (Edizioni Athena, 1988) 83-105; M. Popovic-
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Barletta and Trani) and southern Calabria (Crotone) there came to be in fact a large 
number of Venetian merchants, who founded colonies ruled by consuls under the 
jurisdiction of the Republic.4 In 1475, the consul Filippo Severino, who was appointed 
head of the Venetian natio active in Crotone, was the guarantor of the deals made by his 
countrymen in Calabria.5 The heavy defeat suffered by the Venetian Republic at 
Agnadello (14 May 1509) seemed to put an end to the unequal “economic system”, but 
the recovery of lost territories and the Bologna Declaration of 1529 meant that Venice, 
by regaining her maritime dominance in her Gulf, could regain again in a short time a 
propulsive function in the movement of commercial traffic.6 It is important to note that 
the coastal towns of Apulia and Abruzzo enjoyed in that period a renewed phase of 
economic vitality, thanks to a policy to revitalize the export of the excess agricultural 
products directed towards the Adriatic markets of central and northern Italy, but also to 
those of East Adriatic coast.7 Although the military ambitions of Venice had changed, 
the Dominant continued to exert a direct control on Istria, Dalmatia and Albania, which 
also acted as strategic bases of support for the maritime convoys headed out of the Gulf 
to the Levant and to the West, and a form of indirect supervision of the ports in south-
central Italy, essentially not involved in the big traffic in the Mediterranean, through the 
renewal of bilateral agreements and through a mercantilist policy based on a favourable 
customs regime towards her partners, the adoption of a series of measures to reduce the 
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tax burden (the composite rate, for example, facilitated the import-export of goods by 
Lee-side).8 Prompted by demand and supported by the customs measures taken by 
Venice, the Italian ports and piers of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas then became the 
protagonists of a considerable coastal trade, which, practiced mainly on small boats 
(tartans, marcilianas, luggers, and feluccas), constituted a significant share of the 
commercial movement of the Republic.9 The ports of the Kingdom of Naples that were 
stationed along the Tronto at intervals down to Crotone, served as inland or limited 
terminals, such as those of Abruzzo, because of the physical conformation of the 
territory and the lack of modern road conditions. Some of the particularly large ports in 
Apulia were specialized in the export of certain goods, supplying the Venetian market 
with agricultural products (wheat, oil, wine, saffron, almonds and dried fruit) and 
natural products (salt and sulphur), but also with wool, skins, raw silk, animals, in 
exchange for manufactured goods (fabrics in wool, silk, linen and cotton), crude iron, 
hardware, glassworks, paper and book.10 The dysfunctions of the Venetian “leeward 
transit”, which by law conveyed all goods (“tutte le robbe”) from abroad (mainly from 
Germany) and production canters on the mainland to the Venetian market only; the 
failed attempt to move the goods terminal and the customs office of “leeward transit” to 
Chioggia; the heavy financial losses arising from the continued existence of the system 
of privileges enjoyed by the Adriatic canters of the West, while those of Levant were 
subject to much more demanding duty charges, and above all the strong circumvention 
of measures were all elements that led to an increased competition in the circuits of 
inter-Adriatic trade, which was moreover supported by the smuggling, and a marked 
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diversion of trajectories and the movement of traffic.11 It was in this new context and 
under the relentless Ottoman advance that the first signs of crisis in Venetian dominance 
of the Adriatic began to be glimpsed. Other factors which contributed to this slow 
decline were the war against the fugitives (uscocchi) and the growing pressure exerted 
by the Habsburgs by demanding discussions on the issue of freedom of navigation 
thereby calling the maritime primacy of Venice into question. It was in this context that 
the conditions ripened for the setting on motion of an “integrated market system” that 
would allow the main Adriatic ports to free themselves from the conditioning rule of 
Venice while continuing to interact in its trading business. Taking advantage of the 
difficult political and economic moment that the Dominant was passing through, the 
coastal canters of both shores of the Adriatic Sea proposed, in short, to establish 
themselves as prime actors in Venetian trade and not mere ‘silent partners’ any longer.12 
The contemporary documentary sources (cadastral, notarial deeds), albeit in a 
fragmentary way, confirm the increase in the volume of trade between the two shores of 
the Adriatic Sea, also evidenced by the massive presence in the main Italian maritime 
canters of the middle and lower Adriatic Coast of the Dalmatian, Ragusan, Albanian, 
Greek and Slav merchants alongside of merchants from Lombardy, Venice, Florence, 
Lucca and especially from Genoa.13 This increase in the commercial dynamism of the 
Adriatic ports of the Kingdom helped in the realization of the plan for the construction 
of defensive coastal towers completed in 1569. From the report prepared in the last 
decade of the 16th century by the Marquis of Celenza, Carlo Gambacorta, governor of 
Abruzzo and Capitanata, we learn that in those years stocks of goods and warehouses 
were built or expanded at the expense of local and foreign merchants as well as of the 
universities; numerous places of sale, taverns and inns were opened and temporary 
shelters for seasonal workers were  erected.14 It is interesting to note, moreover, that 
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before the construction of the Spanish defense system numerous docks for the loading, 
unloading and storage of goods were actually mobile so that at the first sign of a 
Turkish incursion these locations were abandoned.  With the construction of the coastal 
towers the merchants felt assured of safer landing piers, and they promoted the 
construction of a modern port system, which facilitated the expansion of trade, the 
increase in the transit of vessels and the influx of a growing number of traders, 
personnel employed in various capacities in the commercial activities of import and 
export, and workers (caulkers, carpenters and shipwrights) who, coming from the 
Venetian lagoon (Chioggia and Burano), from Ravenna and Ferrara (Comacchio), were 
specialized in the construction, repair and maintenance of vessels of small tonnage. 
Venetian and Ragusean workers were employed in the shipyard of Giulia, that in the 
mid-1570s was in full swing as was the dock located at the mouth of the Vomano, 
which the Acquaviva family of Atri had provided with warehouses that had an 
improved storage capacity. Venetian shipwrights and carpenters, Dalmatian carpenters 
from Šibenik, experts in the construction of ship hulls, worked in the shipyards of Vasto 
and Ortona.15 As for the increase in traffic between the ports of the Kingdom and the 
Adriatic Sea, it must be remembered that the Acquavivas exported large quantities of 
wine and oil and supplied wheat to the towns of Ascoli and Fermo. At regular intervals 
large quantities of ‘worked and prepared’ timber were  dispatched to the shipyards of 
Chioggia and Ragusa for the construction of ships.16 Abruzzo, for the richness of its 
forest cover supplied other Adriatic ports with timber and boards for the planking of the 
boats. In the second half of the 16th century, Cesenatico and Rimini bought huge loads 
of very robust logs to be used in the construction of the piles of their basins. In 1589 the 
town of Rimini bought 8,000 trees from the University of Lanciano. The trees were 
from the Sant’Apollinare forest which was owned by the city of Lanciano.17 The 
existence of a circular system of exchange of people and goods is confirmed by the 
Libri delle contumacie, recently the object of an interesting study by Marco Moroni. 
The Libri that do not record all port movements, report the number of boats and ships 
that docked in the port of Ancona in the first half of the 17th century, their types and 
their origin. The number of dockings reached its highest point in 1633 when there were 
308 ships that docked in Ancona. From the 1640s onward the ship traffic that arrived in 
the port of the Marche diminished; from 186 units in 1644 it declined to 94 ships 
registered in 1649. The economic crisis and the epidemic that hit the city in the fifties 
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caused a further decline of the port movement. Surprisingly the largest number of 
registered vessels was coming from the small ports of Pescara and Termoli.18 The port 
of Abruzzo had become important for the export of a wide range of goods (wine, oil, 
ceramics and leather). From Termoli, instead came large loads of firewood. From the 
ports of Apulia came various goods. From Barletta, goods produced in the vast 
hinterland that stretched from northern Murgia until Melfese and Vulture, were shipped 
large quantities of grain and large loads of salt, transported on Ragusan ships.19 From 
Bari, where the port could count on a diversified agricultural hinterland that produced a 
wide variety of goods including wheat and other high value commodities such as oil, 
wine, vegetables, meat and dairy products. The routes of the ships that sailed from Bari 
were the result of intense negotiations between merchants from Venice, Lombardy and 
Florence and local producers.20 It is said that the system of inter-Adriatic trade relied on 
ships of small tonnage, which with their shallow draught were able to approach the very 
low lying landing docks of the Adriatic Sea. The advantages of boats of this type, also 
used for long distance commerce, were multiple. Not only the construction costs were 
lower than those of ships of greater tonnage, which belonged to the navies of Venice 
and Ragusa and the Atlantic powers (Dutch, English and French) that were increasingly 
present in the Adriatic Sea, but also operating costs were lower, given that their crew 
consisted of a few sailors; furthermore, their flow capacity was considerable and also 
the loading and disembarking operations were faster.21 The Libri delle contumacie also 
provides about the owners of the boats. The number of owners from Bisceglie, Brindisi, 
Molfetta and Bari was now higher, confirming the new commercial classes and ship-
owners and the changes in the economic hierarchy of the maritime cities of Apulia, 
where Trani now occupied a secondary role. The trade activity reported testifies to the 
fact that the goods exported from the ports of the Kingdom on the Adriatic Sea were 
typical of Mediterranean agriculture: wheat, oil, wine, wool, rice, barley, legumes, nuts, 
saffron, salt, vinegar, skins, salted meat and cheese.22 The increased demand for oil 
continued to come from the markets of Venice and Ferrara. At the end of the 16th 
century, the Venetian importation of oil from Puglia increased to about 100 thousand 
hectolitres, of which one half was placed on the market in the hinterland of the Po and 
in Germany, France and England, while the other half was used for lighting, soap 
factories, as a wool fabric softener and for lubricating machinery. Until the end of the 
18th century oil was the main item imported by Venice from the Kingdom; but the 
monopoly of Venice was threatened by the massive haemorrhage of cash money needed 
to purchase the product and by the imposition of heavy duties on imports, as well by the 
difficulties related to the supply of Castilian wool and by the strong English 
competition, which took control of the exportation of the oil produced in the Terra 
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d’Otranto and embarked from the port of Gallipoli.23 The strong commercial 
momentum in the Ionian port had positive effects on the entire economy of Salento. 
Through English mediation, oil production, both peasant and that of the large baronial 
companies, then entered into an international commercial circuit, whose route, despite 
having London as terminal, touched the Tyrrhenian ports of Naples and Livorno.24 In 
the Terra di Bari commercial traffic of olive oil preserved instead an essentially Adriatic 
physiognomy because of the emergence of a class of local autonomous operators, 
although the price of oil on the market of Molfetta, after having reached 19 ducats per 
salma, went down to 12 ducats during the war of Candia.25 Despite the rationing and tax 
constraints, grain remained among the main export items of the Adriatic regions of the 
Kingdom both for its good quality and for the efficient storage and conservation system 
used to export it. Wheat, closed in sacks, was placed in “ditches” that served as 
underground; it was then covered with salt, clay and stones to protect it from alteration 
and it was guarded by public officials. The storage system also ensured a rapid 
embarkation, since the “ditches” were dug in dry soils not far from docks. Barletta was 
the port of the Kingdom which was most specialized in the trade of grains and in the 
thirty years from 1639 to 1668 around 6 million of tomoli of wheat were exported from 
Barletta with an average of 200 thousand tomoli per year. Manfredonia also played an 
important role in the export of large quantities of grain to Venice and Ragusa.26 While 
the owners of the ships were Genoeses or Neapolitans confirming the interest that 
operators from Liguria and Naples had for the Adriatic commercial trade, the 
monitoring of freight and the insurance market was instead concentrated in the hands of 
Ragusean merchants and agents.27 The surplus grain from the vast feudal complex of 
the Di Capua family was exported from the ports of Termoli and Fortore to various 
Adriatic ports.28 Not less relevant for the economic-mercantile system of the Adriatic 
Sea was the salt trade. The salterns of Barletta supplied almost all of the countries 
whose markets gravitated on the Adriatic Sea. Once again, it was thanks to Venice that 
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the salt from Barletta became one of the most widely distributed goods in inter-Adriatic 
trade. The monopoly enjoyed by the Dalmatian salterns of Pag (district of Zadar), Split 
and Istria was challenged when Venice set up a salt market that was governed by a set 
of rules that would ensure the growing prosperity of the sector. Considerable tax 
revenues began to flow into Venetian treasury coffers while the economy of Dalmatia 
and Istria suffered from the change.29 Although Ragusa possessed its own salterns it 
acquired large lots of salt from Barletta. Similarly the Papal States obtained supplies of 
salt from Barletta, delivered to the port of Ancona which became the main supply canter 
of the Papal States.30 The salt of Barletta was also exported in large quantities to the 
canters on the Croatian coast from where it was then sold in the Bosnian and Serbian 
hinterlands and in Trieste, where the salt trade became a strong point of the city 
economy.31 The wool trade, which reached its peak in the late 16th century, instead, 
suffered a sharp contraction when the production canters of Veneto and Lombardy 
entered a terrible crisis with no way out.32 Another characteristic feature of the “Adriatic 
system” was the increase in cash flow and the number of currencies, due to the increase 
in commercial transactions. Alongside of the Spanish currency (the real de a ocho) and 
the Venetian scudo, Ragusa issued its silver grosso; this coinage, however, was 
repeatedly suspended by the government of Ragusa due to the high price of silver on the 
international market. There is no doubt that the creation of its own currency, and the 
obligation that foreign merchants active on the Ragusan market change their money 
with the local currency were the basis for the economic momentum of the small 
Republic, which not only took advantage of the robust merchant relationships with 
Italian ports, but also played an important role in the transit and distribution of goods to 
and from the neighbouring Turkish provinces.33 Nor should we ignore the role played 
by operators of Ragusa in the field of marine insurance. The main Adriatic routes were 
in fact almost all covered by insurance from Ragusa. The route that was most insured 
was Ragusa – Ancona.34  
We have attempted here to focus attention on just some of the many aspects of this 
complex “integrated maritime system” that was founded by the countries and the main 
Adriatic ports in the first centuries of the modern age, and that remained until the 18th 
century. But, it must also be stressed that in the early 18th century the Adriatic Sea was 
not a maritime area under the hegemony of Venice. The geopolitical picture had 
changed. The Venetian sphere of influence was dwindling and inter-Adriatic trade area, 
despite the emergence of new players (the Austrian monarchy had become a great 
European power and in 1719 during the reign of Charles VI had obtained Trieste which 
it maintained as a duty free port) had been reduced to a “provincial” or secondary space 
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in comparison with the great volume of trade then flowing from the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean.35 The very geography of the Adriatic Sea seemed to have been 
diminished into a small and tight angle. However, the Adriatic was not relegated to 
oblivion nor did the distorting tradition that saw the Adriatic as the sea from which 
enemies arrived to plunder and devastate endure for long. The Adriatic was no mere 
theatre for the long war between the Ottoman Porte and the Catholic powers. It was 
instead a crucial space for trade encounters and relations despite the decline of Venice.  
 
 
2. The geopolitical role of the Ionian and Adriatic seas in the Great Napoleonic 
Empire  
 
The Adriatic Sea was a space of communication among peoples, of political 
complicity, cross alliances and of considerable geopolitical significance, as soon 
became obvious to Napoleon.36 If you glance over the pages of the Memoriale di 
Sant’Elena dedicated to the “beautiful theatre of Italy” you can see what strategic role 
the emperor had assigned to the peninsula because of its international geopolitical 
configuration, particularly in the arena of the Mediterranean.37 It is known that the 
Napoleonic expansionism was based on two intersecting trajectories: the first aimed at 
the consolidation of the landmass under French rule; the second aimed at strengthening 
the fleet and contending for English supremacy on the seas.38 Napoleon, therefore, 
turned up on the international political scene not as a pure theorist of the land/sea 
opposition, or of the conflict between the continental powers and maritime powers, but 
as a supporter of continentalist theories, that he however combined at the same time 
with a maritime strategy, aimed at naval superiority, which was useful for the conquest 
of the seas.39 It is in this context that the occupation of the Maltese archipelago and the 
expedition to Egypt can be understood, as a kind of exportation of the Anglo-French 
conflict to the seas and the lands of the East.40 The development of the Mediterranean 
configuration of Napoleon, whose modern geopolitical vision placed great emphasis on 
naval bases and on their geographical and strategic location, identified its main 
stanchions in the port of Livorno and in those of Corsica to control the Tyrrhenian Sea; 
the ports in Malta and in the archipelago to insure hegemony in the heart of the 
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Mediterranean; and, finally, in the ports of Ancona and Corfu and in those of the other 
islands of Ionian Eptanese for control of the Adriatic Sea and the Balkans.41 The 
ratification of the Treaty of Tilsit (7 July 1807), formalizing the renunciation by Russia 
of the strategically situated Adriatic-Ionian islands, which were ceded to France, 
consolidated the French presence in the Adriatic and opened the Balkans to Napoleonic 
influence. Just two years later, in fact, with the Treaty of Schönbrunn (14 October 1809) 
Napoleon founded the Illyrian Provinces, which included Dalmatia, Istria, Ragusa and 
the Bay of Kotor, Carinthia and Croatia.42 This is not the place to retrace the continuous 
territorial adjustments carried out by Napoleon with the intention of giving the Ionian-
Adriatic space a disposition towards greater equilibrium and a more complete 
submission to his policy, the exigencies of his wars and of the economic blockade. 
What matters here is to focus on the fact that the strategy followed by England, which 
aimed to reduce the vast maritime front of the war to a manageable size by dividing it 
into several sections, proved successful precisely in the Adriatic Sea. And it is 
significant that England, that emerged victorious from the militarily and economical 
conflict in which she opposed Napoleon, entrusted the de facto control of the northern 
Adriatic Sea to Austria, making sure, however, that the domain on the middle and lower 
Adriatic Sea and the Ionian Sea remained under British influence. According to the 
Treaties of Vienna, in fact, Corfu and the Ionian Islands formed an independent state, 
under the British protectorate, which lasted nearly fifty years.43  
 
 
3. The formation of the nation in Giuseppe Mazzini’s Lettere slave 
 
The disintegration of the Great Napoleonic Empire and the preponderance of Austria, 
with its direct and indirect holdings in the Italian peninsula and on the Adriatic-Balkan 
chessboard, favoured the spread of nationalist sentiment on both sides of the Adriatic 
Sea. The attention given by Mazzini to the idea of nation, and its centrality to his 
ideology is well known. Mazzini identified an inseparable bond between the principle of 
nationality and the aspiration to unity that led to the independence of the European 
peoples. For Mazzini every sovereign nation had the right, in the context of the “Spring 
of Nations”, to its existence, thus it had the right to its own natural resources, its own 
physical and spatial dimension, population and historical tradition. In assessing the 
importance of movements of the Slavs in the Austrian domains and territories subject to 
Ottoman rule, Mazzini advocated the dissolution of the two empires, and turned his 
gaze to the “Slavic question” as a whole, without circumscribing the issue of the 
Southern Slavs.44 Mazzini’s positions were expressed in the Lettere slave that appeared 
in the Genoese periodical “L’Italia del Popolo”, in a series of articles published between 
15 and 22 June 1857, after the founding of the Pan-Slav Committee, created to relaunch 
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the political agreement between Russia and the Slavic countries of Central Europe and 
the Balkans.45 The Lettere slave were not the first evidence of the Genoese agitator’s 
interest for the “Slavonic question”; Mazzini had dwelt in some of his earlier writings 
on this question and the Lettere slave were actually the result of extensive reworking of 
an earlier essay On the Slavonian National Movement which appeared, in 1847, in the 
“Lowe’s Edinburgh Magazine”. For the Southern Slavs, which he considered one of the 
four major groups of Slavic family together with the Poles, Russians and Czechs, 
Mazzini envisaged the formation of a political unity under an administrative federation, 
which would include Serbs, Montenegrins, Croats and Bulgarians. Mazzini placed a 
particular emphasis on the anomaly of the Habsburg Empire, in which the small 
German minority held political control over the entire country, crushing or relegating to 
a subordinate political position the majority of the population that was of Slavic origin. 
Nevertheless, the Slavic peoples of the Austrian Empire had become aware of their state 
and aspired to achieve independence and unity. In Mazzini’s view the internal situation 
of the Turkish Empire was no different to that of the Habsburg Empire. In the area of 
European Turkey an army of 100 thousand men oppressed over 15 million people. The 
determining factor in creating this anomaly in both Empires had been the policy of 
divide et impera adopted by both states. However, the emancipation of Montenegro, the 
independence of Greece, the struggle supported by Serbia for more than two decades 
from 1804 to 1829, the recognition of its independence, the autonomy obtained by 
Moldo-Vlachs and the powerful “breath of freedom” which blew among the Slavs of 
Bosnia and the Bulgarians were clear signs of the impending breakup of the Turkish 
empire on the Balkan Peninsula, and the collapse of that empire would raise the 
concerns of the Slavs gathered in the Austrian Empire.46 Mazzini was fascinated by the 
political movements of the great Illyria, which tended to form one big Balkan state and 
by the revival of national consciousness in the Southern Slavs to which Ljudevit Gaj 
had made a decisive contribution. What affected Mazzini the most was the prophetic-
religious value of the national poetry, its significance in the formation of consciousness 
of national identity. It was the movement for the recovery of the literary production of 
the past, popular songs, the pjesmas, ethnic traditions, customs, habits and language 
systems, implemented by Croatian, Serbian, Dalmatian and Montenegrin intellectuals 
that gave impetus to the formation of national consciousness.47 It should be 
remembered, however, that the sense of ethical-political solidarity, manifested by 
Mazzini for the Slavic peoples, was for him never separated from the “Italian question”, 
the idea of national unity seen as “moral need and spiritual reality”, by the civilizing 
mission entrusted by God to Italy, which should have been the natural ally of other 
nations then emerging from the struggle against the tyranny of the European powers. In 
the spring of 1871, just a year before his death, Mazzini published in “Roma del 
Popolo” an article entitled Politica Internazionale, in which he wanted to give his 
“political testament”. The prophet of the new Italy returned to considerations of the 
Moral Law, which he believed should be the guiding principle of Italian politics, and 
once again  contemplated the idea of the nation, “New Era soul”, and emphasized the 
need to forge a “strong alliance with the Slavic family”.48 The New Era that Mazzini 
wished for Italy  was configured a new foreign policy that saw the Adriatic Sea as the 
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logistic base for the Italian support of the Slavs of the south and a strengthening of 
fraternal ties between the countries, promoting the ratification of profitable commercial 
treaties; Mazzini, in short, wished to be the theorist of an international policy of peace.49 
In the following years, Italy, shook off the influence of the French and was admitted 
among the great powers but was overwhelmed by the “vortex of the contrasts between 
European states over the division of the world”, and disregarded the invitation of 
Mazzini. This did not mean, however, that the idea of Mazzini, who looked to 
independence, unity, brotherhood and freedom of the people, had lost its powerful 
ethical charge and its strong capacity for modernity: values, these, which were the basis 
of national aspirations for independence both for Italy as well as for the Balkan 
peoples.50 
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THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE: 
COMMERCIAL AUTONOMY AND LAW POLITICS AS AN IDENTITY-MAKING SPACE 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. De facto legitimacy. – 2. The Venetian legal system. – 3. Domination tools: law and 
politics. – 4. Towards maritime coding: the twilight of the Gulf's identity. – 4.1. The merchant navy 
code. 
 
 
1. De facto legitimacy 
 
Almost twenty years ago, the records of a convention dedicated to the Homo 
adriaticus, held in the Marche region were issued. As Alberto Tenenti pointed out at the 
time,1 cultural identity and self-consciousness through the centuries being the 
convention's subject matter, one should have looked for what united rather than what 
divided the opinion. From this point of view, the dominant role of the Republic of 
Venice was decisive.  
Following this suggestion, what we wish to do in these few pages is try to identify 
identification features of the Venetian law that could give us clues about modern 
circumstances, a free walk down a road that might be resumed. This is because we 
believe that, in order to imagine governance tools of the Adriatic-Ionian macro-region, 
one cannot ignore a conscious reconstruction of the historical founding elements of 
what can be symbolically seen as a sort of background. We, in fact, owe the identity 
representation of a common geographic space in our area of reference more to a past 
matrix (not even swept away by the tragedies of the Twentieth century) than to present 
needs.2 
In what the lagoon city called “the Gulf of Venice”, at least until the Eighteenth 
century, the regulation of commercial transactions and the maritime movement of goods 
united the coast people on the Adriatic Sea, although they did not lead to a 
standardisation. The Venetian jurisdiction over the Adriatic Sea was different from the 
others by virtue of its exceptional continuity and duration. 
Born from the median and intermediary role of Venice towards the Byzantine 
Empire, and then developed between the East and the West through the Mediterranean, 
its hegemony can be traced back to the Eleventh century. It was not, however, founded 
on any formal act of recognition, neither from the ecclesiastical power nor from the 
Byzantine government or the Western Empire. It was the heir of the Byzantine conquest 
of the West and joined its homeland defence right to the Byzantine maritime line, “the 
first, only and true essential feature of the undisputed control on the Adriatic”. This was 
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due to the spontaneous continuity with the luck of Constantinople, which kept ruling on 
the Eastern area.3 
The situation was supported, de facto, by military politics and economic pressure:  
 
“The system in question requires non-Venetian armed ships not to enter or travel 
through the Adriatic and sets rules and limits for merchant ships; it obligates ships 
carrying certain goods to use Venice as a port of call, report the cargo and the 
place of destination, pay customs duties, mooring and entry and exit duties, have 
transport and transit licenses and not change the route reported; ships and goods 
will be confiscated in case of violation and smuggling. The lagoon Republic will 
also be in charge of maritime police operations in the ‘Gulf’. Providing 
‘protection’ for sailing people, the ‘freedom of the sea’ and coastal areas involved 
considerable financial and material efforts, for which Venice demanded a 
‘contribution’: to varying degrees, Adriatic cities were subject to expensive taxes. 
In the second half of the Thirteenth century, a ‘Gulf squad’ was established and its 
tasks included, among other things, the suppression of smuggling and piracy (two 
particularly widespread plagues in the Adriatic)”.4 
 
Inter-harbour activities were not completely forbidden. Stopovers and cargo loading 
were allowed and there were numerous exceptions. Goods could not be unloaded, 
because commercial transactions had to take place at the wholesale market of Rialto, in 
Venice. In this context, when smuggling and piracy occurred, Venice also took care of 
eliminating these two plagues.5  
Historically, the point was to preserve the mediation role and control the economy of 
the entire area; today, the tools we are looking for must aim to maintain a functional 
space for trade and exchanges and protect peace, not only on an instrumental level, but 
also as an ideal that, according to us, cannot be overlooked. 
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth centuries were moments of expansion for the lagoon, 
which controlled the Po valley hinterland and, consequently, the routes leading to 
Central and Eastern Europe (i.e. river traffic, as on the coast of northern Adriatic 
through direct domination on Friuli). However, the defeat of Julius II and his League of 
Cambrai (1509-1516), the Turks arriving from Albania through the Balkans, the new 
trade centre shifting to the Atlantic after the discovery of America inaugurated a 
difficult period for the Venetian jurisdiction over “its” Gulf.6 On the one hand, the ban 
and excommunication of Julius II set a precedent, whereas there was insisting pressure 
from the Hapsburg Empire for free navigation in the “Gulf”. In Trieste, in particular, 
goods dispatched to internal Hapsburg territories were handled and sorted and the 
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territories themselves, in turn, wanted access to the sea to facilitate the export of their 
products (minerals extracted from Styria and Carinthia).  
The conflict with Imperial Austria broke out when it expanded to Trieste and Segna 
from the eastern lagoon border, where it had started in the first half of the Sixteenth 
century The Archduke supporters demanded freedom of navigation for merchant and 
war ships, whereas the Venetians claimed their prescribed right of jurisdiction. In 
addition to that, of Friuli, various conferences were held to discuss the navigation 
problem7. The legal and political conflict was basically characterised by the contrast 
between the sea protection principle (in Venice's opinion, a jurisdiction foundation) and 
the future sea freedom natural-law principle supported by Austria8. The conflict insisted 
on a particularly delicate political-military situation for Venice, which, “although [...] 
maintaining its dominion over the Eastern coast [...], was seriously threatened and 
burdened not only by the general weakening of its position in the Mediterranean and the 
Aegean seas, but also by the immediate pressure of the opposed forces moving directly 
towards the Adriatic. The Austro-ducal threat descended from the North, whereas the 
Hispanic one came up from the South; the Turks were expanding more and more 
strongly from the East and, on the Western coast, the papal problem gave no respite”.9 
At the beginning of the Eighteenth century, Emperor Charles VI of Austria 
proclaimed freedom of navigation and, de facto, put an end to the Venetian 
domination.10 
This is why, after the decline of Charles V, the Venetian politics was forced to 
choose between cooperation with allied European powers. It chose a neutral role and 
left the leadership enjoyed so far in the control of the Adriatic military defence.  
The economic picture was influenced by the new global balance that heavily 
transformed the exchange movement and the behaviour of foreign markets.11 The 
powerful “governance” tool that had represented the long-standing power and prestige 
of “La Serenissima” was crumbling. That prestige that derived not only from its actual 
strength, but was also a result of the adaptation of its administration to the Adriatic 
environment and its order requirements focused on business development before land 
expansion. This was the direction chosen by the Lagoon's major regulatory policies, 
which, by virtue of their “effectiveness”, were able to guide and influence the actions of 
the other Adriatic coastal towns. 
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2. The Venetian legal system 
 
The cultural and legal identity of the Republic was of medieval origin and had 
basically crossed the modern era almost unvaried until it reached the contemporary age. 
Autonomy, the aristocratic republican government, the presence of the Podestà as the 
“State's” visibility element had gravitated towards the Lagoon's “commercial spirit” for 
years. A commercial spirit that constituted the concrete unifying pillar around which 
relations, primarily intertwined in coastal populations. A network of relations focused 
on arbitrium iudicis and equity, which we can assume went beyond “the Gulf” in the 
influence that “sea people” had on each other. 
Somehow, the conclusion of the Republic came exactly when the reforms that would 
respond to the system's backwardness, especially the economic ones, stopped being 
implemented even though governors and citizens from Venice, Istria and Dalmatia 
demanded them. The space left to the individual and private merchant “genius” was no 
longer adequate.12 
The State-forming push of the Sixteenth century had a special impact on Venice. It 
did not affect the institutional balance guaranteed by the “substantial continuity of 
aristocratic values, which, in that society, were placed at the top”. It supported the 
economic and social changes through the use of the “great courts of the dominant 
centre”13 made by emerging social forces. Thus, in the Eighteenth century, a substantial 
line of neutrality towards European borders and the preservation of internal, 
institutional and social structures were maintained. There were also attempts towards 
enlightened absolutism. Compared to the War of Austrian Succession (1742), the 
problems were but a few. In fact, Austria used to tolerate some piracy from Segna ships, 
but complained that “La Serenissima” had the same attitude towards the Neapolitan and 
Spanish ships in the Adriatic. “La Serenissima”, in the end, had to allow Austrian troops 
to travel towards Mantua and Austrian war cargoes to be sent to the port of Trieste14. 
Minor accidents occurred with French stops of Venetian ships suspected of smuggling. 
Some complications were brought by closed borders and health surveillance during the 
1742 plague in Hungary and the 1743 plague in Messina.15 
Territory conquest and the dominion over their “Gulf” had, in fact, brought 
Venetians to adopt the typical flexibility and adaptability of ancient regime systems. 
The Adriatic one had been a “dominium” in the medieval sense of the term. Its purpose 
was mercantile and commercial profit, not territorial expansion in itself. Napoleon's 
arrival in 1797 marked the end of the ancient splendour and the illusion of its recovery. 
It brought a vision of modernity that had nothing to do with the past and was not 
compatible with it at all. With the Restoration, Venice entered the Kingdom of 
Lombardy-Venetia, thus ending its parabola. A brief moment was dedicated to its 
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participation in the Risorgimento fights and the uprising of 17 March 1848, when 
Venetian patriots rose up and freed Daniele Manin and Niccolò Tommaseo. Austrians 
were expelled and the Republic, headed by a triumvirate, was proclaimed once again, 
but Venice only resisted the Austrian siege of 1849 for four months because of a severe 
outbreak of cholera and famine. Starting from the third war of independence, its story 
followed that of the Kingdom of Italy until World War I. 
The opposition to Austrian centralism was dull but determined in Friuli Venezia 
Giulia. The Resistance was definitely also, because Austrian taxation was very heavy, 
“the tax on consumption duty burdened the Hapsburgs' Italian subjects three times more 
than the Slavic and German subjects of the monarchy”. So, if most taxes were already 
affecting the less rich and the small owners, taxes on customs duties, stamped paper, 
tobacco, powders and nitrites, salt and other goods affected everyone, without 
distinction: the rich landowner, the labourer, the poor colonist.16 This was certainly not 
going in the direction of the traditional centrality of autonomy and maritime trade, but 
all Venetian subjects were also greatly affected by the Austrian Government Decree 
dated 16 April 1839, in accordance with which the city's lands (uncultivated ones for 
grazing first) were assigned to individuals.17 
Marino Berengo saw the turning point for the Venetian countryside,18 i.e. the 
mainland, in this decree, with a much more general meaning and scope. Once again, the 
time had come to unswervingly break with medieval law, its customs, its uses, and its 
realistic ownership concept.19 Venice was entering a completely different era, and there 
would be no turning back. 
 
 
3. Domination tools: law politics 
 
The lagoon city’s law politics followed a precise line ever since its medieval 
beginning. If, for centuries, Venice only had custom practices regulating the relations 
between individuals and civil life, the first written laws were instead issued during the 
first half of the Twelfth century. These concerned public law (on constitutional organs), 
procedural law, inheritance law, criminal law and what interests us most: maritime 
law.20 The development of a statutory corpus, the Statuta of Comune Veneciarum, 
supported by Doge Jacopo Tiepolo, represented a real turning point. It was not a final 
law corpus, although it grew during the modern era, perhaps disorderly and by partly 
leaving maritime Statutes out, but it remained nonetheless the symbolic skeleton of 
Venetian law until the end of the Republic.  
Just as symbolic was the exclusion of Roman or Imperial law from the hierarchy of 
reference sources to be used when the Statutes could not provide adequate solutions. It 
was a political choice, not a technical one, as pointed out by Enrico Besta. Roman law 
was certainly inherited by Venetian jurisprudence, but its formal exclusion was used to 
declare that it would not be accepted anymore. Meanwhile, justice was entrusted to the 
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judge's arbitrium right. Aristocrats (who were becoming the city's ruling class) were 
entrusted with the centrality needed to protect the spirit, the traditions and the interests 
of the Municipality itself.21  
Venetians, whose commercial power was strongly increasing in the Mediterranean, 
tried to expand into Istria and Zadar, Dalmatia. The general idea was that the City 
should not look like it was subject to any power except that of its own laws and 
customs, starting from the lagoon strip.22 «It would also have been possible to recognize 
the same Roman law as ius proprium through a sovereign act of the City; alternatively, 
while issuing its own law corresponding to the City’s needs, Roman law could have 
been recognized as an alternative law to make up for the former's flaws; Venice, 
instead, preferred to ignore it completely» also affirmed the principle of law 
territoriality earlier than the rest of the continent.23 
We are in the middle of the Thirteenth century. The force that would continue to be 
present on a commercial level was, first of all, indisputable and undisputed 
independence and autonomy. Doges expressed the belief that that geographic area 
separate but inexorably joined by the same business, should have “a point of 
aggregation and cohesion around a unitary structure, the law”. It was an ideal principle 
and a founding one in its teleological purpose more than in its actual implementation.  
Even for this, the Sixteenth century saw the need for a reform that would reduce the 
gap between the law of the Dominant and that of the Mainland.24 The solution was, 
once again, strategic. The Signoria reserved the right to approve local Statutes, at least 
where they were modified, but did not formally impose the addition of its own ones in 
the sources. It believed in the functionality and authoritativeness of its Statutes, “[t]he 
Venetian law, therefore, could also be applied within the Domain and there were some 
who wanted to use it, having found some rule particularly suitable for his/her case, not 
only among Venetians with interests in the Mainland. And that was enough for the 
Republic”.25 
As we said, the exclusion of the Roman-imperial law was emblematic. Not using 
what had been considered the supplementary law by definition throughout Europe for 
centuries is one of the most characteristic data and, undoubtedly, the most striking of 
the entire Venetian system. Just as peculiar is the continuity, and what is more a 
peaceful one, guaranteed for nearly a millennium by that choice. The other distinctive 
features are the collegiality of functions and the magistrate character of public bodies, 
which derived from a deep mistrust that essentially forbade the individual nature of 
power. The ius romanorum influenced most of the country's institutions not by the will 
and authority of an emperor regarded as a stranger, but many of the traditions had 
Roman origins and were maintained valid thanks to local people's will.26  
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Venice, in other words, did not change its mind set just because the State had 
expanded hugely, each local territorial problem had a proper solution through “formal 
legislation”; after all, “the Venetian government never required that the Dominant's 
legislation was adopted in case the Statutes of the various subject cities lacked statutory 
or traditional regulations [...] A triumph ... of local judges, who, given the ambiguity of 
the Statute and, later, the fact that Venice renounced the overall imposition of its own 
law as a supplementary tool, had wide discretion on [. ..] two common laws, the Roman 
and the Venetian”.27 
 
 
4. Towards maritime coding: the twilight of the Gulf's identity 
 
Although it may seem otherwise, it is perhaps possible to say that the Venetian legal 
and institutional spirit never changed. The distinctive character of the Venetian system 
can be identified precisely in its legal continuity. Venice, in other words, did not change 
its mind set just because the State was expanding, each local territorial problem received 
adequate solution through “formal legislation”.28  
However, even before the Eighteenth century, the need arose for corpora to be used 
in forensic practice. Summaries of the regulatory material were dedicated to feudal 
jurisdictions and tax claims on the property of feudal lords. The so-called Feudal code 
was written, which behaved as a marked list of Venetian feudal laws until 1780. The 
only codification attempts occurred in civil and criminal law.29 
 
4.1. The merchant navy code 
 
Unlike the Feudal code, the idea of reorganizing the current merchant navy 
legislation was almost accidentally stimulated by the growing crew indiscipline 
phenomenon, already in 1748. The task was entrusted to the most influential courts in 
the field: the Five wise men, who dealt with sea and land trade control, the Directors of 
Armar who investigated on plunders and wrecks of Venetian ships and were natural 
judges during disputes between sailors, captains and co-owners of merchant ships. The 
activity stagnated for a decade and started again in 1760. The task was assigned to a 
Board, which prepared a work plan provided with firm and modern features. 
Private and public maritime law had, of course, to be modified “in order to enrich the 
Venetian law with the experiences acquired abroad, it was necessary to know the other 
States' laws thoroughly: the most famous colbertine collection, the Ordonnance 
touchant the marine du mois d'août 1681, was therefore translated. Local residents were 
asked about the laws of the British navy, without overlooking those of Mediterranean 
ports, especially Pisa. Livorno, Ragusa. The opinions of particularly expert people 
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(captains, ship-owners etc.) were heard. What is more, numerous parts of the Chapters 
of magistrates ruling the Arsenal were extracted, with particular regard to ship building, 
hawsers and sails making etc.”.30 
There was some enthusiasm in the beginning, but works stagnated again for almost a 
decade, until 1768, then a 1775 provision dismissed all the Conferences that had not 
completed their works. On 28 December 1775, a board was formed whose task was to 
draft a Navy code, and this changed the whole course of events. The text should not be a 
simple collection of current laws, coordinated and integrated, but a real law corpus that 
would organize sea legislation: maritime police, duties and obligations of merchants, 
traders and seafarers. 
The project was completed and made available for approval by the Venetian Senate 
already in 1777 and 1778. It was the Venetian Merchant Navy Code. In a very unusual 
way, the whole project was filed in the Records office and made available to all citizens 
who wished to examine and make changes to it.  
The aim was that of giving space to experience and practice on a subject that could not 
conveniently be governed by a theoretical approach only. Legal culture would have 
perhaps adopted the principles developed by Roman schools too deeply. There were 
criticisms on navigation licenses, evaluations, insurances and workers’ wages.  
The Code consisted of a unitary system of private and public law institutions 
according to the old statutory tradition, but with strong modernity criteria. The Code, as 
reported in the promulgation deed of the Five wise men, had to “be universally regarded 
[...] as the only law in all circumstances and transactions listed within it”.31  
This meant that everything opposing it should have been abrogated, but not 
explicitly, the other competing sources governing the cases not provided for by the 
Code. It was implicitly understood that the old legislation, customs, maritime uses and 
court arbitration should have been used. It was the most important moment in the whole 
compiling activity of the Eighteenth century, a code that would survive the Republic 
itself, albeit briefly. It was identified as a symbol of Italy during the Napoleonic era. It 
aroused the interest of various jurists, including Giuseppe Luosi,32 and influenced 
national attempts to prepare trading codes, and then the imperial authorities imposed 
French private maritime codes on the Italian Kingdom, the second book of the Code du 
commerce. After the Congress of Vienna, it was joined in the Kingdom of Lombardy-
Venetia by the Austrian political edict on mercantile navigation, promulgated by Maria 
Theresa in 1774 for to promote the maritime commerce “of our coastline”, the Julian-
Istria-Dalmatian coastline as it stated in the Preamble.33 
From shortly thereafter, the beginning of the clash between Austria and post-
revolutionary France marked the dismemberment of the Venetian mainland territories. 
Then, with the Peace of the Campoformio, Venice and the lagoon were ceded to 
Austria. 
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However, the arrival of the French found a tired patricians and “Venice, moving 
from the sea and trade to create new fortunes in the crops of the land, [lost] his 
invulnerability as a city between east and west off the coast of the continent”.34 
The disappearance of Venice opened in the Adriatic an emptiness that makes 'his' 
Gulf one of conquest space, but when Austria had the dominion of the Adriatic Sea, the 
coastal population began to claim a national and patriotic sentiment. It manifested itself 
strongly during the nineteenth century (with the myth Illyrian). Since 1866 the problem 
of inheritance Venice was blocked. Austria defended its unique sea and its also trades 
with a navy. Italy saw in this sea the symbol of incomplete unitary construction (with 
the “irredentist” claims). Finally, half century later, the First World War to came to 
establish who he was Adriatic Sea. 
 
 
                                               
34
 P. Cabanes, Storia dell’Adriatico (Il Lavoro Editoriale, 2014) 337-378. 
 
FRANCESCO MASTROBERTI 
 
THE ORDINAMENTA AND STATUTA MARIS OF TRANI AND  
“MEDITERRANEAN COMMON LAW” 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. The domain of  the Adriatic Sea. – 2. The law of the Mediterranean Sea: the Ordinamenta 
Maris of Trani. – 3. The Consolato del Mare and the Ordinamenta Maris. 
 
 
1. The domain of  the Adriatic Sea 
 
The history of Adriatic Sea has been long linked to Venice, called “Adriatic Queen”. 
Thanks to the political and military rise of the lagoon city, a distinctive phenomenon 
took place, representing a singular event after Western Roman Empire fall: Adriatic 
basin became a sort of political, economic and military community, whose head, “la 
Serenissima”, imposed its own currency, rules and power.  
The influence of Venetians across whole Adriatic coast to Aegean islands and the 
power of their fleet set that sea the most safe in Mediterranean: that was during an age 
when the conflict against Islamic world made travelling and trading extremely hard. 
Venice, a city of traders and sailors, let trading ports and autonomous and rich cities, 
such as Bari and Trani in Puglia,1 grow all across Adriatic Sea. In this contest, two 
important political and legal research and confrontation branches raised: the domain of 
the sea and the law of the sea. 
The domain of the sea. The issue about taking control over the seas became relevant 
worldwide between Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, because of great geographical 
discoveries, new trade routes openings and large trade companies raised on a global 
scale. There were two main ways of thinking: the first one promoted the concept of 
mare liberum, based on Natural Law; the second one thought to be possible to retain a 
sort of property right over the sea, if it was completely under some Power control. Hugo 
Grotius proposed his idea of the freedom of the seas in some of his best dissertations, 
mare liberum2. Anyway, many authors expressed adverse opinions. We obviously find 
out some Venetians across them, arguing that it was possible to own the seas just as a 
land on legal basis.3 For example, Giulio Pace de Beriga in De dominio maris 
Hadriatici disceptatio4 pushed on saying that the domain over the seas should not have 
been limited to coastal waters, because the range and extension of the occupation should 
have been exclusively depended on the control capability a country was able to get. 
Paolo Sarpi’s attitude was more or less the same,5 as he based Venice power over 
Adriatic Sea on the historical fact of having kept Adriatic safe from pirates, granting it 
prosperity and growth: 
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“Ma mentre io dico che il Dominio del Mare sia naturale a questa Repubblica, 
creato insieme con lei, non voglio intendere, che tutto in un tempo abbia 
acquistata la padronanza di tutto l’Adriatico, perché le forse nel principio non 
erano tante di poterlo custodire e guardare tutto. Ma in progresso di tempo fatti 
gl’Imperadori un’altra volta deboli, cessarono di mandare Armata in Ravenna, ed 
abbandonata quella parte, che è dal fiume di Tronto in qua si ritirarono nella 
Puglia, il che mise in necessità questa Repubblica, la quale era cresciuta anche di 
forze a pigliar custodia più ampia del Mare, e tenerlo netto dà Corsari per 
mantener sicura la navigazione, incominciando dalla Riviera della Marca 
Anconitana, e dal Quarner fino a Venezia: il che le costava ogn’anno molto 
sangue de’ suoi Cittadini. Per lo che siccome si è detto, ch’il Dominio del Mare è 
naturale alla Repubblica, principiato insieme con lei nelle parti prossime a 
quest’inclita Città, così anche insieme si dee dire, che sia amplificato 
successivamente nell’altre parti di esso Mare, che sono abbandonate da quelli, che 
le possedevano prima, e prese in protezione, e custodia dalla Repubblica fin tanto 
ch’ella s’è fatta Padrona di tutto il Golfo, e perché ciò eccede sei centinaja d’anni, 
supera, e già di molto ha superato ogni memoria, sicché è confermato con la 
consuetudine immemorabile”.6 
 
In Sarpi’s opinion, based on “dottrina de’ giureconsulti”, manifested exertions of 
public authority since immemorial times configured a usucaption and totally justified 
Venice sovereignty and domain over Adriatic Sea. Sarpi’s argument is particularly 
interesting because it opposed who supported the doctrine of natural law (especially 
Grotius) by juridical arguments: for Sarpi there was no reason to distinguish the seas 
from the lands or to assimilate the seas to the air and to the light. Anyway, Sarpi 
separated Adriatic Sea condition (admitting of property) from that of the oceans, on 
which it was impossible to dominate: 
 
“Non è pari la controversia trà Spagnuoli e gli olandesi alla Causa delle 
Serenissima Repubblica: prima perché le pretensioni degl’Olandesi non sono 
sopra un Mare serrato, limitato, posseduto e custodito con fatiche, e spesa da 
tempo immemorabile, com’è questo di Venezia; trattano dell’Oceano, che per la 
sua immensità da niuna Potenza umana può essere guardato tutto. Più s’aggiunge, 
che ancora non eccede la memoria degli uomini il principio della navigazione 
degli Spagnuoli già meno di cent’anni principiata; laddove nell’Adriatico il 
Dominio è nato colla Repubblica, e stabilito da consuetudine immemorabile; 
perloché non si ha da fare alcuna comparazione di queste ragioni”.7  
 
 
2. The law of the Mediterranean Sea: the Ordinamenta Maris of Trani 
 
The law of the sea. In this contest, maritime law had a great t relevance.8 It was a 
priority to merchants to rely on an undoubted law, acknowledged by each people across 
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Mediterranean Sea. Did this law exist? Roman Law, a secular, inexhaustible and 
suitable for every legal need source, ruled navigation both in Digesto and in Codex, 
even if (that was a volunteer choice) so not really deep (ancient Greek and Phoenician 
consuetudes were let to rule locally). During the Middle Ages, an important source from 
Roman-Bizantine Law seems to be used, Nomos rodio nauticòn, but from XI century 
particular kinds of sources appeared, geographically diversified.9 It seems that the first 
source of this kind might come from Trani and it might be Ordinamenta et consuetudo 
maris edita per consules civitatis Trani. We necessarily have to be cautious because the 
date of 1063 which appears in the document is dubious and caused many discussions 
across the historians. The historiographical vicissitude of this important collection, 
which remained unknown until 1839, means a lot about the poor attention always 
reserved even to relevant law sources from Southern Italy10. Italian Mezzogiorno and 
Puglia have been a people crossroad and a shape for different populations in centuries, 
especially thanks to their geographical position. Before Norman unification, coastal 
cities, submitted to a soft Byzantium domain, always enjoyed some autonomy, which let 
them develop traffics and trades as far as possible: during the whole Middle Ages, 
“Mezzogiorno” was an “unarmed frontier” against Muslim threat, but that did not affect 
southern people’s will to challenge the sea and its dangers in order to trade. Even before 
Norman unification, towns like Trani and Bari were important trading centres, where a 
consuetude-based maritime law represented the centre of communities’ juridical life. 
Because of these reasons it has to be remarked the need to focus attention on southern 
towns’ law sources (statutes, capitulations, privileges often collected in Libri rossi etc.), 
which were a product of the strong influence and autonomy of Universitates. It is 
necessary to keep away the concept of Norman Unification killing every sort of 
autonomy of Mezzogiorno towns, in order to pursuit the road traced by Francesco 
Calasso in La legislazione statutaria dell’Italia meridionale, where the great historian 
of pugliese law enlightened the importance of towns’ statutes.11 Something seems to 
have been recently changed because there is some new attention on southern 
Universitates sources12. 
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Let us back to Ordinamenta Maris from Trani. In 1507, the volume Statuta terrae 
Appignani was published in Venice. It contained Fermo statutes, documents from marca 
Picena and a not connected document: Ordinamenta et Consuetudo Maris edita per 
consules civitatis. Trani. Al nome delo omnipotente dio Millesimo sexagesimo tertio 
prima indictione. This was republished three times, in 1589, in 1688 and in 1691. No 
one cared about the importance of this document until 1839, when Pardessus, inside 
volume V of his monumental work Collection de lois marittime antérieures au XVIII 
siècle, exalted this source, imposing that to the attention of historians and accepting the 
date of 1063 which appears in the document. It must be the first Italian collection of 
maritime law, preceding Tabula de Amalpha (1131), Costitutum Usus Pisanae civitatis 
(1160-1161), Commentarii super consuetudini bus praeclarae civitatis Bari (1204), 
Statuta Tarretarum di Venezia (1225), Imposicio Officiii Gazarie di Genova (1313), 
Breve Portus Kallaretani (1318), Statuti di Rimini (1334), Capitula consulatus maris 
Messane (1339) and Ancona’s Statuto del Mare (1397). Before Pardessus, Napolitan 
experts on maritime law, from Nicola Fortunato to Michele de Jorio, did not mention 
within their works, and neither Storie, by Gregorio Grimaldi and Pietro Giannone, 
makes any reference to Trani’s statutes. It is a fact that, after Pardessus had published 
this source, a debate on Ordinamenta Maris began, in which their dating had been 
questioned. Sclopis13 postponed the date at 1363, while Volpicella14 supposed they were 
published in Latin at the end of XII century, precisely in 1183. This it is still an 
unsolved issue. Anyway, it seems that a reflection over the publishing in Venice of 
Statuti tranesi in 1507, together with those from Fermo and some documents from 
marca Picena, is needed it has to be remarked that Trani was under Venetian yoke from 
1496 to 1509 and it is probable that the publishing of the collection in Venice might 
have helped in collecting and organizing local sources of maritime law, which was 
something the Dominator thought to be useful in order to unify maritime law. In this 
perspective it should also be seen the second and better Italian edition of Libro del 
Consolato del Mare (Venice, 1539) which, as Spagnesi states, seems “to have 
constituted – thanks to distributing skills of the lagoon city’s publishers – the starting 
point to the further European diffusion”.15 During the first half of the XVI century, 
publishers in Venice aimed to provide ship-owners and sailors with the legal tools in 
order to face maritime ventures safely. On one side, the interest was focused on local 
Statuti; on the other side on Libro del Consolato del Mare, which gets used as general 
law of maritime trade in Mediterranean Sea, since the end of XV century.  
 
 
3. The Consolato del Mare and the Ordinamenta Maris   
 
It seems to be proper to investigate on the spread of Consolato Del Mare16 and on its 
link with local sources, such as Trani statutes, in order to understand how maritime law 
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15
 Spagnesi (n 8) 22. 
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 A. Solmi, Un falso documento relativo al Consolato del mare (Tip. Ditta Dessì, 1912); P. S. Leicht, ‘Consolato del 
mare’, Enciclopedia Italiana, vol 11 (1931); O. Sciolla, Dell’edizione principe del Consolato del mare (Associazione 
Italiana di Diritto Marittimo, 1934); R. Di Tucci, Consuetudini marittime del Medio Evo italiano nella redazione del 
“Libro del Consolato del Mare” (Associazione Italiana di Diritto Marittimo, 1934); C. Giardina, Una traduzione 
italiana del Consolato del mare del 1479 (Società Editrice del Foro Italiano, 1936); M. Chiudano, Il libro del 
Consolato del mare (Unione Tipografica Torinese, 1959); S. Corrieri, Il Consolato del mare: la tradizione giuridico-
marittima del Mediterraneo attraverso un’edizione italiana del 1584 del testo originale catalano del 1484 
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acted between XV and XVI century: that was a politically changing and complex 
period, in a Venice controlled area as Adriatic was.  
Libre de Consolat de Mer’s diffusion is strictly linked to the rise of House of 
Aragon, which extended its influence over the most part of Mediterranean basin 
countries (Castile, Catalonia, Sardinia, Sicily, Kingdom of Naples), between fourteenth 
and fifteenth century. In those years Barcelona, one of the most relevant ports for 
maritime trade, succeeded in imposing its own consuetudes, accepted by all the sailors. 
This was the way Consolato Del Mare born and its contents began being diffused all 
around Europe. As it has been underlined, the formation process of Consolato Del Mare 
and its actual text still remain both an enigma to historians. It is a fact that a first edition 
was published in Barcelona in 1494 and, as we said before, in volgare language in 
Rome, Italy, in 1519. This work circulated across Europe for at least two centuries, 
representing the common law of the people living on the coasts of Mediterranean Sea. 
Here is what Pier Silverio Leicht states about Consolato del Mare: “Il Libre de Consolat 
de Mar è un testo di consuetudini marittime del bacino del Mediterraneo, redatto a 
Barcellona nella seconda metà del sec. XIV. È opera d'un giurista privato, che raccolse 
gli usi formatisi un po’ per volta fra la gente di mare che frequentava i porti di Spagna, 
d'Italia e di Francia. Particolarmente notevole è l'influsso del diritto marittimo italiano, e 
in primo luogo del diritto amalfitano e delle consuetudini di Pisa e di Genova. Il testo è 
scritto in un idioma di tipo catalano. Esso ha grande importanza per la storia del diritto 
marittimo, sia per la vastità delle materie che abbraccia, sia per l'estesa influenza che 
acquistò rapidamente”17  
Giuseppe Lorenzo Maria Casaregi, who attended to the definitive edition of the text, 
published in Florence in 1719 (reprinted in Lucca in 1720, in Venice in 1737, in 
Livorno in 1738, in Venice in 1802 and in Turin in 1911), made some reference to 17 
collections enacted in Rome, Acri, Majorca, Pisa, Marseilles, Almeira, Genoa, Brandi, 
Rhodes, Morea, Costantinopoli (3), Alamania, Messina, Paris and Majorca between 
1075 and 1270. According to Casaregi – who produced a practice-oriented comment to 
Consolato – this was the real Consolato Del Mare, in which this is no presence of any 
added chapter exclusively dialing with Barcelona: 
 
“Finalmente sappia il lettore, che il Consolato del mare consiste solamente in 
dugento novantaquattro Capitoli, che per l’appunto son que’ medesimi, che qui 
vengono da me spiegati, e che, come dianzi si disse, quai leggi universali, 
accettati furono comunemente, poiché gli altri che a i suddetti vanno congiunti, 
non sono che disposizioni particolari di Barcellona, fatte ne’ tempi appresso, le 
quali sendo stampate tutte in un libro, han data occasione a molti di crederle una 
continuazione del Consolato del Mare”.18  
 
According to Casaregi, Consolato Del Mare got a universal relevance that 
distinguished it from other collections, which ruled at a local dimension only. “Queste 
leggi – Donato Donati says in 1720 Consolato’s Lucca edition preface - perché piene di 
                                                                                                                                               
(Associazione Nazionale del Consolato del Mare, 2005); V. Piergiovanni, La “Spiegazione” del Consolato del mare 
di Giuseppe Lorenzo Maria Casaregi (Il Mulino, 2006); M. Bonomelli, Il diritto di andar per mare: il Consolato del 
mare e le norme sulle assicurazioni (Nova Charta, 2008).  
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46 
equità ebbero forza di innamorare le nazioni più remote, e giunsero ad esercitare il loro 
impero anche sopra i popoli non soggetti alla potestà legislativa del loro compilatore”.19 
Which was the relation between Statuti tranesi and Consolato Del Mare?20 The first 
ones are not a “source” of Consolato and they might be older than the first collection 
composing Libre. Anyway, it is possible to suppose that there two documents hold 
common origins, related to very ancient Mediterranean Sea people’s traditions: “Queste 
raccolte – Saverio di Nisio states, especially referring to Statuti Tranesi - sono innestate 
sostanzialmente sul grande tronco della civiltà giuridica ellenico-romana con l’apporto, 
man mano del diritto bizantino, dei testi dell’oriente mediterraneo e degli usi formatisi 
nei secoli posteriori sino ad esse. Ma di tutto quell’immenso patrimonio ciascuna prende 
a sistemare una parte più o meno ampia, probabilmente quegli istituti che ricorrevano 
più frequenti nella pratica locale”.21 These collections were born with no intervention by 
the State (which means a lack or incompleteness of political power during the Middle 
Ages, as Grossi states, pointing out this element as the most identitary aspect of this 
period22): that caused the birth of consuetudes which were considered as binding as law. 
The lack of the State’s political power lasted for more than one thousand years, 
precisely until 1681, when Louis XIV collected navigation laws in famous Ordonnançe 
de la Marine. This one was partly constituted by Mediterranean collections and partly 
by Anseatic towns’ laws: thanks to that, Northern Law enters Mediterranean Sea. 
Afterwards, everything would have been merged into Napoleonic codes. As it has been 
recently said, there are relevant legal norms, especially in Trani’s Statutes, which one 
even more evolved than Lex Rhodia, the most diffused Roman source about maritime 
law. 
We find the most interesting references just about the sailor’s Person: sailors were 
preserved from ship Patrone’s excessive power:23 
 
“IX. Propone dice et determina et diffinisce li dicti consuli de mare che veruno 
patrone non possa lassare nisino marinaro altro que non fosse per quatro casone et 
defecti de esso marinaro: prima per biastemare Dio, la secunda per esser 
meschiarolo, la terza per essere ladro, la quarta per lux uria. Et per queste quatro 
cose lo patrone possa lassare lo marinaro et conducerlo in terra ferma et fare 
rasone loro in terra ferma”. 
“X. Propone ed diffinisce li predicti consuli de mare, che se uno marinaro se 
partesse con la nave de la sua terra et admalasse ipso deve havere tutta la sua 
parte”. 
“XVI. proponemo dicemo et sententiamo nui consuli predicti, che qualunqua 
patrone menasse scrivano, che qualunqua patrone, ello debia essere iurato del suo 
commune et de esser bono et leale. Et questo dicto patrone non possa fare scrivere 
nisuna cosa che habia con nissuno mercatante che non sia el marca tante de 
presente, overo altro testimonio. El somigliante caso et termine sia coli dicti 
marinari. Et se altro, overo el contrario de cio, facesse et scrivesse, che quello suo 
quaterno over libro non sia tenuto ad nulla rasione ne ad esso se deba dare fede 
alcuna. Et se questo scrivano reccuesse mercantantia dal mercatanti et 
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manchasseli sia tenuto ad mendarlo esso scrivano; et lo discto quaterno si deve 
esser coperto di carta pecudina”. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Macro-regions have developed as a response to the considerable challenges posed by 
the globalized economy on nation-states. Westphalian territoriality and nationally based 
governance institutions are blatantly unable to manage the complexities of transnational 
economic processes, with their related impact both on human communities and the 
environment. Macro-regions represent one of the possible answers to this inability. By 
“including territory from a number of different countries or regions associated with one 
or more common features or challenges,”1 macro-regions contribute to a much needed 
rescaling and restructuring of state power and governance processes both above and 
below the nation-state.  
This rescaling and restructuring have taken many different configurations. In the 
European context, the idea of a “Europe of regions” has affirmed itself as one of the 
most promising answers to the increasingly manifest impossibility to efficiently govern 
complex cross-border events through national programs. According to the European 
Commission,2 a macro-regional strategy involves three components: 1) an integrated 
framework relating to Member States and third countries in the same geographical area; 
2) the ability to address common challenges; 3) and the possibility to benefit from 
strengthened cooperation for economic, social and territorial cohesion. These elements 
combine to transcend traditional Westphalian statehood by involving sub-national and 
supra-national actors in a multi-level governance system.  
Macro-regions may be based upon cultural or ethnic affinities, a common historical 
background, functional links or common interests – or a combination of all of these 
elements. In the case of the Adriatic-Ionian Macro-region, the maritime dimension is 
central. The macro-region revolves around its natural axis, the sea. Marine biodiversity 
is high, but a considerable number of species are endangered. While the Adriatic sea 
basin remains an important area for fishing, fish stocks have suffered from overfishing. 
Water discharges of industrial activities and urbanised areas, as well as intensive coastal 
tourism, have increased the level of pollution. Offshore oil and gas platforms and 
terminals involve further pressure on the environment. In such a context, research has 
identified a strong potential in maritime spatial planning in the region.3  
Partly in response to these challenges, and partly in response to the difficulties in the 
European integration process (see below), the European Commission officially 
                                                        
1
 P. Samecki, Macro-regional Strategies in the European Union,  Discussion Paper, Stockholm, 16 November 2009.  
2
 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions concerning the added value of macro-regional 
strategies,  27 June 2013, COM (2013) 468 final, para 2. 
3
 European Commission (Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries), The Potential of Maritime Spatial 
Planning in the Mediterranean Sea. Case Study Report: The Adriatic Sea, Brussels, January 2011, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/documentation/studies/documents/case_study_adriatic_sea_en.pdf>. 
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launched on 18 June 2014 a new EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region in the 
form of a Communication and an Action Plan to help the region – which comprises 70 
million residents – reap the benefits of closer cooperation in promoting the maritime 
economy, preserving the marine environment, completing transport and energy links, 
and boosting sustainable tourism. The Adriatic-Ionian macro-regional strategy 
replicates the underlying rationale and strategies adopted with the Baltic and Danube 
macro-regions, established respectively in 2009 and 2011, but it develops a region-
specific approach based on four thematic pillars, which include: 1) Blue Growth; 2)  
Connecting the Region (transport and energy networks); 3) Environmental quality; 4) 
Sustainable tourism. In addition, two themes cut across these pillars: 1) Research and 
innovation; 2) Capacity-building.4 Overall, the objective is to combine environmental 
protection, with a focus on the Adriatic and Ionian seas, with the support of economic 
activities and the development of communication and energy infrastructures. 
Needless to say, despite the connecting presence of the Adriatic and Ionian seas, the 
existence of a macro-region cannot be taken for granted, but represent the outcome of a 
process of construction, which is ongoing. Ultimately, the building of a macro-region 
will blur the distinction between the “international” and the “local” and, because of the 
involvement of both EU states (Croatia, Greece, Italy and Slovenia) and non-EU states 
(Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia), it will soften the distinction 
between “Europe” and “non-Europe”. Indeed, macro-regions are based on the 
presupposition that national boundaries are socially constructed and mutable elements 
artificially separating the borderlands where social interaction and exchange is 
frequent.5  
Macro-regions are both actors operating across national borders and tools in the 
hands of European institutions and nation-states to pursue their strategic interests. While 
states’ strategic interests change from one macro-region to another, European 
institutions have endorsed all of them for at least three main reasons. First, they 
contribute to address local problems directly involving a relatively small number of 
states – and thus supposedly opening the way for better cohesion at the EU level; 
second, they support the Europeanization of local and regional governments – thus 
favouring the process of integration into the EU; third, the involvement of local actors 
in multi-level governance is supposed to provide concreteness and effectiveness in 
policy-formulation and implementation.6  
These advantages constitute the so-called added value of macro-regions which, 
however, are expected to play out in context of the EU imposed “three no’s”: no new 
regulation, no new institutions and no additional funding. These strict limitations 
represent both a serious constraint and an opportunity for macro-regions. On the one 
hand, they may push macro-regions towards irrelevance by drastically reducing the 
chances of planning and implementing concrete initiatives. On the other hand, the 
effective integration of existing norms, institutions and funds in a transnational 
framework may constitute the real added value of macro-regional strategies.7  
                                                        
4
 European Commission, Communication concerning the European Union Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian 
Region, 17 June 2014, COM(2014) 357 final.  
5
 F. Celata, R. Coletti, Soft, Mobile or Networked? Cross-Border Cooperation and the topology of the European 
Union Frontier, EUBORDERREGIONS, Working Paper Series 2, April 2012.  
6
 European Parliament (Directorate-General for Internal Policies), New Role of Macro-Regions in European 
Territorial Cooperation - Study, Brussels, 2015. 
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Against this background, this chapter discusses two main issues. First, it argues that 
the establishment of the Adriatic-Ionian Macro-region reflects the outcome of a process 
of convergence between Italian and EU’s foreign policy interests. Second, it examines 
the development of a European geopolitical model based on multi-centred regionalism. 
On balance, while there exist considerable challenges in the process of implementation 
of the Adriatic-Ionian macro-regional strategy, nonetheless this initiative represents a 
further attempt to involve the South East European area within the European political 
and institutional space.  
 
 
2. Italy as the regional hegemony 
 
Italy has strong security, economic, and energy interests in developing an integrated 
area between the eastern and western sides of the Adriatic and Ionian seas, and more 
generally in stabilizing the western Balkans.8 These interests involve trade, investments, 
human mobility, tourism, and environmental protection.9 Italian presence and activism 
in the region is generally well received, since Italy is a key economic partner for most 
states in the area. Italian foreign direct investment (FDI) ranks among the ten major 
investors – with Serbia, Croatia and Albania attracting most investments. The Marche 
region accounts for about 12 % of Italian FDI in the western Balkan states.10 
Unsurprisingly, this region has been strongly committed to the promotion of a macro-
regional strategy.  
The establishment of a macro-region represents the culmination of an Italian foreign 
policy effort, with limited contributions by other participating states. Little national-
level debate has occurred in the process of formulating a strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian 
Macro-region, with only Croatia presenting a non-paper on its views and priorities.11 In 
this context, Italy has been at the forefront in developing the idea and in asking the EU 
to establish a macro-region for the Adriatic-Ionian area.  
At least since October 1999, when the Italian government presented at the Tampere 
EU Summit its Adriatic and Ionian Initiative, Italy has spent much political capital to 
draw the attention of European partners on the problems and challenges confronting the 
region. The Adriatic-Ionian Macro-region, and more generally the western Balkans, is 
one of the few areas where Italy can play an active and visible role. For decades, Italy 
has attempted to act as a “bridge” between Europe and North Africa/Middle East, but 
with little success. The deteriorating security situation on the Southern Mediterranean 
shores in the aftermath of the so-called “Arab spring,” as well as the worsening situation 
in Syria and the rise of the Islamic State, has further diminished Italian policy influence. 
In this geopolitical context, the Adriatic-Ionian area, and more broadly the western 
Balkans, represent an opportunity to raise the foreign policy profile of a weak and 
indecisive middle power such as Italy.12  
                                                        
8
 A. Molnár, ‘Towards an EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region’ in A. Ágh, T. Kaiser, B. Koller (eds), 
Multi-level Governance and Differentiated Integration in the EU (Blue Ribbon Research Centre, 2014). 
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CeSPI Working Paper 77/2011. 
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Investors from the Marche Region’, (2012) 9 European Journal of Comparative Economics 395. 
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While the establishment of an Adriatic-Ionian Macro-region constitutes a (minor) 
success for Italian foreign policy, within the Italian political-institutional environment 
there exist different interests and priorities, with some actors prone to consider the 
macro-region as a tool to sustain the European integration of the western Balkans, while 
others primarily concerned about the economic opportunities that it may offer. As 
Stocchiero aptly argues,13 the two interests are not necessarily in contradiction, although 
a balancing act needs to be found between these different concerns and priorities. The 
fact that since the early 2000s both centre-right and centre-left governments have 
expressed a keen interest in the initiative, and more generally in the western Balkan 
region, may testify to the presence of an unusual bipartisan support for the macro-region 
and its problems and opportunities. In particular, one of the issues that unite national 
level actors is energy. The region is strategically located in an ideal position to become 
the energy hub of Europe. In February 2013 Albania, Italy, and Greece signed an 
agreement on the construction and operation of a Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), whose 
construction is planned to begin in 2016.14 The TAP will transport Caspian natural gas 
to Europe and will cross Greece, Albania, the Adriatic sea and join the Italian natural 
gas network in the South of Puglia.15  
In addition to state-level institutions and actors, both sub-national and civil society 
players have performed an important role in supporting the establishment of the 
Adriatic-Ionian Macro-region. Enduring bottom-up exchanges involving both economic 
and civil society actors have laid the groundwork for further cooperation. In particular, 
during the 1990s Italian civil society established a wide net of relationship involving all 
former Yugoslav states.16 With the end of the wars, regional links and networks 
flourished - involving, for example, Adriatic and Ionian cities and towns, chambers of 
commerce, ports, as well as universities. In this context, the Marche region has been 
actively engaged in promoting both the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative and the Adriatic-
Ionian Macro-region. As mentioned above, the Marche region has strong economic 
interests in the western Balkans, but at the same time it has endorsed a broader 
geopolitical approach. In his opinion “Territorial cooperation in the Mediterranean 
through the Adriatic-Ionian Macroregion”, prepared for the Committee of the Regions 
in 2011, then President of the Marche Region (Gian Mario Spacca) identified the 
strategic value of the macro-region as a tool “to facilitate the entry of third countries 
into the European Union by drawing on the shared interests of the regions”.17 In sum, a 
number of national, regional, and local interests and activities converged in the 
assessment of the macro-region as a useful tool, and prepared the ground for its 
establishment.  
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3. The European Union and the macro-region’s geopolitical value 
 
While Italy has promoted the macro-region and asked Brussels to establish it, EU 
policy-makers have initially demonstrated a limited interest for the initiative – possibly 
considering it as a distraction from the on going process of European integration. 
However, the experience with the enlargement to Central and Eastern European states, 
when the EU relied significantly on cross-border cooperation programmes 
(institutionalized in the form of Euroregions), demonstrated the useful role regional 
strategies can play in the enlargement process as a training ground for aspiring new 
members. With their focus on small projects affecting citizens’ daily lives, Euroregions 
contributed to ease mutual suspicion, foster links across the border, support economic 
development, and provide opportunities to engage in multi-level governance.18 In 
practice, through the support of a number of funding schemes (such as INTERREG, 
TACIS, and PHARE) the “EU space” was extended across the border before any of the 
aspiring new EU members actually joined the Union.19  
Building on this experience, the EU strategy explicitly affirms that the macro-region 
is expected to play an important role in promoting the European integration of the 
Western Balkans. The Adriatic-Ionian Macro-region, similarly to what happened in 
Central in Eastern Europe with the establishment of Euroregions, aims to contribute to 
the Europeanization of non-EU states at the time when the promise of future 
membership in return for reforms is hollow and largely off the agenda. Indeed, as it took 
office in November 2014, the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker 
suggested that no further enlargement is expected to take place within the timespan of 
the Commission mandate (that is, until 2019). While Juncker’s statement largely 
expressed the obvious, since no western Balkan state will be ready to access the Union 
for several years to come, it nonetheless proved demoralizing for aspiring new 
members, and raised doubts about the EU’s ultimate intentions vis-à-vis the region. The 
statement confirmed how politically and economically marginal the area has become, a 
sort of “periphery of the European periphery.”20  
The EU’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for any further enlargements after the entry of 
Croatia on 1 July 2013 has contributed to strengthen in the western Balkans a latent 
Euroscepticism or, more precisely, a “EU-scepticism.”21 The outbreak of the economic 
and financial crisis in 2008, and the difficulty in finding seemingly efficient responses 
to it, had already eroded Europe’s image as a land of prosperity and stability. The EU’s 
tough stance on future memberships, together with the related application of strict 
conditionality vis-à-vis candidate countries, has further undermined the EU’s appeal in 
the region. In this context, Russia has been playing a more assertive and influential role. 
From a Russian perspective, the western Balkans represents an important strategic area, 
at least for two reasons.22 First, the region is a valuable transit zone for Russian gas. 
Moscow plans to replace transit through Ukraine with a Balkan route before 2020. After 
the abandonment of the South Stream project, the current plan foresees the building of a 
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gas pipeline that, through the Black sea, will reach Turkey and from here Western 
Europe. 
Second, while Russia is well aware that it is not able to provide the western Balkans 
with a realistic alternative to the development of closer ties with the EU, it nonetheless 
attempts to create obstacles to the (slow) process of European integration. For example, 
the outbreak of a (controlled) crisis in the region would shift international attention 
away from the situation in Ukraine, and contribute to bring to the surface European 
divisions. Unsurprisingly, the political crisis in Macedonia, which intensified in the 
course of 2015, has seen the direct involvement of Moscow, which tried to influence 
Macedonian politics for its own foreign policy interests.  
In sum, membership prospects for South East European states have become 
intangible, a sense of EU-scepticism has been taking hold in the region, and other major 
powers – above all Russia – have been expanding their influence in contraposition to 
European interests. In this context, the Adriatic-Ionian Macro-region represents the 
attempt to keep the region on the enlargement agenda, while not explicitly engaging in 
enlargement politics. In other words, the macro-region constitutes both a way to avoid 
enlargement and to continue it by other means. It avoids enlargement because, by 
establishing a form of cross-border cooperation, it postpones answering demands for 
full membership. At the same time, the macro-region continues on a process of 
expansion of EU’s norms and hegemony on its South East neighbours.  
 
 
4. What kind of Europe? 
 
The EU does not have a single strategy towards non-EU members. Since the 
establishment of the Baltic Sea Region in 2009, followed by a Danube Region in 2011 
and by the Adriatic-Ionian one in 2014, the EU has demonstrated a growing interest in 
supporting cooperation in greater European regions. At the same time, however, the EU 
has developed another wide range of foreign policy tools towards states in its 
neighbourhood and beyond.23 The lack of a single strategy towards non-EU members 
ultimately reflects the co-existence among European policy-makers of different 
political-institutional logics. In turn, this co-existence reflects the EU’s own evolution 
from a rather limited political-economic institutional arrangement involving a few 
states, to a major actor composed by 28 members. Browing and Joenniemi have 
identified 3 different geopolitical models, widely employed in the literature, to describe 
this evolution.24  
First, the Westphalian model suggests that the EU is assuming the characteristics of 
modern statehood, with sovereignty shifting from national to supranational institutions 
in Brussels. From this perspective, the EU is seen as an empire in the making, which 
engages in a politics of difference and exclusion while imposing its norms and interests 
abroad.25 However, the re-nationalization of foreign policy, which has followed the 
outbreak of the global economic and financial crisis in 2008, raises serious doubts about 
the current relevance of this model. European states have increasingly re-asserted their 
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sovereign prerogatives in all policy-making fields, including foreign policy. In Southern 
Europe, Italy plays a hegemonic role in relations to its neighbours, and the 
establishment of an Adriatic-Ionian Macro-region testifies to (above all) Italian 
perseverance and influence.  
Second, a Eurocentric or imperial model is arranged around a European core with 
various degrees of differentiation the further away from the centre. This model reflects a 
logic of “concentric circles” and interprets power as emanating from Brussels and 
moving outwards towards the periphery and beyond. As a geopolitical entity, the EU is 
thought to both insulate itself from external threats through impermeable borders and to 
promote peace and stability through various forms of association and cooperation 
agreements and partnerships. This kind of geopolitical approach is perhaps best 
described as a kind of “regulatory imperialism” with regard to the Union’s drive to 
extend its norms and values to the rest of the world – starting from its near abroad. 
Whether this imperial logic accurately reflects the evolution of the Union remains a 
matter of debate. However, it is indubitable that at time of instability (such as during the 
wars in the Balkans in the 1990s or in the aftermath of the “Arab spring” in North 
Africa), the EU tends to interpret its outside as a source of insecurity.  
Third, the neo-medieval model conceives of the EU as a networked political space 
characterized by a polycentric system of government and fuzzy borders where multiple 
and overlapping jurisdictions oversee territories increasingly heterogeneous both 
culturally and economically.26 Importantly, there is no one centre in this model but, as 
the metaphor of “Europe of Olympic Rings” nicely suggests, there exist various 
regional cores cutting across borders and levels of authority. While Browing and 
Joenniemi focus on Northern Europe and the Northern Dimension as the most 
significant empirical illustration for this model, all macro-regions, including the 
Adriatic-Ionian one, could actually be described as a ring in a rather decentralized 
Europe. Macro-regions suggest the existence of a European integration process which is 
not simply directed by a strong centre from where policies emanate, but evolves around 
multiple and diverse regional sites. In this context, the promotion of forms of cross-
border cooperation focusing greatly on civil society development further suggests a 
departure from traditional state-centred geopolitics.27  
Above all, macro-regions provide an opportunity to move away from a Eurocentric 
“Europe of concentric circles” towards more equal and shared partnerships – even 
despite the material asymmetries between EU and non-EU states.28 In a Europe of 
Olympic Rings, each ring should be seen as interconnected to the other ones. The 
Adriatic-Ionian Macro-region could primarily be linked to the Danube macro-region. 
Significantly, membership overlap to an extent, with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia belonging to both macro-regions, in a model of “open 
regionalism”29 connecting the area to regional and wider networks. In a such a model, 
the macro-region is expected to be inclusive and open towards all of its neighbours, 
with a particular attention to Turkey and the Middle East, in order to deal constructively 
with common problems, including the management of growing migration flows and 
humanitarian needs emerging from instability in North African and the Middle East.  
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Drawing from Walters,30 Browing and Joenniemi further illustrate how the 
Westphalian, imperial and neo-medieval models convert into four different geo-
strategies with regard to the various ways border spaces are organized. First, the 
“networked (non) border” involves a partaking of responsibilities between EU and non-
EU members and actors on the basis of shared liberal principles and values. Second, the 
“march strategy” envisages the creation of security areas, or buffer zones, along the 
border in order to keep disorder and instability at a distance. Third, the “colonial 
frontier” foresees the transformation of the outside in such a way to make it compatible 
with the inside, and thus easier to absorb/incorporate within the Union. Finally, the 
“limes” creates an enduring separation between the inside and the outside, without any 
attempt to incorporate the latter into the former.  
While these geo-strategies are clearly overlapping in practice, and crucially 
influenced by the stance of external players (with Russia central in the geo-strategic 
assessments of the EU), they are useful in drawing attention to the existing diversity in 
EU foreign policy. According to Browing and Joenniemi, in the northern area 
networked borders reflect extensive regional cooperation; in the East, EU enlargement 
testifies to the combined influence of a “march” and “colonial” strategy; in the 
Mediterranean, the focus on the “limes” reflects a long-lasting divide between Europe 
and North Africa. Stocchiero takes the analysis further by explaining how different geo-
strategies translate into a set of complex and composite policies: EU immigration 
policy, for example, reflects largely a “limes” strategy while, by contrast, trade policy 
suggests the emphasis on breaking down and networking borders.31 
In sum, the EU’s external policy cannot easily be understood as a hegemonic, 
imperial project, but rather as a hodgepodge of different cross-border projections. With 
regard to South Eastern Europe, the creation of an Adriatic-Ionian Macro-region 
evolves from a broader evolution of the relationship between Europe and the western 
Balkans. Historically, the Balkans have been understood as a region external to 
European civilization, and thus to be kept at arm’s length. The “Balkans” has been the 
depository of negative perceptions and, in the aftermath of the violent process of 
Yugoslav dissolution, occasionally continues to be seen as a “problem” to be addressed, 
rather than a (perhaps dysfunctional) part of the European family. Unsurprisingly, to use 
Walter’s terminology, the “march strategy” and the “limes” have been the prevailing 
European geo-strategies vis-à-vis the region. 
Since the early 2000s these perceptions have been slowly changing in the direction 
of less drastically negative views. Accordingly, the EU’s approach moved from a logic 
of exclusion to one of inclusion based on the promise of future membership of the 
Union. Ultimately the Balkans constitute a reflection of the European past, and thus a 
repository of troubling memories involving authoritarianism and war, rather than simply 
an instance of Europe’s Other.32 As a result, the Balkans, not unlike Western Europe, 
can reach a post-modern, Kantian condition of peace and stability. On this basis, a 
“colonial frontier” strategy aimed at the transformation of the region has taken ground. 
Significantly, the “western Balkans” has been devised in Brussels as a bureaucratic 
rather than geo-political category to describe, in a rather aseptic manner, all of those 
states involved in the EU integration process. The creation of an Adriatic-Ionian Macro-
region, in particular with its civil society component, adds a “networked (non)border” 
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element to the European approach, and signals a further shift in the way the “Balkans” 
are understood and interpreted in Europe. Put it differently, the macro-region constitutes 
another instance of a broader re-conceptualization of Europe where regional differences 
are recognized and promoted, where the presence of multiple centres is acknowledged, 
and where borders are fluid and not necessarily expressing opposition to “non-Europe”. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The achievements of any macro-region will ultimately depend on the political 
support it will receive from national and regional policy-makers and administrators. 
However, such a support cannot be taken for granted. Macro-regions are paradoxical 
entities, since they are based on conflicting logics: on the one hand, the territorial logic 
of the nation-state contributes to conceive of borders as sharp dividing lines. On the 
other hand, cross-border cooperation induces a border bridging territorial logic. These 
conflicting logics explain why national governments may simultaneously promote and 
undermine macro-regions. National governments may support the development of 
cross-border links, but their ultimate goal is to use macro-regions in order to tackle the 
limits of Westphalian sovereignty, rather than to create integrated territorial entities.33  
In a context dominated by perhaps contradictory priorities, the impact and 
effectiveness of macro-regional strategies can be easily overestimated. On paper, 
macro-regional strategies look like the most reasonable tool to address common issues 
and problems in a particular geographical space. In practice, effectiveness depends on 
several factors including, in addition to governments’ political will, administrative 
capacities, efficient multilevel governance mechanisms, and the availability of resources 
to turn general priority areas into concrete projects and programs. In this regard, the 
post-2008 Europe-wide economic and financial crisis may complicate the task, not least 
because the EU budget for the period 2014-2020 has been reduced compared to the 
previous 2007-2013 cycle. Seen from a cohesion perspective, the economic and 
financial crisis has had a visibly negative impact by increasing disparities of wealth 
between regions.34 Macro-regional strategies could contribute to reverse this trend, 
crucially by involving EU and non-EU states, but it remains to be seen whether they 
will be able to use a diminishing pool of resources in synergic and more efficient ways. 
Ultimately, however, the macro-regions’ real added value may lie less in their practical 
achievements and more in the mental maps, or “geographical imaginaries”,35 of 
common belonging and sharing that they could contribute to foster. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the role of macro-regional strategies in the 
governance of marine spaces, in particular comparing the model of the EU Strategy for 
the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) with that of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and 
Ionian Region (EUSAIR).1 
It is necessary to point out that it is a sui generis comparison as the Baltic macro-
region is in an advanced stage of its development,2 while the Adriatic and Ionian macro-
region is taking its first steps.3 However, a comparison between the two macro-regional 
strategies is possible precisely because the management of marine spaces is a common 
objective of both. 
The paper begins by briefly examining the role of macro-regions in the context of 
EU policies and law. Then, it examines the Baltic Strategy, in particular the objective 
“Save the sea” and the connected policy areas and flagship projects. After that, it carries 
out an analysis of the Adriatic and Ionian Strategy, paying particular attention to the 
architecture of the governance and objectives and initiatives concerning the marine area 
involved. 
 
 
2. Macro-regional strategies in the context of EU policies and law 
 
The “macro-region” and the “macro-regional strategy” have been recently set up as 
tools available to the EU to promote territorial cooperation and cohesion.4 
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Indeed, the concepts above-mentioned have received great attention and interest 
inside the EU over the last few years. In October 2009, the European Council 
established the first macro-regional strategy, that related to the Baltic Sea, involving 
eight EU Member States (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Sweden) and four Third States (Belarus, Iceland, Norway, Russia). In June 
2011, the European Council established the EU Strategy for the Danube Region 
(EUSDR), with the involvement of nine EU Member States and five Third States 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova, and Ukraine).5 In June 2014 
the European Council approved the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region that 
covers four EU Member States (Croatia, Greece, Italy, Slovenia) and four Third States 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia). Finally, in July 2015, the 
European Commission adopted a Communication and an Action Plan on the EU 
Strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP), which involves five EU Member States 
(Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Slovenia) and two non-EU countries (Liechtenstein, 
Switzerland).6 
It is no coincidence that the initiatives just cited are contemporary to the drawing up, 
signing and entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It is with the reform put in place in 
Lisbon that the territorial cohesion has been added to the economic and social one 
through the reformulation of Article 174 TFEU. This in coherence with the EU’s aims 
established by Article 3 TEU that, among other things, gives to the Union the task to 
promote the economic, social and territorial cohesion (par 3, c. 3).7 
Consequently, macro-regional strategies have been identified as a tool able to 
valorize the aims of the new EU cohesion policy.8 
Confirmation of that can be found in the same definition of macro-region: “an 
integrated framework relating to Member States and third countries in the same 
geographical area” that “addresses common challenges” and “benefits from 
strengthened cooperation for economic, social and territorial cohesion”.9 
 
 
3. Procedure for the establishment of a macro-region and for the elaboration and 
the gradual adaptation of a macro-regional strategy 
 
There are different steps for the establishment of a macro-region and the 
development of the related strategy. First, several political, economic and social actors 
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such as Member States, private and public stakeholders and Members of the European 
Parliament should express their will of setting up a macro-region. Then, the European 
Council assesses whether the request is coherent, useful and strategic for the 
achievement of EU objectives. If the European Council considers the proposal worthy 
of attention, the Commission is asked to develop a strategy. Usually, before developing 
a macro-regional strategy, the Commission holds a consultation with Member States, 
third Countries involved in the initiative, regions, intergovernmental organizations and 
nongovernmental organizations, public and private stakeholders as well as citizens. 
Thereafter, taking into account the above activities, the Commission outlines the 
strategy in the form of a Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions. Such a 
Communication describes both the challenges and the opportunities of the macro-
region. It also draws up a plan of action which identifies precisely the objectives and the 
related activities necessary to reach them. Finally, the Commission proposal is approved 
by the European Council, usually by the means of a reference in the Conclusions of its 
meetings. 
It is worth to underline, even though it could seem obvious from the above 
description, that both the Commission Communication and the European Council 
Presidency Conclusions are not binding but they represent political acts. The main 
advantage of using non-binding acts is that the framework of the macro-regional 
strategy is rather flexible. As a matter of fact, the relevant institutions could modify 
such a framework with acts of the same nature of those used for establishing the macro-
region and, therefore, adapt it to the specific needs which occur during the 
implementation of the strategy.  
 
 
4. The structure of the macro-regional strategy 
 
From the above description, it is clear that the implementation of the strategy is 
inextricably linked with the original action plan and its revisions. These are aimed at 
updating the strategy through the operational configuration of objectives, policy areas, 
horizontal actions and flagship projects.  
In relation to the various objectives within the context of a macro-regional strategy, it 
has to be underlined that they are closely connected to each other so that the 
achievements related to one objective could have positive impacts also on the others.  
The policy areas are the prominent feature of a macro-regional strategy, as 
consequent projects and actions are determined on the basis of them. 
With reference to the actions, those of horizontal nature are particularly relevant 
because they operate in mutual connection with the objectives in order to integrate with 
them. 
Finally, the flagship projects play a crucial role in putting into effects the macro-
regional strategy as they represent the primary projects to implement in each policy 
area. 
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5. The governance of the macro-regional strategy 
 
The governance architecture is one of the essential features for the realization of the 
macro-regional strategy. From a general point of view, we could certainly consider the 
macro-regional strategy organization as a multilevel governance system.10 This is 
because many different kinds of actors – institutional, non-institutional, supranational, 
national and regional – are involved in the shaping and, specifically, in the 
implementation of the strategy. In particular, as for the implementation, all the actors 
involved have both equal position and equal importance. Therefore, the multilevel 
governance of the strategy determines a horizontal structure which is ruled by consensus 
so that cooperation, collaboration, supervision and assessment of implemented policies 
are significantly boosted. 
More precisely, three different levels could be identified in the governance of a 
macro-regional strategy: a political level, a coordination level and an implementation 
level.  
Regarding the political level, leading roles are occupied by the European Council, 
the Commission and the High-level group. This last-named is composed by 
representatives – National Contact Points or equivalents – of each Member States and 
third Countries involved in the strategy. The political level influences both the general 
strategy and the action plan and is in charge of the potential revision of the latter.  
The coordination level bears the crucial responsibility of adopting measures related 
to the strategy in order to accomplish a successful implementation. Policy areas 
Coordinators, Horizontal Action Leaders and National Contact Points take part in this 
activity and play an essential role in coordinating them inside their respective 
governments.  
The implementation level concerns the financial aspects of the strategy and is 
connected with programmes and funding instruments of the EU budget cycle. 
 
 
6. The establishment of the strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and the following 
revisions 
 
As mentioned above, the strategy for the Baltic Sea Region has been the first macro-
regional strategy adopted within the EU.11 From the very beginning, it has been 
considered an ideal experimentation of cooperation as the regions involved present a 
considerable amount of common issues so that the establishment of a common strategic 
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framework is justified. It involves eight member States of the Union: Denmark, 
Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. In 2006, the EU 
Parliament, with a resolution aimed at supporting the northern Dimension of the EU, 
ask the Commission to develop a strategy for the Baltic Sea. In December 2007, also the 
European Council advanced this request to the Commission. For this reason, the 
Commission presented its proposal and the related action plan in June 2009. The 
strategy was approved by the European Council at the meeting on 29/30 October 2009.  
The strategy and the action plan have been emended twice. In the first review, the 
Commission has proposed a reduction from four to three pillars: 1) protection of the 
marine environment; 2) interconnections in the region; 3) a prosperous region. In this 
context, the Commission assessed for the first time the implemented activities and the 
reached outcomes, developing new proposals for the implementation of the new 
strategic framework as well. In September 2015, the Commission adopted a second 
revision concerning mainly the action plan in order to ensure the alignment of the Baltic 
strategy with Europe 2020 strategy. 
 
6.1. The structure of the Baltic strategy 
 
Having been the first macro-regional strategy to be adopted, the Baltic strategy 
presents a structure that has been a model for the following ones and that, as noted 
above, is composed of objectives, sub-targets, policy areas, horizontal actions and 
flagship projects. As it is a very complex structure, we will focus just on the aspects 
directly related to the marine environment. From this standpoint, the most relevant 
feature of the strategy is the objective named “Save the sea”. This, in turn, is structured 
into four sub-targets which identify the main elements connected with the 
accomplishment of the overall objective: clean water; rich and healthy wildlife; clean 
and safety shipping; better cooperation. 
As for the policy areas of the “Save the sea” objective, the strategy considers: 
nutrients, the reduction of an excessive input of nutrients to the sea to acceptable levels; 
risks, the reduction of the use and impact of hazardous substances; bioeconomy, the 
support of sustainable agriculture, forestry and fishing; shipping, promoting clean 
shipping; safety and security, both from the maritime perspective and in relation to the 
protection from disasters, accidents and cross border organized crimes.  
There are also four horizontal actions – spatial planning, neighbourhood policy, 
capacity building and climate – which interact with the three overall objectives and 
policy areas. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that, for the practical implementation of the 
strategy, flagship projects, linked to each objective and policy area, are developed.  
 
6.2. The governance of the Baltic strategy 
 
Similarly to other strategies, the governance of the Baltic macro-region is structured 
into three levels: political, coordination and implementation. These three levels are well 
represented by both the Member States that are part of the strategy and national 
coordinators, who are responsible for the coordination and the implementation of the 
strategy at national level. On the one hand, Member States are responsible for the 
fundamental task of ensuring the permanent commitment to the implementation and the 
accomplishment of the objectives of the macro-regional strategy. They also ensure that 
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strategic planning, relevant policies, programmes and national financial instruments are 
aligned with the needs of the Baltic strategy. On the other hand, national coordinators 
are in charge of many key tasks such as the political support of the implementation of 
the strategy at national level, the coordination with national coordinators of other 
Member States, even for the exchange of best practices, the participation to the revision 
of the action plan in partnership with the Commission and the other policy areas and 
horizontal actions coordinators, the promotion of the participation of all the 
stakeholders of the Baltic region.  
With reference to the architecture of the Baltic governance, the European Council, 
the Commission and the High-level group are parts of the political level. EU institutions 
ensure both the political commitment and the general orientation for the realization of 
the strategy. Particularly, the Commission supports dialogue, participation and 
cooperation of every stakeholder and, above all, promotes the alignment of policies, 
programmes and financial resources of each level involved – supranational, national, 
regional – with the objectives of the strategy. The High-level group, composed of 
national coordinators, determines the strategic implementation and develops the 
different thematic aspects related to the strategy. 
The coordination level is carried out by policy areas coordinators, the four horizontal 
actions coordinators and by the focal points of both policy areas and horizontal actions.  
Coordinators of policy areas and horizontal actions are committed to fulfilling crucial 
tasks such as the participation to the elaboration of new action plans, the promotion of 
the development and the implementation of actions and flagship projects in each policy 
area, the enhancement of dialogue with entities responsible for programmes and 
financial instruments so that the alignment of available resources with policy areas 
objective is ensured, the supervision on the coherence of implemented actions in order 
to avoid overlapping and duplication. 
Focal points connect at national level all those subjects concerning main policy areas 
and horizontal actions. Specifically, they deal with the dissemination of information to 
the public.  
In order to provide a complete understanding of the Baltic strategy governance, it 
should be noted that the coordinators of both the policy areas and horizontal actions 
have established direction committees. These are composed of representatives of all 
States involved in the strategy and stakeholders in order to support coordinators in the 
fulfilment of their tasks and in the discussion of strategic issues in each thematic area. 
Direction committees serve also as fora for dialogue related to flagship projects.  
At the implementation level, there are entities in charge of the realization and the 
provision of programmes, financial resources, flagship projects and their leaders. At 
this level, all the activities concerning the alignment of the available financial resources 
with the objectives of the strategy are ensured.  
 
6.3. The governance of the objective “Save the sea” 
 
As previously noted, the “Save the sea” objective is structured into four sub-targets 
and six policy areas which reveal not only the relevant issues for the accomplishment of 
objectives but also the actors involved in doing so. It is impossible to examine all the 
priority areas in this article. However, in order to briefly clarify how the governance 
related to the “Save the sea” objective works, we will focus our attention on one 
particular policy area, pertaining nutrients. 
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This area is essential because one of the main problems of the Baltic basin is 
represented by the eutrophication of water. This phenomenon is mostly due to the 
detrimental inputs of nitres and phosphates generated by unsustainable agriculture and 
industrial production techniques. The achievement of the overall objective “Save the 
sea” is indissolubly linked to the reduction of the input of nutrients to an acceptable 
level. The action plan, as reviewed in 2015, provides these actions: a more efficient 
management of nutrients, the improvement of wastewater treatment, the promotion of a 
cross-sectoral dialogue, the improvement of the accuracy of the collection of data 
related to the input of nutrients to the sea, the cooperation with third Countries as Russia 
and Belarus, the identification of more efficient mechanisms for the reduction of 
nutrients. Finland and Poland coordination is responsible for such a primary policy area 
and the direction committee includes the participation of representatives from: ministers 
of environment of Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Finland; agencies for the 
protection of the environment of Germany and Lithuania; the National Authority for the 
management of water of Poland; the EU Commission (DG Regio); the Baltic marine 
environment protection commission, the so called Helsinki Commission; the Swedish 
Authority for the management of the marine environment and water resources. There 
are also seven flagship projects linked to the treatment of wastewater coming from 
different sources – urban, industrial and agricultural. For each of them a responsible 
authority (leader) is identified, which, as for nutrients, could be of various nature such 
as a territorial authority, a research centre, a university or a foundation. 
 
 
7. The EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region 
 
Regional cooperation in the Adriatic and Ionian area has its precedent in the Adriatic 
and Ionian Initiative (AII). Established in May 2000 with the Ancona Declaration,12 the 
AII has the objective of enhancing regional cooperation in order to promote political 
and economic stability and, in doing so, the European integration project as well. In 
order to achieve these objectives, the AII has an institutional architecture structured into 
a Presidency that rotates among Members each year; a Council, which is a decision-
making body, composed of Foreign Ministers; a Committee of Senior officials, with 
executive responsibilities; a Permanent Secretariat, led by the Secretary General, with 
the task of promoting, selecting and coordinating the activities. These involve, 
specifically, cooperation in the fields of tourism, culture, small and medium enterprises, 
transport, marine sector and environment.13  
With the experience of cooperation gained for several years through regional 
networks, cities, chambers of commerce, universities and civil society organizations, the 
AII has had a significant role in the promotion of the establishment of the Adriatic and 
Ionian strategy by the EU14.  
                                                           
12
 Declaration of the Adriatic Ionian Council on the support to the EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian Region, 
adopted in Ancona, 5 May 2010, <www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica_estera/aree_geografiche/europa>. The declaration 
was signed by Foreign affairs Ministers of Italy, Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece and Slovenia. Later 
Serbia and Montenegro joined the initiative. On the AII, see V. Moretti, L’Iniziativa Adriatico Ionica e la costituzione 
della Macroregione, (2015) 3 Sicurezza e scienze sociali 85.  
13
 For more information on AII activities see <www.aii-ps.org>. 
14
 Declaration of the Adriatic Ionian Council on the Support to the EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian Region, 
adopted in Ancona, 5 May 2010, <www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica_estera/aree_geografiche/europa>.  
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Consequently, upon invitation of the European Council in December 2012,15 the 
Commission presented, in June 2014, the macro-regional strategy and an action plan for 
a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the Adriatic and Ionian region.16 The 
strategy was approved by the European Council on 24 October 2014.17 The general 
objective of the strategy is “to promote sustainable economic and social prosperity in 
the Region through growth and jobs creation, and by improving its attractiveness, 
competitiveness and connectivity, while preserving the environment and ensuring 
healthy and balanced marine and coastal ecosystems”. It is a very ambitious objective 
which engages eight Countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, 
Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia) which already participated in the Adriatic and 
Ionian Initiative (AII). 
The starting point of the Commission’s proposals, not differently from the already 
adopted macro-regional strategies, is the identification of common challenges and 
opportunities of the macro-regional area.  
In relation to the challenges, briefly, these are connected mainly to great socio-
economic disparities among engaged Countries in terms of GDP and unemployment and 
to the widespread inability of local companies to exploit the possibilities of cross-border 
trade, innovation and research, especially with regard to blue economy. Furthermore, 
there are many sectors to highlight: the lack of transport infrastructures, and, in 
particular, the deficiencies of road and rail network, the maritime traffic congestion and 
the little development of multi-modal transport; as for energy, the inadequacy of 
electricity grids that prevents the development of an integrated energy market, in 
relation to renewable energy sources as well; with respect to the environment, the 
proposal calls for actions regarding the protection of ecosystems, sustainable tourism, 
the fight against maritime pollution, sustainable fishery and ecological aquaculture, the 
treatment of wastewater and other materials from agricultural activities, the lowering of 
emissions that harms air quality, the fight against illegal hunting, the completion of 
protected areas, the promotion of strategies to neutralize risks such as rising sea levels, 
flooding, drought, soil erosion and forest fires; administrative and institutional limits 
generated by corruption, cross-border organized crime and migration pressure which 
may weaken the implementation of the strategy. 
In relation to the opportunities that the macro-region could offer, the Commission 
stresses four aspects (blue economy, connectivity, cultural and natural heritage and 
biodiversity, tourism) that coincide with the four pillars of the proposed action plan for 
a gradual implementation of the strategy: blue growth; connecting the region; 
environmental quality; sustainable tourism. The responsibility of the coordination of 
each pillar rests with two Countries involved in the strategy.  
I will just underline some features directly related to the issue of maritime spaces.  
First of all, the “blue growth” pillar – coordinated by Greece and Montenegro – has 
the objective of promoting innovative marine and maritime growth through the 
development of blue technologies, supporting sustainability and business opportunities 
of fishery and aquaculture, enhancing governance and marine and maritime services. 
Basically, these are priority areas upon which the 2014 action plan provides several 
specific actions.  
                                                           
15
 See Conclusions of the European Council, 12/13 December 2012, EUCO 205/12, 11. 
16
 See Communication concerning the European Union Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region, 17 June 2014, 
COM(2014) 357 final. 
17
 See Conclusions of the European Council, 23/24 October 2014, EUCO 169/14, 15. 
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Another significant pillar is that of “environmental quality”. Coordinated by Slovenia 
and Bosnia Herzegovina, the pillar has the objective of contributing to improve 
environmental conditions of marine and coastal ecosystems, reducing marine pollution, 
limiting and compensating soil sealing, reducing air pollution and halting loss of 
biodiversity and degradation of ecosystems. On the relevant priority area “marine 
environment”, the strategy provides several actions linked to threats to marine and 
coastal biodiversity and marine pollution.  
With regard to the governance architecture of the strategy, this is structured into 
three levels. The political level does not show any significant difference from that of the 
Baltic strategy. As for the coordination level, a Governing Board has been established, 
led by a Country that chairs pro tempore the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative and by the 
Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy of the EU Commission. Members of 
the Governing Board are: two national coordinators for each Country (usually, a foreign 
affair official and a governmental official responsible for EU funds); four-pillar 
coordinators; members of involved Commission Directorates; a representative of the 
EU Parliament; the Permanent Secretariat of the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative; a 
representative of the Committee of Regions; a representative of the Economic and 
Social Committee; a representative of the Direction Authority of ADRION and one of 
the Facility Point of EUSAIR. The Governing Board works as a strategic guide for both 
the direction and the implementation of the strategy and its action plan. In relation to the 
coordination level, there are four Thematic Steering Groups which are chaired for three 
years, in rotation, by Countries which have the task of coordinating each thematic pillar. 
Finally, the implementation level deals with essentially the ADRION programme that 
supports governance and the implementation of the strategy on the operational and 
administrative plan. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Beyond some terminological differences, it appears that the governance structures of 
the aforementioned strategies do not show any relevant divergences. In practice, the 
model developed with the establishment of the Baltic strategy has been used in the 
Adriatic and Ionian strategy, capitalising on the former experience in order to exploit 
the importance of the political presence of national governments in all the institutional 
aspects of the latter strategy. 
A divergence between the Baltic strategy and the Adriatic and Ionian strategy 
concerns the circumstance that, while in the former only Member States are involved, 
the latter includes also non Member States, even though they are candidates or potential 
candidates for EU accession. This might lead to some difficulties in the achievement of 
the objective, implied in every strategy, of enhancing the relevant EU policies in the 
region, filling the gaps and dealing with challenges concerning particularly the 
management of the marine space and the environment. In relation to these issues, it is 
clear that the Union has a considerable volume of legislation that must be examined and 
assessed in order to support compliance with EU law and this could be more 
challenging for States that are not members of the Union. 
Furthermore, EUSAIR’s tourism is apparently more developed than EUSBSR’s. 
Indeed, the former strategy shows a specific pillar, whereas the latter does not have it. 
Actually, Countries part of the Baltic Region have to elaborate and to implement several 
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flagship projects in this field, whereas in the Adriatic and Ionian Region there is still 
much to do. This is probably due to the fact that EUSAIR started only one year and half 
ago, but also that it is more difficult to coordinate both Countries with a different 
membership at EU level and stakeholders active in the tourism sector in a different way. 
However, there are several similarities between the Baltic Sea Region and the 
Adriatic and Ionian Seas Region. In both cases, there are three closed or semi-closed 
basins, very traffic congestion, with a eutrophication phenomenon, and over time they 
developed same problems and therefore same challenges, but also same opportunities. 
Furthermore, both have acquired an international and geostrategic character over the last 
years. On the one hand, the Baltic Region could be crucial in order to promote 
cooperation programmes and strategic partnerships with others regional actors, 
including Norway, Iceland, Belarus, and especially the Russian Federation. On the other 
hand, the Adriatic and Ionian Region could represent an original and unusual way to 
accelerate integration processes of Western Balkans States, such as Albania, Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. 
In general, questions are: a EU increasingly disunited can reorganize itself around 
several macro-regional strategies? In other words, in order to incentivize a new and 
effective cohesion policy at EU level, also to save the EU project as a whole, is it 
possible and realistic to launch a new territorial cohesion approach starting from macro-
regional strategies? In the very near future, another five new regions could be 
established, thanks to the five strategies currently under consideration: strategies for the 
Atlantic Arc Region, for the Western and Eastern parts of the Mediterranean Sea 
Region, for the North Sea Region, for the Black Sea Region and for the Carpathian 
Region. In conclusion, a EU that in the future will strive for a practical and concrete 
implementation of several federated and inter-linked macro-regional strategies. 
In this context, the Adriatic and Ionian Region becomes crucial for many reasons: 
fighting marine pollution and related prejudicial and dangerous phenomena, such as 
eutrophication, thus saving the two seas; developing “motorways of the sea” to create 
smart and efficient interconnections in order to promote intermodal transport; creating 
the conditions for sustainable fisheries in order to preserve fish stock and to keep clean 
the two seas; filling the "Western Balkans hole"; strengthening stability, peace and 
security in the Balkan area; supporting and speeding up EU integration process of the 
Western Balkans Countries, thus contributing to create appropriate economic, social, 
infrastructural, environmental conditions to withstand the impact of EU standards. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The establishment of a legal regime of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas is a 
development that happened during the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(1974-1981).1 In the past there have been references to bodies of sea water distinct 
geographically from the open oceans,2 but there had been no conceptual elaboration of 
this geographical phenomenon or practical consequences at the legal point.3 None of the 
1958 Geneva Conventions referred to enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. It is indicative, in 
this connection, to point also to the fact that older scholarship on this type of marine 
spaces is extremely scarce; even more, until recently (even after the entry into force of 
1982 UNCLOS), treatises of international law and of international law of the sea did not 
devote a section to this institution. 
The particular legal regime of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas finds its basis on 
UNCLOS, in particular its Part IX (Articles 122 and 123). Through these provisions the 
drafters of UNCLOS endeavoured to establish a legal regime for a primarily 
geographical notion, consisting to rather restricted bodies of sea water, as opposed to 
the vast oceans. I am not going to dwell on the characteristics of the Adriatic and the 
Ionian Seas that can classify them both as a unit and also separately as semi-enclosed 
seas from the geographical point of view. They are both part(s) of the wider 
Mediterranean, sharing the general characteristics of the latter. They also possess 
specific geographic, political and economic features that allow considering them as an 
entity in particular from the socio-political point of view. 
 
 
2. The Adriatic and Ionian marine space 
 
2.1. A short description of relevant facts 
 
The Adriatic Sea forms a narrow sea body in the form of a large and deep gulf 
incised into the European mainland and stretching from the Gulf of Venice at its 
                                                           
1
 The initiative came from Italy, see M. Grbec, The Extension of Coastal State Jurisdiction in Enclosed or Semi-
Enclosed Seas: A Mediterranean and Adriatic Perspective (Routledge, 2014) 19-20. 
2
 G. Gidel, Le droit international public de la mer: le temps de paix, tome I (Mellottée, 1932) 41. 
3
 L. Lucchini, ‘La 3ème Conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer face au phénomène des ‘Méditerranées’ 
ou le triomphe de l’Etat océanique’ in Droit et libertés à la fin du XXe siècle: Etudes offertes à Claude-Albert 
Colliard (Editions A. Pédone, 1984) 289-310. 
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northernmost tip to the Strait of Otranto, separating thus the Italian from the Balkan 
peninsulas. The latter strait connects the Adriatic with the Ionian Sea which extends to 
the south, eastwards until the south-west coast of the Peloponnese and westwards to the 
island of Sicily. Unlike its northern sibling, the Ionian Sea has a wide opening to the 
rest of the Mediterranean, being thus less “isolated”.  
Historically maritime transport has been one of the most important industries of the 
economy of the region: the Adriatic and Ionian Seas have long been a significant 
transport route from the Mediterranean, and through it from the world’s oceans, to the 
central European space, whose economy heavily depends on that maritime route. It is no 
surprise therefore that many medium-and large-sized seaports thrive at the shores of the 
Adriatic and Ionian Seas, including over a dozen of ports with capacity to handle each 
large volumes of cargoes and sizeable numbers of passengers (e.g. Trieste, the largest 
port in the basin, Ancona, Bar, Durres, Koper, Otranto, Patras, Split, etc.). Fisheries and 
tourism are also significant sources of income for the populations of the coastal States. 
Tourism is rapidly growing, while the fishing industry has been suffering from marine 
pollution and overfishing. 
This marine space (Adriatic and Ionian) is comprised of waters along the costs of (in 
alphabetical order): Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro 
and Slovenia. 
The western coast of the Adriatic and Ionian marine space is exclusively occupied by 
Italy, while all the other coastal States lay at the eastern coast of the Adriatic and Ionian 
Seas. Italy has the largest façade to the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, though the existence of 
a host of islands along the continental shore of Croatia, gives the latter a very long 
coastline of approximately 6200 kilometres. Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
the shortest coastlines with approximatively 45 and 20 kilometres respectively.4 Italy 
has also the largest share of maritime traffic and trade in the region: Italian ports 
annually receive around 75 per cent of all commercial ship traffic in the Adriatic Sea. 
Also in some other economic aspects, such as fisheries, Italy is by far the biggest user of 
the Adriatic Sea.5 Italy has also delimited its continental shelf with all its neighours in 
the Adriatic and Ionian marine space,6 while maritime disputes persist among the 
former Yugoslav Republics, between Albania and Montenegro and between Albania 
and Greece.7 
 
2.2. The role of the EU 
 
Out of the above seven coastal states four are EU Member States (Croatia, Greece, 
Italy, and Slovenia), while the remaining three (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
                                                           
4
 Bosnia and Herzegovina has maritime borders only with Croatia (coastline surrounding the city of Neum in the 
canton of Herzegovina-Neretva) and its territorial sea is entirely surrounded by internal waters of Croatia. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina itself indicates that its territorial sea includes the Neum-Klek bay and half of the Channel of Mali Ston; 
for more cf R. Davorin, ‘Hrvatsko tjesnaci između Bosne i Hercegovine i otvorenoga mora [Croatian Straits between 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and High Seas]’, (2007) 46 Poredbeno Pomorsko Pravo 113. 
5
 D. Vidas, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the European Union and the Rule of Law: What is going on in 
the Adriatic Sea, Fridtjhof Nansen Institute Report 12/2008, 4. 
6
 Agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two 
countries in the Adriatic Sea, 8 January 1968, which by virtue of succession of States is binding for Croatia, 
Montenegro and Slovenia; Agreement between the Hellenic Republic and the Italian Republic on the delimitation of 
the respective continental shelf areas of the two States, 24 May 1977; Agreement between the Republic of Albania 
and the Republic of Italy for the determination of the continental shelf of each of the two countries, 18 December 
1992. 
7
 See in this Volume, A. Caligiuri, ‘The Maritime Boundaries in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas’. 
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Montenegro) have the perspective to become EU members, when the necessary 
conditions will be met (as described in the agreed 2003 Thessaloniki Agenda for the 
Western Balkans.8 In accordance with this document aiming at agreeing on ways and 
means to further strengthen the EU's stabilisation and association policy towards the 
Western Balkans, the regional States could be, rightly, qualified members-to-be or 
prospective members. Their actual and effective adhesion to the EU depends on the 
progress to be made by those States; when the objective criteria for accession will be 
met, the Western Balkan States will be accepted in the EU. The process may look, and it 
is actually, staled at this particular juncture in which the EU is more introverted due to 
the problems it is facing with the euro crisis and the sovereign debt predicament, and 
public support for EU is dropping in third countries.9 However, these combined 
phenomena do not, at present, at least, have led to abandoning the goal set in the 
Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans.10  
Thus, in the medium, or the long-run, the Adriatic and Ionian marine space is 
destined to become an EU maritime space in the sense that all coastal States will be EU 
Member States11 (“EU lake” is a term that overlooks the existence in this marine space 
of high seas or of parts of maritime zones in which coastal States have sovereign rights 
and/or jurisdiction). This fact places a particular responsibility to the EU, its institutions 
and its member states with regard to the governance of the of the Adriatic Ionian marine 
space. In this respect it should be noted that the EU already exerts a significant 
influence in the Adriatic-Ionian affairs and that there is no hint that this influence will 
diminish over the time. 
 
 
3. The legal regime of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas in accordance with UNCLOS 
 
UNCLOS devotes to “Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas” one of its shortest parts, the 
Part IX comprised of mere two articles (122 and 123) (only the introduction (part I) and 
the regime of the islands (Part VIII) are shorter, with a single article each). 
For the purposes of this paper, we are not going to dwell on the discussion on the 
existence of a distinction between enclosed and semi-enclosed sea.12 Suffice here to say 
                                                           
8
 The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans – Moving towards European integration, General Affairs and 
External Relations Council, 2518th Council meeting. - External Relations -, Luxembourg, 16 June 2003; Thessaloniki 
Council Presidency Conclusions, 19-20 June 2003. 
9
 J.I. Torreblanca, M. Leonard, The continent-wide rise of Euroscepticism, Policy Memo, European Council on 
Foreign Relations 2013, <www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf>. 
10
 Cf S. Stavridis, C. Tsardanidis, G Christou, ‘The Impact of the International Foreign Policies in the 
Mediterranean’, (2015) 23 Hellenic Studies 23. 
11
 European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, Brussels, 
30 November 2012, COM(2012) 713 final (hereinafter: A Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, 
COM(2012) 713 final). 
12
 For an effort to distinguish between the two notions, cf Intervention by the delegation of URSS in the Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.38, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, vol II, 277: “a clear distinction must be made between enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. From 
a juridical point of view, enclosed seas were comparatively small, had no outlet to the ocean, and did not serve as 
international shipping routes in the broadest sense. In the case of such seas, the legal regime might include certain 
peculiarities on the basis of existing international agreements and international custom. Semi-enclosed seas, on the 
other hand, were large bodies of water with several outlets through which passed international waterways. They had 
never been subject to any special regime. Almost any sea could be called semi-enclosed, and to compare such seas 
with enclosed seas would be quite unjustified. His country could not accept the establishment of a special regime 
benefiting any given country in waters that had traditionally been used by all countries for international shipping on a 
basis of equality. The question of enclosed seas had both a geographical and a juridical aspect. Was the 
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that UNCLOS does not establish a legal difference between the two13 (use of the 
conjunction “or”). 
 
3.1. Constitution of the concept of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas 
 
An initial question raised by the acknowledgement by UNCLOS of a distinct and 
specific concept of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, is whether this new category of 
marine space is primarily a geographical or a legal notion. 
The geographical characteristics attached to the enclosed or semi-enclosed seas vary 
from water bodies like the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea or the Azov Sea (which have only a 
narrow outlet to other seas, the Danish straits, Bosphorus and Strait of Kerch 
respectively) to maritime spaces like the Gulf of Aden or the Behring Sea, which, in 
reality are smaller parts of vast oceanic areas. From that point of view, we must concede 
that geographically, almost every basin, gulf or sea arm, wherever located could be 
considered as a semi-enclosed sea (because of the existence of islands, peninsulas etc, 
justifying this qualification from the geographical point of view). Therefore, some early 
efforts to propose some quantifiable criteria for the definition of an enclosed or semi-
enclosed sea (e.g. a “primary” sea, rather than an arm of a larger semi-enclosed water of 
body; a surface area of at least 50,000 nautical miles; at least fifty percent of its 
circumference had to be occupied by land; the width of the connector between the sea 
and the open ocean should not represent more than twenty percent of the enclosed or 
semi-enclosed sea’s total circumference14) failed to gain general approval and were 
quickly abandoned both in the negotiating and drafting process of the Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea and in practice. 
Many a time there exits an objective element of an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, for 
instance geographical vicinity of coasts or other natural features or neighbourhood of 
the coastal States or natural complementarity, that occur with respect to a given marine 
space. As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has underscored in another 
connection, law should not alter or completely refashion the geography;15 however what 
law cannot (or should not) do, international politics can and actually do on various 
occasions.16 The concept of enclosed or semi-enclosed sea is established by UNCLOS 
primarily as a political and legal one. It relies of course, on the particular geography of a 
marine space, but not without some (narrower or larger) degree of creative 
interpretation and application thereof. The EU concept of the Adriatic-Ionian marine 
space, which combines two bodies of seawater, each of which could be considered, 
from the geographical point of view, as a distinct enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, in 
order to form a single semi-enclosed sea bears testimony to such creation through 
politics of the legal concept. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Mediterranean, for example, an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea? He would say it was neither. It contained many other 
seas and could be compared to an ocean. It was an immense body of water used as a high sea by all countries for 
international shipping […]”.  
13
 Cf L. Lucchini, M. Vœlckel, Droit de la mer, tome 1 (Editions A. Pédone, 1990) 436-437. 
14
 Criteria proposed by Lewis M. Alexander to be applied cumulatively, see L.M. Alexander, ‘Regionalism and the 
Law of the Sea: the Case of Semi-enclosed Seas’, (1974) 2 Ocean Development & International Law Journal 151. 
According to these criteria Professor Alexander had identified twenty-five semi-enclosed seas in the world.  
15
 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 49, 
para 91.  
16
 Suffice here to refer to the composition of the so-called ‘Western European and Others Group (WEOG)’ in the 
context of the United Nations or other universal organizations. 
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At this point, and before going further into the examination of the political and legal 
parameters of the concept, we should add another dimension of its constitution, i.e. the 
historical aspect, which, at least occasionally, complements the legal and geographic 
elements of the notion of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas: the existence, along the 
shared geography, of a shared history demonstrated through closer relations, economic, 
political, commercial, human, etc., peaceful or conflictual, that have been weaved 
between and among the coastal populations and states of each enclosed or semi-
enclosed sea17.  
The above subjective elements coupled with political will for cooperation among 
neighbouring States bordering a given maritime space, based on shared interests and 
mutual advantage can create a favourable breeding ground for the formation of the 
concept of enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, as envisaged by the relevant provisions of 
UNCLOS, in particular its Article 123 (see infra). 
 
3.2. “Regionalism at sea” 
 
The cooperation among States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed, called for by 
Article 123 UNCLOS, is an aspect, or more accurately a consequence of the so-called 
“sea regionalism” or “regionalism at sea”. The studies of Lewis Alexander are seminal 
in this respect: he was, admittedly, the first international legal scholar to undertake 
defining the role of maritime regionalism and particularly its application to enclosed or 
semi-enclosed seas.18 However, despite these efforts, the scope of regionalism at sea has 
not yet been explored.19 This is largely due to the fact that this concept goes beyond the 
law of the sea: as in several other topics of the law of the sea, “the land dominates the 
sea”20 also with respect to the potential regionalization at sea. Yet, the term “region” (let 
alone sub-region) lacks a generally accepted or acknowledged definition even on land. 
It is chiefly an empirical and pragmatic concept, rebellious to generalizations; regions 
are political constructs21 based on heterogeneous motivations and interests, explaining 
the variations of regionalism. 
It is thus not surprising that UNCLOS does not provide a definition of a sea region. 
L. Alexander attempted a categorization of marine regions which provides a matrix for 
                                                           
17
 Cf European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the governance of macro-regional 
strategies, 20 May 2014, COM(2014) 284 final. 
18
 See L.M. Alexander, ‘Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: the Case of Semi-enclosed Seas’, (1974) 2 Ocean 
Development & International Law Journal 151; L.M. Alexander, ‘Special Circumstances-Semi-enclosed Seas’ in J.K. 
Gamble, G. Pontecorvo (eds), Law of the sea: The emerging regime of the oceans, Proceedings: Eighth Law of the 
Sea Institute Annual Conference (Ballinger, 1974) 201; L.M. Alexander, ‘Regional Arrangements in the Oceans’, 
(1977) 71 American Journal of International Law 84; L.M. Alexander, ‘Regionalism at Sea: Concept and reality in 
regionalization of the Law of the Sea’ in D.M. Johnston (ed) Regionalization in the law of the sea, Proceedings: 
Eleventh Law of the Sea Institute Annual Conference (Ballinger, 1978) 3. 
19
 Cf, inter alia, L. Lucchini, M. Vœlckel, Droit de la mer, tome 1 (Editions A. Pédone, 1990) 39-40; A. Vallega, 
‘The regional approach to the ocean, the ocean regions, and ocean regionalisation – a post-modern dilemma’, (2002) 
45 Ocean & Coastal Management 721; A. Vallega, ‘The Regional Scale of Ocean Management and Marine Region 
Building’, (1994) 24 Ocean & Coastal Management 17; M.E. Gonçalves, ‘Concepts of marine region and the new 
law of the sea’, (1979) 3 Marine Policy 255-263; B.A. Bozcek, ‘The Baltic Sea: A Study in Marine Regionalism’ 
(1980), 23 German Yearbook of International Law 196; B.A. Boczek, ‘Global and Regional Approaches to the 
Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment’, (1984) 16 Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law 39. 
20
 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 51, para 96.  
21
 See D. Nolte, ‘Regional Governance from a Comparative Perspective’ in V.M. González-Sánchez (ed) Economy, 
Politics and Governance Challenges (Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2016) 1-15. 
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understanding of this notion. He identified three categories of marine regions:22 physical 
regions, management regions, and operational regions. The constituent aspects of the 
first type of marine regions (physical regions) are their geographic location and spatial 
proximity. Management (sea) regions are identified by the existence of common 
problems that render administrative action among the coastal States meaningful, useful 
or highly recommended. Geographic location or similar (physical) circumstances are 
not necessary elements of this, second type of marine regions. The operational (sea) 
regions are those in which regionalism sits on concrete agreements organizing regional 
governance regimes (e.g. fisheries agreements or agreements on the protection of the 
marine environment). 
In any case, regionalism also in its marine expression pre-existed the legal 
acknowledgment of a specific concept of enclosed or semi-enclosed sea. In the field of 
fisheries regional management organizations or arrangements (RFMO/As) have been 
operating in the Mediterranean and some parts of the oceans already the late 1940s (e.g. 
General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean, International Commission of the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Inter-American Tropical Tuna. With regard to the 
protection of the marine environment, the most relevant international initiative, UNEP’s 
Regional Seas Programme was launched in 1974 as a follow-up to the seminal 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in 
Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972;23 the Convention for Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (Barcelona Convention) was concluded in 1976, 
the year following the adoption Mediterranean Action Plan.24 The 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration, adopted at the eve of the beginning of the Third UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, played also a very significant role in the elaboration of Part XII of 
UNCLOS and its other provisions relevant to the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment.25 However, these antecedents were not enough to mobilize States 
participating in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea to form a homogenous 
pressure group on enclosed or semi-enclosed seas.26 
The already imprecise notion of a marine region becomes more blurred, especially in 
the EU context, from the emergence of a new term pertaining to regional cooperation: 
macro-region. The term was popularized with regard to the Baltic Sea, which “is a good 
example of a macro-region – an area covering a number of administrative regions but 
                                                           
22
 See, supra, n 19. 
23
 J.P. Beurier, ‘La protection des mers régionales’, (2007) 7 Neptunus, <www.cdmo.univ-
nantes.fr/servlet/com.univ.collaboratif.utils.LectureFichiergw?CODE_FICHIER=1342428408714&ID_FICHE=8359
17>; C. Lefebvre, ‘Protection et préservation du milieu marin: Les apports des Conventions Régionales sur les mers 
aux dispositions de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer’,  (2010) 8 VertigO - la revue électronique 
en sciences de l'environnement, <hvertigo.revues.org/10288>; N. Oral, ‘Regional Co-operation in Enclosed and 
Semi-Enclosed Seas for Protection of the Marine Environment under Article 123 of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea 
Convention: An Assessment’ in M.C. Ribeiro (ed), 30 Years after the Signature of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea: Proceedings of the International Conference, Faculty of Law, University of Porto, 15-17 
November 2012 (Coimbra Editora, 2014) 423-424. 
24
 Both instruments have been amended and supplemented after their inception. 
25
 Cf Principle 7 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: ‘States shall take 
all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to 
harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.’ 
26
 Lucchini, Vœlckel (n 13) 435. The authors note in this connexion that “face aux états océaniques pour lesquelles 
les règles en gestation favorisaient la réalisation d'une emprise maritime souvent considérable, les pays bordant mers 
fermées ou semi-fermées – ‘nouveaux pauvres’, riverains d'espaces contraints - éprouvaient un sentiment d'iniquité et 
de frustration dû au fait qu'ils ne bénéficiaient pas de gains ‘territoriaux’ aussi substantiels que les autres”, ibid. 
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with sufficient issues in common to justify a single strategic approach”.27 A macro-
region is thus not just the opposite of an (equally) not precisely defined “micro-region”, 
but a political (and social) construct encompassing actors at different layers, which have 
common or complementary assets, are facing common challenges and have common 
objectives. 
From that point of view the EU concept of macro-region can be useful in order to 
promote co-operation in enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. The acknowledgement in the 
EU of the existence of a macro-region leads to the adoption of a respective “macro-
regional strategy” (EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, EU Strategy for the Danube 
Region, EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region and EU Strategy for the Alpine 
Region). 
A “macro-regional strategy” is an integrated framework endorsed by the European 
Council, which is usually supported by relevant funds and other financial instruments, 
to address common challenges faced by a defined area relating to EU Member States 
and third countries located in the respective geographical area. The objective of those 
strategies is to establish appropriate conditions for strengthened cooperation 
contributing to achievement of economic, social and territorial cohesion. More 
specifically, the EU macro-regional strategies, when devised for sea basins (Baltic Sea 
Region, Adriatic and Ionian Region) and have clearly identified maritime aspects, can 
eventually offer the possibility for enhancing cooperation among the coastal States of 
the enclosed or semi-enclosed sea in question.28 
The afore mentioned lack of a concrete and more or less shared understanding of the 
term “region” in international law (despite its abundant uses in the public discourse) 
should be the reason why the expression “enclosed or semi-enclosed seas” was 
preferred in UNCLOS; this term not being less open to multiple understandings and 
interpretations. However, when speaking about enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, the 
underlying notion of regionalism at sea provides a valuable criterion for avoiding the 
possible confusion between “enclosed” and “closed” sea (mare clausum), the latter term 
implying a marine space kept exclusively within the sovereignty or control of its coastal 
States. The temptation for such a conceptual leap cannot be underestimated, taking into 
account the sense of frustration and the feeling of unfairness of several States bordering 
regional basins participating in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea due to 
the fact that the rules in gestation at this Conference benefitted mainly to States with 
ocean façade.29 The example of the Black Sea, with its undeniable particularities, of 
course, bears a testimony to such a temptation.30 The responsibility of the coastal States 
of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, and their rights should not be understood as 
excluding third States from the rights and benefits they have by virtue of the law of the 
                                                           
27
 Commission of the European Communities, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, 10 June 2009, COM(2009) 248 final. 
28
 Cf European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the added value of macro-regional 
strategies, 27 June 2013, COM(2013) 468 final: “The macro-regional concept arose from a wish for a collective 
response to environmental deterioration of the Baltic Sea, and for concerted action on challenges and opportunities of 
that region”. 
29
 Lucchini, Vœlckel (n 13) 435.  
30
 Cf I. Stribis, Pooling Forces in Protecting the Black Sea Marine Environment: Actors and Actions, ICBSS Policy 
Brief no. 17, 2009, 16 ff; I. Stribis, ‘Black Sea fisheries: the long search for an effective forum for international 
regulation’ in M.C. Ribeiro, E.J. Molenaar (eds), Maritime Safety and Environmental Protection in Europe. Multiple 
Layers in Regulation and Compliance (Gráfica Ediliber, 2015) 133-134. 
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sea.31 In this context, the English text of UNCLOS is the clearest using the term 
“enclosed”, as opposed to “closed”; other official versions of the text do not establish 
the distinction clearly, at the linguistic level, using the same term for “enclosed” and 
“closed” sea (the French version, for instance, reads “mer fermée ou semi-fermée”, the 
Spanish “mar cerrado o semicerrado”, the Russian one, “замкнутые и полузамкнутые 
моря”). 
 
3.3. Elements of the legal regime 
 
UNCLOS acknowledges a legal specificity to the concept of enclosed or semi-
enclosed seas without, however, elaborating a specific normative status to such parts of 
the world’s seas. 
 
i) Definition 
Article 122 UNCLOS provides the definition of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas in 
the following terms:  
 
“For the purposes of this Convention, ‘enclosed or semi-enclosed sea’ means a 
gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea 
or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial 
seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States”. 
 
The provision contains four criteria, out of which the two first must be met in all 
cases of enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, while the two last are envisaged as alternatives.  
The two first mandatory elements of the definition are of natural (quasi geographical) 
and political character. The geographical one requires for the concept of enclosed or 
semi-enclosed sea under the Convention the existence of a marine space in the form of 
gulf, basin or sea. The terms do not provide full clarity; they should be understood as 
denoting a marine space with various, undefined, geographical features (e.g. channels, 
islands, peninsulas, etc.) that can establish the basis for the coastal States to declare the 
given marine space as “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea”. In strict logic this first 
requirement does not add anything particular in the concept of enclosed or semi-
enclosed sea, and its omission would not have had any influence to its definition: it goes 
without saying that any enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should be a marine space.  
The political criterion requires for the existence of an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea 
that the given marine space should have more than one coastal State. In accordance with 
this criterion the Sea of Azov, for instance, qualifies as a semi-enclosed sea, after the 
dissolution of the URSS and the accession to independence of the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine. Before 1991 (during the existence of the Soviet Union and before it of the 
Russian Empire), the same marine space was an internal sea. The same goes also for the 
Sea of Marmara, whose coasts belong only to Turkey. 
In addition to these two criteria, the existence of an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea 
requires that a given marine space be “connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow 
outlet” or consist “entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic 
zones of two or more coastal States”. These requirements are directly or indirectly 
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 Cf the reservations of France to the concept of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas underscoring that it was extraneous 
to international law and that creating special rules for these marine spaces would risk establishing a mare clausum, 
A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.38, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol II, 276. 
 The Legal Regime of the Semi-enclosed Seas in the light of the UNCLOS ... 
 
 
 
79
geographical. Therefore applies to both of them what has been already said on the 
malleability of geography by political considerations. With this caveat in mind, the first 
of these two requirements tends to identify a marine space that is enclosed in the 
geographical sense, through the existence of a “narrow outlet”; the dimensions of the 
outlet are to be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particularities 
of each marine space. By the second requirement the drafters of UNCLOS tried to 
exclude from the normative scope of Part IX vast oceanic spaces, which could not 
consist “entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two 
or more coastal States”. The extension of the State jurisdiction to the sea allows, 
however, to encompass into the concept of enclosed or semi-enclosed sea marine spaces 
that otherwise could not be considered as such. UNCLOS thus clearly envisages the 
right of coastal States to declare exclusive economic zones in enclosed and semi-
enclosed seas, though it presupposes the narrowness of such marine spaces. Because of 
this last element it has been submitted that the coastal States of enclosed or semi-
enclosed seas would probably abstain from declaring exclusive economic zones, 
preferring to establish contiguous zones.32 Though this suggestion appears reasonable 
taking into account the predicament that the implementation of extended maritime 
jurisdictions can create in constrained spaces,33 it has not been confirmed in practice. 
 
ii) Cooperation of States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas 
Having defined the concept, UNCLOS proceeds with trying to substantiate a specific 
legal regime of the enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. Article 123 provides: 
 
“States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each 
other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under 
this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an 
appropriate regional organization: 
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 Lucchini, Vœlckel (n 13) 435. 
33
 Cf the conundrum concerning the establishment of EEZ-inspired zones (ecological protection and fisheries zones) 
in the Adriatic Sea by Croatia, Slovenia and Italy, the suspension of their implementation, the selective opposability 
of such zones, etc., cf Decision on the Extension of Jurisdiction of the Republic of Croatia in the Adriatic Sea, 
adopted by the Croatian Parliament on 3 October 2003, in Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 53/2004, 68–69; Decision on 
Amending the Decision on the Extension of the Jurisdiction of the Republic of Croatia in the Adriatic Sea of 3 
October 2003, adopted by the Croatian Parliament on 3 June 2004 (2005) 55 Law of the Sea Bulletin 31; Decision 
Modifying the Decision on the Extension of the Jurisdiction of the Republic of Croatia in the Adriatic Sea, adopted 
by the Croatian Parliament on 13 March 2008; Act on the Proclamation of the Ecological Protection Zone and on the 
Continental Shelf, adopted by the Slovenian Parliament, in Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 60/2006, 56–57; Law 61 on 
the Establishment of an Ecological Protection Zone Beyond the Outer Limit of the Territorial Sea, adopted on 8 
February 2006, in Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 61/2006, 98; and the diplomatic correspondence contained in Law of 
the Sea Bulletin, Nos 56/2004, 139; 57/2005, 125; 58/2005, 20; 59/2005, 33; 60/2006, 127.  
The relevant scholarship is abundant, see inter alia, D. Vidas, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 
European Union and the Rule of Law: What is going on in the Adriatic Sea, Fridtjhof Nansen Institute Report 
12/2008; M. Grbec, ‘Extension of Coastal State Jurisdiction in the Mediterranean: Quasi EEZs or Real "Sui Generis" 
Zones?’ in N.A. Martínez Gutiérrez (ed), Serving the Rule of International Maritime Law: Essays in Honour of 
Professor David Joseph Attard (Routledge, 2010) 191-201; U. Leanza, ‘L’Italia e la scelta di rafforzare la tutela 
dell'ambiente marino: l'istituzione di zone di protezione ecologica’, (2006) 89 Rivista di diritto internazionale 309; M. 
Petrak, ‘Should Croatia Declare an Exclusive Economic Zone?’, (2006) 83 Pravnik 132; Željko Dominis, ‘Nestanak 
instituta otvorenog mora u Jadranu [Disappearance of the Institute of the Open Sea in the Adriatic]’, (2006) 53 Naše 
more 228; G. Andreone, ‘La zona ecologica italiana’, (2007) 109 Il diritto marittimo 3; European Parliament, The 
Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone (ZERP) in Croatia, 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2008/397233/IPOL-PECH_NT%282008%29397233_EN.pdf>; 
A. Del Vecchio, ‘In maiore stat minus: la ZEE e le zone di protezione ecologica nel Mediterraneo’ in Studi in onore 
di Vincenzo Starace, vol 1 (Editoriale Scientifica, 2008) 207-220. 
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(a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of 
the living resources of the sea; 
(b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where appropriate 
joint programmes of scientific research in the area; 
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international organizations 
to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this article”. 
 
The language used in this article raises from the outset the issue of the normative 
density of this provision, in other words to what the States parties commit to by 
becoming parties to UNCLOS? 
The opening of the provision calls on the coastal States of an enclosed or semi-
enclosed sea to cooperate; this call is couched in the conditional (“States … should 
cooperate”). The indicative mood is used with the verb “endeavour” (“they shall 
endeavour”). Thus the duty to cooperate appears in this provision as contingent (or 
dependent) on some circumstances (or conditions) and is in fact limited to an effort by 
the coastal States. Of course such an effort to cooperate shall be earnest and in good 
faith; otherwise the provision would be without effect. In any case, the plain language 
of the provision indicates that we have, at best, a programmatic provision, a 
commitment to behave in a certain manner indicated by law – at worst, Article 123 
would be a soft law provision; the above difference between the two moods in the same 
phrase cannot be meaningless: Article 123 addresses to States bordering an enclosed or 
semi-enclosed sea a strong recommendation and instigation to cooperate, to the extend 
possible. The duty to cooperate contained in this article is a soft one. 
We may speak here for the so-called “pedagogical function” of the law, and, in 
particular of law-making, in the sense of articulating in an normative text an aim the 
legislator wants to achieve, in order to imprint it in the minds of the subjects and other 
users of the law and achieve thus in a gradual and incremental manner the passage from 
an inchoate commitment to a fully-fledged obligation. Article 123 UNCLOS, and in fact 
the whole Part IX, can be viewed from this viewpoint. 
Furthermore, Article 123 did not codified pre-existing customary law – the 
discussions at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea testify to that: the two 
provisions on the enclosed or semi-enclosed seas constitute progressive development of 
international law. Consequently in the process of becoming customary law after the 
signature and entry into force of UNCLOS, which is still in progress, only the contents 
of the agreed written text of Part IX can become a customary obligation, binding upon 
States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. 
Consequently Article 123 UNCLOS addresses an entreaty to states bordering an 
enclosed or semi-enclosed sea to cooperate. However, the normative density of this soft 
obligation may increase, reading the Convention as a whole. In this respect the 
obligation provided for the protection of the marine environment (“coordinate the 
management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the 
sea”, Article 123 (b)) could be reinforced when read together with Part XII UNCLOS, 
in particular Articles 192 and more so 197, which provide, respectively, for the general 
obligation of States “to protect and preserve the marine environment”, and the more 
specific obligation for cooperation on a global or regional basis, in the latter case 
“taking into account characteristic regional features”, “for the protection and 
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preservation of the marine environment”.34 Similarly Articles 242 and 243 UNCLOS 
are pertinent for the commitment relating to marine scientific research (Article 123(c)), 
while the provisions of Articles 61 ff and 117 ff UNCLOS may be invoked in order to 
strengthen the weak binding force of the clause relating to the living resources of the sea 
(Article 123(a)). The necessity however to turn to the general rule in order to give 
binding force to a specific one is a clear indication of the programmatic nature of the 
incitement addressed to States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed by UNCLOS. 
This conclusion is further supported by the concrete contents of the commitment 
contained in Article 123 UNCLOS. Not only is the call to cooperate formulated in 
programmatic terms, but it is also limited to “coordination” of national policies, rights 
and duties of the coastal States in the areas of fisheries and in general marine living 
resources, protection and preservation of the marine environment and scientific 
research. With respect to the scientific research Article 123(c) seems to go further than 
mere coordination as it contains also an encouragement to the coastal States to 
“undertake where appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area”. This 
additional step does not however warrant the conclusion of the existence of a binding 
obligation, as it is coupled with the qualification “where appropriate”, a standard term 
for “soft” obligations. 
The fourth and last item of the call to States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed 
seas to cooperate consists in an appeal for international cooperation that goes beyond 
the regional coastal States: Article 123(d) provides that the coastal States of an enclosed 
or semi-enclosed sea “shall endeavour […] (d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested 
States or international organizations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the 
provisions of this article”. This is a further remainder of the fact that enclosed or semi-
enclosed seas are not “closed” seas and that the issues within the scope of Article 123 
UNCLOS (management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living 
resources of the sea; protection and preservation of the marine environment) commonly 
transcend the confined space of an enclosed or semi-enclosed and may require 
international cooperation not limited to the regional or sub-regional coastal States. 
The established programmatic character of Article 123 UNCLOS does not however 
authorize the conclusion that this provision is devoid of any legal consequences. There 
is a good faith obligation of coastal States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea 
to cooperate in the fields provided for in Article 123 UNCLOS. This is an obligation of 
behaviour which may encompass various measures from consultations among the 
coastal States to the establishment of regional arrangements and the negotiation of 
agreed instruments for the coordination of their national policies concerning marine 
living resources, protection and preservation of the marine environment and marine 
scientific research. 
Though Article 123 UNCLOS opens with the phrase that “States bordering an 
enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their 
rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention”, it keeps silent with 
respect to the delimitation of zones under national jurisdiction. The travaux 
preparatoires of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea reveal that in an the 
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 Unlike Article 123, Articles 192 and 197 are written in binding terms: Article192, “States have the obligation to 
protect and preserve the marine environment”; Article 197, “States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as 
appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and 
elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, 
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features” 
(emphasis added). 
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early stages of the Conference few states submitted proposals to include in the relevant 
provisions on enclosed or semi-enclosed seas some references to the delimitation in 
these marine spaces (in the form of an incitation to coastal states to cooperate also in 
this field, or a proposal to elaborate specific rules applicable to the delimitation in 
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas).35 These efforts did not succeed and the text of Article 
123 was finalized already in the Revised Single Negotiating Text of 1976,36 and 
remained the same from this early state of the Third Conference on the Law of the 
Sea.37  
The case Maritime delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) confirmed the 
lack of specific rules pertaining to the delimitation in enclosed or semi-enclosed sea. 
The ICJ faced with opposite views by the parties on the issue whether the “Black Sea’s 
nature as an enclosed sea and its rather small size”38 constitute a relevant circumstance 
which ought to be taken into account in the delimitation process of the maritime areas of 
Romania and of Ukraine,39 did not in its Judgment of 3 February 2009 find any 
particular relevance of this circumstance in the delimitation process and considered 
“that, no adjustment to the equidistance line as provisionally drawn” in accordance with 
the general method the Court applies for any delimitation process “[wa]s called for”, 
due to the enclosed nature of the Black Sea.40 
There is here a weakness of the regime of the enclosed or semi-enclosed seas as 
envisaged in Part IX UNCLOS, because the lack of delimitation and the ensuing 
disputes in this respect between and among coastal states of an enclosed or semi-
enclosed sea limit the effectiveness of the invitation for coordination in areas where the 
coastal states have (depending on the zone) sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction 
and control. This is an aspect that cannot be neglected when examining the state 
practice in regard to enclosed or semi-enclosed seas they border. 
Be that as it may, coordination as envisaged by Article 123 UNCLOS has borne 
some fruits, in particular in the fields of marine living resources and of the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment: the strengthening of the UNEP Regional 
Seas Programme through regional conventions and action plans,41 and the establishment 
of several new regional fisheries management bodies (RFMOs) have been undeniably 
encouraged by the concept of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas and the feeling of 
solidarity that this concepts strives to instil in the relations among coastal states 
                                                           
35
 Cf A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.17, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol II, 
148; A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.28, ibid. 164; A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.38, ibid. 273, 274, 275, 277; A/CONF.62/C.2/L.8, 
Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol III, 188. 
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 See Article 130 of the Revised Single Negotiating Text of 6 May 1976, A/CONF.62/WP.8/REV.1/Part II, Official 
Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol V, 172. 
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 B. Vukas, ‘Enclosed and semi-enclosed seas’, (1978) 11-12 Revue iranienne de relations internationales 171; M. 
Bennouna, ‘La délimitation des espaces maritimes en Méditerranée’ in The law and the sea: Essays in memory of 
Jean Carroz (FAO, 1987) 13. 
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 International Court of Justice, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment of 3 
February 2009, ICJ Reports 2009, 118, para 171. 
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 Ibid, 118-119, para 171 and 172. 
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 Ibid, 120, para 178. 
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 N. Oral, ‘Regional Co-operation in Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas for Protection of the Marine Environment 
under Article 123 of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention: An Assessment’ in M.C. Ribeiro (ed), 30 Years after 
the Signature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Proceedings of the International Conference, 
Faculty of Law, University of Porto, 15-17 November 2012 (Coimbra Editora, 2014) 434-438; Christophe Lefebvre, 
‘Protection et préservation du milieu marin: Les apports des Conventions Régionales sur les mers aux dispositions de 
la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer’, (2010) 8 VertigO - la revue électronique en sciences de 
l'environnement, <vertigo.revues.org/10288>; P.H. Sand, ‘The rise of regional agreements for marine environment 
protection in The law and the sea: Essays in memory of Jean Carroz (FAO, 1987) 223-232. 
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bordering such marine spaces. These developments have a direct bearing to the 
Mediterranean at large (Barcelona Convention system and General Fisheries 
Commission for the Mediterranean), including thus to the Adriatic and Ionian marine 
space. 
 
 
4. EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR)42 
 
In addition to the above general regime applicable to the Adriatic and Ionian marine 
space as a sub-system of the Mediterranean Sea, the prospect of that marine area being 
in the medium- or longer-term bordered by EU Member States places, as it has been 
underscored supra, a particular responsibility to the EU and its institutions along its 
Member States. 
The general EU primary and secondary law regarding maritime affairs is of course 
applicable in the Adriatic and Ionian marine space to the extent this space is under the 
sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and control of EU member states. In the fields 
of the law of the sea where the EU has exclusive or concurrent competencies (e.g. 
conservation and management of marine fisheries, prevention of marine pollution, 
maritime transport, safety of shipping, promotion of cooperation with third countries 
and international organizations on marine research and technological development),43 
the EU itself is a coastal actor of the Adriatic and Ionian seas with rights and duties 
under the law of the sea and an actor to which the invitation to cooperate included in 
Article 123 UNCLOS is also addressed. 
However, the specific responsibility of the EU in the Adriatic and Ionian marine 
space is not limited to the above fields of exclusive or shared competencies. Conscious 
of the significance of its responsibilities in this marine space, EU institutions included 
the Adriatic and Ionian basin among their priorities in the new EU regional policy, 
marked by the concept of macro-region, already succinctly presented earlier in this 
paper. The European Ministers responsible for the Integrated Maritime Policy and the 
European Commission highlighted in the Limassol Declaration that sea basin 
cooperation is a milestone in the development and implementation of the EU's 
Integrated Maritime Policy.44 In this context the European Commission has elaborated 
an EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region and submitted it to the other 
institutions on 17 June 2014. This Strategy draws from the developments in other 
macro-regions (EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, 2009; EU Strategy for the 
Danube Region, 2011). The starting point for the EUSAIR was the Maritime Strategy 
for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, adopted by the Commission on 30 November 2012, 
which was envisaged by the Commission itself as a possible “first component of an EU 
macro-regional strategy covering additional fields”, should the EU Member States 
                                                           
42
 See the EUSAIR area on Map 4, infra, at 246. 
43
 For more details, see Declaration concerning the competence of the European Community with regard to matters 
governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 and the Agreement of 28 
July 1994 relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention, 1 April 1998, 
<www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#European Community Declaration 
made upon formal confirmation>. 
44
 Declaration of the European Ministers responsible for the Integrated Maritime Policy and the European 
Commission on a Marine and Maritime Agenda for growth and jobs, Limassol, 8 October 2012, para 3. 
 Ioannis Stribis 
 
84 
decided to ask the Commission to prepare such an EU Strategy for the Adriatic and 
Ionian region.45  
 
4.1. Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas 
 
The Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas was aimed at assessing the 
needs and potential of sea-related activities in this marine space and setting out a 
framework for coordinated efforts by maritime stakeholders driving concrete 
cooperation in maritime affairs forward. The proposed framework for cooperation was 
devised in order “to adapt the [EU’s] Integrated Maritime Policy to the needs and 
potential of the natural resources and socio-economic fabric of the Adriatic and Ionian 
marine and coastal areas”, through promoting “long-term sustainable and responsible 
fishing activities, good environmental status of the marine environment and a safer and 
more secure maritime space” and horizontal issues, such as the “efficient adaptation to 
the impact of climate change”. The ultimate aim was to “foster smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth of the maritime economy thus contributing to achieving the targets of 
the Europe 2020 Strategy”.46 
The Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas purported to set an agenda 
for achieving such smart, sustainable and inclusive growth from the sea. This agenda 
contained four pillars, which were elaborated through extensive stakeholder 
consultations held in 2012. These four priority areas are: 1) Maximising the potential of 
the blue economy; 2) Healthier marine environment; 3) A safer and more secure 
maritime space; and, 4) Sustainable and responsible fishing activities. 
The first pillar of the Maritime Strategy envisages the creation of a thriving maritime 
economy that provides growth and job opportunities to the coastal populations. Its 
major aims are to set the conditions for innovation and competitiveness; to promote the 
development of Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP) and establishment of Integrated 
Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) at both at national and cross-border level, on the 
basis of the ecosystem approach; to enhance efficient and environmentally friendly 
maritime transport as well as intermodality, by integrating seaborne and land transport; 
to foster coastal and maritime tourism as one of the main and fast-growing maritime 
activities; to contribute to the development of a strong, high-quality European 
aquaculture sector that is environmentally and economically sustainable and has the 
potential to create jobs and to supply healthy food products.47 
The second pillar addresses the issue of a healthier marine environment, which is of 
crucial importance in the architecture of Article 123 UNCLOS. In this respect, the 
Maritime Strategy aims at ensuring that exploitation of the economic potential of the 
Adriatic and Ionian seas is consistent with a healthy and productive marine 
environment. The Maritime Strategy provides examples of priority areas to develop in 
the respective EU policies, as applicable to the Adriatic and Ionian marine space: ensure 
good environmental and ecological status of the marine and coastal environment by 
2020 in line with the relevant EU acquis and the ecosystem approach; preserve 
biodiversity, ecosystems and their services by implementing the European ecological 
network Natura 2000 and managing it, considering also related work within the 
Barcelona Convention system; reduce marine litter, including through better waste 
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management in coastal areas; continue improving sub-regional cooperation and 
monitoring the existing mechanisms, particularly those set up by EMSA as regards 
prevention, preparedness and coordinated response to major oil spills and exploring 
how to make better use of available EU resources.48 
One of the specificities of the Adriatic and Ionian marine space is the high amount of 
ships’ crossings, compared to most other sub-systems of the Mediterranean. In addition 
to the cargo crossings towards Central Europe, there is an increasing number of 
passenger ships sailing in this marine space; oil and gas transportation is also growing. 
Beyond commercial maritime traffic, the Adriatic and Ionian seas are used by criminal 
networks engaged in irregular migration and other illegal activities. In this conditions 
the third pillar consisting in making the Adriatic and Ionian marine space safer and 
more secure focuses on the enhancement of the capabilities of public authorities of the 
coastal States to monitor maritime traffic, respond to emergencies, save human lives, 
preserve the marine environment, control fisheries activities, and cope with security 
threats and illegal activities.49 
The fourth and last pillar, unsurprisingly, deals with sustainable and more 
responsible fisheries activities, a topic directly envisaged for coordination in Article 123 
UNCLOS. The Maritime Strategy aims at elaborating regional policies to enhance 
efforts towards long-term sustainable and responsible fisheries which must provide an 
economic resource for the coastal areas and their inhabitants, based, in particular, on 
effective implementation of the principles of the reformed Common Fisheries Policy 
and cooperation on scientific issues for the fisheries management on the regional and 
sea-basin level, such as the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean and 
FAO regional projects (Adriamed and Eastmed). The Maritime Strategy proposes the 
development of some indicative priority areas to develop: a) achieving the sustainable 
management of fisheries, including the development of multiannual plans and measures 
such as Marine Protected Areas in their wider sense; b) contributing to the profitability 
and sustainability of fisheries, by strengthening stakeholders' involvement in fisheries 
management and other actions; c) improving the culture of compliance, saving 
resources, facilitating the transfer of information and enhancing cooperation for the 
control of fishing activities; and, d) developing scientific cooperation on fisheries.50 
The above pillars involve not only coordination of the management, conservation, 
exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea (Article 123(a) 
UNCLOS), but also coordination of marine scientific policies, undertaking of joint 
scientific research programmes in this field, as well as invitation for cooperation to non-
regional actors (or non-exclusively regional actors) (Article 123(c)-(d) UNCLOS). They 
further require coordination in concrete aspects of the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment in the Adriatic and Ionian marine space (Article 123(b) UNCLOS), 
which is a topic cross-cutting all four pillars of the Maritime Strategy.51 
The reception of the Maritime Strategy by the concerned stakeholders confirmed 
their support for the direction taken and the concrete policy priorities it set. 
Nevertheless, it also raised expectations for the elaboration of a wider macro-regional 
strategy, including an action plan for the implementation of the policy priorities 
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contained in the Maritime Strategy. One month after the presentation of the Maritime 
Strategy, the European Council requested the Commission to bring forward an EU 
Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region before the end of 2014.52 The new Strategy 
would of course fully incorporate the thematic components of the Maritime Strategy for 
Adriatic and Ionian Seas; it would however have a wider scope and cover also issues 
not directly related to the sea. 
 
4.2. From a maritime strategy to a macro-regional strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian 
region 
 
The drafting of the EUSAIR reflects the developments in the regional policy of the 
EU by the emergence of the Adriatic Ionian macro-region.  
The concept of macro-region originally arose from the need for a collective response 
to environmental deterioration of the Baltic Sea, and for concerted action on challenges 
and opportunities of that region.53 The European Commission identified the basic 
elements providing the basis for macro-regional cooperation. These include a regional 
sense of identity, a wish for common strategic planning and a willingness to pool 
resources.54 Furthermore, the macro-regional concept rests upon the principles of 
integration, coordination, cooperation, multi-level governance and partnership. Taken 
individually these guiding principles require that the objectives that a macro-regional 
policy seeks to achieve should be embedded in existing policy frameworks (EU, 
regional, national, local, pre-accession), programmes (EU, country-specific, territorial 
cooperation, sectoral), and financial instruments (integration); that the policies, 
strategies and funding resources should avoid compartmentalisation whether between 
sectoral policies, actors or different tiers of government (coordination); that regional 
actors (at the State or infra-State level) should cooperate across the region, changing the 
“mind-set” from inward to outward-looking regional development ideas (cooperation); 
that the creation of a macro-region should not create new tiers of decision-making, but 
function with various levels of policy-makers working better together (multi-level 
governance); and, that in the framework of a macro-region, EU and non-EU countries 
can work together on the basis of mutual interest and respect (partnership).55 
The conceptualisation of the macro-region lead to the next step, the elaboration of 
the concept of macro-regional strategy. A macro-regional strategy is a jointly agreed 
strategy on how to overcome challenges and benefit from identified within a macro-
region. The idea of a macro-regional strategy is thus to coordinate projects and actions 
financed by a variety of sources regarding these macro-regional challenges and 
opportunities.56 This type of strategy purports to bring together relevant stakeholders 
(institutions, thematic experts and financial instruments) existing on local, micro-
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regional,57 national and macro-regional levels to implement the common objectives 
identified. Participants at each of these levels are expected to contribute to the common 
objectives with their own respective priorities, competences, experience and resources. 
In this connection it is important to underscore that macro-regional strategies do not 
create new political or administrative tiers, but strive to mobilise existent actors and 
align various existing policies and funds around the agreed objectives.58 
The EUSAIR has been public by the European Commission on 18 June 2014 and 
was endorsed by the Council on 29 September of the same year.59 The general objective 
of the EUSAIR is to promote sustainable economic and social prosperity in the Adriatic 
and Ionian region. It proposes a rolling Action Plan with four pillars: 1/ Blue Growth; 2/ 
Connecting the Region; 3/ Environmental Quality; and 4/ Sustainable tourism. 
The main objective of the “Blue Growth” pillar60 is to drive innovative maritime and 
marine growth in the Adriatic and Ionian region, by promoting sustainable economic 
development and jobs, as well as business opportunities in the Blue economy.61 Priority 
fields of regional cooperation under this pillar include blue technologies, coordinated 
fishery management and maritime and marine governance and services.62 The second 
pillar of the Action Plan entitled “Connecting the Region (transport and energy 
networks)” aims to improve transport and energy connectivity in the Adriatic and Ionian 
region and with the rest of Europe, inter alia, through coordinated monitoring of 
maritime traffic and development of multimodal transport, interconnection of power 
grids and development of gas networks.63 Under the pillar “Environmental Quality” the 
drafters of EUSAIR address in priority the marine environmental (threats to coastal and 
marine biodiversity, pollution of the sea) and set measurable milestones in the 
achievement of concrete goals (e.g. enhancement of the NATURA 2000 and Emerald 
networks and establishment of a coherent network of Marine Protected Areas under the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive by 2020; 10% surface coverage by 2020 of the 
Adriatic and Ionian Seas by Marine Protected areas, in line with international 
commitments.)64 Lastly, the fourth pillar, “Sustainable Tourism” pillar intends to 
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develop the full potential of the Adriatic and Ionian region in terms of innovative, 
sustainable, responsible and quality tourism.65  
In addition, capacity building, including communication, as well as research and 
innovation with a view to boosting employment, growth and competitiveness, are cross-
cutting aspects of the rolling Action Plan. Climate change mitigation and adaptation as 
well as disaster risk management are horizontal principles relevant to all four pillars. 66 
From the above very schematic presentation, it becomes clear that the four pillars of 
the Strategy (maritime and marine growth, including fisheries, transport and energy 
networks, environmental quality and sustainable tourism), and the targets proposed for 
the implementation of these priority pillars fully incorporate the relevant priorities set in 
the Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. As it has been showed earlier in 
this paper these priorities are consonant with the invitation to cooperation and 
coordination Article 123 UNCLOS addresses to States bordering an enclosed or semi-
enclosed sea. As confirmed and developed in the EUSAIR, the pillars of the Maritime 
Strategy cover and probably surpass the contents of the coordination in the fields of 
marine living resources, protection and preservation of the marine environment and 
marine scientific research, envisaged in the invitation to cooperate of Article 123 
UNCLOS. In fact the EUSAIR could be seen as an example or a best practice as it 
provides valuable and detailed input to the manner through which the aims of Article 
123 UNCLOS can be successfully met in other regional seas (independently from the 
participation of the EU). 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The initiative of the EU to undertake to elaborate and then implement a distinct EU 
Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region, though not primarily, and even not mainly, 
motivated by considerations relating to the problématique of enclosed or semi-enclosed 
seas, fulfils nonetheless the specific role that the EU has and will have in the future in 
the Adriatic and Ionian marine space, as a coastal actor, along its Member States and its 
prospective members. The real challenge, however as in every strategy and action plan 
lies in their implementation. Even so, the contribution of the EUSAIR from an 
institutional point of view, to the consolidation of a specific regime for enclosed and 
semi-enclosed seas, initiated in UNCLOS, and of the invitation to States bordering such 
marine spaces to cooperate is already perceptible. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The legal regime on Adriatic and Ionian basins results from various forms of 
international cooperation, which was developed, during the time, by autonomous 
policies, through the sector-specific rules, not always in a coordinated manner. 
These factors evidently compromise a good degree of systemic coherence in the 
overall management of activities in this basin, concerning in particular transport, trade, 
port and coastal industry, fishing, aquaculture and, increasingly, marine research, 
renewable energy, technology, innovation and resource exploitation. 
The continuous development of these activities, that are common to the majority of 
European seas and not only to Adriatic and Ionian Seas, led the EU to adopt the so 
called Integrated Maritime Policy, which was presented by the Commission in October 
2007 by the Communication concerning “An Integrated Maritime Policy for the 
European Union”.1 The Commission has in fact recently begun to warn of the need to 
develop and implement forms of maritime governance for integrated, coordinated and 
common management of water, in order to identify and exploit potential synergies 
between all EU policies affecting the oceans, seas, coastal regions and maritime sectors. 
In this views, the Integrated Maritime Policy promotes a cross-sectoral approach to 
the maritime governance, based on the recognition that all matters relating to Europe’s 
oceans and seas are interlinked, and on the opportunity to develop and implement an 
integrated, coherent, and joined-up decision-making in relation to the oceans, seas, 
coastal regions and maritime sectors.2 
This inter-sectoral approach justifies and founds an action at EU-level: actually, the 
EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy has no explicit legal basis in the Treaty. However, the 
Integrated Maritime Policy covers many EU sectorial policies with a bearing on the seas 
and coasts such as fisheries, freedom security and justice, transport, industry, territorial 
cohesion, research, environment, energy and tourism.3 
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In this perspective, the European Commission has launched the European Strategy 
for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR),4 recently endorsed by the Council,5 
following the model provided by the Baltic Sea Region.6 The starting point for this 
strategy was the Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas,7 now incorporated 
into the EUSAIR. 
The EUSAIR builds upon already existing cooperation in this area, mainly through 
the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative, which started in 2000 with the signature of the 
Ancona Declaration.8 
The total area of the eight participating countries to the EUSAIR covers more than 
70 million people and plays a key role in strengthening geographical continuity in 
Europe. This Region enjoys a unique geographical position and specific coastline 
structure: its rich marine biodiversity represents an immense potential for the creation of 
innovative and sustainable “economic development and growth, including blue 
technologies, fisheries and aquaculture, and better maritime and marine governance and 
services”.9 
The region presents heterogeneous levels of development and needs and the socio-
economic differences between the countries are large, especially between EU Member 
States and non-Member States: in this perspective, EUSAIR represents an important 
instrument for creating the conditions for reducing socio-economic differences between 
the countries and for promoting sustainable development and territorial, social and 
economic cohesion.10 
The impact of the financial crisis on the region is furthermore very serious and it 
requires a systematic exchange of knowledge, experience and practices in this context 
and a periodical evaluation of strategies planned to achieve economic reforms, 
especially in less developed countries. In this field, the EU institutions underline the 
close interdependence between smart, inclusive and sustainable growth of economic 
dynamics and the increase of cultural, scientific and educational cooperation.11 
Among the social issues affecting the Adriatic and Ionian Region, a priority is 
represented by migratory challenges: face of all the tragedies in the Mediterranean, a 
comprehensive and integrated approach to migration in the Region is essential among 
Member States and in cooperation with third countries, to realise solidarity and to 
encourage the exchange of good practices in receiving migrants and protecting asylum 
seekers. Indeed, after the Lisbon Treaty, the cohesion policy includes territorial 
dimension, as result both from the new Article 174 TFEU and also from Article 16 
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TEU, which refer, inter alia, to the promotion of social, economic and territorial 
cohesion and solidarity between States. In this context, EU Strategies for the creation of 
Macro Region represent particularly suitable tools to realise the EU cohesion policy.12 
 
 
2. The inter-sectorial instruments and strategies for the Adriatic and Ionian 
Region 
 
The absence of an expressed competence connotes and characterizes all the EU 
Integrated Maritime Policy and profoundly affect the definition of the articulation of the 
relationship between national policies and EU policies. The action at EU level stems 
from the cross-sectoral and trans-national nature of the activities involved and synergies 
among sectoral policies. The purpose is to develop a comprehensive strategy for growth 
and sustainability for the oceans, seas, coastal regions and cross-cutting elements of the 
maritime sectors.13 
This feature involves in particular the principles of the Maritime Spatial Planning 
(MSP) and Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM), that represent specific tools 
of the EU maritime policy, since they promote the integrated use all the potential 
offered by the sea, with the aim of composing and reconciling economic growth and 
environmental protection; national interests and the biological integrity of seas and 
oceans. 
Actually, these processes have a significant impact in the context of Adriatic and 
Ionian Region: the renewed impulse to the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas 
offshore and on land involves a careful evaluation of the risks of disasters, involving the 
whole Region, with very serious consequences for the environment, economy, tourism 
and public health.14 These considerations are particularly important for the Adriatic Sea, 
which is a semi-enclosed, shallow sea, lacking the capacity to disperse pollutants and 
mainly founding its economic activities and tourism on its specific environmental 
features and ecosystems. 
A proper joint governance of the maritime space provides, in this perspective, an 
important framework for the sustainable and transparent use of maritime and marine 
resources, to guarantee “that the interests of the sectors concerned are taken into account 
in an equitable way at every stage in the development of maritime activities, namely 
when designing maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal zone management”.15 
In order to ensure consistency and legal clarity for MSP, in 2014, the European 
Parliament and the Council adopted the Directive 2014/89/EU.16 It is the result of 
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complex negotiations, characterized by widely divergent positions from the Member 
States.17 
In the light of Article 3(2) of this directive, “maritime spatial planning” means “a 
process by which the relevant Member State’s authorities analyse and organise human 
activities in marine areas to achieve ecological, economic and social objectives”. 
This Directive recognizes in one hand that the Member States remain responsible and 
competent for designing and determining, within their marine waters, the format and 
content of such plans, including institutional arrangements and, where applicable, any 
apportionment of maritime space to different activities and uses respectively. Article 
5(1), cites that “this Directive is without prejudice to the competence of Member States 
to determine how the different objectives are reflected and weighted in their maritime 
spatial plan or plans”. 
At the same time and in the other hand, the Directive identifies the MSP as a cross-
cutting policy tool enabling public authorities and stakeholders to apply a coordinated, 
integrated and trans-boundary approach. The application of an ecosystem-based 
approach will contribute to promoting the sustainable development and growth of the 
maritime and coastal economies and the sustainable use of marine and coastal 
resources”.18 
In conformity with the subsidiarity principle set out in Article 5 TEU, the 
Commission explains that the added value of EU action is first of all to ensure and 
streamline Member State action on MSP and ICZM to guarantee consistent and 
coherent implementation across the EU, through to a common legal framework and 
uniform references and legal standards. 
Secondly, the EU action in this field enable a better co-operation on MSP and ICZM 
between Member States that share marine regions and sub-regions, like Adriatic and 
Ionian Region. The cross border cooperation in this field is essential to safeguard of 
marine ecosystems, fishing grounds, marine protected areas as well as maritime 
infrastructures, such as cables, pipelines, shipping lanes, oil, gas and wind installations, 
running across national borders.19 
Maritime spatial plans and integrated coastal management strategies also lends to 
apply, thirdly, an ecosystem-based approach to facilitate the co-existence and prevent 
conflicts between competing sector activities in marine waters and coastal zones. 
The added values of a common approach at EU level take on a special importance in 
particular with specific reference to the Adriatic and Ionian basins, because all the 
coastal States of the region are full members of the EU (Croatia, Greece, Italy and 
Slovenia), or are still candidate Countries (Albania, Montenegro and Serbia) or have 
potential candidate membership status (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
Although the Commission has repeatedly stated that there will be no new 
enlargement in the near future, the creation of the macro-region “will enable the 
                                                                                                                                               
Applicability to Ocean Renwables’ in P.A. Fernandez Sanchez, J.A. Azeredo Lopes (eds), Seguridad medioambiental 
y orden internacional: IV Encuentro Luso-Español de Profesores de Derecho International Público y Relaciones 
Internationales (Atelier, 2015). 
17
 See, in this light, the emblematic position of French Government, Contribution des Autorités françaises dans le 
cadre de la consultation publique de la Commission européenne concernant la planification spatiale maritime et la 
gestion intégrée des zones côtières, July 2011. 
18
 Directive establishing a framework for Maritime Spatial Planning (n 12) para 3. 
19
 See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
framework for Maritime Spatial Planning and integrated coastal management, 13 March 2013, COM(2013) 133 
final. 
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candidate Countries to make a step closer to the EU by aligning their policies and 
working closely with Member States”,20 with the Commission’s guidance. 
Indeed, in view of their long-term future accession, policies relating to the 
management of the whole area would fall entirely within the scope of EU law and thus 
it is evident that the governance of this regional basin constitutes a strategic interest for 
the EU and it is in this context even more obvious the strong need to rely on a common 
framework at EU level to support the cooperation between States in the MSP. 
In this perspective, the macro-regional strategy may be perceived “as a tool of 
European integration and increased territorial cohesion based on voluntary cooperation 
among Member States and neighbouring countries in addressing common challenges”.21 
This is, indeed, also the perspective adopted by the Directive 2014/89/EU, which, in 
Article 11, encourages the cooperation in the framework of specific strategies for sea 
basins, such as the realisation of the EUSAIR.22 
The macro-regional strategies represent “a new model of multilevel governance”. 
The involvement of stakeholders representing the EU, national, regional and local 
levels, including economic and social partners and civil society organisations, important 
role in the promotion of democracy, decentralisation and greater local and regional 
autonomy, as well as the complementarity between different policies and programmes 
are actually essential for successful implementation and make tangible benefits for the 
regions involved.23 Actually, the Baltic Sea strategy has confirmed the success of EU 
cooperation mechanisms and provided useful experience for developing new macro-
regional strategies, particularly as a pioneer in MSP in Europe.24 Thus, previous 
experiences of macro-regional strategies represent an important point of reference for 
the Adriatic and Ionian area, to use to exchange best practices, and to increase cross-
border and trans-national cooperation under cohesion policy. 
 
 
3. The objectives and aims of the Protocol to the Barcelona Convention on 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management: their relevance for the Adriatic and Ionian 
Region 
 
The MSP acts on three different dimensions, involving activities concerning  the 
seafloor, water space and water surface. A same part of marine space can consequently 
                                                 
20
 In these terms, Report Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on an EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian 
Region (n 4) Explanatory Statement. 
21
 Ibid, point G. 
22
 Article 11: “1. As part of the planning and management process, Member States bordering marine waters shall 
cooperate with the aim of ensuring that maritime spatial plans are coherent and coordinated across the marine region 
concerned. Such cooperation shall take into account, in particular, issues of a transnational nature. / 2.   The 
cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be pursued through: (a) existing regional institutional cooperation 
structures such as Regional Sea Conventions; and/or (b) networks or structures of Member States’ competent 
authorities; and/or (c) any other method that meets the requirements of paragraph 1, for example in the context of sea-
basin strategies”. In particular, the European Commission identifies the northern part of the Adriatic as having “more 
potential for the application of Maritime Spatial Planning than the other parts of the Adriatic”; on this point, see 
European Commission (Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries), The Potential of Maritime Spatial 
Planning in the Mediterranean Sea. Case Study Report: The Adriatic Sea, January 2011, 
<ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/documentation/studies/documents/case_study_adriatic_sea_en.pdf>. 
23
 Report Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on an EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (n 4) 
point A. 
24
 See J. Zaucha, The Key to Governing the Fragile Baltic Sea. Maritime Spatial Planning in the Baltic Sea Region 
and Way Forward (VASAB Secretariat, 2014). 
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be used for different purposes, provided that they are compatible with each other. This 
three-dimensional character distinguishes the MSP from the territorial planning, 
because the conditions and methods of planning are clearly different. 
In this perspective, it is also important to ensure a certain degree of consistency in 
planning terrestrial and maritime spaces, in particular for the management of that 
specific area of transition between land and sea which is represented by the coastal 
areas, which form the “hinge” between maritime and terrestrial development. 
The instrument given by the ICZM, according to the principles and objectives of the 
Protocol to the Barcelona Convention on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM 
Protocol),25 assumes consequently  a particular importance in this field. 
Due to its semi-enclosed nature, the Adriatic Sea is especially vulnerable to pollution 
and has unusual hydrographic features such as the fact that the depth and coastline vary 
considerably between the north and south of the region; whereas fish stocks are shared 
among all the coastal countries, which puts regeneration of the stocks under sustained 
pressure.26 These factors have to be taken into consideration, to ensure that the planned 
actions and technical measures are devised at the regional level and tailored to the 
specificities of this area and its marine resources and fisheries.27 
Objective of ICZM28 is indeed to create a general framework to fully exploit the 
potential of the coastal zone as a whole, through the development of environmental 
governance and taking into account, in an integrated manner, natural, socio-economic 
and cultural elements that affect the coastal regions. 
Although the specific object of reference is different (marine areas vs coastal areas), 
it is clear that there is profound interrelation between the MSP and ICZM policies. 
Hence the need to ensure coherence between the two instruments. The Commission had 
indeed initially proposed the adoption of a sole Directive on both institutions.29 The 
proposed instrument required Member States, inter alia, to establish coastal 
management strategies to strengthen the implementation of those principles and 
elements set out in the Council Recommendation on Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management of 200230 and the ICZM Protocol. Actually the Directive 2014/89/EU, 
which refers exclusively to the MSP, contains two mere references to the ICZM, calling 
on Member States to promote coherence between the two processes31 and to use the 
                                                 
25
 The ICZM Protocol was signed in Madrid on 21 January 2008 and entered into force on 24 March 2011. This 
Protocol was ratified by the EU with the adoption of 2010/631/EU: Council Decision of 13 September 2010 
concerning the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management in the Mediterranean to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal 
Region of the Mediterranean (in Official Journal of the European Union, L 279, 23 October 2010, 1 ff.). In the 
Adriatic and Ionian Region, the ICZM Protocol is currently in force in Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro; Italy and 
Greece are signatories, but  they have not ratified it; and Bosnia and Herzegovina has not signed it. 
26
 Randone (n 14). 
27
 Report Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on an EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (n 20) 
point H. 
28
 According to Article 2(f) ICZM Protocol, ICZM means “a dynamic process for the sustainable management and 
use of coastal zones, taking into account at the same time the fragility of coastal ecosystems and landscapes, the 
diversity of activities and uses, their interactions, the maritime orientation of certain activities and uses and their 
impact on both the marine and land parts”. 
29
 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
framework for maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal management, 12 March, 2013, COM(2013) 133 
final. 
30
 Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2002 concerning the implementation of 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Europe, in Official Journal of the European Communities, L 148, 6 June 
2002, 24 ff. 
31
 Cf. Article 6(2)(c), Directive 2014/89/EU. 
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ICZM to take into account land-sea interactions with MSP.32 However, it is important to 
note that the geographical scope of ICZM and MPS partially overlapped: while ICZM is 
focused on the sustainable management of areas of sovereignty (internal waters, 
territorial sea and/or coastal territory),33 MPS deals with the sustainable management of 
maritime areas, including areas where coastal States exercise sovereign rights and/or 
jurisdiction (continental shelf, EEZ and/or sui generis zones of jurisdiction).34 
The ICZM Protocol offers tools for a potential cooperation in the Adriatic and Ionian 
region. Article 17 requires the Parties to “define […] a common regional framework for 
integrated coastal zone management in the Mediterranean to be implemented by means 
of appropriate regional action plans and other operational instruments, as well as 
through their national strategies” and Article 18(1) provides that “Each Party shall 
further strengthen or formulate a national strategy for integrated coastal zone 
management and coastal implementation plans and programmes consistent with the 
common regional frame work […]”. In the light of this provisions, it is desirable for the 
coastal States of the region to cooperate in the elaboration of a common sub-regional 
framework for ICZM, on the basis of relevant EU guidelines and polices, even if 
outside the Union legal framework. 
Moreover, the variety of features of sea basins, on which the EU faces, requires the 
adoption of a regional approach, specifically to implement the MSP at the level of 
individual basins, to the need to take into proper account the specific characteristics of 
each sea basin. 
In this views, the regional approach to the Arctic35 and to the Mediterranean36 and, in 
particular, the establishment of the Macro-Region in the Baltic Sea37 and in the Adriatic 
Ionic Basin38 may be considered as instruments of European integration, based on 
voluntary cooperation among involving countries in addressing common challenges and 
finalized to increase territorial cohesion. 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Cf. Article 7(1), Directive 2014/89/EU. 
33
 Article 3(1), ICZM Protocol: “The area to which the Protocol applies shall be the Mediterranean Sea area as 
defined in Article 1 of the Convention. The area is also defined by: (a) the seaward limit of the coastal zone, which 
shall be the external limit of the territorial sea of Parties; and (b) the landward limit of the coastal zone, which shall 
be the limit of the competent coastal units as defined by the Parties”. 
34
 The Directive 2014/89/EU is applied to the “marine waters” of the Member States. According to Article 3(4), 
“marine waters” means “the waters, the seabed and subsoil as defined in point (1)(a) of Article 3 of Directive 
2008/56/EC and coastal waters as defined in point 7 of Article 2 of Directive 2000/60/EC and their seabed and their 
subsoil”.  
35
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The European Union and the 
Arctic Region, 20 November 2008, COM(2008) 763 final. 
36
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Towards an Integrated 
Maritime Policy for better governance in the Mediterranean, 11 September 2009, COM/2009/0466 final. 
37
 See, in particular, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region, 10 June 2009, COM(2009) 248 final; and Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The European Union 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, 23 March 2012, COM(2012) 128 final. 
38
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The European Union Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region, 17 
June 2014, COM(2014) 357 final. 
 Maura Marchegiani 
 
96 
4. Conclusion 
 
Among the pillars identified as a priority by the Commission in the Strategy for the 
Adriatic and Ionian Region in its Communication,39 a pillar is specifically dedicated to 
“Blue Growth”:40 it aims to improve the administrative and institutional capacities, 
services and governance, including the sharing of data, shared and coordinated planning 
of existing resources, by, among the others instruments, MSP and ICZM. 
The States bordering the Adriatic and Ionian Seas are however already engaged in a 
varied dynamic cross-border cooperation, in part due to the EU, in part based on 
different and independent initiatives, as precisely the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative, in 
accordance with international obligations, in particular the UNCLOS, which requires to 
increasing of forms of cooperation between coastal States bordering on semi-enclosed 
basins. 
The definition of a coordinated framework, at macro-regional level, responds to the 
need to facilitate cooperation and to harmonise initiatives, proposals and projects which 
concern the Adriatic and Ionian Region, including joint planning, alignment of funding 
opportunities and a bottom-up approach. 
Actually, some important experiences of integration have been realized in various 
forms: through independent initiatives, or between regional and local administrations of 
different States, and they have realized a fine combination of public and private.41 
These initiatives are characterized by a high degree of specialization, but are held on 
heterogeneous levels of cooperation, without any real coordination.42 
EU initiatives affecting the Adriatic and the Ionian, such as the recent Directive 
2014/89/EU on the MSP and the EUSAIR, may contribute, in this perspective, to reduce 
the existing fragmentation and to ensure, even by the diversification of the available 
tools, a greater degree of coordination and convergence. In the light of principles of 
integration, coordination, cooperation and partnership, a place-based approach 
concerning the cooperation activities and a multi-level governance model,  
experimented at the local, national and EU level, should increase and strengthen the 
administrative capacity and pool resources in the macro-region, building on synergies 
resulting from the articulation of different EU policy instruments and interventions of 
national or local authorities or private sectors.43 
                                                 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ibid, para 3.1. 
41
 See, in this perspective, Handbook on Integrated Maritime Spatial Planning, Experience Tools & Instruments Case 
Studies, from the INTERREG III B CADSES PlanCoast Project, 2008. 
42
 See, inter alia, the Project in Emilia Romagna Region, concerning the Integrated Coastal Zone Management about 
river Po delta and its peculiar elements of vulnerability, or the D.A.M.A.C. Project, concerning the oil spills risks 
planning, promoted by Marche Region (I) and Greek District of Zadar (H). 
43
 See, in this sense, Report Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on an EU Strategy for the Adriatic and 
Ionian Region (n 4) General Considerations, points 1 and 3. The document insists in particular on the need to include 
the local and regional authorities in the political managing bodies and in the operational, technical and implementing 
bodies of the strategy while maintaining the Commission’s role in the coordination process (point 3). 
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1. The Adriatic Sea (geography, transport and marine environment) 
 
As described, ‘[t]he Adriatic is a narrow, shallow and temperature warm semi-
enclosed sea, forming a distinct sub-region within the Mediterranean Sea Region […]’.1 
The Adriatic Sea is nowadays surrounded by the following States: Italy, Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania. Of interest is that the 
geographical coordinates of the Adriatic Sea slightly differ depending on the purpose of 
the specific measurement. From the practical point of view of particular importance are 
coordinates contained in various IMO documents relating to safety of navigation in the 
Adriatic Sea. In the joint proposal submitted in 2003 by Albania, Croatia, Italy, 
Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro on the establishment of new recommended Traffic 
Separation Schemes/Recommended Routes System and other new Routeing Measures 
in the Adriatic Sea, endorsed by the IMO, the Adriatic is described as follows: 
 
“The Adriatic Sea is the part of the Mediterranean sea situated between Balkan 
and Appenine peninsulas, on the geographical longitude between 012°15’ E and 
019°45’ E and the geographical latitude between 39°45’ N and 45°45’N. The 
south border includes the whole area of the Strait of Otranto and leads on joint 
line of the Cape of Santa Maria di Leuca [Italy] – the north coast of the island of 
Krf [Corfu-Greece] – the mouth of the river Butrinit [Albania]”.2  
 
Greece is generally also considered as an Adriatic State. This is mostly a result of the 
geographical position of the Greek island of Corfu located at the entrance, and due to 
some smaller Greek islands located within the Strait of Otranto. 
Due to its relatively long and narrow shape, the Adriatic is deeply indented into the 
European mainland and linked to the rest of the Mediterranean Sea (Ionian Sea) only 
through the Strait of Otranto. The surface of the Adriatic Sea amounts to 138,595 km², 
while the total length of the Adriatic coastline is around 7,912 km, more than half of 
                                                           
* This paper is based on sections 1.2 and 5.4-5.5 of the book Extension of Coastal State Jurisdiction in Enclosed and 
Semi-enclosed Seas: A Mediterranean and Adriatic Perspective, written by the author (Routledge, 2014).  
1
 D. Vidas, ‘Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas: The Need for Regional Cooperation in the Adriatic Sea’ in K. Ott (ed), 
Croatian Accession to the European Union: Institutional Challenges (Zagreb Institute of Public Finance, 2006) 347 
ff., at 359.  
2
 IMO, Routing of Ships, Ship Reporting and Related Matters: Establishment of new recommended Traffic Separation 
Schemes and other new Routing Measures in the Adriatic Sea. Submitted by Albania, Croatia, Italy, Slovenia and 
Serbia and Montenegro, NAV 49/3/7, 27 March 2003, 2. On the limits of the Adriatic Sea defined by the 
International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), see in this Volume, A. Caligiuri, ‘The Maritime Boundaries in the 
Adriatic and Ionian Seas’, para 1. 
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which composed of the coastline of the numerous islands fringing particularly the 
Eastern Adriatic coasts. The length of the Adriatic Sea from Venice and the mouth of 
the River Butrinit in Albania amount to almost 475 nm. It is noteworthy that the average 
width of the Adriatic is only 85 nm.3  
It is important to note that the Adriatic has been also an important route of 
international navigation. The main navigation route in the Adriatic Sea goes from the 
‘wider’ Mediterranean Sea (Ionian) through the approximately 45 nm wide Strait of 
Otranto and towards one of the Northern Adriatic ports: Trieste (Italy), Koper 
(Slovenia) and Rijeka (Croatia). It has been suggested that an important characteristic of 
the ‘Adriatic route’ is the high and even increasing amount of oil (and other dangerous 
goods) transported particularly towards the Northern Adriatic ports of Trieste and 
Venice. The overall yearly amount of transported oil in 2005 on this route amounted to 
approximately 60 million tonnes while in the overall Adriatic the number rose to 
approximately 70 million tonnes. Vidas is in this regard of the opinion that a significant 
increase in the transport of oil and other dangerous cargoes, including LNG may be 
expected during the second decade of the 21st Century. 4  
The Adriatic marine environment is on the other hand extremely sensitive and 
represents an almost unique ecosystem.5 It has been alleged that its environmental 
conditions are mostly a result of the specific exchange of waters with the wider 
Mediterranean (Ionian Sea) through the Otranto Strait and the Palagruža threshold 
separating the shallower Northern Adriatic from the deeper Southern Adriatic, and 
furthermore by the inputs of freshwater from the mountains in the Eastern and the rivers 
in the Western part.6 Its living resources can be generally qualified as ‘highly 
diversified, with numerous species but low abundance’7 which makes the Adriatic’s 
ecosystem particularly vulnerable.  
 
 
2. Cooperative arrangements between Adriatic States  
 
Adriatic sub-regional cooperation has in the past been particularly accentuated in the 
field of protection and preservation of the marine environment. This had been, however, 
prior to 1990, particularly due to the isolationistic policy of Albania understood as a de 
facto cooperation between Italy and the SFRY.8 The two States took active part in the 
existing Mediterranean cooperative arrangements which included the Barcelona system, 
General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) and Commission for the 
Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean Sea (CIESM), while specific sub-regional 
forms of cooperation were primarily aimed at supplementing those already existing at 
the regional (Mediterranean) level.  
                                                           
3
 M. Grbec, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia 
(LL.M Thesis, IMO IMLI, 2001) 1-2.  
4
 Vidas (n 1) 362-363.  
5
 Joint Expert Group of the Adriatic States on the PSSA, ‘Designation of the Adriatic Sea as a Particularly Sensitive 
Area’, draft proposal, 2007, Copy on file with the author. See also Section 1.3.1. 
6
 Ibid.  
7
 The ‘PSSA draft proposal’ makes reference to the fact that more than 1.800 living species have been found only in 
the Slovenian part of the Gulf of Trieste, the northernmost and shallower part of the Adriatic. Furthermore, the 
biodiversity seems to be also high in front of the coast of Montenegro with almost 80% of Mediterranean fish species 
found there. The ‘draft proposal’ emphasizes, however, that high diversity is not supported by a high number of 
specimen. Ibid, p. 8.  
8
 Albania acceded to the Barcelona Convention in 1990.  
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An important milestone in the environmental protection of the Adriatic and which 
even preceded the adoption of MAP and/or the Barcelona Convention was the 
conclusion in 1974 of the Italy-SFRY Agreement on cooperation and prevention of 
pollution of the Adriatic waters and its coastal zones (Belgrade Agreement).9 The latter 
however did not contain specific provisions regarding the protection of the Adriatic 
marine environment and it was more intended as a framework for the identification of 
various problems and conclusion of additional agreements in this field.10 Its main 
achievement was the establishment of a joint ‘Italo-Yugoslav’ Commission which did 
not have decision making powers and which goals were primarily to carry out research 
activities, and to advise the two governments on any question relating to marine 
pollution. It should be noted that the scope of application of the 1974 Belgrade 
Agreement extended to all Adriatic waters, including therefore the high seas.11  
It is, to a certain extent, ironic that the next important document relating to the 
environmental protection of the Adriatic Sea was signed less than three weeks after the 
proclamation of independence of Slovenia and Croatia (25 June 1991) and after the 
breaking up of the war on the territories of the former SFRY. Reference is made here to 
the Declaration on the Adriatic Sea, signed in Ancona on 13 July 1991.12 The 
importance of the 1991 Declaration derives from the fact that it was the first multilateral 
document aimed at the protection of the Adriatic Sea, signed not just by Italy and the 
SFRY, but also by Albania, Greece and the European Commission. The adopted 
document was therefore a political declaration with however a strong wording and clear 
commitments. The signatories declared their firm intention to cooperate in the 
environmental protection of the Adriatic Sea and the preservation of its ecological 
balance and to undertake joint comprehensive regional programmes in this regard.13  
The importance given to the close interrelation between the Adriatic and the Ionian 
can be clearly implied from the participation at the Conference and the signature of the 
Declaration also by Greece. Although the ranging war on the territories of the former 
SFRY stopped for almost ten years a comprehensive Adriatic multilateral (sub-regional) 
cooperation, trilateral cooperation continued during the 1990s between Italy, Slovenia 
and Croatia within the framework of the Commission for the protection of the Adriatic 
Sea and coastal area from pollution, usually referred to as the Trilateral Commission. 
The latter replaced the mixed Italo-Yugoslav Commission established on the basis of 
the Belgrade Agreement and achieved substantial results, also due to the work of its 
sub-commissions first among which the ‘Working Group for environmentally safe-sea 
traffic’.14 The latter has been at the origin of the preparation of important agreements 
between the three States particularly in the field of safety of navigation and prevention 
of ship-source pollution, therefore in areas not directly addressed by existing regional 
cooperative arrangements (the Barcelona System).  
                                                           
9
 OGRI of 22 February 1977. The Agreement entered into force on 20th April 1977.  
10
 M. Gestri, ‘I rapporti di vicinato marittimo tra l'Italia e gli Stati nati dalla dissoluzione della Iugoslavia’ in N. 
Ronzitti (ed), I rapporti di vicinato dell’Italia con Croazia, Serbia-Montenegro e Slovenia (Giuffrè, Luiss University 
Press, 2005) 177 ff., 207-208.  
11
 See Article 1.  
12
 At that time it was disputed whether the SFRY still represents also the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of 
Croatia which formally proclaimed independence on 25 June 1991.  
13
 Scovazzi mentioned that the ‘Adriatic Sea Declaration’ has been listed as a Treaty by the official Italian publication 
on Treaties in force. See T. Scovazzi, ‘Regional Cooperation in the Field of the Environment’ in T. Scovazzi (ed), 
Marine Specially Protected Areas, (Kluwer Law International, 1999), 81 ff., 97. 
14
 Gestri (n 10) 208.  
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The next important milestone in the Adriatic sub-regional cooperation was the 
launching of the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative (AII)15 and the signature of the Ancona 
Declaration in 2000. The latter was adopted at the Conference on Development and 
Security in the Adriatic and Ionian; held on 19 and 20 May 2000 and signed by all 
Adriatic States (with the exclusion at that time of Serbia and Montenegro)16 and the EU. 
The AII is however formally a distinct cooperative arrangement from that of the 
Trilateral Commission. The Ancona Declaration builds on the structure and content of 
the already discussed (1991) ‘Adriatic Sea Declaration’ although it is broader in its 
scope of application. The aim of the Ancona Declaration (and of AII in general) is in 
fact not only to achieve the protection and preservation of the Adriatic Sea and its 
ecological balance, but instead  
 
“[…] to foster peace and security in the Adriatic and Ionian Region by promoting 
sustainable economic growth and environmental protection and by exploiting 
cultural heritage that the countries in this region share […]”.17  
 
Areas of cooperation include, without prejudice to other areas of cooperation which 
may be selected in the future, economics, transport and tourism cooperation, sustainable 
development and protection of the environment, cooperation in the fields of culture, 
science and education; and cooperation in the fight against illegal activities.18 If 
transferred to the maritime context it would seem that the emphasis is placed on the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment, with additional emphasis on 
maritime safety and security, and impliedly also to the protection of underwater cultural 
heritage and the fight against illegal activities.  
The second important difference between the two initiatives is represented by the 
geographical scope of application. The Ancona Declaration is not focused only on the 
Adriatic Sea, but on the Adriatic and Ionian region.19 An interesting question is 
accordingly whether the Ancona Declaration treats the Adriatic and Ionian as a separate 
marine region and/or sub-region of the wider Mediterranean Sea? It would seem 
however that the expression ‘Adriatic and Ionian region’ refers to the overall territories 
of all the signatories and not specifically to the Adriatic and Ionian seas. This can be 
implied from Article 1 of the Declaration where emphasis is placed on the Adriatic and 
Ionian as an ‘area of peace, stability and increasing prosperity’, while the ultimate 
answer seems to be provided by the Preamble to the Ancona Declaration according to 
which the aim of the Declaration is to foster ‘[…] synergies, coordination and 
complementarities between the Adriatic and the Ionian cooperation network launched at 
the Conference […]’. The aim of the ‘Ancona Process’ is therefore to better coordinate 
and to foster synergies between two distinct cooperation networks, the Adriatic and 
Ionian. Such interpretation seems to find its confirmation also in the (2008) Marine 
Strategy Directive which defines the Adriatic and Ionian as two separate sub-regions of 
                                                           
15
 Hereinafter ‘AII’.  
16
 Serbia and Montenegro joined the AII in 2002. After the dissolution of the Union in 2006, both Serbia and 
Montenegro retained their membership. 
17
 Emphasis added. Preamble, para 4.  
18
 Ibid., para 3. 
19
 This can be nowadays, as suggested, interpreted as meaning the Adriatic-Ionian (Macro) Region. See 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian 
Region, 17 June 2014, COM(2014) 357 final.  
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the Mediterranean Sea20 and seems to be ultimately confirmed by the concluded 
agreements within the framework of the AII.  
It is also noteworthy that the Ancona Declaration provides an express link to the 
Barcelona Convention. Article 5 of the Declaration in fact stresses ‘[…] the need to take 
into account the Adriatic and Ionian dimension within the Convention for the Protection 
of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution […]’. This reinforces the assertion that 
cooperation undertaken within the framework of AII is not intended to conflict with that 
directly undertaken within the framework of the Barcelona Convention. Nonetheless, 
due to the expanding scope of application of the Barcelona system, there seems to be a 
need for a better coordination between the two and other cooperative arrangements in 
the Adriatic (e.g. Trilateral Commission).  
 
2.1. Agreements concluded within the AII framework 
 
It is important to emphasize that the majority of the agreements in the maritime field 
concluded within the framework of the AII, and particularly those from the field of 
safety of navigation in the Adriatic Sea, were prepared by the Trilateral Commission 
despite the fact that some were signed on the occasion of the launching of the AII in 
Ancona in 2000. The common characteristic of such agreements is that they apply either 
to the Adriatic (e.g. Northern Adriatic) or to the Ionian, and not to the Adriatic and 
Ionian basin. The goals of the Ancona Declaration have been therefore achieved 
through a coordinated network of bilateral and/or trilateral binding agreements on a 
certain topic and not, generally speaking, through a single multilateral convention 
involving all Adriatic States and/or the EU.  
Such build up approach can be implied also from paragraph 7 of the Preamble, which 
provides that States build  
 
“[...] upon a multifaceted network of bilateral relations that they intend to further 
strengthen by promoting new bilateral agreements, such as those signed in the 
framework of the present Conference, which can create a homogeneous, 
multilateral pattern of cooperation through shared content and objectives […]”. 
 
The organizational structure of the AII is therefore in many aspects similar to that of 
the Union for the Mediterranean21 and its predecessor Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(Barcelona process),22 with the notable difference that the process is not directly driven 
by the EU. There are also clear signs that the AII is, after the first decade of its 
existence, broadening its activities to other areas, of which particularly noteworthy is 
the protection and preservation of Adriatic underwater cultural heritage.23 It is 
nonetheless suggested that the recently adopted Communication of the European 
                                                           
20
 See Article 4(2) of the Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (2008) OJ L164, 
25.6.2008. 
21
 Hereinafter the ‘UFM’.  
22
 The UFM was launched (on a French initiative) on 13 July 2008 at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean as a 
partnership of 27 EU States and 16 States located in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. It upgrades the 
previously existing Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process).  
23
 See infra in para 2.1. 
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Commission on “A Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas’24 and of the 
already mentioned EU strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (macro-region) 
represents additional evidence of the forthcoming leading role of the EU in the field of 
Adriatic (and Ionian) cooperation. 
 
2.1.1. Safety of Navigation 
 
Concluded agreements in the field of safety of navigation in the Adriatic may be 
broadly divided in three groups. The first group relates to the establishment of a joint 
system of vessel traffic service (VTS) in the Adriatic Sea. A network of bilateral 
agreements was concluded in the period 2000-2001 between Italy on one side and 
Slovenia, Croatia, Albania and (Serbia) Montenegro for the Adriatic and between Italy 
and Greece regarding the Ionian.25  
A second group of agreements, based obviously on the successful conclusion of the 
first group of agreements, related to the establishment of a mandatory ship reporting 
system in the Adriatic (ADRIAREP). A trilateral Memorandum of Understanding was 
concluded between Italy, Slovenia and Croatia,26 supplemented by two bilateral 
agreements concluded between Italy and Albania, and Italy and (Serbia) Montenegro.27 
In December 2002 the IMO, upon a joint proposal by all Adriatic States, also formally 
confirmed the ‘Adriatic Traffic’ with its entry into force as of 1 July 2003.28 Since then, 
all oil tankers of 150 gross tonnage and above and all ships exceeding 300 gross 
tonnage and carrying dangerous or polluting goods as cargo, need to report to the 
designated Adriatic coastal authorities their entry into the Adriatic, their position at 
certain points and their departure from the Adriatic Sea. In the elaboration of a 
comprehensive ‘Adriatic system’ the Adriatic States opted therefore for a two-tier 
approach. The first step was a conclusion of a series of bilateral and trilateral binding 
agreements between themselves, while the second was the submission of a joint 
proposal to the IMO. 
The same approach has been followed with the third group of agreements which 
relate to the establishment of a common routeing system and traffic separation schemes 
in the Adriatic (Adriatic Traffic). A Memorandum of Understanding has been concluded 
between Italy, Croatia and Slovenia relating to the Northern Adriatic;29 coupled with 
bilateral agreements between Italy and (Serbia) Montenegro and Albania regarding 
routeing measures in parts of the central and southern Adriatic.30 Although the agreed 
‘traffic separations schemes’ did not cover the entire Adriatic, in 2003 the Adriatic 
                                                           
24
 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, 30 
November 2012, COM(2012)713final. 
25
 See Gestri (n 10) 209, n 117-119. 
26
 See Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Italian Republic on Mandatory Ship Reporting System in the Adriatic 
Sea, OGRS 96/2000, 19 October 2000.  
27
 See Gestri (n 19) 210-211, n 120-123.  
28
 Resolution MSC.139(76), Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems, 5 December 2002. See also ‘Establishment of a 
Mandatory Ship Reporting System in the Adriatic Sea known as “ADRIATIC TRAFFIC”: Submitted by Albania, 
Croatia, Italy, Slovenia and Yugoslavia, NAV 47/3/4, 30 March 2001. 
29
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Italian Republic on the Establishment of a Common Routeing System 
and Traffic Separation Scheme in the Northern Part of the Northern Adriatic, OGRS No. 96/2000, 19 October 2000.  
30
 See Gestri (n 10) 210, n 123-126. 
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States concerned jointly proposed to the IMO the adoption (confirmation) of the agreed 
measures.31 These measures were then confirmed on 28 May 2004.32  
In the light of the foregoing it is important to highlight that since 1 December 2004 
there is in force a system of traffic separation schemes in the Northern Adriatic 
regulating navigation to and from the ports of Koper (Slovenia) and Trieste and 
Monfalcone (Italy) crossing the maritime areas of Croatia, Slovenia and Italy.  
There seems to be an agreement among users and policymakers alike, that the 
(Northern) Adriatic is, particularly with regard to maritime safety and prevention of 
marine pollution, a ’high risk area’. This is not only due to the extremely dense traffic 
of cargo ships and tankers, but also to the increasing number of yachts and pleasure 
boats in the area.33 It may be asserted that further (Northern) Adriatic cooperation in this 
field should focus on the upgrading and further integration of the already existing 
measures (VTS-ADRIAREP, Adriatic Traffic). The need for further standardisation and 
exchange of maritime traffic information between national maritime authorities, 
ensuring consistency with the applicable EU systems (e.g. SafeSeaNet), has been 
perceived by stakeholders and policymakers as the next area where Adriatic (Ionian) 
cooperation is needed.34 Proposals have been also echoed for the extension of existing 
(compulsory) routeing measures applicable to the Northern Adriatic to other parts of the 
Adriatic Sea.35 It is suggested furthermore that the designation of an ‘Adriatic PSSA’, 
endorsed by IMO, would represent an appropriate framework for such upgrading and/or 
further integration of existing measures relating to ship safety and ship source pollution 
in the Adriatic Sea.36   
 
 
3. Adriatic PSSA: added value to the protection of the Adriatic marine 
environment? 
 
Notwithstanding the Adriatic’s ‘Special Area’ status under Annex I of MARPOL, as 
part of the wider Mediterranean, where all operational discharges of oily waters from 
ships are prohibited,37 one of the main problems in the Adriatic Sea is still operational 
pollution, or in other words ‘illegal discharges’ from ships. It has been estimated that an 
annual average of 250 illegal oil spills occurred in the Adriatic in the early 2000 and 
there are indicators that the situation has not substantially improved since then.38 
                                                           
31
 See Albania, Croatia, Italy, Slovenia, (Serbia) Montenegro, ‘Establishment of new recommended Traffic 
Separations Schemes and other new Routeing Measures in the Adriatic Sea’, IMO Doc. NAV 49/3/07, 23 March 
2003.  
32
 See IMO, ‘Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-Eight Session’, MSC 78/26 of 28 May 2004, 
86 and Annex 21 and ‘New and Amended Traffic Separation Schemes’, COLREG.2/Circ. 54 of 28 May 2004.  
33
 Round Table organized by the European Commission on Competitive and Sustainable Transport and a Safer and 
More Secure Marine Space (Conclusions), Third Stakeholders Workshop on Maritime Affairs: Towards a strategy for 
the Adriatic Ionian Macro-Region (Roundtable on Healthier Marine Environment and Sustainable Fisheries), 
Portorož-Slovenia, 17 September 2012 
34
 See also European Commission; High level stakeholders conference “Setting an Agenda for Smart, Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth from the Adriatic and Ionian Seas”, Zagreb Conclusions, Zagreb, 6 December 2012. 
35
 Hrvoje Kačić, ‘Traffic Separation Schemes in the Adriatic Sea’, paper delivered at the round-table EU Maritime 
Policy and the (Northern) Adriatic (Maritime Law Association of Slovenia, 2011). 
36
 See infra para. 3.1. 
37
 Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil. The entire Mediterranean has also a ‘Special Area Status’ under 
Annex V of MARPOL (Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution from Garbage from Ships). Annex VI 
(Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships) on the other hand allows for the establishment of special 
emission control areas.  
38
 See Vidas (n 1) 364-365.  
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Additionally, an increasingly important problem in the Adriatic Sea is the occurrence of 
discharges of ballast waters, particularly from ships having their port of departure 
outside the Mediterranean. The quantity of ballast waters released in 2003 in the 
Adriatic ports of Croatia, Italy and Slovenia amounted to 8 million tonnes, although less 
that 10 percent of the mentioned quantity originated outside the Mediterranean.39 With 
the expected increase of the maritime traffic in the Adriatic, particularly after the 
completion of the envisaged new oil and LNG terminals in the Adriatic ports of Vlore, 
Ploče, Krk and Trieste which will open new ‘export routes’ of (Caspian) oil and gas,40 it 
would seem that the quantity of discharged ballast water in the Adriatic Sea, particularly 
that originating outside the Mediterranean, may increase dramatically.  
A logical consolidation of the existing measures in the field of safety of navigation 
and prevention of ship-source pollution could be the designation of the entire Adriatic 
waters (by the IMO) as a PSSA. Such course of action has been followed also by many 
other EU States, including those bordering the semi-enclosed Baltic Sea.41 Reference 
should be made to the fact that the possibility of the ‘proclamation’ of PSSAs in the 
Adriatic has already been made by the ‘2005 Agreement on the Sub-regional 
Contingency Plan’ with which Slovenia, Croatia and Italy agreed to cooperate in the 
designation of PSSAs in the area covered by the Plan.42 It is important to note that the 
PSSA may be located within or beyond the limits of the territorial sea, and as pointed by 
Slim and Scovazzi it ‘[…] offers the opportunity to enable the development of common 
jurisdictional and enforcement regimes for environmentally significant marine areas 
[…]’.43 
At this point it may be useful to refer to the definition of a PSSA which can be 
defined as ‘[…] a marine area that needs special protection through action by the IMO 
because of its significance for recognized ecological or socio-economic or scientific 
reasons, and because it may be vulnerable to damage by international shipping 
activities’.44 The three general requirements which are further elaborated in the Revised 
Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas,45 
are however not cumulative, as one criteria must be fulfilled. Furthermore, as provided 
by Article 1.5 of the 2005 PSSA Guidelines: 
 
“Identification and designation of any PSSA and the adoption of any associated 
protective measures requires consideration of three integral components: the 
particular attributes of the proposed area [Adriatic], the vulnerability of such an 
area to damage by international shipping activities, and the availability of 
associated protective measures within the competences of IMO to prevent, reduce, 
or eliminate risks from these shipping activities”.46  
                                                           
39
 Ibid.  
40
 Ibid. 361-363.  
41
 In 2004 the IMO confirmed upon a joint proposal by Belgium, France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK, the 
Western European Atlantic Waters as a PSSA (IMO Doc. MEPC 49/8/1, 2003). The same occurred in 2005 with the 
Baltic Sea area (with the exception of Russian waters) based on the joint proposal by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden (IMO Doc. MEPC 51/8/1, 2003).  
42
 Agreement on the Sub-Regional Contingency Plan for Prevention off, Preparedness for, and Response to Major 
Marine Pollution Incidents in the Adriatic Sea (OGRS 61/2008). 
43
 S. Habib, T. Scovazzi, Study of the current status of ratification, implementation and compliance with maritime 
agreements and conventions applicable to the Mediterranean Sea Basin: With a specific focus on the ENPI South 
Partner Countries (AGRECO Consortium, 2009) Part 2, 36.  
44
 Emphasis added. See Vidas (n 1) 349. 
45
 IMO Assembly Resolution A. 982(24), 1 December 2005, para 4. Hereinafter the ‘2005 PSSA Guidelines’.  
46
 Emphasis added. 
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Therefore, it follows that to the extent approved by the IMO, the PSSA status allows 
coastal State(s) to enforce specific associated measures (within the competence of 
IMO), e.g. compulsory reporting systems and/or pilotage, routeing measures, Special 
Area Status under MARPOL and/or application of discharge restrictions. Taking into 
account that three of the said protective measures are already in force in the Adriatic 
(the Special Area Status on the basis of Annexes I and V of MARPOL, the reporting 
system on the basis of SOLAS [Adriatic Traffic], and a system of routeing measures in 
the Northern Adriatic on the basis of COLREG), what would be the added value of 
proclaiming an Adriatic PSSA? It is important to note in this regard that the proposed 
associated measures may have ‘an identified legal basis’ also in IMO conventions 
and/or codes which are not in force yet. A clear example in this regard is represented by 
the 2004 Ballast Water Convention which is unlikely to enter into force in the near 
future.47  
 
3.1. Work undertaken in relation to the proclamation of an Adriatic PSSA 
 
The idea to proclaim an Adriatic PSSA originates from a Croatian proposal and was 
based on studies carried out in the period 2004-2006. In 2006, a Joint Expert Group on 
the PSSA comprising representatives of all Adriatic States (later replaced by the 
Correspondence Group) was established upon the Croatian initiative and held several 
meetings including the meetings in Opatija (April 2006) and Portorož (October 2006).48 
According to the prepared draft text of the Proposal49 the associated protection measures 
applicable in the Adriatic PSSA would in addition to the strengthening of the already 
existing measures (e.g. the extension of the existing routeing measures to other parts of 
the Adriatic) include also some associated protective measures having its identifiable 
legal basis in the 2004 Ballast Water Convention. That would include the designation of 
the Adriatic Sea as a No-Ballast-Water-arriving in the Adriatic in ships from other seas 
(including from the Mediterranean) and secondly on the extension of the existing 
mandatory ship reporting system also on ballast waters entering the Adriatic.50 Other 
associated measures proposed in the future could include, for example, the ‘Special 
Area Status’ on the basis of Annexes II and VI of the MARPOL Convention and/or 
other measures embodied in present or potential future IMO Guidelines and Codes; and 
this even before their entry into force.  
It is accordingly regrettable that despite an ambitious timetable for the submission of 
the joint proposal to the IMO (end of 2007) the work on the proposal stopped. It is just 
to be hoped that the proposal will be finalized and submitted to the IMO in due time and 
that the whole waters of the Adriatic will be, like those of the Western European 
                                                           
47
 See Slim, Scovazzi (n 43) Part 1, 120-122.  
48
 Vidas (n 1) 370.                                                                          
49
 Designation of the Adriatic Sea as a Particularly Sensitive Area (draft). On file with the author.  
50
 See Vidas (n 1) 369. Noteworthy is the fact that the contracting parties to the Barcelona Convention adopted in 
2011, through the assistance of REMPEC, a Harmonized Voluntary Arrangements for Ballast Water Management in 
the Mediterranean Region. The Guidelines provide guidance and options to vessels transiting the Mediterranean with 
regard to ballast water management and exchange, although presently only on a voluntary basis. The Guidelines are 
‘in force’ since 1 January 2012 and will be applicable up to the time the 2004 Ballast Water Convention enters into 
force. See IMO, ‘International Convention for the Control and Management of Ship’s Ballast Water and Sediments. 
Communication received from the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean 
Sea’, BWM.2/Circ.35, 15 August 2011, Annex 1.  
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Atlantic Waters (2004) and the Baltic in 2005 (without Russian waters),51 proclaimed as 
a PSSA. It is however encouraging that authorities and stakeholders from all Adriatic 
States (and the EU) participating at the ‘High level stakeholder conference “Setting an 
Agenda for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth from the Adriatic and Ionian Sea’ 
held in Zagreb on 6 December 2012, ‘[…] express readiness to continue the joint efforts 
towards the designation of the Adriatic Sea as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA), 
in accordance with the IMO Guidelines.’52 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
It is suggested that an Adriatic PSSA would represent a flexible tool, a potential 
forum and a main incentive for Adriatic States for discussing the management of the 
risks posed by international shipping,53 including by operational pollution. In that regard 
it seems possible to agree with Vidas that: 
 
“[...] the designation of a PSSA in the Adriatic Sea can provide a significant 
regional cooperative framework, in line with the EU policy, and also highlight the 
awareness of the vulnerability of the Adriatic Sea environment”.54 
 
It seems possible to conclude that the proclamation of the Adriatic PSSA, in addition 
to the proclamation of (transboundary) marine protected areas over the most vulnerable 
Adriatic Sea areas, may substantially contribute to the protection of the Adriatic marine 
environment from shipping activities, including from operational pollution [inc. ballast 
water].55 It is ultimately suggested that such proclamation sponsored by all Adriatic 
States may help achieving a further balance between navigation (transport) and 
protection of the marine environment in the Adriatic-Ionian Marine Region. 
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 Cf n 36. 
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 Ibid. 
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 See Vidas (n 1) 348.  
54
 Ibid.  
55
 See discussion in D. Vidas, M. Kostelac Markovčić, ‘Ballast Water and Alien Species: Regulating Global 
Transfers and Regional Consequences’ in D. Vidas, J.P. Schei (eds), The World Ocean in Globalisation (Brill, 2011) 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the Challenger expedition in the 1870s, which is considered as the advent of 
modern oceanography,1 marine scientific research (hereafter: MSR) has considerably 
evolved. New methods of research covering a wide area of scientific interest such as 
biology, chemistry, geology and geophysics, as well as advanced technology 
stemming from simple techniques (dredging, sediment coring, towing of platforms 
carrying video recorders and echo sounding traverses) to very sophisticated and 
extremely expensive ones (such as Remotely Operated Vehicles, known as ROVs, 
capable of diving to great depths to carry out research and retrieve samples from the 
deep sea) have been put forward in order to enhance our knowledge on the marine 
environment.2 This scientific (r)evolution has inevitably increased the interest of the 
coastal states in the potential economic exploitation of their offshore resources and 
has consequently grown their appetite for further expanding their jurisdiction in the 
oceans.  
While scientific progress accomplished since the nineteenth century has been 
considerable, we still know very little of this huge, abyssal and often inaccessible, 
natural asset. Although oceans represent a very essential part of our planet, 
paradoxically, they are the least known and, thus, the least understood geographical 
and geomorphological areas. As one commentator has, quite eloquently, noticed: 
“until quite recently we did not know what was at the bottom of the oceans. Nor did 
we know what the bottom of the ocean was made of. In most areas, we did not even 
know where the bottom of the ocean actually was”.3 This is actually the case for the 
deep sea, where only 8% has been explored and mapped to this date, but also for 
smaller and more crowded marine areas such as the Adriatic and the contiguous 
Ionian marine region. Indeed, in the communication concerning the EU Maritime 
Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, the European Commission has underlined 
that our understanding of the marine environment covering this area is still not 
complete.4 For instance, general information on deep-sea resources and issues of bio-
security in this marine region is still missing. Furthermore, there is lack of marine 
                                                        
1
 The Challenger expedition, led by British naturalist John Murray and Scottish naturalist Charles Wyville 
Thompson between 1872-1876, is considered to be the first true oceanographic expedition organized to gather data 
on a wide range of ocean features, including ocean temperatures, currents, marine life and geology of the seafloor. 
2
 For brief general background information on the nature of MSR conducted in the oceans see D. Kenneth Leary, 
International law and the genetic resources of the deep sea (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 183-188. 
3
 Ibid, 8. 
4
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the EU strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, 
17 February 2014, COM (2014) 357 final.  
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habitat maps and information on small-scale fisheries as well as a complete inventory 
of the biodiversity. Undoubtedly, there are other areas of concern, not mentioned in 
the European Commission’s communication, such as the impact of more or less 
frequent seismic surveys on the marine and geological environment. 
Consequently, there is a strong need to develop further knowledge of the marine 
environment covering the Adriatic and the contiguous Ionian seas. The interest, 
however, does not only lie in knowing and better understanding what actually 
occupies their hidden realm. A better knowledge of the marine environment could 
also have important practical applications. It could, for instance, grow the capacity of 
coastal states to combat climate change and respond to increasing anthropogenic 
pollution or promote sustainable policies and management of their resources, mineral 
or biological. Not to mention the role that some potentially valuable biological 
resources of the seabed, yet unexplored, may play in the future. 
However, this need to develop further knowledge of the marine environment is 
being restricted by rules of law. The Adriatic and the contiguous Ionian marine region 
consist of a complex mosaic of different maritime zones, where different legal 
regimes apply. To enter these waters, researchers, being a State, an international 
organization or private institutions, should in some cases request and obtain the 
authorization to do so by following several procedures coming from different 
administrative services. So, the first question that arises is what potential controls 
could be held on research projects. In other words, how is MSR regulated in this area? 
Is the applicable legal framework suitable for the current emergent needs of the 
region? Does it encourage or not the conduct and promotion of marine scientific 
research? 
This paper explores the international legal regime, which operates to regulate 
marine scientific research within the Adriatic and Ionian marine regions. The first part 
outlines the general characteristics of this regime. It begins with a brief legislative 
history to illustrate the factors that have influenced the shape of the current legal 
framework. It then gives a brief overview of the current regime. The second part then 
goes on to consider implementation concerns as well as some unsettled questions that 
could lead to potential confusion when the regime is being interpreted and applied in 
practice. It concludes with some general remarks on possible solutions.  
 
 
2. The MSR legal regime 
 
2.1. From Geneva to Montego Bay: a brief legislative history 
 
The regulation of MSR is a relative latecomer to the law of the sea. Until the 1950s 
it was not perceived as necessary. MSR has been conducted more or less freely on the 
high seas.5 However, the gradual expansion of national jurisdictions on the 
continental shelf and the recognition of the increasing importance of its resources led 
to calls for the development of the legal framework in this area. Several coastal States 
wanted to protect their freshly accorded rights from potential unwanted researchers. 
                                                        
5
 T. Treves, ‘Marine Scientific Research’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), para 5, <www.mpelpil.com> (accessed 15 October 2015). 
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The first attempt to develop MSR regulation arose during the first UN Conference 
on the Law of the Sea in 1958. However, among the four Conventions adopted,6 only 
the Convention on the Continental Shelf contained few provisions on MSR. In its 
Article 5, it recognized to the coastal State sovereign and exclusive rights for the 
purpose of exploring its continental shelf and exploiting its natural resources. Any 
research concerning the continental shelf was subject to limited control by the coastal 
State, especially where MSR might infringe upon these rights.7 Therefore, a 
distinction concerning the nature of the research activities between fundamental 
(undertaken only for scientific purposes carried out with the intention of open 
publication) and applied (resource-related) research was embodied in the relevant 
provisions.8 Research activities qualified as fundamental would normally be 
conducted without restrictions, while those qualified as applied research, were subject 
to the coastal States’ consent.  
MSR was neither specifically addressed in the case of the territorial sea nor in the 
case of the high seas. Regulation within the territorial sea was considered to be an act 
of sovereignty and, thus, under exclusive control of the coastal State.9 Within the high 
seas, although MSR was not expressly listed as a freedom, it was generally accepted 
as such.10Thus, the legal framework set forth in Geneva would result in a 
simultaneous application of a different regime in the same maritime space. Whereas 
MSR on continental shelf was subject to the consent of the coastal State, it was 
nevertheless free when conducted on the superjacent waters (waters above), belonging 
to the high seas.  
All these elements would form the basis of a more detailed MSR regime, adopted a 
few years later in Montego Bay within the framework of the UNCLOS. However, the 
way was not paved with nenuphars. During the negotiations, held from 1973 to 1982, 
MSR regulation proved to be one of the most delicate and difficult issues to resolve.11 
The major researching (and, of course, mostly developed and having the necessary 
funding) States crossed swords with the newly independent and developing coastal 
States on a number of conflicting issues: the distinction between fundamental or pure 
and applied research, the extent of the coastal States’ control over MSR especially in 
the emerging Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as well as dispute settlement.12 Both 
sides put forward claims and arguments. Researching States claimed a liberal regime 
for MSR, without restrictions, and open publication of the results of benefit to all. On 
the other hand, coastal States had a special interest in research activities conducted 
within waters under their jurisdiction. Several, mostly developing, States strongly 
believed (rather understandably) that an unlimited right to conduct MSR would lead 
                                                        
6
 The Convention on the High Seas, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the Convention 
on the Continental Shelf and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas. 
7
 According to Article 5(8): “the consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of any research 
concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there. Nevertheless the coastal State shall not normally withhold 
its consent if the request is submitted by a qualified institution with a view to pure scientific research into the 
physical or biological characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the proviso that the coastal State shall have 
the right, if it so desires, to participate or to be represented in the research, and that in any event the results shall be 
published”.  
8
 For a general discussion see L. Caflisch, J. Piccard, ‘The Legal Regime of Marine Scientific Research and the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea’ (1978) 38 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht 
und Volkerrecht 848. 
9
 For further analysis, ibid, 855-856. 
10
 Kenneth Leary (n 2) 191. 
11
 For a brief description see A. de Marffy, ‘La recherche scientifique marine’ in R.-J. Dupuy, D. Vignes (eds), 
Traité du nouveau droit de la mer (Economica, Bruylant, 1985), 957-973. 
12
 UN, DOALOS (hereafter: DOALOS Guide), Marine Scientific Research, A revised guide to the implementation 
of the relevant provisions of UNCLOS (United Nations Publications, 2010), 3. 
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to abuses on the part of the researching States, because it would inevitably have some 
direct or indirect bearing on their natural resources or might serve as a disguise for 
other operations related to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources or 
even intelligence gathering activities.13 Some countries called for the establishment of 
an international body responsible for regulating MSR in all marine areas.14 While 
these arguments and proposals were not entirely convincing, it was nevertheless clear 
that some balance should be found between conflicting interests: the interest of 
researchers in facilitating the conduct and promotion of MSR and the interests of the 
coastal States in protecting their rights within the waters under their jurisdiction. 
Thus, the final result incorporated in the UNCLOS, signed in Montego Bay in 1982, 
was a product of compromise trying to accommodate concerns stemming from both 
sides. 
 
2.2. Current regime under UNCLOS: consent v. freedom 
 
The 1982 UNCLOS compensated the prior indigence by devoting an entire part, 
consisting of 28 articles, to the subject of marine scientific research. Part XIII 
(Articles 238-265) describes in detail the legal framework within which all research 
activities must be carried out in order to ‘promote the study of the marine 
environment’, proclaimed in the preamble of the Convention.  
A simple lecture on the first articles gives the impression of a rather liberal regime. 
The general rule is that all states, coastal or not, and competent international 
organizations have the right to conduct MSR subject to rights and duties of other 
States.15 This right is directly associated with the obligation to promote and facilitate 
MSR,16 which has been convincingly described as a ‘principle of positive 
engagement’ for the purpose of increasing knowledge for the benefit of all mankind 
on what is its major natural environment: the ocean.17  
Nevertheless, the general right to conduct MSR is not an absolute one as it is 
restrained by subsequent principles and rules. Some of them are justified by the due 
respect to other international rules or legitimate uses of the sea. Thus, marine 
scientific research shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, with 
appropriate scientific methods and means compatible with the Convention and in 
conformity with regulations under the Convention,18 including those for the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment.19 
Other principles and rules, though not unjustified, seem to complicate the 
applicable regime and their implementation in practice might create great confusion to 
researchers when preparing, planning and conducting a research project. The need to 
balance the interests of the researching States and the interests of the coastal States 
resulted in an area-by-area approach to rights in connection with MSR. Thus, the rules 
vary in accordance to the legal status of the marine areas in which the research is 
being conducted. The general idea concerning MSR is that the closer to the shore of a 
coastal State, the greater its consent powers to control the research activities. 
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Therefore, within the territorial sea, the coastal State being full sovereign has 
complete control over marine scientific research activities.20 It has the exclusive right 
to regulate, authorize and conduct MSR. This jurisdiction is not even limited by the 
right of innocent passage as it is expressly provided that conducting MSR during 
passage through territorial waters renders a passage non-innocent.21 Consequently, all 
research activities within the territorial sea require the coastal State’s express consent 
through diplomatic channels.  
UNCLOS extended the MSR regulation to the emerging EEZ. However, the 
regime governing MSR both in the EEZ and on the continental shelf is more 
complicated than the one governing the territorial sea because the coastal State’s 
consent is subject to conditions.22 Within these maritime zones, the coastal State has 
jurisdiction over MSR and has the right to regulate, authorize and conduct research 
activities. Its consent for MSR activities conducted by third States or international 
organizations is also required, but, in this case, the coastal State does not have an 
unlimited discretion to withhold such consent. It can do so only in four cases, 
expressly enumerated in the Convention that concern projects: a) of direct 
significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, whether living 
or non-living; b) that involve drilling into the continental shelf; c) that involve 
construction, operation or use of artificial islands and d) that contain incorrect 
information provided to the coastal State or if the researching State or competent 
international organization has outstanding obligations to the coastal State from a prior 
research project.23 The coastal State is given further guarantees, as it has the right to 
require the suspension of cessation of any MSR activities if they are not conducted 
under the conditions set forth in Part XIII UNCLOS.24  
However, the consent has to be granted in normal circumstances,25 provided that 
the research activities are carried out for peaceful purposes and undertaken in order to 
increase the knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of mankind. The 
consent must be explicit, except for two cases, in which the Convention provides the 
possibility of a presumed26 and an implied27 consent, under specific conditions. 
However, these two possibilities have been ignored by State practice. 
This constant give-and-take of guarantees between researching and coastal States 
attests the difficulties in balancing the conflicting interests of both sides. Researchers 
have also procedural obligations not only before undertaking a research activity (to 
provide the coastal State all necessary information at least six months before the 
starting date of the research activities),28 but also after having been granted consent to 
conduct MSR: to ensure the right of the coastal State to participate, if it so desires, in 
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the research project, to give the coastal State access to data and information about any 
major changes in the project.29  
In the maritime zones beyond national jurisdiction – on the high seas and in the 
deep seabed – MSR may be conducted by all States with due regard for other rules 
under the Convention, such as the duty to protect the marine environment.30 In the 
high seas MSR has been expressly accorded the status of a high seas freedom.31 Thus, 
in this case, only the flag State of the ship conducting research activities has 
jurisdiction. 
These provisions raise some remarks that are worth noting. The first is that the 
balance seems to weigh more on the side of the coastal States, whose sovereign rights 
have undoubtedly been reinforced. The extension of the MSR regime to EEZs and the 
upgrading of the coastal State’s consent powers have restrained freedom of scientific 
activities in larger areas of the sea at the expense of scientific research. However, and 
this is the second remark, the consent regime applicable to the EEZ and on the 
continental shelf is not absolutely clear. For instance, the provisions related to the 
procedural obligations of the researchers are subject to different interpretations or 
even controversy:32 what are the limits of the coastal State’s right to participate, if it 
desires so, in the research project? Which are the appropriate official channels for the 
communication of MSR projects? Who assesses the data required prior or during the 
research activities? Are decisions related to withdrawal of consent justiciable?33 
Arguably, the rights of the researchers are not well-defined and this ambiguity may 
delay or even discourage potential research projects.34 
 
 
3. From theory to practice: implementing the MSR regime in the Adriatic and 
Ionian marine region 
 
MSR in the Adriatic and Ionian marine region is regulated by the relevant 
provisions of the UNCLOS, in which all coastal States are contracting parties. It is 
worth noting that the coastal States have not enacted special national legislations to 
prescribe procedures necessary for conducting MSR, but it seems that their practice is 
consistent with the UNCLOS requirements.35Moreover, the almost universal 
acceptance of the Convention36 and the influence of its Part XIII on State practice 
indicate that most of the MSR provisions reflect customary international law and, 
thus, are applicable to all users of the Adriatic and Ionian seas.37 Other legal 
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instruments, such as the 1995 Barcelona Convention for the protection of the marine 
environment and the coastal region of the Mediterranean, complement the general 
framework by encouraging State parties to cooperate for the promotion of MSR.38 
Obviously, international law offers a general framework for conducting and 
promoting MSR. The question is how this regime is applied to the Adriatic and the 
contiguous Ionian marine regions. There are three components related to the practical 
implementation of the MSR legal framework. The first concerns its spatial dimension, 
while the second refers to its functional application. The third component relates to 
who is involved. 
 
3.1. Where? The spatial dimension 
 
The Adriatic and the contiguous Ionian seas link seven countries: Italy, Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania and Greece. A particular 
feature of this marine region is that many coastal States have not claimed all maritime 
zones that they are entitled to establish under international law.39 The result is that 
large areas of the Adriatic and Ionian marine region remain beyond the jurisdiction of 
coastal States and under the regime of the high seas. 
In fact, the current jurisdictional picture is quite complex.40 All coastal States have 
established a 12 nm territorial sea, with the exception of Greece, which maintains a 6 
nm territorial sea and Bosnia Herzegovina, which is a special case due to its particular 
geographic situation.41 Within this zone, coastal States have exclusive control over 
MSR activities and their express consent is required.  
The coastal states have also jurisdiction on the continental shelf, where they 
exercise substantial control over MSR activities. This zone does not need to be 
proclaimed, as it exists ab initio and ipso facto, but the narrow sea space does not 
permit them to enjoy the maximum jurisdictional rights permitted under international 
law. However, the relative maritime boundaries have not been yet fully established. 
With the exception of three delimitation agreements in force (the 1968 Agreement 
between Italy and former Yugoslavia, the 1977 Agreement between Italy and Greece 
and the 1992 Agreement between Italy and Albania), the rest of the maritime 
boundaries remain to be agreed, including some territorial sea boundaries, as for 
example the southern boundary of the Slovenian territorial sea with Croatia, with the 
dispute being currently subject to arbitration.42 Not to mention the maritime 
boundaries between Greece and Albania. In 2009, after lengthy negotiations, the two 
States signed a continental shelf delimitation agreement with a built-in mechanism for 
automatic extension to any future maritime zones that might be proclaimed. However, 
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a year later, the Albanian Constitutional Court declared – rather unconvincingly43 – 
the agreement as unconstitutional. 
And the story does not end there. In 2003, Croatia proclaimed an ecological and 
fisheries protection zone44 on the water column above its continental shelf. Although 
this zone is not mentioned in the UNCLOS, its establishment derives from the rights 
of coastal States to claim an EEZ and, thus, the legal regime may be identical to the 
regime of an EEZ. Thus, MSR activities in this zone are subject to the coastal State’s 
consent. Nevertheless, the Croatian act raised strong protests on the part of the 
neighboring countries, especially Slovenia, who also declared an ecological protection 
zone with overlapping jurisdiction with the Croatian one.45 The dispute has taken not 
only legal but also political proportions as it was linked to the accession of Croatia to 
the EU and the two countries agreed to follow the route of arbitration. Italy has also 
declared an ecological protection zone, but it does not apply to the Adriatic and Ionian 
seas.46  
In other words, the maritime zone map of the region is not yet completely drawn, 
as there are still pending disputes (between Croatia and Slovenia), open issues (for 
instance delimitation of maritime boundaries between Croatia and Bosnia 
Herzegovina or between Croatia and Montenegro concerning the Bay of Bota 
Kotorska and the Prevlaka Peninsula), or even “unfinished business”47(between 
Greece and Albania). Obviously, this situation affects the conduct and promotion of 
MSR activities and is not so encouraging for potential researchers. From which 
coastal State are they going to request permission to undertake a research in disputed 
areas? It is worth noting that some States (including Greece48 and Italy49) provide in 
national legislations that in the absence of delimitation agreements the median line 
will apply provisionally.  
There is also another issue of concern. As EEZs have not been proclaimed (with 
the exception of the derivative zones of Croatia and Slovenia already mentioned), 
MSR activities on the continental shelf are subject to the consent of the coastal State, 
whereas they are free when conducted on the superjacent waters, belonging to the 
high seas. That is why, in practice, several coastal States (including Greece) require 
either notification or permission on research activities undertaken in the high seas, in 
order to ensure that these activities do not infringe upon their sovereign rights on the 
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seabed.50 The real question is if there is anything else they can do to ensure that the 
resources lying on the seabed are treated appropriately.  
This unhappy jurisdictional picture could change with the establishment of EEZs 
or even derivative zones, which will reinforce the coastal States’ rights to control and 
benefit from MSR conducted in areas currently belonging to the high seas.51 
Undoubtedly, the next necessary step should be the delimitation of the maritime 
boundaries. Although tempting, this scenario is not so desirable. Some coastal States 
(being also researchers) would rather maintain the current status quo, because 
otherwise their rights to conduct free MSR, as well as other activities, up to the limits 
of the territorial sea of the neighbors will be restricted. Others, although flirting with 
the idea of proclaiming an EEZ, hesitate to do so; their act could open a Pandora’s 
box, as the example of the dispute between Croatia and Slovenia reveals.  
 
3.2. Which activities fall under MSR? The functional dimension 
 
Although many proposals have been discussed during the negotiations,52 the 
UNCLOS does not provide a definition for MSR. It seems that the most controversial 
issue was the difficulty of clearly distinguishing between fundamental and applied 
research.53 Many developing States strongly believed that the acceptance of such a 
distinction would inevitably lead to abuses. However, the simple rejection of the 
difference and the submission of both activities to discretionary coastal State consent 
do not eliminate potential abuses, as several incidents reveal.54 
A careful reading of the UNCLOS provisions, especially those concerning conduct 
of MSR in the EEZ and on the continental shelf, sheds light on an implicit distinction 
between fundamental and applied research, affecting the discretionary powers of the 
coastal State to uphold its consent. Even if the precise terms are not explicitly used, it 
is obvious that the activities where the coastal State should normally grant its consent 
refer to fundamental research (projects undertaken exclusively for peaceful purposes 
and in order to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the 
benefit of all mankind); on the other hand, those where consent may be withheld 
concern applied research (projects of direct significance for the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources, that involve drilling into the continental shelf, 
etc.).55  
However, in practice, it is difficult to distinguish the two types of activities, as no 
objective criteria have been set forth. The Geneva regime was more effective in that 
respect, as it provided for the criterion of open publication of the results in order to 
make a distinction between the two. Thus, fundamental research is conducted with the 
intention of open publication of the results, while applied research is undertaken with 
the intention of producing certain practical results. Certainly, all fundamental research 
may acquire some practical relevance, but, as Lucius Caflisch suggested, “this does 
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not mean that such research is undistinguishable from applied research”.56 As the 
same author argues, “even in borderline cases where the planned research is partly 
fundamental in nature and partly aimed at obtaining practical results”, the 
requirement of open publication will not be necessarily detrimental to the coastal 
State’s interests as “it will in fact be the coastal State which will mainly benefit from 
these results”.57 This is because it enjoys exclusive resource jurisdiction over the area 
in which the research is carried out. Nevertheless, even if MSR is conducted under the 
watchful eye of the coastal State, the latter might be unwilling to publish the results 
and the UNCLOS gives full discretion in that respect. 
Yet, it can be argued that even if the Convention had incorporated a definition for 
MSR, it might have been outdated, as science and technology evolving more quickly 
than legal regimes. Regardless of how persuasive this argument may be and in line 
with the position of the negotiators who concluded that a definition would be 
superfluous,58 the lack of a clear definition may lead to different interpretations. 
Therefore, it creates great uncertainty about the activities covered by the MSR regime 
and those that are not. There is a legal grey zone concerning jurisdiction. For instance, 
it is not certain if all forms of data collection, routine operational activities such as the 
Argo-types floats59or hydrographical surveys (collection of information for the 
making of navigational charts and safety of navigation)60 can be subject to the MSR 
regime. Some authors suggest that activities directed at shipwrecks and other forms of 
underwater cultural heritage61 or even military surveys (data collection for military 
purposes)62 come within the scope of MSR regime and are, thus, subject to the coastal 
State consent.63 There is also controversy whether bioprospecting, which relates to the 
access to genetic resources, falls under the MSR regime.64 Unfortunately, there is no 
clear answer for these concerns. 
 
3.3. Who is involved? The unexplored duty of cooperation 
 
MSR in the Adriatic and Ionian marine region is open to coastal States and their 
research institutions as well as to foreign States and competent international 
organizations. Certainly, the coastal States are the most interested not only in 
conducting and promoting scientific research, but also in ensuring protection of their 
natural resources and economic interests.  
Do the coastal States have adequate means to study and understand by themselves 
their adjacent marine environment? It seems that capacities in terms of institutions 
and equipment are very uneven on the two sides of the Adriatic and Ionian coast.65 
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Thus, as far as public sector research is concerned, only few States have large 
research vessels able to undertake research in the high seas. To reinforce their 
research capacity they might conclude agreements with foreign researchers States.66 
The UNCLOS encourages international cooperation in MSR between States and 
competent international organizations.67 These actors are even invited to conclude 
bilateral or multilateral agreements to create favorable conditions for the conduct of 
MSR and integrate the efforts of scientists in studying the marine environment.68  
Indeed, cooperation is very much needed in a domain such as MSR, which 
requests considerable investments in human and financial resources. Advantages 
could be gained from networking and better cooperation between research 
institutions. In fact, some international research projects covering the Adriatic and 
Ionian seas do exist. Examples are the projects ADRIAMED (Scientific cooperation 
to support responsible fisheries in the Adriatic Sea)69 and MEDITS (International 
bottom trawl survey in the Mediterranean).70 Moreover, the EU has expressed 
recently a strong interest in promoting MSR in the Adriatic and Ionian marine 
region.71 It has even provided examples of possible projects,72 which include, among 
others, a “Deep sea observation network” to map and monitor the seabed, a “Research 
platform marine robotics” to strengthen unmanned marine vehicles for underwater 
and seabed operations and a “Research platform on the exploitation of micro-
organisms” growing in the Adriatic and Ionian seas. These projects could be 
potentially financed by the 8th EU Framework Research Program (Horizon 2020), 
which covers marine scientific research.  
However, international cooperation is not always a given. Jurisdictional 
uncertainty and legal ambiguities may impact the conduct of these projects as practice 
reveals. For instance, in the MEDITS project, the research activities end at the 
boundary of the ecological and fishery protection zone claimed by Croatia.73 
Therefore, the delimitation of the marine area and the clarification of legal 
ambiguities are the very first step in launching regional cooperation for MSR 
activities.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this paper was to show how MSR can be conducted and 
promoted in the Adriatic and Ionian marine region. The legal framework is provided 
by UNCLOS, which establishes general obligations and the legal basis for jurisdiction 
of the coastal States over MSR. Certainly, it does not resolve all questions 
satisfactorily and does not provide for technical details. Being a product of a difficult 
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compromise between the interests of the coastal and the researching States, it is 
unlikely to be changed, at least in the nearby future.  
Nevertheless, the general regime could be further developed and the legal 
ambiguities clarified by regional cooperation and consistent State practice. Such 
cooperation could be undertaken by the coastal States themselves or in the framework 
of competent international organizations or even in the framework of the Barcelona 
system for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea from pollution.74 For instance, a 
code of conduct or guidelines for MSR activities could be developed to diminish 
potential controversies. The need for a more integrated approach is more than evident. 
Instead of a strict balance of interests between coastal and researching States, wider 
concerns need to be taken into account, such as issues of sustainability as well as the 
necessity to know and better comprehend the adjacent marine environment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Mediterranean Sea, of which the Adriatic and Ionian Seas form part, is known 
for its rich underwater cultural heritage (UCH) that has lain for centuries on the seabed.1 
Ever since antiquity, and certainly also in earlier historic periods, seafaring routes to and 
from the Levant have stretched along the shores of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, 
especially the more sheltered Eastern shores. But not all ships would reach their port of 
destination. Many foundered due to unexpected storms or shipping accidents. The sites 
of such shipwrecks, which encapsulate material remains of human culture at the 
moment of their sinking, are an invaluable source of knowledge about human activities 
at sea and about life in the past in general.2 Unfortunately, lying on the seabed these 
historic wrecks do not attract only those who are interested in their cultural and 
scientific value, but they are also exposed to treasure hunters and plunderers who are 
keen to get hold of anything valuable that can be sold for profit. Thus, the protection of 
UCH sites from undue disturbance and, in many cases, plain devastation becomes vital 
if we want to preserve the knowledge they harbour about the past and convey it to future 
generations. 
Considering this fascinating heritage we have at the bottom of our seas, it will come 
as no surprise that almost all the riparian States of the Adriatic and Ionian seas should 
                                                 
1
 See eg P. Throckmorton (ed), The Sea Remembers: Shipwrecks and Archaeology (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987); J-
Y. Blot, Underwater Archaeology: Exploring the World beneath the Sea (Thames and Hudson, 1996). Selected 
shipwreck sites in the Croatian Adriatic from various periods of history are described in D. Frka, J. Mesić, Blago 
Jadrana [The Treasures of the Adriatic] (Adamić, 2012). 
2
 By way of illustration, as at 8 May 2015 in Croatia there were 154 underwater sites listed in the Cultural Heritage 
Register and thus protected under the terms of the Croatian Cultural Heritage Act (see infra n 19). The Adriatic and 
Ionian States put a lot of effort into developing underwater archaeological research and protecting the UCH. In 
Greece, for example, the “Ephorate” for Underwater Antiquities was established as a special service within the 
Ministry of Culture already in 1976 (see <www.yppo.gr/1/e1540.jsp?obj_id=91>, accessed 12 December 2015), and 
the private, non-profit Hellenic Institute of Marine Archaeology (HIMA) exists even since 1973 (see 
<http://www.ienae.gr/index.php/en/hima/about-us> accessed 12 December 2015); see also A. Strati, ‘Greece’ in S. 
Dromgoole (ed), The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: National Perspectives in Light of the 
UNESCO Convention 2001 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 98. In Italy, activities concerning underwater 
archaeology are coordinated on the national level within the “Direzione Generale Archeologia” which forms part of 
the Ministry of Culture. In 2004, the ‘Direzione Generale Archeologia’ launched the project “Archeomar” with the 
aim of creating a comprehensive register of underwater archaeological sites (see official website 
<www.archeomar.it/archeomar/>). In Croatia, a special Department for Underwater Archaeology operates within the 
Croatian Conservation Institute, a state agency tasked with the conservation and restoration of movable and 
immovable cultural objects, which is also involved in archaeological field work (see the official website of the 
Croatian Conservative Institute <www.h-r-z.hr>). Furthermore, in 2007, the International Centre for Underwater 
Archaeology in Zadar (ICUA) was founded as an organisational unit within the framework of the Croatian 
Conservation Institute and, as a first of its kind, was granted the auspices of UNESCO; for more information, see the 
official website <www.icua.hr/en>. 
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have become parties to the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage (CPUCH),3 Greece being the sole exception.4 Adopted in 2001 within the 
UNESCO and in force as of 2009, the CPUCH is the first international instrument that 
comprehensively deals with the protection of UCH. 
On the other hand, the 1982 UNCLOS was the first multilateral treaty to at least 
address the issue of UCH protection, albeit to a very limited degree. Indeed, the 
UNCLOS contains only two very summary and vague articles on “archaeological and 
historical objects”, as UCH is called in the terminology of that Convention. Based on 
these fragmentary provisions, it was impossible to ensure the comprehensive protection 
of the UCH.5 Still, it is the great achievement of the UNCLOS that it proclaimed the 
general obligation that “States have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological and 
historical nature found at sea and shall cooperate for this purpose”.6 
The most obvious problem with the piecemeal protection regime of the UNCLOS 
was the lack of a special rule for “archaeological and historical objects” on the 
continental shelf and in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which left valuable cultural 
objects, especially historic shipwrecks, found on the seabed beyond the 24-mile limit 
virtually unprotected. As has been aptly observed, such a legal situation presented for 
treasure hunters an invitation to loot the UCH.7 It should be recalled at this point that in 
fact Greece brought the issue of UCH protection to the fore during the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, seeking to achieve an extension of coastal 
State jurisdiction on the continental shelf and in the EEZ also to include “archaeological 
and historical objects”. However, this was met with insurmountable opposition.8 
The question of coastal State jurisdiction was again a highly controversial issue 
throughout the negotiations for the CPUCH within UNESCO.9 Although the initial draft 
had favoured an extension of coastal jurisdiction, it soon turned out that such a solution 
would be unacceptable to the major maritime States. Any extension of coastal State 
jurisdiction beyond the competences accorded by the UNCLOS was out of the question. 
                                                 
3
 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2009) 2565-I UNTS 51. To date 52 States have 
become bound by the CPUCH; see the status of ratifications available on UNESCO’s website, 
<www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13520&language=E> (accessed 12 December 2015). 
4
 Among the Adriatic and Ionian States Croatia was the first, and the third State overall to ratify the CPUCH back in 
2004; Montenegro and Slovenia ratified in 2008; Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2009, and finally Italy in 2010; 
ibid. 
5
 Although Article 303, placed in Part XVI (General Provisions) UNCLOS, purportedly relates to archaeological and 
historical objects in all maritime zones, its para 2 is famous for the complex, if not contradictory, legal construction 
of a special rule concerning such objects found on the seabed of the contiguous zone, which avoided to expressly 
recognise a jurisdictional right of coastal States to regulate and authorise protective measures in respect of UCH (see 
text to n 41-46). Article 149, on the other hand, deals with archaeological and historical objects in the Area, which 
“shall be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole”. For an early criticism of these provisions 
see L. Caflisch, ‘Submarine Antiquities and the International Law of the Sea’, (1982) 13 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 3. See also eg T. Scovazzi, ‘A Contradictory and Counterproductive Regime’ in R Garabello, T. 
Scovazzi (eds), The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Before and After the 2001 UNESCO 
Convention (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003) 4 ff; R. Garabello, La Convenzione UNESCO sulla protezione del 
patrimonio culturale subacqueo (Giuffrè, 2004) 16 ff; S. Dromgoole, Underwater Cultural Heritage and 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 29 ff. 
6
 Article 303(1) UNCLOS. 
7
 Scovazzi (n 5) 8. 
8
 The Greek proposal was in the end reduced to Article 303 UNCLOS. For more details on the travaux préparatoires 
see Caflisch (n 5) 16 ff.; A. Strati, The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: An Emerging Objective of 
the Contemporary Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 162 ff.; Garabello (n 5) 19 ff; N.C. Pallas, 
Maritimer Kulturgüterschutz (Duncker & Humblot, 2004) 256 ff; Dromgoole (n 5) 32 ff. 
9
 For an account of the negotiating history see especially R. Garabello, ‘The Negotiating History of the Convention 
on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage’ in R Garabello, T. Scovazzi (eds), The Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage: Before and After the 2001 UNESCO Convention (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003). 
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Hence, a compromise had to be worked out, especially for the continental shelf and the 
EEZ, but even the moderate provisions that we have today in the CPUCH were 
perceived by a number of States, notably major maritime States, as running counter to 
the existing set of jurisdictional zones in the UNCLOS.10 Greece, on the other hand, was 
unable to accept that the CPUCH did not provide for a clear-cut rule on coastal State 
jurisdiction concerning the UCH on the continental shelf and in the EEZ.11 
Anyhow, the result we have is that the UCH protection regime as envisaged by the 
2001 UNESCO Convention follows the pattern of jurisdictional zones already existing 
in the UNCLOS. It is the aim of this paper to explain the basic features of the 
jurisdictional regime for the protection of UCH in the various maritime zones but within 
the context of the Adriatic and Ionian marine space. Hence, the International Seabed 
Area will not be addressed in particular, since there is no Area in the Adriatic and 
Ionian Seas.12 A section of the paper will also be devoted to the status of sunken State 
vessels and aircraft as UCH. Where appropriate, and as far as accessible, reference will 
be made to normative solutions contained in the national legislations of the Adriatic and 
Ionian coastal States. As concerns national legislation, all of the States in question 
follow the same legislative technique. None of them have specific laws concerning the 
protection of UCH. In other words, the general cultural heritage legislation encompasses 
also the UCH, with certain provisions, or regulations adopted on the basis of the laws, 
referring to some specific aspects of UCH protection.13 
Before turning to the jurisdictional regimes in the various maritime zones which are 
at the heart of our discussion, it seems necessary, however, to at least briefly explain the 
                                                 
10
 Thus, Norway giving its reasons for voting against the CPUCH stated: “[T]he Convention unfortunately also 
includes parts, which jeopardise the fine balance of jurisdiction achieved through the carefully drafted UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This applies in particular to provisions relating to the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf”; see ‘Statements on Vote during Commission IV on Culture’, UNESCO, 
31st Session of the General Conference, 29 October 2001, reprinted in R Garabello, T. Scovazzi (eds), The Protection 
of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Before and After the 2001 UNESCO Convention (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2003) 248. The Russian Federation, also voting against the Convention, gave a similar explanation: “[F]or principal 
reasons, a number of provisions of the Convention are not acceptable for Russia. For example, Article 10 may be 
interpreted as exceeding the scope of rights and jurisdiction of a coastal State in adjacent seas as set forth by the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982” (ibid, 249). The US, although not a member of UNESCO at the time and 
participating in the negotiations only with observer status, rejected the CPUCH “because of objections to several key 
provisions relating to jurisdiction, the reporting scheme, warships, and the relationship of the Convention to 
UNCLOS” (ibid, 252). The jurisdictional regime was one of the reasons why France abstained from voting (ibid, 
246). But any concerns France might have had have obviously been resolved in the meantime, since it ratified the 
CPUCH in 2013. It should, nevertheless, be noted that many important maritime States voted in favour of the 
Convention, thus acknowledging the compromise that had been reached, among them Australia, Canada, China, Italy 
and Japan. 
11
 The Greek delegation, explaining the reasons for its abstention from voting, stated, inter alia, that the system 
envisaged in the CPUCH for the continental shelf and the EEZ “leaves to the coastal State only a ‘coordinating role’ 
on its own continental shelf and does not ensure its right to be notified of discoveries of UCH or intended activities 
directed at UCH found in the area (see in particular Article 9(1)(b)ii). Despite the fact that throughout the 
negotiations at UNESCO the majority of governmental experts were in favour of extending coastal rights over UCH 
on the continental shelf, the Draft Convention does not even mention the term ‘coastal State’”, ibid, 247. 
12
 The CPUCH’s protection regime for the UCH in the Area (Articles 11 and 12) largely resembles the reporting and 
consultation procedure established for the EEZ and the continental shelf. For more details see eg PJ O’Keefe, 
Shipwrecked Heritage: A Commentary on the UNESCO Convention on Underwater Cultural Heritage (Institute of 
Art and Law, 2002) 95 ff; Garabello (n 5) 291 ff; Pallas (n 8) 448 ff; Dromgoole, Underwater Cultural Heritage (n 5) 
294 ff. 
13
 On UNESCO’s thematic web pages dedicated to the CPUCH a “Model Implementation Law” can be found which 
seems to advocate this approach, giving the “example of a comprehensive law on the protection of cultural heritage, 
encompassing land-based as well as submerged immovable heritage as well as movable objects”; 
<www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/UNESCO_MODEL_UNDERWATER_ACT_2013.p
df> (accessed 12 December 2015). 
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CPUCH’s substantive scope of application, i.e. how the Convention defines UCH, and 
to highlight the CPUCH’s most important objectives and general principles. 
 
 
2. The definition of Underwater Cultural Heritage 
 
Article 1(1)(a) CPUCH defines UCH as “all traces of human existence having a 
cultural, historical or archaeological character which have been partially or totally under 
water, periodically or continuously, for at least 100 years”. 
This rather broad definition is supplemented by a non-exhaustive list of examples 
contained in Article 1(1)(a)(i)-(iii) of the Convention. The listed relics are explicitly 
considered as UCH and, thus, fall within the scope of the Convention. This list includes: 
“(i) sites, structures, buildings, artefacts and human remains, together with their 
archaeological and natural context;14 (ii) vessels, aircraft, other vehicles or any part 
thereof, their cargo or other contents, together with their archaeological and natural 
context; and (iii) objects of prehistoric character”. 
The advantage of introducing a time limit lies in its objectivity but its downside is, of 
course, that many shipwreck sites of a younger date, which might well be of 
archaeological significance, will remain outside the scope of the CPUCH. What 
immediately comes to mind, are the numerous wrecks of warships and military aircraft 
sunk during the Second World War.15 This seems to have been the reason why the 1998 
UNESCO preliminary draft had allowed for the possibility that States encompass in 
their national legislations cultural heritage that had been under water for less than 100 
years.16 Although this provision was omitted in the final text of the CPUCH, there is no 
discernible obstacle why States could not choose a stricter time criterion in their 
national legislations, at least as concerns the maritime zones under their sovereignty. 
By the expression “traces of human existence”, the definition clearly excludes pure 
natural phenomena and also remains of palaeontological character,17 but on the other 
hand it includes human remains, thus acknowledging the status of shipwrecks as grave 
sites. This is reasserted in Article 2(9), which requires States to “ensure that proper 
respect is given to all human remains located in maritime waters”. 
The definition does not comprise a geographic element. Accordingly, the scope of 
the Convention, and, thus, the obligation of States to protect underwater cultural 
heritage, extends geographically to all seas and oceans, as is the case with the 
UNCLOS.18 
As to the national legislations of the Adriatic and Ionian States, in Croatia, for 
example, the 1999 Act on the Protection and Preservation of Cultural Objects,19 
                                                 
14
 Specifically excluded from the scope of the CPUCH are all pipelines and cables placed on the seabed (Article 
1(1)(b)), while installations other than pipelines and cables cannot be considered as underwater cultural heritage, as 
long as they are still in use (Article 1(1)(c)). 
15
 Submerged relics from the First World War, on the other hand, will soon be entirely covered by the definition. cf 
O’Keefe (n 12) 42; D. Momtaz, ‘La Convention sur la protection du patrimoine culturel subaquatique’ in T.M. 
Ndiaye, R. Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge 
Thomas Mensah (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 447 ff; Dromgoole (n 5) 90. 
16
 S. Dromgoole, ‘2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage’, (2003) 18 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 59, 63. 
17
 M. Rau, ‘The UNESCO Convention on Underwater Cultural Heritage and the International Law of the Sea’, (2002) 
6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 387, 402. 
18
 Pallas (n 8) 408; Momtaz (n 15) 447. 
19
 Narodne novine [Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia; NN] No 69/1999; subsequent amendments and/or 
corrections in NN Nos 151/2003, 157/2003, 87/2009, 88/2010, 61/2011, 25/2012, 136/2012, 157/2013, 152/2014, 
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although covering UCH, does not contain a specific definition. However, a number of 
provisions refer to underwater archaeological sites. Among them the list of immovable 
cultural objects provided in Article 7 comprises “archaeological sites and archaeological 
zones, including underwater sites and zones”. In order for cultural objects to be 
protected under the Croatian Cultural Heritage Act no specific time-limit has been 
prescribed. In practice the Croatian services for cultural heritage protection have applied 
a stricter time criterion than the one adopted in CPUCH’s definition, placing many 
underwater sites from the First and Second World Wars under the protection afforded 
by law.20 
The Greek Law 3028/2002 “on the Protection of Antiquities and the Cultural 
Heritage in General”21 deals with almost every aspect of cultural heritage protection 
and, thus, encompasses underwater cultural heritage, as well.22 In the Law a very 
complex definition of the protected cultural heritage was elaborated. This definition 
forms the basis for determining the different levels of protection that are accorded to 
various categories of cultural heritage depending primarily on their age. To that end a 
combination of time criteria is used, including the 100 year-limit.23 However, in Greek 
legislation a specific time criterion for UCH will be found elsewhere, namely in a 
decision issued by the Minister of Culture on the basis of Law 3028/2002 in 2003.24 
Under that decision all wrecks of ships and aircraft which have been under water for 
more than 50 years are generally classified as monuments in the sense of the Greek 
Cultural Heritage Law.25 
The Slovene 2008 Cultural Heritage Protection Act26 does not define UCH. There are 
also no provisions which would solely address the protection of UCH. From the usage 
of terms in the Act it is nevertheless clear that the Act’s scope of application covers 
UCH. According to Article 3(1)(2) “archaeological finds” are movable archaeological 
remains which have been in the earth as well as those which have been under water for 
at least 100 years. It is then further clarified that the term “archaeological finds” also 
comprises “arms, munitions, other military material, military vehicles and vessels or 
their parts” which have been in the earth or under water for at least 50 years. The 
reference to UCH in the usage of the terms is evident. It is interesting that the definition 
combines two time limits, a general one of 100 years as used in the CPUCH, and a 
specific time limit of 50 years for archaeological finds of a military nature. The stricter 
time criterion was quite obviously introduced with a view to extending the Act’s 
protection regime to relics from the two world wars of the 20th century. The same 
differentiation of time limits is repeated in Article 3(1)(3) concerning the definition of 
the term “archaeological remains”.27 
                                                                                                                                               
98/2015. An English translation of the initial text adopted in 1999 can be retrieved from the UNESCO Database of 
National Cultural Heritage Laws, <portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=33928&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html> (accessed 14 December 2015). 
20
 See also TM Šošić, ‘Konvencija UNESCO-a o zaštiti podvodne kulturne baštine i jurisdikcija država u 
Jadranskome moru’ [‘The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage and State 
Jurisdiction in the Adriatic Sea’] (2010) 49 Poredbeno pomorsko pravo [Comparative Maritime Law] 101, 125. 
21
 Official Gazette A’ 153/2002. 
22
 Strati (n 2) 105. 
23
 For more details see ibid, 106 ff. 
24
 Ministerial Decree 48604/3385/05.09.2003, Official Gazette B’ 1701/2003. 
25
 Strati (n 2) 108. 
26
 Uradni list Republike Slovenije [Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia; UL] No 16/2008; subsequent 
amendments in UL Nos 123/2008, 90/2012, 111/2013. An English translation of the initial text adopted in 2008 can 
be retrieved from the UNESCO Database of National Cultural Heritage Laws (n 19). 
27
 See also Šošić (n 20) 131. 
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3. Objectives and general principles of UCH protection 
 
The objectives and principles of the international legal regime of UCH protection as 
established by the CPUCH are contained in its Preamble and in Article 2, but they are, 
of course, concretised and elaborated through other provisions of the Convention. We 
will highlight some of the more important objectives and principles, along with other 
key general provisions. 
Article 2(2) of the Convention restates the general obligation, which, as mentioned, 
was already introduced by Article 303(1) UNCLOS, namely that “States Parties shall 
cooperate in the protection of underwater cultural heritage”. Indeed, the principle of 
cooperation is omnipresent in the CPUCH. The cooperation among States is 
indispensable for the effective implementation of the protective regime as envisaged by 
the Convention, and, as will be seen, this is particularly true for the protection of the 
UCH in the EEZ and on the continental shelf.28 
Another important principle is the duty of States to “preserve underwater cultural 
heritage for the benefit of humanity”.29 Read together with the 1st recital of the 
Preamble, which acknowledges “the importance of underwater cultural heritage as an 
integral part of the cultural heritage of humanity and a particularly important element in 
the history of peoples, nations, and their relations with each other concerning their 
common heritage”, the employed phrase clearly reflects the common heritage of 
mankind principle.30 
Closely linked to the duty to preserve the UCH for the benefit of humanity is the 
general prohibition of the commercial exploitation of UCH.31 This general prohibition is 
reinforced in the “Rules concerning activities directed at underwater cultural heritage” 
which are annexed to the CPUCH and contain a set of modern archaeological and 
technical standards.32 Rule 2 of the Annex states that “[t]he commercial exploitation of 
underwater cultural heritage for trade or speculation or its irretrievable dispersal is 
fundamentally incompatible with the protection and proper management of underwater 
cultural heritage” and provides that “[u]nderwater cultural heritage shall not be traded, 
sold, bought or bartered as commercial goods”. The prohibition of commercial 
exploitation is undoubtedly aimed against treasure hunters and looting activities of any 
kind, but should, on the other hand, not be interpreted as to totally exclude any 
involvement of commercial organisations. Indeed, there might well be profit-oriented 
organisations that have an interest to participate with their financial potential in 
coordinated research and protection efforts, and this should clearly not be prevented.33 
                                                 
28
 See, infra, para 6. 
29
 Cf Article 2(3) CPUCH. 
30
 For more details see T.M. Šošić, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind and the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage’ in B. Vukas, T.M. Šošić (eds), International Law: New Actors, New Concepts – Continuing Dilemmas. 
Liber Amicorum Božidar Bakotić (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) 319-350. 
31
 Cf Article 2(7) CPUCH. 
32
 According to Article 33 CPUCH the Rules annexed to the Convention “form an integral part of it and, unless 
expressly provided otherwise, a reference to this Convention includes a reference to the Rules”. On the 
archaeological and technical standards as contained in the Annex to the CPUCH see eg O’Keefe (n 12) 152, 155 ff.; 
T.J. Maarleveld, U. Guérin, B. Egger (eds), Manual for Activities Directed at Underwater Cultural Heritage: 
Guidelines to the Annex of the UNESCO 2001 Convention (UNESCO, 2013), 
<www.unesco.org/culture/en/underwater/pdf/UCH-Manual.pdf> (accessed 2 January 2016). 
33
 Dromgoole (n 5) 233 ff. 
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In line with modern archaeological standards, Article 2(5) CPUCH provides for the 
application of in situ protection, whenever this is feasible and in the best interest of the 
UCH. The principle of in situ protection is reiterated in Rule 1 of the Annex and made 
effective through other Annex rules concerning e.g. project funding and design, project 
team competence, conservation management, etc.34 
One of the intensely debated issues during the negotiations for the CPUCH was, of 
course, the relationship of the Convention with the UNCLOS. The major maritime 
States argued that the UNCLOS was a carefully balanced legal structure, notably as 
concerns the jurisdiction of States in the various maritime spaces, and that the 
established jurisdictional equilibrium must not be tampered with. Other States, however, 
felt that the CPUCH was pointless unless it went beyond the UNCLOS. Article 3 of the 
CPUCH procured the general solution, affirming that “[n]othing in this Convention 
shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under international law, 
including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ and that the CPUCH 
“shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner consistent with 
international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”. 
Nevertheless, critics say that, in spite of Article 3, many provisions of the CPUCH have 
significantly departed from the UNCLOS regime. Certainly, if a restrictive approach to 
interpretation were chosen, this might be true to some extent, but otherwise a workable 
protection regime for underwater heritage could simply not have been created. Besides, 
already the 1995 Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, though 
considered to be an implementing agreement vis-à-vis the UNCLOS and containing a 
provision similar to Article 3 CPUCH, did not merely implement the pertinent articles 
of the UNCLOS, but provided for largely innovative solutions, which, restrictively 
interpreted, could not be deemed as being in full compliance with the UNCLOS.35 
 
 
4. Marine spaces under the sovereignty of coastal states 
 
The protection of the UCH found in marine spaces under the sovereignty of a coastal 
State, i.e. in its internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea, remains, 
expectedly, under the sole jurisdiction of the respective State. Pursuant to Article 7(1) 
CPUCH coastal States “have the exclusive right to regulate and authorize activities 
directed at underwater cultural heritage in their internal waters, archipelagic waters and 
territorial sea”. However, this does not mean that it is left to the discretion of the coastal 
State whether or not to take appropriate protective measures, as might be concluded 
from the wording of the provision. The opposite holds true, since according to the 
general principle in Article 2(4) CPUCH States parties “shall … take all appropriate 
measures … that are necessary to protect underwater cultural heritage”,36 which clearly 
indicates an obligation.37 The coastal State’s sovereignty is also limited in so far as it 
must ensure the application of the archaeological standards contained in the Rules of the 
                                                 
34
 Ibid, 317 ff. 
35
 G. Carducci, ‘New Developments in the Law of the Sea: The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of 
Underwater Cultural Heritage’, (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 419, 421 ff; Dromgoole (n 16) 75; 
Scovazzi (n 5) 15 ff. For more details concerning the compatibility of the CPUCH with the UNCLOS see eg Rau (n 
17) 421 ff; Garabello, (n 5) 415 ff; Pallas (n 8) 393 ff; Dromgoole (n 5) 277 ff. 
36
 Emphasis added. 
37
 Rau (n 17) 408 ff; Pallas (n 8) 430 ff. 
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Annex, as regards protective measures taken in its internal waters, archipelagic waters 
and territorial sea.38 
Since the national cultural heritage legislations of the Adriatic and Ionian States 
which we had occasion to consult, do not specifically extend their scope of application 
to maritime zones beyond State sovereignty, they will, at least in principle, be applied 
only within coastal States’ territories, i.e. up to the outer limits of the territorial seas.39 
As concerns the archaeological and technical standards of the Annex to the CPUCH, 
which, as mentioned, concern such issues as assurance of proper archaeological 
expertise through approval of project design and funding, conservation and site 
management, reporting on project implementation, etc., they are, as far as could be 
established, to a large extent reflected in the general cultural heritage laws.40 
 
 
5. Contiguous zone 
 
A cursory reading of Article 8 CPUCH would suggest that the jurisdiction of the 
coastal State in respect of cultural objects in its contiguous zone is identical with the 
regime in the maritime zones under its sovereignty. Indeed, according to Article 8 States 
“may regulate and authorize activities directed at underwater cultural heritage within 
their contiguous zone”, which undoubtedly means that States have legislative 
competence regarding UCH. 
However, in the opening passage of Article 8 it is said that the coastal States will 
exercise this right “in accordance with Article 303, paragraph 2, of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea”. The rather famous – or should we say infamous? – 
and, to all intents and purposes, deliberately ambiguous provision contained in Article 
303(2) UNCLOS41 establishes a legal fiction and has been interpreted both restrictively 
and extensively, and naturally with disparate outcomes.42 Surely, the wording of Article 
303(2) UNCLOS is vague and obscure,43 but it undoubtedly gives more powers to 
States regarding the protection of archaeological and historical objects in the contiguous 
zone than the mere control necessary to prevent and punish violations of “customs, 
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations”.44 As we have argued elsewhere,45 
already on the basis of Article 303(2) UNCLOS States had the possibility of exercising 
certain regulatory competences in respect of UCH on the seabed up to the 24-mile limit, 
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 Cf Article 7(2) CPUCH. 
39
 Exceptions, albeit of a limited scope, can be found in the Italian and Greek laws. 
40
 In respect of the Croatian legislation, cf J. Mesić, ‘Protezione del patrimonio culturale subacqueo in Croazia’ in F 
Maniscalco (ed), Tutela, conservazione e valorizzazione del patrimonio culturale subacqueo (Massa Editore, 2004); 
Šošić, ‘Konvencija UNESCO-a’ (n 20) 126. In respect of the Greek legislation cf Strati (n 2) 123. 
41
 See, supra, n 5 and 8. The provision reads as follows: “In order to control traffic in [archaeological and historical] 
objects, the coastal State may, in applying Article 33, presume that their removal from the seabed in the zone referred 
to in that article [ie the contiguous zone] without its approval would result in an infringement within its territory or 
territorial sea of the laws and regulations referred to in that article [ie customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws 
and regulations]”. 
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Zone as an Archaeological Maritime Zone’, (2014) 29 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1, 5 ff. 
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 Cf Article 33 UNCLOS. 
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and practice has shown that States have understood and used Article 303(2) UNCLOS 
in that sense.46 These regulatory competences are not tied to the other jurisdictional 
powers accorded to coastal States by Article 33 UNCLOS. In other words, the coastal 
State may claim an archaeological zone without necessarily making use of the other 
jurisdictional powers in the contiguous zone. This view on Article 303(2) UNCLOS, 
which we have summarily presented, has found its confirmation in Article 8 CPUCH, 
giving the coastal State the right to “regulate and authorize” protective measures in 
respect of UCH located in the contiguous zone. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the opening passage of Article 8 CPUCH 
contains another proviso to the legislative competence, saying that it is given to coastal 
States “[w]ithout prejudice to and in addition to” Articles 9 and 10 CPUCH, i.e. the 
provisions concerning the protection of UCH in the EEZ and on the continental shelf. 
This obviously means that the mechanism of reports and consultations in respect of 
UCH in the EEZ and on the continental shelf may also be applied to artefacts found in 
the contiguous zone. Consequently, the coastal State’s legislative competence in respect 
of UCH in its contiguous zone is, at least to some extent, limited. But the reference to 
Articles 9 and 10 CPUCH should be understood as an expression of the principle of 
cooperation rather than as an obligation of the coastal State to coordinate every single 
measure taken in respect of UCH in the 24-mile zone with other States claiming an 
interest in the fate of the UCH in question.47 
As in the case of the maritime zones under the sovereignty of coastal States, Article 8 
CPUCH requires the application of the Rules in the Annex regarding UCH in the 
contiguous zone. This presents again a limitation on the coastal State’s legislative 
competence, but here the purpose is to safeguard the effective protection of the UCH 
through the application of current archaeological standards and best practices. 
Turning to the national legislations of the Adriatic and Ionian States, it should, first 
of all, be said that none of them have expressly proclaimed contiguous zones in the 
sense of Article 33 UNCLOS. In Italy’s 2004 Cultural Heritage and Landscape Code48 
we will find a provision – Article 94 – that concerns “archaeological and historical 
objects found on the seabed of the maritime zone extending twelve nautical miles from 
the outer limits of the territorial sea”.49 Thus, the provision concerns the seabed of 
maritime areas which are co-extensive with the contiguous zone. The UCH found in 
that zone “shall be protected in the sense of the ‘rules concerning activities directed at 
underwater cultural heritage’, as annexed to the UNESCO Convention on the Protection 
of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, adopted in Paris on 2 November 2001”. The 
conclusion must be that Italy claims to have jurisdiction, at least to a certain degree, 
regarding the protection of the UCH located on the seabed beyond its territorial sea and 
within the 24-mile limit. It is interesting that Article 94 does not expressly extend the 
application of the Code itself to the UCH found on the seabed beyond Italy’s territorial 
sea but provides for the application of the Rules, i.e. the archaeological and technical 
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 For a detailed presentation of the State practice see Aznar (n 42). See also Šošić (n 42) 313 ff. 
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 See also Šošić (n 42) 323. 
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 Decreto Legislativo 22 gennaio 2004, n. 42, ‘Codice dei beni culturali e del paesaggio, ai sensi dell’articolo 10 
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standards of the Annex to the CPUCH. Nevertheless, since the Rules require e.g. the 
issuance of various authorisations and approvals and the regulation and control of 
activities directed at UCH, it would certainly fall upon the competent Italian authorities 
to fulfil these tasks. Another point of interest is that, despite the express reference to the 
CPUCH in the Cultural Heritage and Landscape Code, Italy was neither a party to the 
Convention nor was it in force when the Code was adopted in 2004. In Law No. 157 of 
23 October 2009, concerning the ratification and implementation of the CPUCH by 
Italy,50 Article 3 expressly refers to Article 94 of the Cultural Heritage and Landscape 
Code. The provision, although avoiding the usage of the term “archaeological zone”, 
deals with delimitation issues and thus confirms the distinctiveness of the maritime zone 
established by the 2004 Code.51 
In Greece’s 2002 Antiquities and Cultural Heritage Law (Law 3028/2002) there is a 
provision which seems broader in scope than Article 94 of the 2004 Italian Code. In 
defining the “cultural heritage of Greece” Article 1(2) of the Greek Law encompasses 
“cultural objects, found within the boundaries of Greek territory, including the territorial 
waters, and other maritime zones over which Greece exercises relevant jurisdiction in 
accordance with international law”.52 In other words, the Law, in principle, allows for 
UCH protection by Greek authorities even beyond the territorial sea, at least up to the 
24-mile limit. The importance of such a provision is marked by the fact that the Greek 
territorial sea has a breadth of only 6 nautical miles.53 
 
 
6. Exclusive economic zone and continental shelf 
 
As pointed out in the introduction, during the negotiations for the CPUCH the 
maritime powers were opposed to giving coastal States any extra jurisdictional rights in 
respect of UCH, which would go beyond the regime in the UNCLOS. Thus, a 
compromise solution was worked out in the CPUCH as concerns the protection regime 
in the EEZ and on the continental shelf. As a result, Articles 9 and 10 CPUCH, in order 
to ensure the protection of UCH, institute a very complex reporting and consultation 
mechanism based on existing State rights and the flag State and nationality principles of 
jurisdiction.54 
First of all, the introductory sentence in Article 9(1) stresses that all States parties are 
responsible for protecting UCH in the EEZ and on the continental shelf. The provision 
obviously builds on the existing general obligation of States to protect UCH, and 
without addressing the coastal States in any particular way. 
Article 9(1) goes on with providing for a reporting scheme on discoveries of UCH 
sites and intended activities directed at cultural relics in the EEZ and on the continental 
shelf. The reporting procedure differs depending on the location of the site in the coastal 
State’s own EEZ or continental shelf or the EEZ or continental shelf of a foreign State. 
Naturally, when a national or vessel flying its flag makes a discovery or intends to 
pursue activities on UCH sites in its own EEZ or continental shelf, the State shall 
                                                 
50
 Legge 23 ottobre 2009, n. 157, in Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, n. 262/2009. 
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 M. Mancini, ‘Agreements to Which Italy Is a Party and Agreements and Understandings to Which Italian Regions 
and Autonomous Provinces Are Parties’, (2009) 19 Italian Yearbook of International Law 469, 471. 
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 Emphasis added. 
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 Strati (n 2) 105 ff. 
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require that national or the master of the vessel to report to that very State, that is their 
own State.55 
In respect of UCH in the EEZ or on the continental shelf of a foreign State, States 
parties to the CPUCH may choose between two reporting procedures. They shall either 
require their nationals and masters of vessels flying their flags to report discoveries and 
activities to them and directly to the foreign State,56 or the State party shall, 
alternatively, require that discoveries and activities be reported only to it, but it then 
must “ensure the rapid and effective transmission of such reports to all other States 
Parties”.57 In other words, in the latter instance the foreign State in whose EEZ or on 
whose continental shelf the UCH is located will receive the report indirectly. According 
to Article 9(2) CPUCH States must make a declaration regarding the manner in which 
these reports will be transmitted, when ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to 
the Convention. 
In essence, the purpose of Article 9 is to secure the transmission of the reports to all 
interested States, including the respective coastal State and any other State with “a 
verifiable link, especially a cultural, historical or archaeological link, to the underwater 
cultural heritage concerned.58 Besides, the reports shall also be notified to the Director-
General of UNESCO who will make them available to all States parties.59 
Article 10 CPUCH, which provides for a consultation procedure on the best means of 
protection for the UCH in the EEZ and on the continental shelf, reflects the principle of 
cooperation underlying the whole Convention.60 Apart from the coastal State, in whose 
EEZ or on whose continental shelf the UCH is located, all States with a verifiable link 
to the heritage are included in the consultation procedure.61 The consultations are led by 
a “Coordinating State”, a duty primarily to fall upon the coastal State whose EEZ or 
continental shelf is involved.62 As a rule, the coordinating State will also be the one to 
implement the protective measures that have been agreed upon and will issue the 
necessary authorisations.63 
An important feature of Article 10 is the right of the coordinating State to “take all 
practicable measures, and/or issue any necessary authorizations … to prevent any 
immediate danger to the underwater cultural heritage”.64 The coordinating State may 
take such preventive action even prior to the commencement of consultations.65 
Yet, it must be stressed that, whenever the coastal State acts as coordinating State, it 
“shall act on behalf of the States Parties as a whole and not in its own interest”.66 And 
just to make sure that the rights given to the coastal State as coordinating State are not 
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 Cf Article 9(1)(a) CPUCH. 
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 Cf Article 9(1)(b)(i) CPUCH. 
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 Cf Article 9(1)(b)(ii) CPUCH. 
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interpreted as to amount to an extension of jurisdiction, it was added that any actions 
taken by the coordinating State cannot be “a basis for the assertion of any preferential or 
jurisdictional rights not provided for in international law, including the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea”.67 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the coastal State has express legislative 
competence in order to prevent activities directed at UCH which may interfere with its 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction according to the UNCLOS. Pursuant to Article 10(2) 
CPUCH the coastal State may “prohibit or authorize” any such activity. Since its 
sovereign rights are at stake, such a situation undoubtedly does not entail the 
consultation procedure, and the coastal State clearly acts on its own behalf and not on 
behalf of all States parties within the meaning of Article 10(6) CPUCH.68 
As concerns specific provisions on UCH protection in the EEZ and on the 
continental shelf in the national legislations of the Adriatic and Ionian States, it should 
be remembered that none of them have declared a fully-fledged EEZ.69 On the other 
hand, of course, the coastal State’s right to the continental shelf is not dependent on 
declaration. 
Of the Adriatic and Ionian States only Italy made the required choice under Article 
9(2) CPUCH, opting for the procedure in Article 9(1)(b)(ii), i.e. that its nationals and 
masters of vessels flying the Italian flag shall send reports only to the Italian 
authorities.70 The choice made by Italy is implemented by Law No. 157 of 23 October 
2009 concerning the ratification and implementation of the CPUCH.71 According to 
Article 5(3) of the Law, Italian nationals and masters of vessels flying the Italian flag 
shall report discoveries of UCH or intended activities directed at UCH in a foreign 
State’s EEZ or continental shelf to the competent Italian consular services abroad. The 
consulate shall, upon receipt of such a report, inform the competent authorities of the 
foreign State but also the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,72 which in turn will 
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transmit the report to the Director-General of UNESCO and, as the case may be, make a 
declaration to the foreign State under Article 9(5) CPUCH.73 
It is interesting that Italy in its Law No. 61 of 8 February 2006 “on the Establishment 
of Ecological Protection Zones”74 included the exercise of jurisdiction concerning “the 
archaeological and historic heritage, in compliance with the provisions of the … United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the 
protection of the underwater cultural heritage, adopted in Paris on 2 November 2001, 
since the date of its entry into effect in Italy”.75 However, the Law itself did not 
effectively proclaim an ecological protection zone. It rather empowered the President of 
the Republic to do so on the basis of a decree and after preparatory work by various 
authorities.76 It should be noted that the Law refers to ecological protection zones in the 
plural. Thus, ecological protection zones for different segments of Italy’s coastline may 
be established and at different points of time.77 On Italy’s Adriatic and Ionian coasts, so 
far, no ecological protection zone has been proclaimed. Naturally, the UCH will 
invariably be located on the seabed. In other words, Articles 9 and 10 CPUCH will still 
be applicable to Italy’s continental shelf in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. To that end 
Article 5(1) of the 2009 CPUCH Ratification and Implementation Law regulates the 
reporting of UCH discoveries on Italy’s continental shelf or in an ecological protection 
zone and also prescribes that any activity directed at UCH requires authorisation from 
the competent Italian authorities.78 
A similar approach as in the Italian 2006 Ecological Protection Zones Law can be 
found in the Ecological Protection Zone and Continental Shelf Act which Slovenia 
adopted in 2005.79 Article 6(1) of the Act provided that “[t]he legal order of the 
Republic of Slovenia and the EU acquis in the areas of the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment, including the archaeological heritage, … shall apply to the 
ecological protection zone”.80 It is, of course, questionable if Slovenia’s claim to a 
continental shelf and an ecological protection zone is at all tenable under international 
law.81 
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In the case of Croatia, such a provision was not included in its 2003 “Decision on the 
Extension of the Jurisdiction of the Republic of Croatia in the Adriatic Sea”82 which 
established an “ecological and fisheries protection zone”.83 But we will find it in the Act 
on the Coast Guard of the Republic of Croatia adopted in 2007.84 According to Article 
36(1) of the Act, the Croatian Coast Guard shall, in accordance with international law 
and the laws of the Republic of Croatia, perform the supervision and protection of, inter 
alia, the cultural heritage in the Croatian ecological and fisheries protection zone. 
However, there are, it seems, still no specific provisions in the pertinent Croatian 
legislation on the reporting and consultation mechanism provided in the CPUCH for 
UCH in the EEZ and on the continental shelf.85 
 
 
7. The status of sunken warships and other state vessels and aircraft 
 
The legal status of sunken State vessels and aircraft86 was another particularly 
contentious issue during the negotiations for the CPUCH. Many States, and foremost 
the important maritime powers, maintained that warships and other State vessels and 
aircraft retain sovereign immunity according to international law,87 even after and 
regardless of the time of their sinking to the bottom of the seas.88 Consequently, these 
States advocated, if not the total exclusion of State vessels and aircraft from the 
protection regime, then at least a special regime. Accordingly, it must be seen as a 
significant achievement of the CPUCH that sunken State vessels and aircraft have been 
included into the Convention’s protection regime, albeit with some restrictions.89 
Article 2(8) CPUCH comprises the general rule that “[c]onsistent with State practice 
and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying the rules of international 
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law and State practice pertaining to sovereign immunities, nor any State’s rights with 
respect to its State vessels and aircraft”. Obviously, this provision aims at taking into 
account the concerns of the maritime powers with respect to the wrecks of warships. 
Furthermore, the provision in fact leaves the unclear legal situation regarding the 
sovereign immunity of sunken State vessels and aircraft aside, retaining a status quo in 
this respect.90 
However, the specific provisions concerning the wrecks of warships in the various 
maritime zones seem to contradict the general rule provided in Article 2(8) CPUCH. 
Thus, regarding the maritime zones under the sovereignty of a coastal State, Article 7(3) 
CPUCH stipulates that “[w]thin their archipelagic waters and territorial sea” coastal 
States, “with a view to cooperating on the best methods of protecting State vessels and 
aircraft, should inform the flag State Party … with respect to the discovery of such 
identifiable State vessels and aircraft”.91 The usage of the word “should” instead of 
“shall” suggests that this is a recommendation rather than a strict obligation. In addition, 
the provision does not extend to the coastal State’s internal waters. However, in light of 
the principle of cooperation, laid down in Article 2(2) CPUCH, and its fundamental 
importance for the protection regime of the CPUCH, it is to be expected that the coastal 
State will normally inform and consult the flag State.92 
In the EEZ and on the continental shelf, as a rule, “no activity directed at State 
vessels and aircraft shall be conducted without the agreement of the flag State and the 
collaboration of the Coordinating State”.93 However, the opening passage of Article 
10(7) CPUCH says that this is “subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 4 of this 
Article”. In other words, when the sovereign rights of the coastal State in its EEZ or on 
its continental shelf are at stake or an imminent danger for the wreck site exists, there is 
no obligation to seek the agreement of the sunken warship’s flag State for carrying out 
appropriate protective measures.94 
In the CPUCH there is no special provision concerning submerged State vessels and 
aircraft in the contiguous zone. This is because, as discussed earlier, Article 8 CPUCH 
is applied “[w]ithout prejudice to and in addition to Articles 9 and 10”. In other words, 
Article 10(7) CPUCH extends as well to wrecked State vessels and aircraft found in the 
contiguous zone. 
To be sure, the provisions of Articles 7(3) and 10(7) must have been the main reason 
why the CPUCH’s regime for sunken State vessels and aircraft was eventually 
unacceptable to the maritime powers.95 
In recent years the legal status of sunken warships in general had been studied within 
the Institut de Droit International (IDI). As a result of this work, the IDI adopted the 
Resolution on the “Legal Regime of Wrecks of Warships and Other State-owned Ships 
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ratification ensued in 2005; Aznar-Gómez (n 88) 211. 
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in International Law” (IDI Resolution) at the Tallinn Session in 2015.96 The aim was to 
contribute to the clarification of “the uncertainties that continue to surround the question 
of wrecks of warships” in international law.97 According to Article 3 of the Resolution 
“sunken State ships98 are immune from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag 
State”, although the provision is “[w]ithout prejudice to other provisions of this 
Resolution”. It would, thus, seem that the Resolution confirms the legal position of the 
maritime powers regarding the sovereign immunity of warship wrecks. However, this is 
somewhat contradicted by other provisions of the Resolution. First of all and which is 
important for the topic of our discussion, the Resolution does take into account that 
wrecked warships may have an archaeological and historical significance, providing, in 
line with the CPUCH, that the wreck of a warship “is part of cultural heritage when it 
has been submerged for at least 100 years”.99 States must ensure the protection of such 
shipwrecks,100 where appropriate through preservation in situ.101 On the other hand the 
articles concerning the various maritime zones do not distinguish between recently 
sunken ships which clearly are not UCH and those having the status of UCH. In the 
maritime spaces under the full sovereignty of the coastal State, the balance seems to go 
in the coastal State’s favour, since it “has the exclusive right to regulate activities on 
wrecks”, albeit “without prejudice to Article 3 of this Resolution”.102 The same may be 
said in respect of the contiguous zone, but here the regulatory competence of the coastal 
State is limited with reference to Article 303 UNCLOS.103 Yet, in the EEZ and on the 
continental shelf the jurisdiction of the flag State seems to prevail, with the coastal State 
having a limited right to being informed on activities directed at the wreck of the 
warship by the flag State. The flag State’s activities should, however, be carried out 
“with due regard to the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State”. Still, 
when there is interference with the coastal State’s sovereign rights, it “has the right to 
remove a wreck” but only “if the flag State does not take any action after having been 
requested to co-operate with the coastal State for the removal of the wreck”.104 Finally 
and in view of our topic, it is commendable that the Resolution stresses the duty of 
                                                 
96
 The text of the Resolution is available at <www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2015_Tallinn_09_en.pdf> 
(accessed 9 January 2016). The rapporteur for the topic was Natalino Ronzitti. 
97
 Preamble, 8th recital, IDI Resolution. 
98
 In Article 1, the term “sunken warship” is defined as “a warship, naval auxiliary or other ship owned by a State 
and used at the time of sinking solely for governmental non-commercial purposes. It includes all or part of any cargo 
or other object connected with such a ship regardless of whether such cargo or object is owned by the State or  
privately. This definition does not include stranded ships, ships in the process of sinking, or oil platforms” (para 2) 
and the term “wreck” as “a sunken State ship which is no longer operational, or any part thereof, including any 
sunken object that is or has been on board such ship” (para 1). The wrecks of military and other State aircraft are not 
dealt with in the Resolution, nor are space objects, although the rules for such craft and objects should be analogous; 
see IDI, ‘9th Commission: The Legal Regime of Wrecks of Warships and Other State-owned Ships in International 
Law’ (N Ronzitti rapporteur), (2011) 74 Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international 131, 135. 
99
 Article 2(1) IDI Resolution 
100
 Article 2(2) IDI Resolution. 
101
 Article 2(3) IDI Resolution. 
102
 Article 7 IDI Resolution. 
103
 Article 8 IDI Resolution: “In accordance with Article 303 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, the coastal State may regulate the removal of sunken State ships from its contiguous zone”.  
104
 Article 9 IDI Resolution: “Any activity of the flag State on a sunken ship in the exclusive economic zone or on the 
continental shelf of a foreign State should be carried out with due regard to the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the 
coastal State. In accordance with applicable treaties, the flag State should notify the coastal State of any activity on 
the wreck which it intends to carry out. The coastal State has the right to remove a wreck interfering with the exercise 
of its sovereign rights if the flag State does not take any action after having been requested to co-operate with the 
coastal State for the removal of the wreck”. 
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cooperation among States, inter alia, as concerns the protection and preservation of 
“wrecks which are part of cultural heritage”105 
 
 
8. Conclusion: a bid for regional cooperation 
 
By way of conclusion, we would like to highlight another important tool for 
enhancing efforts regarding the protection and preservation of UCH on the regional and 
sub-regional level. According to Article 6(1) CPUCH “States Parties are encouraged to 
enter into bilateral, regional or other multilateral agreements … for the preservation of 
underwater cultural heritage”. Moreover, the CPUCH gives States an incentive to use 
such agreements in order to “adopt rules and regulations which would ensure better 
protection of underwater cultural heritage than those adopted in this Convention”.106 
Given the rich culture heritage from all periods of human history lying on the bottom 
of the Mediterranean Sea, it seems quite logical that an initiative for the conclusion of a 
Mediterranean regional convention on UCH protection appeared even before the 
adoption of the CPUCH.107 The “Siracusa Declaration on the Submarine Cultural 
Heritage of the Mediterranean Sea” (Siracusa Declaration),108 which was adopted by the 
participants of an international scientific conference on the protection of UCH in the 
Mediterranean in 2001, contained and appeal to the Mediterranean countries to “study 
the possibility of adopting a regional convention that enhances cooperation in the 
investigation and protection of the Mediterranean submarine cultural heritage and sets 
forth the relevant rights and obligations”.109 Two years later Italy presented the 
preliminary draft of a possible regional convention to government experts from other 
Mediterranean States who were gathered, again on Sicily, at another conference on 
regional cooperation for UCH protection.110 Unfortunately, no further action on the 
matter seems to have ensued. 
Even if a convention on the protection of the Mediterranean UCH were realised at 
some point, but also independent of and in addition to a possible regional regime, the 
Adriatic and Ionian States should consider the conclusion of agreements on the sub-
regional and bilateral level with a view to improving the protection and preservation of 
the UCH in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. This follows not only from Article 6 CPUCH 
but was as well recommended in the Siracusa Declaration which urged the 
Mediterranean countries “to promote the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements … relating to specific components of the Mediterranean submarine cultural 
heritage, such as wrecks and single objects”.111 What is more, the recent IDI Resolution 
renews this entreaty as concerns the particular case of sunken warships and other State 
                                                 
105
 Cf Article 15(1). It is, nevertheless, striking that the wording ‘should co-operate’ has been used, since, at least as 
far as UCH is concerned, a clear cooperation duty was provided already in Article 303(1) UNCLOS. 
106
 Cf Article 6(1) in fine CPUCH. Article 6 is again an expression of the cooperation principle on which the whole 
CPUCH protection regime is founded; see text to n 28. 
107
 Garabello (n 5) 60, 118 ff; T. Scovazzi, ‘Un futuro accordo sulla protezione del patrimonio culturale sottomarino 
del Mediterraneo’ in T. Scovazzi (ed), La protezione del patrimonio culturale sottomarino nel Mare Mediterraneo 
(Giuffrè, 2004) 164; T Scovazzi, ‘L’approche régionale à la protection du patrimoine culturel sous-marin: Le cas de 
la Méditerranée’, (2009) 55 Annuaire français de droit international 577, 585 ff. 
108
 English text published in Scovazzi (ed), La protezione del patrimonio culturale sottomarino nel Mare 
Mediterraneo (n 110) 353. 
109
 Siracusa Declaration, para 10 in fine. 
110
 Scovazzi, ‘Un futuro accordo’ (n 110) 164 ff; Scovazzi, ‘L’approche régionale’ (n 110) 586. 
111
 Siracusa Declaration, para 11. 
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vessels, calling on States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea to cooperate in the 
performance of their duties, inter alia, in respect of UCH protection.112 
Of course, the conclusion of such agreements will only be purposeful if they provide 
an added value to existing treaties, notably the CPUCH.113 Since most of the Adriatic 
and Ionian States are bound by the CPUCH, a regional or bilateral agreements would 
also serve as a means of the CPUCH’s implementation in practice. Certainly, manifold 
issues could and should be dealt with in such agreements. For one, the reconnaissance, 
research and protection of UCH sites is invariably a very costly undertaking. Thus, an 
institutionalised regional or sub-regional framework might help making financial 
resources more reliable. Such a regional framework could also provide for structured 
exchange of expertise and information-sharing,114 including the training of underwater 
archaeologists and other experts for UCH protection.115 Another matter requiring 
cooperation among States might be the elaboration of a comprehensive database on 
known UCH sites, especially in respect of sites located beyond the territorial seas. As 
concerns specific UCH sites, their protection could be improved by the establishment, 
where necessary, of transboundary submarine archaeological parks.116 
                                                 
112
 Article 15(2) IDI Resolution, 
113
 Cf Scovazzi, ‘Un futuro accordo’ (n 110) 164; Scovazzi, ‘L’approche régionale’ (n 110) 584. 
114
 Cf Article 19 CPUCH. 
115
 Cf Article 21 CPUCH. 
116
 Cf Siracusa Declaration, para 12, 13. 
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1. Fishing in the Historiography of the Mediterranean 
 
For a long time, Italian historians paid only passing attention to fishing – 
notwithstanding the recent renewed interest in maritime history – because, due to the 
numbers of people it employed and the revenues it generated, it was considered of only 
secondary importance compared with the larger fields of inquiry such as the history of 
agriculture or industry. 
Michell highlights as much in one of the first economic historiographic essays on 
European fishing in the modern era:  
 
“Gli storici si sono interessati delle industrie ittiche in grado di dare origine a più 
ampie attività commerciali basate su investimenti relativamente cospicui, a 
scapito di quelle che si presentavano semplicemente come una fonte di sussistenza 
per le popolazioni in via d’incremento dell’Europa del XV e del XVI secolo”.1 
 
Fishing in the Mediterranean, moreover (with the exception of specific types of 
fishing, such as tuna and coral),2 remained for a long time an activity that was limited to 
sustenance and subsistence. In fact, it did not experience nearly the same level of 
qualitative and quantitative growth in the Mediterranean as it did in North-eastern 
European countries, which dramatically changed the contours of Nordic fishing in the 
modern era.3 
The gradually increasing importance of piscatorial gathering activity in the Baltic 
countries and northern Europe – a progress accelerated by the population boom of the 
eighteenth century – earned fishing a place of primary importance in Northern European 
historiography. It is sufficient to review the indexes of certain industry periodicals to 
gain an understanding of its substance and nature.4 
The predominant theme is clearly that of historical-economic analysis, centred on 
quantitative growth and industrialization: a theme through which the various stages of 
                                                 
1
 A.R. Michell, ‘La pesca in Europa agli inizi dell’età moderna’ in Storia economica Cambridge, vol V, Economia e 
società in Europa nell’età moderna (Einaudi, 1978) 193. Translation of the text: “Historians are interested in those 
piscatorial industries that were able to give rise to broader commercial activities based on relatively conspicuous 
investments, as opposed to those which presented themselves simply as source of sustenance for the growing 
population of the XV and XVI centuries”. 
2
 E. Grendi, ‘Una comunità alla pesca del corallo: impresa capitalistica e impresa sociale’ in Studi in memoria di 
Luigi Dal Pane (Clueb, 1982) 445-460; M.L. Ferru, M. Marini, Il corallo. Storia della pesca e della lavorazione in 
Sardegna e nel Mediterraneo (Edizioni Tema, 1989); E. Grendi, Il Cervo e la Repubblica. Il modello ligure di antico 
regime (Einaudi, 1993); G. Doneddu, La pesca nelle acque del Tirreno (secoli XVII-XVIII) (Edes, 2002). 
3
 M. Mollat Du Jourdin, L'Europa e il mare (Laterza, 2004) 91, 151-152; F. Braudel, Civiltà materiale, economia e 
capitalismo. Le strutture del quotidiano (secoli XV-XVIII) (Einaudi, 1993) 188-195. 
4
 Specifically, “International Journal of Maritime History” and “Research in Maritime History”. 
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the modern age – the introduction of steam power, the transportation revolution, 
development of new product preservation technology – run through to the present day. 
All of these are precipitating factors in the great transformation of Nordic fishing which 
takes over the organization of the work and enterprise structure.5 
Clearly, nothing similar to the Nordic model is discernible in the various areas of the 
Mediterranean. As a result, nothing comparable to Anglo-Saxon historiography can be 
found in Mediterranean historiography.6 
In Mediterranean countries, small enterprises persisted along with artisanal methods 
of capture, which is significant, but does not necessarily belie an underdeveloped or 
marginalized fishing industry, if not proportionally with a more general growth of 
secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy compared to the first. 
Clearly, an important key to understanding the history of modern fishing in the 
Mediterranean is that of resources, which in recent years have undergone extensive 
study and research.7 This line of research, started by North American environmental 
historiography,8 highlights the ways in which the characteristics of marine ecosystems 
are central to understanding certain structural characteristics of fishing and its long-term 
dynamic; and, conversely, to what extent human activity has impacted these marine 
ecosystems.9 
 
                                                 
5
 S. Ryan, ‘The Industrial Revolution and the Newfoundland Seal Fishery’, (1992) 2 International Journal of 
Maritime History 1; D. Vickers, ‘Comparing Fisheries’,  (1995) 1 International Journal of Maritime History 198; R. 
Van Ginkel, ‘The Abundant Sea and her Fates: Texelian Oystermen and the Marine Commons, 1700 to 1932’, (1996) 
38 Comparative Studies in Society and History 218; J. Coul, ‘The Trawling Controversy in Scotland in the Late 
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century’, (1994) 2 International Journal of Maritime History 107; N. Cooper and D. 
Whitmarsh, ‘Production and Prices in the Herring Industry of England and Wales, 1900 to 1944’, (1994) 2 
International Journal of Maritime History 175; C.W. Sanger and A.B. Dickinson, ‘Renewal of Newfoundland and 
Labrador Shore station Whaling 1918-1936’, (1995) 1 International Journal of Maritime History 83; R. Robinson, 
‘The Diffusion of Steam in the Fishing Industries of Northwest Europe’, (1998) 2 International Journal of Maritime 
History 179. 
6
 In Italy, however, there has been a positive change in recent years in the historiographic picture of fishing in the 
Mediterranean. See, specifically, A. Di Vittorio (ed), Tendenze e orientamenti nella storiografia marittima 
contemporanea (Pironti, 1986); S. Anselmi, ‘La pesca in Italia. Note e indicazioni per un profilo storico’ in S. 
Anselmi, Adriatico. Studi di storia, secoli XIV-XIX (Clua, 1991), 421-453; T. Fanfani (ed), La Penisola italiana e il 
mare. Costruzioni navali, trasporti e commerci tra XV e XX secolo (Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1993); P. Frascani 
(ed), A vela e a vapore. Economie, culture e istituzioni del mare nell’Italia dell’Ottocento (Donzelli, 2001); G. 
Doneddu, M. Gangemi (eds.), La pesca nel Mediterraneo occidentale (secc. XVI-XVIII) (Puglia Grafica Sud, 2000);  
A. Di Vittorio, C. Barciela López (eds),  La storiografia marittima in Italia e in Spagna, in età moderna e 
contemporanea. Tendenze, orientamenti, linee evolutive (Cacucci, 2001); S. Cavaciocchi (ed), Ricchezza del mare, 
ricchezza dal mare secc. XIII-XVIII (Le Monnier, 2006); L. Palermo, D. Strangio, M. Vaquero Piñeiro (eds), La 
pesca nel Lazio. Storia, economia, problemi attuali (Editoriale Scientifica, 2007); V. D'Arienzo, B. Di Salvia (eds), 
Pesci, barche, pescatori nell'area mediterranea dal medioevo all'età contemporanea (Franco Angeli, 2010). On the 
history of fishing in the Mediterranean, see also D. Faget, J. Sacchi, ‘Fishing in the Mediterranean, Past and Present: 
History and Technical Changes’ in A. Monaco, P. Prouzet (eds), Development of Marin Resources (ISTE Ltd, 2014) 
1-55. 
7
 U. Leanza (ed), La pesca e la conservazione delle risorse biologiche del mare Mediterraneo (Editoriale Scientifica, 
1993); M. Armiero, ‘La risorsa contesa: norme, conflitti e tecnologie tra pescatori meridionali (XIX sec.)’, (1998) 31 
Meridiana 179; P. Bevilacqua, G. Corona (eds), Ambiente e risorse nel Mezzogiorno contemporaneo (Donzelli, 
2000); M.L. De Nicolò, Microcosmi mediterranei. Le comunità dei pescatori nell’età moderna (Clueb, 2004); A. 
Clemente, Il mestiere dell’incertezza. La pesca nel golfo di Napoli Tra XVIII e XX secolo (Guida, 2005); M. Ciotti, 
La pesca nel medio Adriatico nel Settecento tra innovazione delle tecniche e conservazione delle risorse (EUM, 
2006). 
8
 A. McEvoy, The Fisherman's Problem. Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries, 1850-1980 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1986); M.B. Bouge, Fishing the Great Lakee. Environmental History, 1783-1933 (University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2000); B.J. McCay, Oyster Wars and the Public Trust: Property, Law and Ecology in New Jersey 
History (University of Arizona Press, 1998). 
9
 See specifically, P. Holm, T.D. Smith, D.J. Strakey (eds), The Exploited Seas: New Directions for Marine 
Environmental History (Liverpool University Press, 2001). 
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2. Fishing in the Adriatic 
 
Fishing, especially in the Adriatic, was impacted by a multiplicity of economic, 
political and legal factors that created limits and obstacles to its evolution for many 
years. Firstly, the very nature of the activity must be taken into consideration, i.e., 
harvesting a product in many ways more similar to hunting than agriculture,10 even 
though it can be analogized to farm production in that, as with all so-called primary 
productions, it exploits a natural resource: in agriculture the fertility of the soil, and in 
fishing the reproductivity of the fish.11  
Moreover, in fishing, production depended on more complex natural fluctuations 
than agriculture, fluctuations that did not permit forecasting or calculation of actual 
yield.12  
Fishing also required considerable financial resource investment to purchase and fit 
out a boat’s equipment, and, given that it concerned a highly perishable food source, to 
cover the costs of preservation and commercialization of fishing’s products, and thus, in 
turn, extremely tight linkage within transportation systems and sale points.13 
Ultimately, for the transformation of this productive sector from marginal activity to 
maritime industry, it was necessary to implement a development model that integrated 
each of the product’s production, preservation, and commercialization.14  
In the Adriatic, such a development took place, not by chance, in the lagoon area 
around Venice, where Venetian fisherman worked, as well as some from Chioggia and 
Comacchio, who after centuries of maritime experience had become true masters in the 
art of navigation, able to practice lagoon fishing and preservation techniques.15 The 
symbiotic relationship between fishing and salterns, or, in any event, the wider 
availability of salt for product preservation, constituted the basis for the entire lagoon 
economy, protected and sustained by Venice, which had made it a real object for 
preservation.16 
                                                 
10
 Michell (n 1) 157; M. Armiero, ‘La risorsa invisibile. Stato, pescatori e comunità nell'Ottocento meridionale: il 
caso di Taranto’ in P. Bevilacqua, G. Corona (eds), Ambiente e risorse nel Mezzogiorno contemporaneo (Donzelli, 
2000) 225. 
11
 Armiero (n 10) 225. 
12
 Ibid; Michell (n. 1) 160-165. 
13
 For analysis of the kinds of fishing structures in modern Europe, see Michell (n 1) 166-168.  
14
 As with economic valuation models for fishing, relevant above all in North European countries in which fishing 
activity was closely linked to management of another product of great strategic importance like salt. In this regard, 
see Mollat du Jourdin (n 3) 91 and 151-152; according to the author, the extraordinary development of Nordic 
fishing, starting in the low Middle Ages, was one catalyst of the solidifying of trade between the Northern Seas and 
the Mediterranean. For an analysis of the relationship between the fishing economy and the production and trade of 
salt, see J.F. Bergier, Una storia del sale (Marsilio, 1984); J.C. Hocquet, Il sale e il potere. Dall’anno Mille alla 
Rivoluzione francese (ECIG, 1990). 
15
 The bibliography relating to the lagunar city is very robust; see Chioggia e la sua storia (Canova, 1980); M. 
Marzari, Il bragozzo. Storia e tradizioni della tipica barca da pesca dell’Adriatico (Mursia, 1982); D. Memmo, 
Calafati, squeri e barche di Chioggia, vol I - La storia (Nuova Editrice Charis, 1985); for the Comacchio area, see 
also: L. Palermo, ‘La pesca nell’economia dello Stato della Chiesa in età moderna’ in G. Doneddu, M. Gangemi 
(eds), La pesca nel Mediterraneo occidentale (secc. XVI-XVIII) (Puglia Grafica Sud, 2000) 131-139. 
16
 For analysis of the political valence, in the sense of economic power, which the salt trade represented for the 
Republic of Venice, see J.C. Hocquet, Le sel et la fortune de Venice, vol 2 (Université de Lille III, 1978); J.C. 
Hocquet, ‘Monopole et concurrence à la fin du Moyen Age. Venice et les salines de Cervia (XII-XVI siècle)’, (1973) 
XV Studi veneziani 21; A. Tenenti, ‘Il sale nella storia di Venezia’ (1980) IV Studi Veneziani 15. Moreover, on the 
legislation of the Republic of Venice related to fishing, see the public documents available in the Annali del MAIC 
(Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce), La pesca in Italia. Documenti raccolti per la cura del MAIC, 
ordinati da Adolfo Targioni Tozzetti, vol I, part II, Ordini disciplinari intorno alla conservazione della laguna e della 
pesca (Tipografia del Reale Istituto Sordo Muti, 1872) 526-625. 
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This picture remains unchanged until the mid-eighteenth century, when, with the 
introduction of new fishing and preservation techniques for fresh fish, there was rapid 
expansion of a production and commercial phase for fishing. 
Here we note the development and diffusion of the gaetana, a landmark event in 
piscatorial history, marking the passage from a subsistence economy to a productive 
sector representing an increasingly significant economic factor. 
 
 
3. The Introduction of Fishing alla Gaetana  
 
This fishing technique, already widely practiced in the Tyrrhenian Sea since the 
beginning of the eighteenth century,17 was brought to the Adriatic by fishermen from 
Puglia around halfway through the eighteenth century.18  
Fishing alla gaetana, a fishing method using two boats – paranze, paranzelle, 
bilancelle, tartanelle, as they came to be called depending on the region – dragging a 
net between them with a long, capacious bag made of thick webbing and fitted with 
popping corks on top to keep it open, and on the bottom with plumbs grazing the bottom 
of the sea – represented the most important innovation in piscatorial technique then 
being used, through to the modern day. This innovation, together with the initial use of 
pair trawling, which – depending on the regional areas in which it was used was also 
called a bufala, a paranza or a coccia – had an external matrix in the Italian oceans. It 
had been copied from Provençal fishermen who had in turn imitated Catalan fishermen 
who as early as mid-seventeenth century were using aux boeufs fishing, a term used to 
distinguish pair trawling with two boats from that employing only one boat (pêche a la 
vache) or a tartana.19 
As Biagio Salvemini has noted, this new technique injected an “element of decisive 
force” that freed fishing from the marginal position it had previously held and allowed it 
                                                 
17
 As evidenced in the edict of the State of the Church issued in 1701, which prohibited “nelle spiaggie romane”, 
fishing “di conserva o a coppia, congiungendo la rete all’una e all’altra barca o tartana sola”, published in De Nicolò 
(n 7) 143; the Proclamation of the Medici of 1727 expressly prohibited fishing “che si dice alla Gaetana”, published 
in G. Cascio Pratilli, L. Zangheri (eds), La legislazione medicea sull’ambiente, vol II, Bandi (1621-1737) (Olschki, 
1994) 906-908; and the ban of 1729 for fishermen from Procida and the districts of Naples and Salerno, published in 
G. Di Taranto, Procida nei secoli XVII-XIX. Economia e popolazione (Droz, 1985) 60. 
18
 On fishing with paranze a coppia, or alla gaetana, in the Gulf of Gaeta and later, in the mid-eighteenth century, 
along the coast of Puglia, and the mid-Adriatic, see B. Salvemini, ‘Dalla “gaetana” al motopesca. Pescatori pugliesi 
nella grande trasformazione’ in B. Salvemini, L’innovazione precaria. Spazi, mercati e società nel Mezzogiorno tra 
Sette e Ottocento (Donzelli, 1995) 77-121; G. Cavezzi, ‘La “Paranza” nel Piceno (XVIII-XX sec.)’ in M. Marzari 
(ed), Navi di legno. Evoluzione tecnica della cantieristica nel Mediterraneo dal XVI secolo ad oggi (Ed. Lint, 1998) 
315-326; Ciotti (n 7) 71-86.  
19
 The term aux boeufs actually alludes to the greater power of the plough attached to the two oxen compared with 
that drawn by a single animal, see H.-L. Duhamel Du Monceau, Traité général des pêches et histoire des poissons, 
vol 1, Suite de la seconde section, § 5. De la pêche au Gangui, dite de Boeuf; des Bouefs; ou aux Bœufs (Chez 
Saillant & Nyon et Desaint, 1769) 154-155 (see Fig. 2) and § 6. De la pêche dite Tartane, 155-160 (see Fig. 1). On 
fishing techniques in the Eastern Mediterranean, see also G. Buti, ‘Tecniques de pêche et protection des ressources 
halieutiques méditerranéenne (XVIIe-XIXe siècle)’ in V. D'Arienzo, B. Di Salvia (eds), Pesci, barche, pescatori 
nell'area mediterranea dal medioevo all'età contemporanea (Franco Angeli, 2010) 105-122. On fishing a tartana and 
with paranze a coppia in the Adriatic, see M.L. De Nicolò, ‘Dal bragozzo alla tartana. Una rivoluzione piscatoria a 
Pesaro in età ducale’, (1992) 2 Pesaro città e contà 72;  M.L. De Nicolò, ‘Recherches sur l’histoire de la pêche en 
Méditerranée: Tartanes de Provence, tartanes de Vénétie, trabacs, modèles adriatiques pour la pêche à la traîne et le 
petit cabotage (XVIIe - XVIIIe siècles)’, (2012) 84 Cahiers de la Méditerranée 309; M.L. De Nicolò (ed), Le tartane 
(Museo della Marineria Washington Patrignani di Pesaro, 2013); Ciotti (n 7) 63-86; M. Ciotti, ‘Caratteri della pesca e 
tecniche piscatorie nei porti della Marca meridionale tra XVI e XVII secolo’ in C. Vernelli (ed) Le Marche tra 
medioevo e contemporaneità. Studi in memoria di Renzo Paci (Quaderni del Consiglio regionale delle Marche, 2016) 
197. 
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to assume the complete independence of a specialized production sector.20 One of the 
immediate problems accompanying the introduction of the gaetane was that of resource 
preservation. The issue was one that the peninsular states would soon need to resolve 
and assume the role of resource supervisor “in order to bend the free market initiatives 
of individuals to the will of regulators for the public benefit and reconcile the search for 
private enrichment with the satisfaction of general public needs”.21  
 
 
4. Technological Innovation vs. Resource Preservation 
 
The need to regulate piscatorial activity, both close to the shore and on the open sea, 
is not a necessity of the modern world. Already during the Middle Ages the laws of 
some coastal towns specifically prohibited certain fishing practices they deemed 
harmful to juvenile fish and the propagation of certain species.22 But it was only during 
the eighteenth century that the issue of resource preservation began to take centre stage 
in the history of fishing: it will be debated up to the present day.23  
As noted previously, the issue of preservation of fishing resources significantly 
contributed to the re-evaluation of fishing as a subject for research and study. The 
introduction of the gaetane also constituted a watershed moment in this sense. 
The unanimous charge levelled at this fishing practice during the eighteenth century 
and even more so in the nineteenth century, was that it compromised the reproduction of 
many fish species, devastated the juvenile population and caught fish that had not yet 
grown to full size.24  
Trawling, notwithstanding its use in the past, became, over the course of these two 
centuries, the prevalent fishing technique not only in the Mediterranean but also on a 
world scale.25 Its widespread popularity was in response to growing demand linked to 
urbanization and demographic development in the second half of the eighteenth 
century.26 It presented itself, to use an often-repeated term, as true technological 
innovation, compared with traditional fishing practices that had been prevalent up to 
that point. It follows that subsequent innovations related to the technology of means and 
methods of preservation, but not of catching, which remained – and remains to this day 
– fundamentally founded on trawling principles. 
Numerous government interventions, conflict, and the strong opposition that the new 
technique immediately met with, belie fishing’s structural transitional phase from 
marginal activity used primarily for sustenance to a capitalistic, competitive activity; 
above all these reveal a broken societal and environmental equilibrium.27 
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What is substantially at issue in this fishing practice is not merely the technique of 
trawl fishing with nets, also used by the tartane, but also the destructive potential 
introduced by the gaetana fishing method. This latter technique consisted in innovation 
in the production process that combined the catching power of traditional fishing with 
the driving force of the traditional latina net, used by both types of vessels. This 
allowed for trawling the net at greater speeds than a single vessel could achieve, 
because, in order to fish, it had to place itself sideways, drifting against the wind. 
Restrictive rules that were promulgated by various States on the peninsula in the 
course of the eighteenth century were the results of a legislative intent directed at 
resource preservation and limiting exploitation in order to guarantee fishing’s continued 
longevity.28 
Rather than driven by a prescient environmental sensibility, these were the result of a 
widespread pressure exerted, from time to time, by societal categories with differing 
agendas: merchants of saltwater fish imported from the North and Dalmatia, owners of 
vessels heretofore used for fishing, and especially, coastal fisherman, who suffered the 
most direct harm.29 
Faced with this growing conflict, a fight between groups of fishermen competing for 
access to resources and government interventions via legislation seem to increase and 
become more frequent.30 
 
 
5. Papal Edict of 1773 
 
Among the numerous laws adopted by the governing authorities seeking to place 
limits on this piscatorial practice, the one promulgated by the Pontifical State in 1773 
prohibiting “pesca a due, o sia con le paranze, nelle spiaggie dell’Adriatico”31 from 
April 1 to September 15 is significant. The charge levelled at the paranze, contained in 
the Edict is the same unanimous, general one: that it destroyed “le Ovaje al tempo della 
fetura, per la maggior facilità che hanno di radere più ampiamente il fondo il mare”, and 
caught an “infinita quantità di minuti Pesci, senza farli giungere alla loro naturale 
grossezza”, thus certainly impeding the propagation and reproduction of many fish 
species. 
The documentation produced in support of revocation of the Edict represents an 
important source in tracing the outline of the transformation of regulation of the fishing 
industry.32 In the memoranda presented by the coastal communities to request its 
revocation, the allegations set forth in the Edict are systematically debunked with 
“dimostrazioni” aimed at proving its lack of foundation based on current scientific 
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28
 Armiero (n 24) 194-195. 
29
 Armiero (n 7) 195-199. 
30
 Ciotti (n 7) 92-97. 
31
 Archivio di Stato, Fermo (ASF), Archivio storico comunale, Fermo (ASCF), Raccolta di bandi ed editti, sec. 
XVIII, Editto Proibitivo della Pesca a due, ò sia colle Paranze nelle Spiaggie dell’Adriatico, 23 luglio 1773. 
32
 ASF, ASCF, Osservazioni di Fatto, e di Ragione sulla proibizione delle Paranze a Coppia nell’istesso Mare 
dell’Adriatico, 1774, publisched in M. Ciotti, “Per la pesca ben regolata”. Le “Osservazioni” sulla proibizione della 
pesca con le paranze a coppia nel mar Adriatico (1774) (Crace, 2013) 67-162. 
 Fishing in the Adriatic: From Technical Innovation to Resource Preservation … 
 
145
knowledge and calling upon “i più diligenti e sagaci Osservatori delle cose naturali”.33 
Among these, above all, is Jacques Christophe Valmont De Bomare, French naturalist 
of the eighteenth century, author of the Dictionnaire raisonné universel d’historie 
naturelle, which was widely distributed in France and many European countries,34 as 
well as translated, “dalla Francese in lingua Toscana”35.  
With respect to bans in force “negli esteri Dominj”, to which the Pontifical Edict 
applied, we note that these related mainly to fishing undertaken “con reti fitte e minute, 
lavorate a maglia foltissima e stretta, perché esse ripuliscono affatto il Mare”,36 such as 
those banned, for example, in Livorno and the Tuscan waters.37 Similarly, fishing was 
also banned in the waters of Genova that “coi rastri, non già perché si offendono le 
uova, ma perché si lacera le pasture, le radiche, le piante, i germogli che invitano i pesci 
a rimanere”38. And the use of such nets “et ordegni”, unknown in the Adriatic, which 
rendered fishing with the paranze “perniciosa” in those waters.39  
But the defensive line they adopted was above all aimed at highlighting the objective 
differences running through the two sides, the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic, insofar as these 
required differentiated, appropriate rules for the respective characteristics and 
necessities of the place.40 Regardless, if fishing with paranze was prohibited in the 
Tyrrhenian Sea, it was still allowed in countries bordering the Adriatic.41  
Moreover, in the absence of a uniform prevailing legislation for all countries 
bordering the same sea—a question that remains current to this day—the Papal Edict’s 
goals would have been frustrated by the activities of fishermen from Venice, Puglia, and 
Dalmatia, who were free to roam the waters of the Adriatic.42  
“Quello dunque, che non faranno le nostre Paranze unite”, the fishermen noted, “di 
vuotare cioè il mare (se vuotar si potesse), quello faranno i vicini e i stranieri senza 
divieto”43. 
 
 
6. Some Closing Considerations 
 
Governance of the sea has been one of the biggest legal issues in the history of 
international law.44 Even as relates solely to fishing, maritime law has struggled to 
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define its exact contours. In fact, fishing posed, and to this day continues to pose, not 
only the issue of protecting the integrity of national borders, and therefore, in the case of 
the sea, identification of the same borders, but also protection of a collective asset such 
as the inheritance of fishery.45 
Laws and regulations among the peninsula’s various pre-unification states as well as 
countries bordering the Adriatic, constitute an extremely diverse body of legislation, 
administrations and therefore culture and policy relating to the sea.46 Similarly, one can 
make out many common threads running through piscatorial legislation. In fact, a 
common problem was that of preservation of fishing stock: all governments therefore 
sought to regulate techniques, tools and timing of fishing activity in order to ensure 
adequate reproduction of the resource.47  
Trawling nets remained specifically central to legislative activity due to the harmful 
characteristics attributed to them. To protect against this, States promulgated strongly 
preservationist legislation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that, moreover, met 
with fierce resistance from those same fishermen; so much resistance that governments 
were forced to at least partly renounce their absolute bans on trawling nets.48 
Fishing’s long transition, characterised by conflict between tradition and modernity, 
that marks this activities’ passage from subsistence economy to one of the country’s 
important productive components, spurred at the beginning of the eighteenth century by 
introduction of the gaetane, ended in the first decades of 20th century with a further 
technological innovation, marking the end of navigation with sails and the gradual 
disappearance of traditional piscatorial culture.49  
But, once more, the first attempts at modernizing fishing by introducing motorised 
propulsion was strongly opposed by traditional fishermen, who believed that “come del 
resto avevano già fatto all’apparire delle paranze a vela, che la pesca meccanica avrebbe 
prodotto un forte depauperamento del mare”.50 
From a historical perspective, it is clear that current issues relating to finding 
innovative solutions to the demands of eco-sustainability for fishing activities – which 
still to this day use traditional methods with more powerful propulsive means – are 
actually historical issues rooted in problems that are not easily resolved. Problems that 
today concern not only the methods and the technology used, but also implicating 
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biology, ecology, and, more generally, a new model of governance of the marine 
environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 – H.-L. Duhamel du Monceau, Traité Général des Peches, et Histoire des Poissons, Partie I 
(1769), Section II, Chap. VI, Planche XLV: “Une Tartane actuellement en pêche”. 
 
Comments on Fig. 1: Fishing a tartana, already a widespread practice in the Mediterranean spreads to the 
Adriatic in the first decades of the eighteenth century via some Provencal fishermen. This fishing 
technique, which then led to trawling in deep waters, utilised a large net, the tartana, pulled by a single 
boat by means of two diverging poles at stern and bow. It was also known as pesca alla francese, or 
alla martigana, from the name of the main production centre of the French tartane, Martigues, located on 
the Gulf of Lion, and, as was nearly always the case, the boat took on the name of the kind of net or 
fishing technique that it used. 
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Fig. 2 – H.-L. Duhamel du Monceau, Traité Général des Peches, et Histoire des Poissons, Partie I 
(1769), Section II, Chap. VI, Planche XLIV : DB “deux bateaux qui trainent de concert un Gangui,  
affin d'aller plus vite. C'est ce qu'on nomme les boeufs ou le Boeuf”. 
 
Comments on Fig. 2: The dragging technique originating in the Spanish Levantine coast, the pêche aux 
boeufs spread from the end of the 17th Century over all of the north-occidental coasts of the 
Mediterranean. Quickly accused of destroying resources, pêche aux boeufs was a reply to the increasing 
demands of urban markets. As they only required modest wind-powered boats, the practice of pêche aux 
boeufs gradually won out over pêche a la vache or a tartana. In the Adriatic, pêche aux bœufs (or alla 
gaetana, or with paranze a coppia, or a coccia, as they came to be called along the Western Adriatic 
coast), was introduced by fishermen from Puglia in the second half of the eighteenth century and, in just a 
few years, led to the complete abandonment of larger boats like the tartane e tartanoni (a type of boat that 
was similar to the tartana but larger) which until then had been used for both fishing and commercial 
purposes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Mediterranean Sea is a sort of ocean in miniature acting as a marine biodiversity 
hot spot with a high diversity of habitats and species.1 However, it resulted vulnerable 
and threatened by different anthropic pressures (increasing use of the coastal areas, 
eutrophication, discharges, pollution and dumping, marine traffic, alien species, global 
warming, etc.), with fishing exploitation acting on local and/or global spatial scale as 
one of the main source of direct and indirect modifications. In fact, most aquatic 
ecosystems in the Mediterranean Sea are affected by fishery activities that involve a 
selective removal of part of the marine production for human subsistence, economic 
returns and development.2 In particular, the management of fishery resources in the 
Mediterranean Sea is target–species-oriented, generally ignoring the need of 
implementation of the ecosystem approach.3 In addition, the Mediterranean waters are 
generally classified as oligotrophic and not very productive. Nevertheless, fishing 
activities have local ancient traditions, particularly along the coasts of the Southern 
Adriatic and Northern Ionian seas, where very important fishing harbours are 
distributed.4 
During the past two centuries, the introduction of many technological innovations led 
to a progressive increase in the fishing capacity of the Mediterranean fleet and in the 
catchability by species: both factors further increased the exploitation level in many 
stocks and the fishing pressure on the marine ecosystems itself. As a consequence, to 
promote a long-term sustainable fishing and save the high value of ecological services 
provided by the marine ecosystem, the FAO Conference adopted the Code of Conduct 
for Responsible Fisheries during 1995.5 In this Code, the need for an integrated 
approach for the marine resources management finds a summary of how to achieve 
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long-term sustainable use of fishery resources in terms of food, employment, recreation 
and trade, as well as ecosystem and socio-economic well-being of populations 
throughout the world, in particular along the Mediterranean Sea. Even though parts of 
the Code are based on relevant rules of international laws, it is on voluntary acceptance 
and provides principles and standards applicable to the conservation, management and 
development of all fishing techniques. It also covers the capture, processing and trade of 
fish and fishery products, aquaculture and fisheries research. In particular, the 
international conventions adopted over the last two decades, including the Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, consider the exploitation of living resources on an 
ecosystem basis; they stress the need for the adoption of an Ecosystem Approach to 
Fisheries (EAF). In particular, the principles of an EAF are an extension of the 
conventional principles for sustainable fisheries development to cover the ecosystem as 
a whole.6 This implies sustainable management not only of the commercial stocks, but 
also of the whole environmental system that supports their production, including the 
importance of the economic and social dimension.7 An EAF foresees the integration of 
different practices and measures to deal effectively with complex situations with respect 
to a variety of needs and demands, from the ecological to the socio-economic aspects. 
An EAF aims to achieve an equilibrium between conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity. In particular, it attempts to satisfy the three components of 
sustainability, which are the ecological dimension (effectiveness-reproducibility of 
resources), the economic dimension (efficiency) and the social dimension (equity).8 
Although the Common Fishery Policy (CFP) started in the 1980s, the Green Book on 
the future of the CFP was only presented in 2001 on the basis of the Code of Conduct 
for Responsible Fisheries. This document identifies the limits of the fishery policy that 
has been adopted by the European Community and the principles on which  the reform 
process of the fishery and aquaculture should be based. In this respect, the Regulation 
(EC) 2371/2002 strongly promotes the sustainable exploitation of resources from a 
socio-economic as well as from an ecological point of view.9 Even more important, the 
Regulation (EC) 1967/2006, concerning management measures for the sustainable 
exploitation of fishery resources in the Mediterranean Sea, puts in place the Action Plan 
for the Mediterranean Sea as part of the Common Fishery Policy.10 With this 
Regulation, new rules were established for the protection and conservation of 
Mediterranean resources, in reference not only to the commercial species but also to the 
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protected species and sensitive habitats. In fact, previously the protection of marine 
areas generally occurred for biodiversity conservation purposes and not for fishery 
objectives.11 Consequently, the adopted Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in the 
Mediterranean Sea correspond to areas where sensitive habitats are identified, according 
to the unique nature or rarity of the habitat type, the importance of the ecological 
function provided by the habitat to the whole biological community and the extent to 
which the habitat is sensitive to human-induced effects. However, the adoption of the 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishery and the development of the ecosystem 
approach implementing the precautionary principle in fisheries, emphasized the 
importance of the no-take zones (NTZs) as additional tools for fishery management.12 
To this regard, in the Regulation (EC) 1967/2006 are included the recommendations of 
the General Fisheries Commission of the Mediterranean (GFCM) and the International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) as well as the measures of 
species protection and habitat conservation, reported in the Habitat Directive 
(92/43/EEC)13 and in the Barcelona Convention. In particular, the new regulations will 
require the establishment of “No-take” marine reserves and management measures to 
protect the growth and spawning areas as well as the marine ecosystem from fishing 
effects. Basically, the NTZs, considered as a tool for reconciling marine ecosystem 
conservation with fishery management, are worldwide proposed in order to provide 
refuges for the exploited species, so that they can recover, grow larger, enhance the 
offspring production and re-stock nearby fishing grounds. Thus, the NTZs, which play a 
fundamental role in the life cycle of one or more demersal species of economic interest, 
could insure against uncertainty in predicting fishery dynamics and buffer against 
broader ecosystem effects of overfishing.14 Unfortunately, techniques for designing a 
NTZ are still under development and often their implementation mostly stays on 
empirical basis. In addition, establishing a NTZ is not easy since the restricting use of 
one or more areas raises conflicts of interest. In fact, fishermen are often the biggest 
opponents of NTZs, when they are to be established in fishing areas where fishermen 
obtain the greatest biomass of commercial species (e.g. those with nurseries). In 
particular, the definition of large NTZs in the most productive areas (source areas) often 
meets social resistance and socio-economic pressures, which can lead to the location of 
a NTZ in unproductive areas that no fishermen or other user groups are willing to 
protect.15 In addition, the limit of access to the NTZs will increase overfishing in the 
unprotected areas throughout the displacement of the fishing effort in alternative 
productive grounds. In particular, starting from 1998, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
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and Forestry Policy (MiPAAF) decreed the institution of “no-take zones” as part of the 
protection plan of the fishery resources (Zone di Tutela Biologica, ZTB), where fishing 
is not allowed and/or regulated during critical phases (spawning, recruitment, feeding, 
etc.) of the demersal stocks there distributed, with the aim of allowing the renewal of 
the stocks and their sustainable exploitation in neighbouring areas. Such no-take zones 
should correspond to areas that play a fundamental role in the life cycle of one or more 
demersal species of economic interest. In other words, they would correspond to areas 
where species concentrate for different biological reasons and whose protection could 
enhance the management effect through their proximity to fisheries. Some “no-take 
zones” were identified along the Italian coasts and particularly in the Southern Adriatic 
Sea, whilst up to date this management option is not applied in the Northern Ionian 
Sea.16 
The multi-species nature of Mediterranean fisheries, in terms of both species and 
fishing gears, requires a specific strategy that is able to combine and integrate the 
different management measures and preserve flexibility in the fishing activity. In this 
way, the alternative adoption of a “closed season” in different areas or catch restrictions 
and gear limitations together with the main regulation of reducing the fishing effort 
could avoid the overexploitation of marine resources, mainly with the limitation of 
excessive catches of undersized individuals. To this regard, it is remarkable how the 
catch composition of the trawl fishery in the Mediterranean Sea is typically constituted 
by the first (0+, 1+) age classes, making long term projections (as those usually derived 
by using the classical approaches) sensitive to recruitment fluctuations and to the spatio-
temporal variation of the fishing pattern. Thus, to avoid further increases in mortality 
rates for juveniles and to reduce the amount of discards of dead marine organisms by 
fishing vessels, it is necessary to increase the selectivity of the currently used gear, that 
is to increase the mesh sizes for trawl nets and bottom-set nets and hook sizes for 
longlines. 
As stated in the framework document, the main objective of fishing management is 
to safeguard fish stocks or, in other words, to find a level of exploitation that could 
provide the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Within the Italian law relative to the 
rationalization and development of sea fishing (although this law is no longer in force) 
(Law No. 41/1982)17, systematic studies were promoted by the then Ministry of 
Merchant Navy (now Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Forestry Policy) to monitor the 
distribution, abundance and exploitation status of the fishery resources along the Italian 
coasts. Thus, the knowledge on the bio-ecology of many species was acquired reflecting 
the resource distribution and availability. Some of these studies are still ongoing and 
they are currently funded by the European Commission. In particular, the EU financed 
the MEDITS project (International bottom trawl survey in the Mediterranean) since 
1994 which regards the demersal resources of the Northern Mediterranean basins and 
several Member States.18 Since the year 2000, some EC regulations (e.g., Regulation 
(EC) 1543/200019; Regulation (EC) 1639/200120) implemented the Data Collection 
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(DCF) program in the Member States, including MEDITS and other projects aimed at 
the assessment and management of the marine living resources in the European seas. On 
the other hand, the marine environment is a precious asset which needs to be protected, 
defended and where possible restored, in order to keep biodiversity and protect the 
diversity and livelihood of seas and oceans which need to be clean, healthy and 
productive. To meet these needs, the European Parliament and the EU Council lastly 
issued the framework directive on the Strategy for the Marine Environment.21 This 
directive sets the goal of Good Environmental Status (GES) for the marine waters to be 
reached by member States by 2020. 
 
 
2. Southern Adriatic Sea 
 
2.1. Ecological context, geographical and environmental aspects 
 
The Geographical Sub Area 18 (GSA 18) showed an extension of about 29000 km2 
(in the depth range between 10 to 800 m along the Italian coasts of Apulia.22 The basin 
is characterised by the presence of a deep central depression known as the “South 
Adriatic Pit” (or Bari Canyon), where the maximum depth of 1233 m was recorded, 
hosting a well-structured cold water coral community that needs management measures 
in order to preserve its high biodiversity.23 The continental shelf break is at a depth of 
around 160-200 m and is furrowed by the heads of canyons running perpendicular to the 
line of the shelf. These incisions in the seabed provide preferential routes for the 
transfer of sediments towards the abyssal plain, particularly when they are nearer to the 
coastline. The Southern Adriatic basin contributes to the entire Mediterranean water 
mass circulation with its flow of deep-waters, which are formed in the Southern 
Adriatic Pit by the mixing of highly saline waters from the Levant basin with dense 
waters from the Northern Adriatic and by local convection from surface cooling.24 The 
Adriatic Sea, together with the Levant basin, is one of the three areas in the 
Mediterranean where down-welling processes produced by surface cooling lead to the 
formation of so-called “dense waters”: these are rich in oxygen and supply the lower 
levels. The spatial and temporal variability of the currents influences vitally important 
life-history traits of fish populations, such as the reproductive events, the success of 
recruitment and the effectiveness of the nursery areas.25 An important change in water 
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mass circulation, known as the Eastern Mediterranean Transient (EMT), has affected 
Mediterranean circulation since the late 1980s, following particular climatic events. The 
flow of the deep-waters of the Southern Adriatic Sea was replaced by warmer and more 
saline waters from the Aegean, causing a rise in salinity and temperature, with probable 
consequences on the productivity of the basin.26 
 
2.2. Fisheries characteristics and stock assessments 
 
The Southern Adriatic Sea makes a substantial contribution to national fishery 
production, accounting for about 13% of production.27 In particular, the main fishing 
ports are Manfredonia, Barletta, Bisceglie, Molfetta, Mola di Bari and Monopoli, 
accounting for about 1100 vessels: 44% are equipped with artisanal fishing, 43% with 
bottom trawl and 7% with dredges for bivalve fishing.28 The Gulf of Manfredonia is an 
area with a high concentration of juvenile forms of small pelagic fish (Lembo and 
Spedicato, 2013). Anchovy and sardine in the adult stage are fished throughout the year 
by purse seine. The fishing of juvenile of Sardina pilchardus in Manfredonia is subject 
to thorough revision and specific management plans following the enforcement of the 
Regulation (EC) 1967/2006. Fishing for common octopus, which is abundantly found in 
the first 50 m of depth, is still quite common along the Bari coastline, and so is that for 
the sea urchin Paracentrotus lividus, which since the mid-1990s has been subject to 
specific regulations limiting quantities, size and fishing periods. In the fishing 
communities of Mola di Bari, Monopoli and Savelletri, the large Scombroidei Xiphias 
gladius (swordfish) and Thunnus alalunga (albacore) are fished seasonally, from May 
to November, using long-lines. Fishing for large hake (Merluccius merluccius) with 
bottom long lines is also very common in these fishing communities, particularly in 
Monopoli. This type of fishing involves less than 5% of the entire South-western 
Adriatic fleet, but accounts for a significant share of hake production (around 10-
12%29). Trawling is the most significant fishing activity in the whole area, with a 
fishing effort representing around 70% of the total effort.30 The main demersal 
resources of the Southern Adriatic fisheries are: European hake (Merluccius 
merluccius), cuttlefish (Sepia officinalis), Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus), 
squids (Illex coindetii and Todaropsis eblanae), deep-water rose shrimp (Parapenaeus 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(Parapenaeus longirostris) in the Eastern-Central Mediterranean Sea’, (2009) 83 Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf 
Science 529; M. Murenu, A. Cau, F. Colloca, P. Sartor; F. Fiorentino, G. Garofalo, C. Piccinetti, C. Manfredi, G. 
D’Onghia, R. Carlucci, L. Donnaloia, P. Lembo, ‘Mapping the potential locations of the European hake (Merluccius 
merluccius) nurseries in the Italian waters’ in T. Nishida, A.E. Caton (eds), GIS/Spatial Analyses in Fishery & 
Aquatic Sciences, vol 4 (International Fishery GIS Society, 2010) 51-68;  F. Colloca, G. Garofalo, I. Bitetto, M.T. 
Facchini, F. Grati, A. Martiradonna, G. Mastrantonio, N. Nikolioudakis, F. Ordinas, G. Scarcella, G. Tserpes, M.P. 
Tugores, V. Valavanis, R. Carlucci, F. Fiorentino, M.C. Follesa, M. Iglesias, L. Knittweis, E. Lefkaditou, G. Lembo, 
C. Manfredi, E. Massutí, M.L. Pace, N. Papadopoulou, P. Sartor, C.J. Smith, M.T. Spedicato, ‘The seascape of 
demersal fish nursery areas in the North Mediterranean Sea, a first step towards the implementation of spatial 
planning for trawl fisheries’, (2015) 10 PLoS ONE e0119590;  J.-N. Druon, F. Fiorentino, M. Murenu, L. Knittweis, 
F. Colloca, C. Osio, B. Mérigot, G. Garofalo, A. Mannini, A. Jadaud, M. Sbrana, G. Scarcella, G. Tserpes, P. 
Peristeraki, R. Carlucci, J. Heikkonen, ‘Modelling of European hake nurseries in the Mediterranean Sea: an 
ecological niche approach’, (2015) 130 Progress in Oceanography 188. 
26
 CIESM, The Eastern Mediterranean climatic transient: its origin, evolution and impact on the ecosystem, CIESM 
Workshop Series, n. 10, March-April 2000. 
27
 IREPA Onlus, Osservatorio economico sulle strutture produttive della pesca marittima in Italia 2010 (Edizioni 
scientifiche italiane, 2011). 
28
 IREPA Onlus, Osservatorio economico sulle strutture produttive della pesca marittima in Italia 2009 (Edizioni 
scientifiche italiane 2010). 
29
 IREPA Onlus (n 27). 
30
 Ibid. 
 The Sustainability of Fishing in the Southern Adriatic and Northern Ionian Seas 
 
 
155
longirostris), horned and musky octopus (Eledone spp.) and red mullet (Mullus 
barbatus). Most of the fishery resources in the Southern Adriatic Sea are shared 
between Italy, Albania and Montenegro.31 Their assessment must therefore take data 
from both shores into account. Similarly, the achievement of more sustainable 
exploitation levels should assume complementary and shared management policies.32 
A joint assessment to evaluate the status of exploitation for the hake stock was 
conducted in 2011 by research scientists from Italy, Montenegro and Albania as a 
representative case for GSA 18.33 Various models were applied, two of which based on 
experimental survey data (SURBA model)34 and on commercial fisheries data (VIT 
model)35 respectively, with a third model (ALADYM Age Length Based Dynamic 
Model)36 being based on simulation techniques. According to the analyses, the M. 
merluccius stock appears to be overfished, with current F equal to 0.95 higher than F0.1 
equal to 0.2. This stock is potentially capable of rapid recovery if fishing mortality was 
to be reduced. In fact, a long-term projection of stock and catches (2010-2030) was 
made by simulating various scenarios with stochastic variations. In particular, a gradual 
reduction (14% per year) of F status quo was applied until F0.1 was reached in 2020. The 
results show a clear growth in the spawning stock biomass and a significant increase in 
catches over the long term. An update of hake stock assessment was made by means of 
the XSA model and a4a statistical catch at age with data from 2008 to 2011.37 Results 
confirmed how the stock was in overexploitation with low biomass levels, as current 
fishing mortality exceeds F0.1 levels (0.8 vs. 0.2) and thus it is necessary to consider a 
significant reduction of the fishing mortality to allow the achievement of the 
precautionary threshold reference. 
Anchovy and sardine were very important in the Adriatic Sea from a commercial 
point of view, being targeted by pelagic trawlers (Italy) and purse seiners (Italy, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Montenegro, Albania).38 Most of the Italian boats whose port of registry is 
located in GSA 18 actually fish and land in GSA 17. Thus the stocks of anchovy and 
sardine were assessed using the State-space Assessment Model (SAM) with data from 
1975 to 2013 concerning GSA 17-18. The current F (0.53) is larger than FMSY (0.23), 
which indicates that the stock of S. pilchardus in GSA 17-18 is exploited unsustainably. 
As regards anchovy in GSA 17-18, the current F (1.04) is larger than FMSY (0.50), which 
indicates that this is exploited unsustainably.39 The consequent advice was to reduce the 
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relevant fleets effort until fishing mortality was below or at the proposed FMSY level, in 
order to avoid future loss in stock productivity and landings. This should be achieved by 
means of a multi-annual management plan taking into account mixed-fisheries 
considerations. 
The Norway lobster is only targeted by trawlers on offshore fishing grounds in GSA 
1840 Although during 2008 a management plan was adopted, foreseeing the reduction of 
the fleet capacity associated with a reduction of the time at sea, the landings of N. 
norvegicus in GSA 18 decreased from 2007 to 2013. The stock was assessed by XSA 
method with data from 2007 to 2013, showing current F (2013) = 0.85 higher than F0.1 = 
0.14. Hence, the stock was considered to be exploited unsustainably during the period 
2007-2013. 
The red mullet in GSA18 is mainly targeted by trawlers and to a much lesser extent 
by small scale fisheries using gill nets and trammel nets.41 Taking into account the 
results obtained by the XSA and ALADYM analysis (current F corresponding to the F 
in the 2013 was about 0.48; F0.1 = 0.45), the stock of M. barbatus in GSA 18 was 
considered to be exploited at levels close to sustainability. On the other hand, previous 
assessments carried out using XSA analysis indicated how the stock was in 
overexploitation with low biomass levels, being current fishing mortality higher than 
F0.1 (1.62 vs. 0.74).42 
 
 
3. Northern Ionian Sea 
 
3.1. Ecological context, geographical and environmental aspects 
 
The GSA19 covers a surface of about 16500 km2 in the depth range between 10- 800 
m along a coast line of about 1000 km along the Apulia, Lucania, Calabria and Sicily 
regions, where eight maritime compartments are located.43 The Northern Ionian Sea is 
geo-morphologically divided in two sectors by the Taranto Valley, exceeding 2200 m in 
depth. The former is located between the Taranto Valley and the Apulia region and is 
represented by a broad continental shelf.44 The latter constitutes the southern 
continuation of the Apennine thrust sheets. Along Calabria and Sicily, the shelf is 
generally very limited with the shelf break located at a depth varying between 30 and 
100 m. Many submarine canyons are located along these coasts, playing an important 
role in the transport of terrigenous debris from coastal waters to deeper grounds.45 The 
canyons are sites of vertical displacement for megafauna, some species of which have a 
commercial interest, such as the deep-water shrimps Aristeus antennatus and 
Aristaeomorpha foliacea.46 These habitats are unsuitable for trawling and represent a 
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sheltered site for species during sensitive phases of their life cycle. The canyons can act 
as “ecological refuge” for many bathyal and endemic species, constituting “hot-spots” 
of biodiversity in the Mediterranean Sea where conservation measures are needed.47 
From a hydrographic point of view, the Ionian Sea receives surface Atlantic Water 
from the Western Mediterranean through the Sicilian Channel.48 Levantine Intermediate 
Water lies under the surface layer and extends down to 800-900 m. The Adriatic Sea is 
considered the main source of cold and less saline Eastern Mediterranean Deep-water, 
which extends down to the bottom.49 The general cyclonic circulation in the Ionian Sea 
is markedly influenced by the cold dense deep-water masses of the Adriatic Sea 
inflowing through the Otranto Channel. Hydrographic observations and current 
measurements performed in the 1990s revealed strong modifications in the dynamics of 
the entire water column termed Eastern Mediterranean Transient (EMT) which at the 
present seems to be concluded.50 Although the Ionian Sea shows a general low 
productivity, the total vertical flux of particulate matter recorded on the slope in the 
Otranto Channel was found to be similar to that observed in coastal areas of the Western 
Mediterranean and Northern Adriatic seas. The Amendolara seamount extends south-
west towards Cape Spulico, covering an area of about 31 km2 with a high diversity of 
fish, crustaceans and cephalopods sought by local fishermen. In the bathyal ground, the 
Santa Maria di Leuca (SML) coral province, characterized by living Madrepora-
Lophelia-bearing coral mounds, extends within an area of about 900 km2 between 425 
and 1100 m in depth.51 More than 220 species were identified in this area. The SML 
coral province represents a Mediterranean deep-water biodiversity “hot-spot”, playing 
the role of attraction refuge for deep-sea fish fauna and also as nursery and spawning 
area for demersal species.52 In order to protect this site, in January 2006 the GFCM 
created the new legal category of “Deep-sea fisheries restricted area”. 
 
3.2. Fisheries characteristics and stock assessments 
 
In the Northern Ionian Sea fishing occurs from coastal waters to about 800 m deep 
waters. Gallipoli, Taranto, Crotone and Reggio Calabria represent the most important 
fisheries, although they have a different distribution of the fishing effort. In the whole 
GSA 19 different fishing techniques are used. The national official statistics (Mipaaf- 
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IREPA Font) report the highest percentage of big gross tonnage vessels (≥ 10 GRT) in 
Crotone (42%), followed by Gallipoli (33%), while Taranto and Reggio Calabria 
fisheries are mainly made up by small vessels.53 Small scale fishing, which utilizes 
mostly trammel nets, longlines and traps, is widespread along the GSA 19. Trawlers 
represent about 21% in number, 64% in gross tonnage and 56% in engine power in the 
whole GSA 19. However, in all Ionian fisheries, fishing boats registered as polyvalent 
fishing vessels often change type of fishing, according to the season and sea/weather 
conditions as well as the variable availability of resources and market demand. The 
most important resources in the basin are the red mullet (Mullus barbatus) on the 
continental shelf, hake (Merluccius merluccius), deep-water rose shrimp (Parapenaeus 
longirostris) and Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus) on a wide bathymetric range; 
as regards the deep-water, shrimps (Aristeus antennatus and Aristaeomorpha foliacea) 
on the slope were the most important. In particular, for those commercial species, 
different nursery areas were detected with persistency along the GSA 19. Other 
important commercial species in the GSA 19 are the octopus (Octopus vulgaris), the 
cuttlefish (Sepia officinalis) and common pandora (Pagellus erythrinus) on the shelf, 
the horned octopus (Eledone cirrhosa), the squids (Illex coindetii and Todaropsis 
eblanae), the blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassau), the anglers (Lophius piscatorius 
and Lophius budegassa) on a wide bathymetric range, the greater forkbeard (Phycis 
blennoides), the rockfish (Helicolenus dactylopterus) and the shrimps Plesionika 
heterocarpus and Plesionika martia on the slope. In addition, many other species are 
generally caught and totally discarded due to their lack of economic value such as the 
chondrichthyes Galeus melastomus and Etmopterus spinax and the osteichthyes 
Hoplostethus mediterraneus, Coelorinchus caelorhincus, Nezumia sclerorhynchus and 
Hymenocephalus italicus. 
The results concerning the exploitation of the main target species in the GSA19 was 
provided. In particular, the stock assessment for M. merluccius was computed by means 
of the application of VIT, ALADYM and Surba models on MEDITS and DCF data 
concerning bottom otter trawl, gill net and longline. Results highlighted an 
overexploitation of the stock in the GSA 19. The assessment of M. barbatus was 
computed during 2012 by means of VIT4win model on MEDITS and DCF data. Yield 
per Recruit (Y/R) model for all the fishing gears (bottom otter trawl, gill net, trammel 
net) indicated a current F value equal to 1.17 higher than the reference point estimated 
F0.1 = 0.38.54 The assessment of P. longirostris in GSA 19 was computed by applying 
an XSA analysis on data from MEDITS and DCF data concerning the bottom otter 
trawl. The results of the Y/R model showed a F0.1 value equal to 0.67 while current F 
was equal to 1.60 indicating an overexploitation of the stock in the area.55 The Norway 
lobster stock in the GSA 19 resulted underexploited from bottom otter trawl being the 
exploitation rate (E) lower than 0.4. The stock of A. foliacea was evaluated by means of 
XSA model on data from MEDITS and DCF concerning the bottom otter trawl. The 
Y/R analysis estimated a reference point F0.1 equal to 0.294. The current fishing 
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 P. Maiorano, L. Sion, R. Carlucci, F. Capezzuto, A. Giove, G. Costantino, M. Panza, G. D’Onghia, A. Tursi, ‘The 
demersal faunal assemblage of the North-Western Ionian Sea (Central Mediterranean): present knowledge and 
perspectives’, (2010) 26 Chemistry and Ecology 219. 
54
 General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean, Report of the Working Group on Stock Assessment of 
Demersal Species (WGSAD), Bar, Montenegro, 28 January-1 February 2014. 
55
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mortality was equal to 0.657 consequently a condition of overexploitation was recorded 
for the species in the basin.56 
                                                          
56
 General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (n 37). 
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1. Introduction  
 
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are usually defined in the scientific literature as “any 
area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its overlying water and associated flora, 
fauna, historical and cultural features, which has been reserved by law or other effective 
means to protect part or all of the enclosed environment”.1 They are a typology of the 
wider category of Protected Areas (PAs) that are defined as “a clearly defined geographical 
space, recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to 
achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and 
cultural values”.2  
According with such definitions, MPAs are increasingly regarded as valuable tools 
aimed at both achieving marine conservation and resource management goals.3 They are 
also basic instruments for the ecosystem-based management approach adopted to mitigate 
the multitude of threats affecting coastal and marine ecosystems and the services they 
provide to humankind.4 Marine ecosystems worldwide are, in fact, subjected to both human 
(e.g. overexploitation of marine resources, pollution, habitat degradation) and climate 
change impacts5 that can compromise natural biodiversity, ecosystem functioning and 
services relevant to society.6  
Available evidences from a number of case studies worldwide confirm that MPAs may 
play an important role in recovering marine communities and ecosystems and in enhancing 
                                                          
* The present study was supported by the ‘Waitt Foundation’ (Rapid Ocean Conservation ‘ROC’ Grant; USA), the 
‘Prince Albert II of Monaco Foundation’ (Monaco) and the ‘Total Corporate Foundation’ (France). 
1
 G. Kelleher (ed.), Guidelines for Marine Protected Areas, Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No. 3, 1999. 
2
 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Guidelines for applying the IUCN Protected 
Area Management Categories to Marine Protected Areas, Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No. 19, 2012. 
3
 The Science of Marine Reserves (2nd Ed.: Europe, Partnership for Interdisciplinary Studies of Coastal Oceans (PISCO), 
2011), <www.piscoweb.org/files/file/science_of_marine_reserves/SMR_EU-HR.pdf>. 
4
 B. Worm, E.B. Barbier, N. Beaumont, J.E. Duffy, C. Folke, B.S. Halpern, J.B.C. Jackson, H.K. Lotze, F. Micheli, S.R. 
Palumbi, E. Sala, K.A. Selkoe, J.J. Stachowicz, R. Watson, ‘Impacts of biodiversity loss on ocean ecosystem services’, 
(2006) 314 Science 787. 
5
 B.S. Halpern, K.L. McLeod, A.A. Rosenberg, L.B. Crowder, ‘Managing for cumulative impacts in ecosystem-based 
management through ocean zoning’, (2008) 51 Ocean & Coastal Management 203; C.D. Harley, A. Randall Hughes, 
K.M. Hultgren, B.G. Miner, C.J. Sorte, C.S. Thornber, L.F. Rodriguez, L. Tomanek, S.L. Williams, ‘The impacts of 
climate change in coastal marine systems’, (2006) 9. Ecology letters 228; J.B. Jackson, M.X. Kirby, W.H. Berger, K.A. 
Bjorndal, L.W. Botsford, B.J. Bourque, R.H. Bradbury, R. Cooke, J. Erlandson, JA. Estes, ‘Historical overfishing and the 
recent collapse of coastal ecosystems’, (2001) 293 Science 629. 
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fishing stocks and also related revenues to fishermen.7 Such successes explain the high 
increase of the number of MPAs, a number that now exceeds 11,300 on a worldwide scale 
(Marine Conservation Institute, 2015). Although on average MPAs exhibit positive effects, 
the magnitude (and occasionally also the direction) of responses to protection can vary 
dramatically.8  
The sources of this variability in MPAs’ performance are numerous and, in some cases, 
quite well studied. Key issues that have been documented include the level of enforcement, 
social compliance, MPA size, age, location and fishing regulations.9 A significant portion 
of the variability of MPA effectiveness, however, still remains unexplained, which suggests 
the need to explore more in depth other aspects possibly affecting MPA performance. Some 
areas ripe for exploration are, for instance, the goals that each MPA have set and the 
organizational activities undertaken to achieve such goals. Exploring these institutional 
characteristics and their influence on MPA performance requires bringing new perspectives 
and tools from other disciplines to MPA analyses. 
Organization Science (hereafter OS) studies the structures, processes, practices, culture, 
knowledge and other organizational variables and supplies tools to carry out organizations’ 
performance analysis.10 Organizations are “cooperative systems of consciously coordinated 
activities of two or more persons, with a common purpose”.11 Within the framework of the 
OS, organizations are evaluated based on their ‘organizational dimensions’. These 
dimensions include variables, such as size, vision, mission, goals and strategies.12 More 
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partially protected areas’, (2008) 367 Marine Ecology Progress Series 49; C. Mora, S. Andréfouët, M.J. Costello, C. 
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specifically, the ‘size’ of an organization is described by various variables, the most 
important being the number of employees and total revenues or assets. ‘Vision’ is the 
“representation of the future we seek to create”.13 ‘Mission’ is the core purpose of the 
organization or the scope of its being.14 ‘Goals’ are the results or the end points toward 
which organizational efforts are directed and represent one of the cornerstones in OS.15 
‘Strategies’ are the actions implemented in order to achieve organizational goals and 
mission (e.g. the enforcement of the law issued for the protection of the natural 
ecosystems).  
Protected Areas can be seen as social-ecological systems (SESs),16 established and often 
managed by public and/or no-profit organizations. MPAs, therefore, can be considered as 
“organizational systems” whose effectiveness can be influenced by their own 
organizational dimensions. Although the analysis of the organizational aspects of MPAs is 
a new approach still in its infancy,17 the tools provided by OS may provide important 
insights to analyze and potentially improve MPA performance. 
The aim of the study is 1) to assess the putative variability in organizational and strategic 
profiles of three Mediterranean MPAs used here as case studies and 2) to suggest possible 
indications aimed at improving MPA organizational asset and related effectiveness. 
 
 
2. Research Methodology 
 
2.1 Study Area 
 
The research was carried out in the Adriatic and Ionian regions, where we used an 
exploratory ‘multiple case studies’ approach18 focusing on three MPAs (Fig. 1): Porto 
Cesareo and Torre Guaceto MPAs (Italy), and Zakynthos National Marine Park (Greece).  
We selected such case studies mainly because they have an active management authority 
and to compare among MPAs from two different countries.  
Porto Cesareo MPA (hereinafter Porto Cesareo) is located in SE Italy and covers 16.654 
hectares. It was established in 1997 and it is managed by a consortium constituted by two 
municipalities (Porto Cesareo and Nardò) and the province of Lecce.  
Torre Guaceto MPA is located in SE Italy and it covers about 2,200 hectares. It was 
established in 1991 and it is managed by a consortium constituted by the WWF Italy and 
the municipalities of Brindisi and Carovigno.  
                                                          
13
 P.M. Senge, The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization (Random House LLC, 2006). 
14
 Ibid; J.C. Collins, J.I. Porras, ‘Building your company’s Vision’, (1996) 74 Harvard Business Review 65. 
15
 A. Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs N.J. Prentice-Hall, 1964); E. Mintzberg, The Nature of 
Managerial Work (New York Harper & Row, 1973). 
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 E. Ostrom, ‘A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems’, (2009) 325 Science 419; F. 
Micheli, F. Niccolini, ‘Achieving success under pressure in the conservation of intensely used coastal areas’, (2013) 18. 
Ecology and Society 19. 
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 C. Scianna, F. Niccolini, S. Gaines, P. Guidetti, ‘Organization Science’: A new prospective to assess marine protected 
areas effectiveness’, (2015) 116 Ocean & Coastal Management 443. 
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Zakynthos National Marine Park takes its name from the Ionian Greek island where it 
stands on and it covers 8,331 hectares. The Park was created in 1999 and it is managed by 
an agency constituted by different national Ministries, regional and local administrations, 
associations and cooperatives.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Map of the Mediterranean Sea with the three case study areas: 
a) Porto Cesareo MPA; b) Torre Guaceto MPA; c) Zakynthos National Park. 
 
2.2 Sampling Methods 
 
As a first step of this study, we contacted the three MPAs’ management authorities via 
email in order to present our research and ask for their availability for subsequent 
interviews and support for data collection. 
Once they accepted, we administrated structured face-to-face interviews to managers 
and key informants in order to collect critical data on the three MPAs, chiefly concerning 
organizational and management issues. Interviews are common instruments employed in 
both OS19 and MPA science20 to collect critical data. 
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 R. Andrews, G.A. Boyne, R.M. Walker, ‘Strategy Content and Organizational Performance: An Empirical Analysis’, 
(2006) 66 Public Administration Review 52; A.K. Jain, ‘Impact of Organizational Size & Alliance Formations on 
Perceived Organizational Performance’, (2012) 47 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations 559: H. Schmid, ‘Relationships 
between organizational properties and organizational effectiveness in three types of nonprofit human service 
organizations’, (2002) 31 Public Personnel Management 377. 
20
 A. Balmford, P. Gravestock, N. Hockley, C.J. McClean, C.M. Roberts, ‘The worldwide costs of marine protected 
areas’, (2004) 101 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 9694; A.H. Himes, 
‘Performance indicator importance in MPA management using a multi-criteria approach’, (2007) 35 Coastal Management 
601. 
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Many variables have been identified in order to analyze MPAs organizational structure, 
mission, goals and strategies. Such variables can be divided in two main classes: 
quantitative variables (Q) and categorical variables (C). 
In order to assess MPAs organizational structure, we focused on the following variables: 
- size of the organization in terms of number of employees working all year round (Q); 
- type of contract of the current manager (C): a= permanent position, b= temporary 
position; 
- formal employer of the personnel (C): a= the management authority, b= others. 
We focused also on some management and strategic variables, such as 
- vision formalization (C): presence (1) vs absence (0) of a formal vision; 
- mission (C): 
• mission formalization: presence (1) vs absence (0) of a formal mission; 
• mission kind: a= conservation, b= education, c= monitoring, d= recreation, e= 
research, f= surveillance, g= sustainable development;  
- goals (C):  
• goals formalization: presence (1) vs absence (0) of formalized goals; 
• goals quantification: a= absent, b= partial, c= complete; 
- strategies, enforcement (C): 
• authority of MPA staff members (in charge of the enforcement) to inflict penalties 
to the lawbreakers: 0= no, 1= yes, 
• MPA staff carries interpretative activities out: 0= no, 1= yes,  
• presence of police body/coast guard in charge to enforce conservation/management 
measures: 0= no, 1= yes,  
• presence of coordination between MPA authority and police body/coast guard in 
order to carry on an effective surveillance out: a= no, b= just money and/or 
activities carried out together, c= strong collaboration, 
- evaluation process, in terms of availability of the data (C): 
• presence of a plan of bio-ecological monitoring: 0= no, 1= yes, 
• availability of the data about the bio-ecological monitoring: 0= no, 1= yes, 
• availability of the data about the hours spent for the surveillance by the MPA staff: 
0= no, 1= yes, 
• availability of the data about the hours spent for the surveillance by the police body: 
0= no, 1= yes 
• availability of the data about the penalties inflicted to the lawbreakers: 0= no, 1= 
yes. 
 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
 
The three MPAs investigated here have different size: Porto Cesareo has 7 employees, 
Torre Guaceto has 10 employees and, lastly, Zakynthos has 32 employees charged to carry 
on the activities at the MPAs (notwithstanding the type of contract).  
The managers (often called also ‘Directors’) of Torre Guaceto and Zakynthos have 
permanent positions. On the contrary, the manager of Porto Cesareo has a temporary 
position. This is because, by law, all the managers of the Italian MPAs have to be hired 
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with a temporary contract. The manager of Torre Guaceto is one of the few exceptions in 
Italy with a permanent position because Torre Guaceto is also a national reserve that is 
subject to regulations different from those of MPAs.  
The status of all the other employees of Italian MPAs is even more complex than the 
status of the managers. While Zakynthos’s employees are hired directly by the management 
authority, in Torre Guaceto and Porto Cesareo the employees are hired by temp agencies 
that have temporary contracts with the management authorities to provide services to the 
two MPAs. According to the Italian law in fact, MPAs’ management authorities cannot hire 
permanent or temporary employees (the only exception is the manager). The three case 
studies1) highlight the differences in the legal frameworks concerning MPAs in different 
countries and 2) reveal the weakness of the MPA as organizations, e.g. in Italy, where 
MPAs are created for a specific mission but their management authorities are not able to 
hire employees in order to carry out the activities to pursue the mission itself, as usually 
happens in other public institutions (e.g. schools, hospitals). 
Porto Cesareo and Torre Guaceto have formalized their ‘vision’, which however 
according to definitions provided before, can be classified as missions. There is not any 
formalized vision for the Zakynthos MPA yet.  
The ‘mission’ is clearly expressed for all the three MPAs, stated in the national law or in 
the decree that established each MPA. The remarkable aspect is that “conservation of the 
nature” is the mission for all the three MPAs, pointing out that, at least in the Adriatic and 
Ionian Region, there is a common core purpose for the creation of MPAs. 
Porto Cesareo and Torre Guaceto have formalized their ‘goals’ in their management 
plan, while Zakynthos did not. Nevertheless, the goals formalized by Porto Cesareo and 
Torre Guaceto are just in part quantitative. Such important aspect highlights a fundamental 
weakness of MPAs when OS principles are taken into account. They try, in fact, to pursue a 
mission without a system of clear and measureable goals. In other words, those MPAs work 
without any clear and measurable plan about the results that they want to obtain.  
A crucial point about the management effectiveness of MPAs is the enforcement, which 
is the activity most cited by the managers (during the interviews) as the more problematic 
one to be organized. Moreover, a well-defined enforcement plan is one of the crucial 
strategies in order to reach MPA goals and mission. Within our sample of MPAs, according 
to the national law, enforcement and surveillance are assigned to the Coast Guard or other 
police authorities having competence/power at sea. Consequently the MPA staffs do not 
have the authority to inflict penalties to the lawbreakers and they just carry on 
‘interpretative enforcement’. Moreover, only in Zakynthos there is coordination between 
the MPA authority and the coast guard in order to carry on the surveillance.  
Regarding the bio-ecological monitoring, the three MPAs considered have a plan for it. 
However, the results of such efforts are available to the researchers and the public in terms 
of public reports and/or scientific publications just for Torre Guaceto MPA. This evidence, 
unfortunately, stresses the fact that the availability of scientific data, their use and 
dissemination is not a priority for some MPA managers, while it should be, considering that 
adaptive and ecosystem-based approaches to management require reliable data to be 
properly adopted. 
The exact data about the hours spent for the surveillance are available just in Zakynthos, 
at least for those concerning the activities carried out by the MPA staff and by the MPA 
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staff in collaboration with the Coast Guard. Such coordination between the MPA authority 
and the Coast Guard in Zakynthos makes also available the data about the penalties 
inflicted to the lawbreakers. In Porto Cesareo and Torre Guaceto, only the approximated 
data about the hours spent for the surveillance by the MPA staff are available. The data 
about the penalties inflicted by the policy body to the lawbreakers are available just for 
Porto Cesareo. Once again, the inconsistency in the rules and organization among Italian 
MPAs makes the difference; in fact Porto Cesareo regulation provides that the policy body 
has to notify the penalties inflicted to the management authority. Such regulation is not in 
force in Torre Guaceto, where the data about the penalties inflicted by the policy body to 
the lawbreakers are not available. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The present study represents an exploratory attempt, in MPA science context, to apply 
some typical analytical tools of OS in order to describe the structure and management 
profiles of MPAs. 
In spite of the implicit complexity of this study, aiming substantially at relating OS 
variables with MPAs effectiveness, a number of interesting indications came out, especially 
in terms of possible aspects to be deepened in future researches and implications for policy 
makers. 
The analysis revealed that MPAs can differ and can be complex in terms of 
organizational characteristics. Even locally, each MPA is organized in a different way 
compared to the others, depending on local needs and customs, legislation and internal 
dynamics/logics. Such result on the three MPAs, if confirmed when a larger sample of 
MPAs will be analyzed, could give useful hints in order to improve, in the future, MPAs 
organization and their effectiveness at regional and European scale. This is particularly 
important, since MPAs have been identified as a crucial tool by EU (see e.g. Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive) for the management of European seas. It would be, 
therefore, a very interesting starting point to shape EU-MPAs, in terms of organization and 
functioning, in a more consistent way, to then adapt such basic and coherent structure to 
local needs.  
 
ANTONELLA PENNA 
 
NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE MARINE SCIENCE: 
THE BIOLOGICAL RESOURCE EXPLOITATION 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. European Bioeconomy. – 2. Biotechnology. – 3. Blue Biotechnology. – 4. Marine Bio 
products: actual and potential markets. – 5. Metagenomic and massive sequencing in the oceans: DNA 
products. – 6. Marine Cosmetics and Nutraceuticals. – 7. Renovable Energy Production. 
 
 
1. European Bioeconomy 
 
The European Programme, Horizon 2020, handles the EU research and innovative 
funds under three topics: Excellent Science, Competitive Industries, and Better Society. 
Under the topic Better Society, six key points are included: (i) health, demographic 
change and well being; (ii) food security, sustainable agriculture, marine and maritime 
research and bioeconomy; (iii) secure, clean and efficient energy; (iv) smart, green and 
integrated transport; (v) climate action, resource efficiency and raw materials; (vi) 
inclusive, innovative and secure societies. The European Bioeconomy Strategy acts for 
developing low-emission economy, more sustainable agriculture and fisheries, 
providing secure food, and promoting renewable biological resources use for industrial 
purposes preserving the biodiversity and environment.1 
It is already known that in the next decades competition for limited and restricted 
natural resources will occur. In fact, a increasing global population will need a harmless 
and secure food supply. Further the global climate change will have an impact on 
primary production ecosystems, such as fisheries, aquaculture, agriculture and forestry. 
It is emergent and basic to act toward an ideal use of renewable biological resources. 
It is urgent to move towards sustainable primary production and processing systems that 
can produce more food and other bio-products with lesser efforts, few environmental 
impact and CO2 emissions. All countries have to contribute for satisfactory goods based 
on raw materials, energy and industrial products under conditions of decreasing fossil 
carbon resources; it is expected to drastically decrease the production of oil and gas by 
60% by 2050. Bio waste represents a high potential resource as feedstock for productive 
processes (138 millions/year). About 30% of food produced in developed countries is 
discarded. Therefore, it is necessary to change the direction to a more resource efficient 
society that relies more on renewable biological resources to satisfy the needs of 
consumers, industry and mitigate climate change. 
The Bio economy wants to provide a sustainable production of renewable resources 
from sea, land, forestry and conversion into food, feed, drugs, and bio-energy. The 
Bioeconomy provides 20 million jobs and accounting for 9% of total employment in EU 
in 2009. The Europe Strategy 2020 suggests continuous investment for research and 
production. The Bioeconomy sustains the pillars of Safe Food, Bio-based Industries, 
Aquatic Resources and Biotechnology. 
 
 
                                                   
1
 European Commission, Innovating for Sustainable Growth: A Bioeconomy for Europe (Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2012). 
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2. Biotechnology 
 
The Biotechnology is the driving technology of the bio-economy. It contributes to 
innovation in all the other Activities under the bio-economy, namely food, agriculture 
and forestry, and fisheries and aquaculture. Examples of biotechnology applications are 
in industrial processes as bio-pharmaceuticals, food, and feed production and bio-
chemicals. In Europe, the bio-pharmaceuticals sector includes the 20% of current 
medicines derived from biotechnology. The potential of biotechnology processes and 
bio-based products could lead to a reduction of CO2 emissions to be estimated to range 
between 1 to 2.5 billion tons CO2 equivalent/year by 2030. In particular, the 
Biotechnology Biotech Areas include: Novel sources of biomass and bio-products; 
Marine and fresh-water biotechnology (blue biotechnology); Industrial biotechnology: 
added-value bio-products and bio-processes; Bio-refinery; Environmental 
Biotechnology; Emerging trends in biotechnology.  
 
 
3. Blue Biotechnology 
 
Blue biotechnology treaties the exploitation of the sea biodiversity for developing 
new products, as pharmaceuticals or industrial enzymes with high economic value. In 
the long term, it is expected that the sector will offer high-skilled employment and 
significant opportunities. In this area, research priorities are strongly driven by Marine 
and Maritime policies on economical and environmental sustainability. 
The high biodiversity contained in the oceans represents a high potential for 
innovation first as better understanding of marine and maritime resources and 
biodiversity, second as efficient exploitation of economic and scientific potential. The 
Blue Biotechnology is able to transform this high potential into real products and 
knowledge. Blue biotechnology is one of the key enabling technologies and maritime 
economic sectors. Further, the Marine Biotechnology contributes to more effectively 
protect the marine environment across Europe, also specifically about the definition of 
Good Environmental Status (GES) indicators.2 
 
 
4. Marine Bio products: actual and potential markets 
 
A long list of marine bioproducts or linked processes can be done about their 
exploitation for the generation of industrial products. At the top list of exploitation and 
market there are the pharmaceuticals, then cosmetics, nutritional complements, 
agrichemicals, enzymes, antifouling and antibiofilm compounds, bioremediation, 
biofuels, nucleotide sequences.  
The potential of biotechnology is concentrated on the drug discovery, development 
and design. The synthesis of antiviral drugs and anticancer drugs includes: AZT 
(zidovudine, Terovir®): anti HIV; Acyclovir (Zovirax®): anti herpes; Ara-A 
(Vidarabine®): antiviral; Ara_C (Cystosar-U®): anti leukemias. 
                                                   
2
 See Directive 2008/56/EC of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine 
environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive), in Official Journal of the European Union, L 164, 25 
June 2008, 19 ff. 
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The marine pharmaceutical is a recent pipeline: The preclinical pipeline continues to 
supply several hundred novel marine compounds every year and those continue to feed 
the clinical pipeline with potentially valuable compounds. From a global perspective the 
marine pharmaceutical pipeline remains very active, by delivering several new 
compounds to the marketplace in the near future.3 Furthermore, the advent of genetic 
techniques that permitted the isolation/expression of biosynthetic pathway from marine 
microbes may well be the new frontier for natural products lead discovery. It is now 
apparent that biodiversity may be much greater in marine microbes. The numbers of 
potential species involved in the microbial world are many orders of magnitude greater 
than those of plants and animals. The explosion of genetic big data led not only to novel 
screens, but the genetic techniques permitted the implementation of combinatorial 
biosynthetic technology and genome mining. The knowledge allowed unknown 
molecules to be identified. These novel bioactive structures can be optimized by using 
combinatorial chemistry generating new drug candidates for many diseases.  
 
 
5. Metagenomic and massive sequencing in the oceans: DNA products 
 
EU financed Projects in the framework FP7 started to produce metagenomic multi-
sequences of the marine microbial diversity. In particular, the EU 7FP project Micro B3 
(Marine Microbial Biodiversity, Bioinformatics, Biotechnology) develops innovative 
bioinformatic approaches and a legal framework to make large-scale data on marine 
viral, bacterial, archaeal and protists genomes and metagenomes accessible for marine 
ecosystems biology and to define new targets for biotechnological applications. Micro 
B3 constructed upon a highly interdisciplinary consortium of 32 academic and industrial 
partners comprising world-leading experts in bioinformatics, computer science, biology, 
ecology, oceanography, bioprospecting and biotechnology, as well as legal aspects. 
Micro B3 takes full advantage of current sequencing technologies to efficiently exploit 
large-scale sequence data in an environmental context. Micro B3 creates integrated 
knowledge to inform marine ecosystems biology and modeling. Moreover, it facilitates 
detecting candidate genes to be explored by targeted laboratory experiments for 
biotechnology and for assigning potential functions to unknown genes. Micro B3 
develops clear IP agreements for the protection and sustainable use of pre-competitive 
microbial genetic resources and their exploitation in high potential commercial 
applications. The translational character of Micro B3, outreach and training activities 
for various stakeholders is provided, as well as an Ocean Sampling Day to make project 
results accessible and gain valuable user feedback.4 Within the project the massive 
sampling for metagenomic activity is carried out. Through a wide network build up by 
Ocean Sampling Day (OSD) is offered a largest dataset on and function in marine 
research. The results will mark a baseline for the marine environment accessible for 
researchers, industry, public and policy makers. The OSD constitutes the Workpackage 
2. Meanwhile, another important Workpackage 8 is comprised in the Project MicroB3. 
The goals are (a) ensure intellectual property protection on downstream commercial 
applications; (b) while alleviating obstacles to facilitated access to pre-competitive 
research materials and associated data; (c) adopting appropriate access and benefit 
                                                   
3
  A.M.S.  Mayer, K.B. Glaser, C. Cuevas, R.S. Jacobs, W. Kem, R.D. Little,  ‘The odyssey of marine 
pharmaceuticals : a current pipeline perspective’, (2010) 31 Trends Pharmacol Sci 255. 
4
 See the EU 7FP project Micro B3, <http://www.microb3.eu>. 
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sharing rules which can promote R&D activities in resource countries and generate 
funding for biodiversity conservation through a multilateral approach most appropriate 
for marine bioprospecting. This last part mentions the Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity. The sampling of seawater 
resources is under the Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) document that resolves the 
legal permits to undertake research in different maritime zones and to transfer research 
materials to another country. The sampling activity has different rules if the distance 
from the coast changes. Permit to the National Authority has to asked if the sampling is 
in internal waters – territorial seas – exclusive economic zones; otherwise, if the 
sampling is in the areas beyond national jurisdiction the permit is not required; if the 
sampling is in the Antarctic Treaty Area the activity is subject to prior notification. 
 
 
6. Marine Cosmetics and Nutraceuticals 
 
The greatest applications of Blue Biotechnology products in commercialisation are 
the cosmetics and food sectors with most products having a large predictable societal, as 
well as economic value. 
The organisms to be exploited can be microscopic (bacteria and microalgae) or 
macroscopic (seaweeds, jellyfish, corals); the functionality properties are several, as 
UV-filter, after sun; viscosity control agents; surfactants; preservatives; liposomes, 
carrier systems for active ingredients. The Cosmetic sector is relevant, since it is a 
growing sector demanding marine innovations. Personal care products industry overall 
is reaching EUR 487 billion by 2017 with about 713 patents. 5 
The other main sector the production of nutraceuticals supply of marine origin. The 
specific applications are antioxidants, anti-inflammatory; fat loss; reducing cholesterol; 
anti-HIV properties, antibiotic and mitogenic properties anti-tumour; iodine deficiency, 
anti-influenza; treatment of gastric ulcers. The Marine organisms can be 
microorganisms (bacteria, microalgae) and organisms (fungi, sponges, corals, 
invertebrates, seaweeds). The socio-economic impact of the food sector has experienced 
a great development over the past years. The production is based mainly on products 
from seaweeds. Most of the SME are in north Europe strongly interested in the marine 
production for food supply even if the largest seaweed production countries are the 
Philippines and China. The EU is responsible for 21% of world hydrocolloids and for 
38% the world production of alginates.   
 
 
7. Renovable Energy Production 
 
The Bio refinery research involves the application of biotechnology for the 
production of bioproducts and biofuels. The Biorefinery can significantly contribute to a 
green economy supporting the EU's Climate Action. To reduce the dependency on fossil 
fuels imports and meet the target of renewable energy sources in transport it is highly 
demand to encourage the production and use of biofuels. The Renewable Energy 
                                                   
5
 Study in Support of Impact Assessment work on Blue Biotechnology, Revised Final Report FWC MARE/2012/06 – 
SC C1/2013/03, 24 July 2014, available at: <ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/documentation/studies/documents/study-
blue-biotechnology_en.pdf>. 
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Directive in 2008, required Members States to meet 10% of transport energy from 
renewable sources by 2020. By 2012, it was estimated that biofuels consumed in the EU 
accounted for around 4.5 % of road transport fuels. 
The European Renewable Energy Action Plans encourages the sustainable 
cultivation and use of biomass, bioenergy and biofuels.6 The European Biofuels 
Technology Platform (EBTP) contribute to the development of cost-competitive 
biofuels and the creation of a healthy biofuels industry, and to accelerate the sustainable 
deployment of biofuels in the European Union, through a process of guidance, 
prioritisation and promotion of research, technology and development.  
The microalgae and aquatic biomass has the potential to provide a new range of 
"third generation" biofuels. The microalgae produce high oils and biomass yields of 
high quality and versatile products, widespread available, not competitive with 
agricultural land hectare. Further, the algal biomass efficiently capture CO2 and can be 
used for wastewater treatments and other industrial plants; algae and aquatic biomass 
are promising renewable sources for a sustainable and low-carbon economy.7 
Increasing attention is about the rules and policy on the exploitation of algal green 
and aquatic biomass. The European Policy and Standards for sustainable biomass and 
biofuels production consists in developing a series of key actions as: (i) the Policy and 
Sustainability; (ii) the Deployement of advanced biofuels societal benefits of biofuels, 
(iii) the Biofules markets; (iv) the Financing and Investment; (v) the Regulatory 
Framework; (vi) the Policy and legislation, Standards and Certification.  
 
                                                   
6
 See the official website of the EBTP, <biofuelstp.eu>. 
7
 See Algae, cyanobacteria and aquatic plants for production of biofuels, <biofuelstp.eu/algae-aquatic-
biomass.html>. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, security of supply has become a prominent issue on the EU energy 
policy agenda. The attention for this new ‘old’ issue has been driven by several factors. 
They include the gas crisis between Russia and the Ukraine, the growing tension 
between Russia and the EU after the outbreak of war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and the 
Russian annexation of Crimea, and the continuing instability of North Africa and the 
Middle East. The majority of oil and gas production in Europe takes place offshore, and 
there are currently over one thousand operations in European waters. The recent 
economic crisis has negatively affected EU energy consumption, but given the EU’s 
growing energy demand in the medium and long run, offshore energy resources will 
continue to be important for helping reduce EU energy dependence and diversify its oil 
and gas supplies. Most of the current EU offshore petroleum production is located in the 
North Sea and takes place in the territorial sea and continental shelves of traditional EU 
energy producers, such as the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
However, particularly after the 2007-08 global financial crisis and the economic 
downturn in Southern Europe, many countries of the Adriatic and Ionian Region, such 
as Italy, Greece, Croatia, and Montenegro, have formulated new plans for the 
exploration and exploitation of offshore petroleum resources as a strategy to not only 
reduce energy dependence, but also to boost economic recovery by attracting foreign 
investments and by exploiting oil and gas rent. The relaunch of the offshore 
hydrocarbon sector in the region is also driven by an intra-regional competitive 
dynamic; that is, once a country starts to elaborate a new plan to exploit its resources, 
other countries which share a common marine border tend to be pushed to accelerate or 
review their plan in order to preserve their own resources. Generally speaking, these 
plans are coherent with the new EU Energy Security Strategy, which has emphasized 
the importance of increasing EU energy production from fossils fuels in the next few 
years1. Nevertheless, the relaunch of offshore plans in the region have triggered specific 
patterns of interstate and transnational political dynamics, which on one hand reflect 
some traditional features of offshore politics and on the other hand signal the emergence 
of a new layer of politics in offshore development. 
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 Final Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European Energy Security 
Strategy, 28 May 2014, COM(2014) 330 final.  
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The Adriatic and Ionian Sea basins are the second area in the EU where offshore 
hydrocarbon installations have been developed, mainly thanks to the operations taking 
place in the Italian continental shelf (minor offshore activities are also taking place in 
Croatia and Greece)2. According to the data on proven hydrocarbon reserves (both 
onshore and offshore), the potential of the Adriatic and Ionian region in a wider 
European perspective is not impressive: proven oil reserves represent about 6.5% of the 
entire European continent (EU member states plus Norway), and proven gas reserves 
account for about 2.1% of the total (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 – Adriatic-Ionian region (AI) proved oil (in billion barrels) and  
gas (in trillion cubic feet) reserves by countries. 
 
Country Oil (BB) Gas (TCF) 
Italy 0.52 2.20 
Croatia 0.07 0.88 
Greece 0.01 0.04 
Albania 0.17 0.03 
Montenegro 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 
Tot. Adriatic-Ionian Region (AI) 0.77 3.15 
Tot. EU (+Norway) 12 146 
%AI/EU(+Norway) 6.4% 2.1% 
Source: U. S. Energy Information Administration statistics, 2013, <www.eia.gov>. 
 
However, from a regional perspective, these resources can play an important role. 
The most promising countries in terms of hydrocarbons development seem to be Italy 
and Croatia, followed by Albania for oil and Greece for gas reserves, while Montenegro 
has only recently launched its first plan to develop its largely unexplored territorial sea 
and continental shelf. Italy is the country with the most significant gas reserves in the 
region, and more than the half of these reserves are located in the Adriatic Sea3. 
Since the end of 2000s, the relaunch of offshore development plans has opened 
opportunities for cooperation in the common development of energy resources and also 
for confrontation, especially where sea boundaries among the regions’ countries are not 
definitely settled, such as between Croatia and Slovenia and Croatia and Montenegro. 
The Adriatic Sea has a very fragile marine ecosystem; it is a semi-enclosed sea inside a 
semi-enclosed sea which is generally considered to be the most endangered in the 
Mediterranean, and important economic activities, such as fisheries and tourism, depend 
on its conservation. Due to this fragility and the proximity among the riparian states, 
potential conflicts in the region address not only the issue of energy resource ownership 
– i.e. the delimitation of each state’s sovereignty rights for the monetization of gas and 
oil fields – but also possible transboundary pollution from normal operations of offshore 
installations and the risk of major incidents.  
Against this background, this chapter aims to analyse the emerging policies and 
politics of hydrocarbon development in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas by highlighting the 
main drivers and effects of the recent relaunch of offshore activities in the region. The 
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 European Commission, ‘Offshore oil and gas safety’, <ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/offshore-oil-
and-gas-safety>. 
3
 F. Terlizzese, Lo sfruttamento sostenibile delle risorse minerarie del mare, report presented at the Conference: “Il 
Mare: la sostenibilità come motore di sviluppo. Marine Strategy e Blue Growth, (Livorno, 14-15 novembre 2014”. 
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first section of the chapter illustrates the origins and development of offshore activities 
in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas from the 1960s to the relaunch of offshore plans at the 
end of the 2000s. It describes national policies, the main international institutions and 
regimes at work in the region, and the basic patterns of international interactions. The 
second section focuses on recent developments and the political effects of the current 
offshore plans. Two main patterns of political interactions are highlighted. The first has 
a more traditional inter-state character and includes cooperative and confrontational 
interactions. The second represents the emergence of a new kind of political dynamics 
with domestic and transnational features. These dynamics are related to the growing 
importance attached to the environmental impact of offshore activities. Finally, in the 
conclusion, the main findings are summarised and the differences between the ‘old’ and 
the ‘new’ politics of offshore development are described. 
 
 
2. Origins and development of offshore policies and politics in the Adriatic and 
Ionian seas 
 
The history of offshore development in the Adriatic and Ionian seas can be divided 
into three main periods. In the first period, from about the 1960s to the beginning of the 
1990s, the basic domestic legislative framework and the bilateral international regime of 
the sector were established under the general provision of the law of the sea. In 
particular, at the national level, the offshore sector was basically organized into a 
centralized institutional structure around the main state-owned companies (or ‘national 
champions’), which managed the sector along with the respective ministers responsible 
for economic development or industry. There were obviously differences between 
countries like Italy and Greece, after Greece joined the European Community in 1981, 
and countries like Yugoslavia and Albania, as latter two countries were less open to 
foreign companies. With regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf for the 
exploration and production of hydrocarbon resources, Italy – the major producer 
country – took the lead in negotiating and defining its sea borders with Yugoslavia, 
Greece and Albania. During this period, no serious disputes were open which could 
have blocked or undermined national plans for offshore hydrocarbon development, and 
environmental concerns were not prominent on the political agenda, although some 
bilateral agreements between the states of the regions were established, and the 
Barcelona system began to enter into force.  
The second period, from the beginning of the 1990s to the end of the 2010s, was 
characterized by two opposite trends: integration (and homogenization) and 
fragmentation. On one hand, at national level, the sector was progressively opened to 
competition and harmonized, especially due to the implementation of the directive 
94/22/EC.4 Moreover, the new Balkan states began the process of integration into the 
EU, and at the same time an entirely set of new institutions were established to promote 
cooperation among the countries and local communities on the Adriatic and Ionian 
Seas. On the other hand, the international regime for the delimitation of the marine 
borders was complicated by the Balkans wars and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Among 
the new Balkan countries, especially, disputes emerged, and Albania and Greece were 
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 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting 
and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons, in Official Journal of the 
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also not able to reach a definitive agreement. Finally, in the recent period (since 2008–
09), there has been a relaunch of offshore plans that in the previous phase were 
declining, due mainly to the decrease in Italian offshore activities. This relaunch has 
been driven by three primary factors: the economic crisis, concern about the security of 
supply (especially in the gas sector) and intra-regional competition. The relaunch of 
national plans for offshore development has created further tensions among the Balkan 
countries, in particular between Croatia and Montenegro and Croatia and Slovenia. 
However, this period has also been characterized by a transformation in offshore 
politics, which have become progressively more complex due to the development of 
new EU and international governance structures. These dynamics, coupled with 
growing awareness about the environmental risks of offshore activities, which was 
aggravated by the 2010 oil disaster in Gulf of Mexico, have broadened the constellation 
of actors involved in offshore politics. Along with the traditional bilateral government-
to-government diplomacy and involvement of energy companies, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), local communities and sub-national governments are becoming 
more and more involved in the national and transnational political dynamics that 
overlap with more traditional interstate diplomatic practices.  
 
2.1. State intervention, national champions and the construction of the bilateral regime 
(1960-1990) 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Yugoslavia (1965), Italy (1967), Greece (1969) and Albania 
(1970) all made claims to continental shelf, according to the principles provided by the 
law of the sea (particularly Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the continental 
shelf). During this period, Italy was the most active country in the region in the 
development of offshore energy resources, both domestically - thanks to the operations 
carried on by the state-owned companies ENI and Agip - and internationally. With Law 
No. 613 of 21 July 1967, the Italian government asserted Italy’s claim to the continental 
shelf, established the legislative framework for offshore activities and identified the 
marine areas open for such activities (so-called ‘zone marine’) in specific portions of 
the Adriatic Sea (in the Ionian Sea, the areas open for offshore activities were 
established in 1975). Along with developing its domestic policy framework, Italy 
focused its efforts to build the bilateral international regime intended to delimitate the 
state’s continental shelf5. In 1968, Italy and Yugoslavia signed an agreement (and later 
Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia would become successor states of Yugoslavia in this 
agreement), and in 1977, Italy and Greece signed another. Both agreements were 
negotiated according to the principles and rules of UNCLOS – i.e. the criterion of 
equidistance was modified to account for specific geographic circumstances (islands or 
the curvature of the coastline) – and both agreements included provisions for an 
obligation to cooperate in case oil and gas deposits were discovered between the 
maritime borders of the two countries6.During this period, Greece also initiated some 
important offshore activities, mainly through its state-owned company DEP, and minor 
activities were conducted in Yugoslavia, especially in Croatia, by the state-owned 
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 For a detailed account of the bilateral agreements in the Adriatic regions from the 1960s to the 1990s, see in this 
Volume, A. Caligiuri, ‘The Maritime Boundaries in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas’. 
6
 U. Leanza, ‘The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf of the Mediterranean Sea’, (1993) 8 International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 373; F.A. Annish, The International Law of Maritime Boundaries and the Practice of States 
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company INA (during the 1960s and the 1970s, the state-owned company Jugopetrol, in 
cooperation with foreign companies, also did some exploration in Montenegro, but 
made no important discoveries).  
Although Albania did not sign and ratify UNCLOS until 2003, Italy and Albania 
negotiated and signed an agreement for the delimitation of the continental shelf in 1992 
according to the UNCLOS principle of equidistance7. The agreement, which included 
provisions for the joint management of energy resources located between the 
continental shelves of the two countries, was facilitated by Albania’s willingness to 
develop its hydrocarbon resources. Albania has been a hydrocarbon producer since the 
1950s–60s, mainly through its state-owned company Albpetrol, and oil has been an 
especially important source of revenue for the state since that period.  
With the Albania-Italy continental shelf agreement of 1992, the process of 
delimitation between the Adriatic and Ionian’s opposite coasts was virtually completed. 
Although environmental concerns were a less significant factor at that time than now, 
Italy also took the lead in the establishment of a bilateral intergovernmental framework 
intended to promote the protection of the sea. Italy signed an agreement with 
Yugoslavia in 1974 and with Greece in 1979. Those agreements included the creation of 
the Joint Commission to monitor offshore activities and manage potential accidents with 
trans-boundary effects; however, by the end of the 1980s, these commissions were no 
longer in place. At the same time, Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece became parties to the 
1976 Barcelona Convention, while Albania did not sign the Mediterranean Action Plan 
and did not ratify the Barcelona convention until 1990. In 1991, Albania was also a 
signatory, together with Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia and the European Commission, of the 
Adriatic Sea Declaration, signed 13 July 1991 in Ancona, which, inter alia, provides for 
environmental protection of the Adriatic Sea and preservation of its ecological balance8.  
 
2.2. Between integration and fragmentation (1990-2008) 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, different dynamics began to transform the previous 
institutional framework both domestically and internationally. With the EU directive 
94/22/EC, the hydrocarbon sector of the member states was harmonized and opened to 
competition. Italy applied directive 94/22/EC in 1996, and Greece applied it in 1995. In 
Albania, in 1993, the government transformed Albpetrol into a public company, owned 
by the state, and in 1994 enacted Law 7853/94 and Law 7811/94 in accordance with the 
directive 94/22/EC. In Croatia, INA became a public company in 1993, and since 2003, 
it has been progressively privatized. Since the mid-2010s, Croatian energy policy has 
focused on the liberalization and privatization of the energy sector, and the country 
gradually adopted the EU legislative energy framework, first in the context of the 
Energy Community and then in the process of accession until the country joined the EU 
in 2013. After Montenegro gained independence in 2006, it also started to reform its 
energy sector and to harmonize its laws and standards with the EU energy legal 
framework (in 2005, Montenegro joined the Energy Community). 
During this period, the Italian government enacted various measures to relaunch the 
energy sector, which had been declining since the second half of the 1980s. Despite the 
new legislative framework, offshore activities continued to decrease in the 1990s and 
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8
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2000s. During the 2000s, Italy enacted other changes in the royalties regime and 
established new procedures to speed up the authorization processes for exploration and 
exploitation licenses. Nevertheless, the new measures did not reverse the trend, and 
offshore activities continued to decrease, due in part to growing regional and local 
opposition to the government’s plan. From 1995 to 2010, offshore gas production in 
Italy fell from about 15 bcm/y to about 5 bcm/y9.  
Along with the homogenization of domestic energy markets, the EU and Italy made 
important efforts during this period to support the stabilization and integration of the 
new Adriatic Balkan states. The EU-sponsored Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 
led to the creation, in 2000, of the Italian-sponsored Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, which 
represented the most important inter-state multilateral forum involving all the 
Southeastern European countries aspiring to join the EU10. In the same period, a dense 
network of transnational institutions was also created: the Forum of the Cities of the 
Adriatic and Ionian Basin (1999), the Forum of the Adriatic Chambers of Commerce 
(2001) and the Adriatic-Ionian Euro-Region (2006). All of these new governance 
structures referenced the need to promote cooperation to preserve the Adriatic and 
Ionian Seas and to support sustainable development of the coastal areas. This process of 
transnational institution building was reinforced at the end of the 2010s when, in the 
context of the EU Integrated Maritime Policy and EU Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive, the countries of the regions – supported by the sub-national governments – 
started a political campaign to found an EU Macro Regional Strategy for the Adriatic 
and Ionian Seas basin. The campaign was successful, and the European Union Strategy 
for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR) was eventually established in 2014, 
covering four MS (Croatia, Greece, Italy and Slovenia) and four non-EU countries 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia). Also during this period, 
both the EU and the non-EU countries of the region ratified the Espoo and Sea Protocol, 
which strengthened environmental protection.  
However, along with these processes of homogenization and institutionalized 
cooperation, the region witnessed a fragmentation of sea boundaries in the 1990s and 
2000s. Italy easily solved the problem of new marine border delimitation since Croatia, 
Montenegro and Slovenia became Yugoslavia’s successor states in the 1968 agreement 
(Slovenia became part of the UNCLOS in 1995 and Montenegro in 2006 after its 
independence). In 2005–06, new agreements between Italy and Croatia and between the 
two companies involved in the monetization of gas resources, ENI and INA, were also 
signed to facilitate the common development of a gas field between the Italian and 
Croatian continental shelves11 (called the Annamaria gas field). In 2009, Italy and 
Croatia signed a technical agreement for the joint exploitation of this gas field12.  
For the new Balkan countries, the situation was more complicated. A definitive 
agreement for the common delimitation of state borders at sea has not yet been 
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concluded among these countries. In 2002, an ‘interim regime’ was established between 
Croatia and Montenegro regarding the contested coastal and sea border near the 
peninsula of Prevlaka13. In the following years, various efforts to find a definitive 
solution were made through bilateral negotiations between the Croatian and 
Montenegrin governments. However, the dispute has proven to be very difficult to 
solve, and in 2014, both governments agreed to solve the issue of demarcation by means 
of international arbitration through the International Court of Justice. 
An agreement regarding the sea border between Croatia and Slovenia was first 
negotiated in 2001, but the Croatian government did not sign the resulting treaty14. No 
substantive negotiations took place between 2002 and 2008, but the two governments 
agreed to resolve the dispute with the assistance of a third party. In 2009, with the 
support of the EU institutions and in the context of Croatia’s EU accession process, the 
arbitration agreement was signed,15 but the process has not yet been concluded.  
After two years of negotiations, Greece and Albania also signed an agreement in 
2009. However, in 2010, the Albanian Constitutional Court nullified the agreement due 
to ‘procedural and substantial violations’ of the constitution and of the UNCLOS16. In 
summary, so far only Italy has signed an international agreement with all relevant 
parties regarding maritime border delimitation in the Adriatic and Ionian region. Italy 
and Croatia have agreed to cooperate on the joint development of some gas fields in the 
Adriatic Sea (Table 2). Unresolved issues still remain between Croatia and Slovenia, 
Croatia and Montenegro, and Greece and Albania, and the marine border between 
Montenegro and Albania has not yet been defined (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 – Maritime border delimitation agreements/issues in the Adriatic and Ionian Region. 
 
 
Italy Croatia Greece Albania Montenegro Slovenia 
Italy  IA/TA IA IA IA IA 
Croatia IA/TA  ------ ------ IR/U* U* 
Greece IA ------  U* ------ ------ 
Albania IA ------ U*  No ------ 
Montenegro IA IR/U* ------ No  ------ 
Slovenia IA U* ------ ------ ------  
Note: IA = intergovernmental agreement; TA = technical agreement; IR = interim regime;  
U* = unresolved issues; No = marine border/no agreement; ------ = no marine border. 
 
2.3. The relaunch of offshore policies (2009-2014)  
 
By the end of the 2010s, offshore policies in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas had been 
relaunched. Albania was the first country to move to attract new investors and exploit 
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 Protocol between the Government of Croatia and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the 
temporary border regime along the southern border between the two counties, 10 December 2002.  
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 Treaty Between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia on the Common State Border (the so-called 
Drnovšek-Račan Treaty), 2001. 
15
 See, Arbitral Agreement between the Government of the Republic Slovenia and the Government of the Republic of 
Croatia, 4 November 2009. 
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 See Albanian Constitutional Court Nullifies Maritime Boundary Agreement with Greece (University of Durham, 10 
February 2010), <www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=9534>. 
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its energy resources. Albania’s national organizational structure of offshore governance 
was modified in 2006 when a new public agency, the National Agency of Natural 
Resources (AKBN), was established to manage the relationships between the 
government and companies involved in the hydrocarbon sector, including Albpetrol. 
Currently, some areas are still unassigned, especially onshore (nine areas); the only 
offshore block remaining unassigned is the ‘Rodoni North’ block at the marine border 
between Albania and Montenegro. Greece’s first efforts to relaunch its energy sector 
began in 2007 when the government took over the concessions previously granted to 
state-owned companies. Since the explosion of Greek’s debt crisis in 2009–10, Greece 
has improved its energy strategy. In particular, Law No. 4001/2011 modified the 
legislative framework for granting rights to exploration and exploitation and established 
a new public agency (the Hellenic Hydrocarbons Management Company, HHRM SA) 
in order to attract international companies. In 2014, the Greek government launched an 
international licensing round for twenty marine areas (blocks), eleven in the Ionian Sea 
and nine in the offshore area south of Crete, and an open-door invitation for two 
offshore areas in the Patraikos Gulf and Katakolo. This plan of the Greek government in 
the offshore sector has been associated with other energy initiatives, such as the 
development of the Southern Gas Corridor and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, promoting 
the idea of turning Greece into an ‘energy hub’ and advancing the energy security of the 
entire EU.  
The first attempt by the Croatian government to improve hydrocarbon production 
was sketched in the policy document ‘Energy Strategy of the Republic of Croatia’, 
issued in 200917. However, it was only after 2012 that the new Croatian government 
began to develop a decisive strategy to expand exploration and exploitation (currently, 
INA is the only offshore hydrocarbon producer in the country, running five gas fields 
located in the Northern Adriatic Sea in a joint venture with the Italian ENI). In the wake 
of the Ukraine-Russia energy crisis, Croatia also decided to improve its gas supply 
security by promoting two new infrastructure projects, the Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline and 
an LNG facility near the Island of Krk. In 2013, Croatia combined these three projects 
(pipeline, LNG and hydrocarbon development), with the goal of making Croatia an 
important energy hub for EU energy security. As for offshore activities, in 2013, the 
government assigned the task of conducting a seismic acquisition survey of offshore 
Croatia to the Norwegian Spectrum Company as a precursor to the offshore licensing 
round that the government planned to hold in the following years. The company 
estimated that Croatia could have offshore reserves equivalent of 3 billion barrels of oil, 
enough to meet domestic demand for many decades and to supply the European market, 
further strengthening the government’s willingness to proceed with its plans18. In 2013, 
a new regulatory framework was also enacted in order to align Croatian legislation with 
EU guidelines (Directive 94/22/EC) and to attract foreign companies. The new 
‘Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons Act’ established a new public agency, 
the Croatian Hydrocarbons Agency, to manage the licensing rounds and to help the 
Ministry of the Economy administrate the sector. Finally, in 2014, the government 
defined twenty-nine offshore blocks in the Croatian section of the Adriatic Sea (eight 
blocks in the Northern Adriatic and twenty-one in the Middle and Southern Adriatic), 
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 See The Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship, Energy Strategy of the Republic 
of Croatia, June 2009. 
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 B. Pancevski, ‘Faltering Croatia Seeks Oil Bonanza’, The Sunday Times (29 September 2013). 
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and in April, it launched its first ‘Offshore round for licences for the exploration and 
production of hydrocarbons’19.  
In Italy, the relaunch of the hydrocarbon sector has been at the centre of the national 
energy policy agenda since the end of the 2010s. In 2013, with the National Energy 
Strategy (‘Strategia Energetica Nazionale’), the Italian government decided again to 
take action to enhance its energy security, reduce its dependence on foreign countries, 
and boost economic growth in the aftermath of the economic crisis20. Accordingly, on 
13 September 2014, the new Italian government of Matteo Renzi enacted the so-called 
‘Unlock Italy’ (Sblocca Italia) Law (Law Decree of 12 September 2014, No.133), which 
introduced some changes into upstream sector governance. The law simplified the 
procedure for obtaining concessions for exploration and production and recentralized 
the decision-making processes to overcome the regional and local opposition that 
limited Italy’s energy policy during the 2000s. Moreover, the new law provided for the 
issuance of temporary experimental concessions designed to last five years in the Gulf 
of Venice in the Northern Adriatic Sea, in order to ‘preserve the national resources of 
hydrocarbons located in the sea and in the continental shelf in areas in the vicinity of the 
areas of other coastal countries which are undergoing exploration and production 
activities’21. This measure was intended to respond in particular to the new offshore 
Croatian plan and to preserve Italian resources at the marine border between the two 
countries22.  
Finally, in 2011, the government of Montenegro formulated a comprehensive energy 
strategy which explicitly stated that part of the government energy policy should be 
based on the exploitation of domestic hydrocarbon resources and on improvement of 
supply security in the gas sector. In 2010–2011, Montenegro enacted two laws to 
establish a new legislative framework in line with the directive 94/22/EC (‘Law on 
Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons’), No. 41/10 of 23 July 2010 and 40/11 of 
8 August 2011. Then, in 2012–13, thirteen offshore blocks were defined in the Adriatic 
Sea, and on 7 August 2013 Montenegro launched its first international bidding round to 
assign the concessions for exploration and exploitation in these areas. 
 
 
3. Maritime boundaries, environmental protection and the emerging offshore 
politics in the Adriatic and Ionian seas 
 
Three basic patterns of inter-state dynamics resulted from the relaunch of offshore 
plans in the Adriatic and Ionian region: cooperation, competition and confrontations and 
disputes over the delimitation of the states’ border at sea. Italy and Croatia have mainly 
cooperated, developing their shared energy resources by relying on the bilateral 
agreement set in the 1960s and its more recent adjustments as well as on the practical 
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 ‘First Offshore License Round is Closed!’, Croatian Hydrocarbon Agency (2015), <www.azu.hr/en-us/License-
rounds/1st-Offshore-License-Round>. 
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 See Strategia Energetica Nazionale: per un’energia più competitiva e sostenibile, approved with the Decree of the 
Ministry of Economic Development and of the Ministry of Environment, Land and Sea 
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 Law Decree of 12 September 2014, No.133, Article 38(10).  
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cooperation between the companies involved in the development of the gas fields. But 
while they cooperate in the joint development of gas resources, a competitive dynamic 
has been also at work between these two countries as the Croatian plan has provoked a 
‘reaction’ from the Italian government to preserve possible energy resources located 
near Croatian waters. Confrontations and disputes have been prompted mainly among 
the Balkan states, especially where the boundaries at sea were not yet defined, i.e. 
between Croatia and Slovenia and between Croatia and Montenegro. These disputes 
have not prevented energy companies already active in the regional energy markets to 
take part in the licensing rounds launched by Croatia and Montenegro. However, in 
2015, the uncertainty caused by the unsolved maritime boarders coupled with a fall in 
oil prices induced some companies to review their investment decisions.  
Croatia and Montenegro have also continued to support their offshore plan while 
trying to resolve their dispute through the traditional instruments provided by the law of 
the sea. The EU has indirectly supported the Balkan countries’ offshore plans in the 
context of wider efforts by European institutions to support the development of 
Southeastern Europe’s energy infrastructure system. The Balkan countries have also 
cooperated among themselves in the area of energy infrastructures. Moreover, along 
these more traditional patterns of interstate interactions, the relaunch of offshore plans 
has triggered a new set of national and transnational political dynamics. These dynamics 
are the result of two mutually reinforcing trends. The first is growing public concern 
about the negative environmental impact and potential risk of offshore activities and the 
mobilization and opposition of environmental NGOs, generally supported by local and 
regional governments. The second trend is the result of the strengthened supranational 
and EU environmental framework that has created new bridges between offshore 
activities and environmental protection and has provided new institutional channels of 
political interactions that overcome national boundaries.  
 
3.1. Between cooperation and confrontation 
 
Although the original 1968 agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia had already 
established some basic principles for cooperation in the development of joint fields, it 
was only in the 2009 technical agreement that the Italian and Croatian governments 
formally approved the programs of gas exploitation signed by ENI and INA. The 2009 
technical agreement allowed both governments to supervise and control actual 
production from the joint gas fields; however, in practice, its successfulimplementation 
depends on the arrangements between the companies involved in the monetization of 
gas resources23. Indeed, while ENI is responsible for production in Italian waters 
(Annamaria platform B), the Croatian side (Annamaria platform A) is run by a joint 
operating company, INAgip, owned 50% by INA and 50% by ENI. ENI, the leading 
operator in the Italian upstream hydrocarbon sector, was also one of the companies to 
take part in the 2014 Croatian offshore bidding round. The round received ten bids for 
just fifteen exploration areas of the twenty-nine blocks that constitutes the country’s 
offshore zone. Despite the relatively simple technical environment of the Croatian 
offshore – its sea depth is between 100 and 500 meters – no major international 
companies took part in the licensing round. Declining oil prices were one contributing 
factor. ENI obtained a license in partnership with the UK-based company Medoilgas, 
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and seven more licences were granted to a consortium between Austria’s OMV and the 
US-based Marathon Oil. The other two licences were awarded to a consortium made up 
by INA, co-owned by the Croatian government and Hungary’s MOL. For these 
companies, which were already involved in the southern and central European energy 
market or in the Balkans, the opportunity to find new resources and to expand their 
position in those markets was sufficient reason to invest in the exploration of the 
Croatian offshore. Marathon Oil, OMV, ENI and Medoilgas took also part in the 
Montenegrin offshore round, as did the Russian company Novatek and the Greek 
company Energean. In three consortia (Marathon Oil and OMV, Eni and Novatek, and 
Energean and Medoilgas), these companies submitted applications for seven of the 
thirteen blocks offered by Montenegro. 
By the end of 2015, exploration had still to begin, and, notwithstanding the 
suggestions made by the Spectrum Company based on the seismic survey, the actual 
potential of the Croatian and Montenegrin offshore was not yet clear. Meanwhile, the 
Croatian government sought to highlight the importance of the country’s resources 
forEuropean energy security to bring attention to the country’s offshore sector and to 
gain the support of EU institutions. EU institutions did not directly express support for 
the offshore Croatian plan, but they were supportive of the country’s strategy for gas 
infrastructure development, which will be important if gas is found in the Croatian sea 
in sufficient quantities to allow exportation. The development of the Croatian and 
Montenegrin energy infrastructures (such as the Ionian-Adriatic-Pipeline and the LNG 
facility at Krk Island) was also regarded by the energy companies involved in offshore 
exploration as an important guarantee that possible discoveries could be monetized in 
reasonable amount of time.  
Although the goal of improving Balkan energy security has been supported by all the 
countries of the region – leading to important cooperation, such as for the realization of 
the Ionian-Adriatic-Pipeline24 – the launch of the offshore plan has provoked new 
disputes. In 2014, the Montenegrin Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially filed a 
complaint against Croatia arguing for the inclusion of the Prevlaka peninsula in the 
government-issued geographic maps that were offered to interested concessionaires for 
oil and gas exploration25. In particular, Montenegro contested the Croatian plan 
respecting blocks 27, 28 and 29, which are located in whole or in part in a portion of the 
Adriatic Sea claimed by Montenegro. Montenegro recalled that the Protocol on the 
Provisional Regime of 2002 obliges the two countries to refrain from unilateral actions 
that would prejudice determination of the common border at sea and on land. According 
to the Montenegrin government, Croatia’s unilateral act of calling for public tenders in 
the southern part of the Adriatic was inconsistent with the Protocol and violated the 
principles set by UNCLOS26. In January 2015, after the Croatian international offshore 
round was concluded, Montenegro’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European 
Integration sent a formal note of protest to Croatia for the licenses awarded to the 
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consortia of INA, Marathon Oil and OMV in blocks 23, 26, 27 and 2827. In January 
2015, a formal note of protest was also sent to Marathon Oil and OMV for violating the 
‘letter and spirit of UNCLOS’28. But no additional actions have been taken against these 
companies, partly because they were also involved in the Montenegrin offshore sector. 
However, in July 2015, Marathon Oil and OMV decided to return the seven offshore 
exploration licenses to Croatia, three of which were in waters disputed by the two 
countries. This decision was also motivated by the slump in the oil prices that was 
forcing the energy industry to cut investments29. 
The dispute has also gone in the opposite direction. Montenegro’s offshore plan 
initially included a number of blocks that, according to Croatia, were in the disputed 
area between the two countries, violating the 2002 Protocol. Following several public 
exchanges with Croatian government, the Montenegrin Government decided to exclude 
the disputed blocks from its first offshore round and award concessions only for the 
blocks in its undisputed southern waters30.  
The arbitration process initiated in 2009 over the sea border between Croatia and 
Slovenia was not yet concluded when Croatia decided to develop its offshore plan. 
Therefore, in April 2014, following the launch of the Croatian bidding round, the 
Slovenian government presented a formal objection to Croatia for the inclusion of areas 
close to the contested sea border. The Slovenian position was soon reinforced by the 
declaration of the Director General for Bilateral Relations and European Affairs, which 
reminded Croatia of its obligation to ‘act in good faith’ and conform to the Article 10 of 
the 2009 Arbitration Agreement stipulating that ‘parties must refrain from any action or 
statement which might intensify the dispute or jeopardise the work of the Arbitral 
Tribunal’31. In theory, the final decision of the arbitration tribunal was expected by the 
end of 2015. However, in summer of the same year, a scandal occurred after press 
revelations of secret conversations between the Slovene judge on the panel and the 
Slovenian representative. The episode caused the Slovenian government to ask for the 
resignation of both persons involved, and the Croatian government has expressed doubt 
about its willingness to continue the arbitration process32. 
 
3.2. The national and transnational environmental dimensions of offshore politics  
 
In addition to the problems related to the longstanding international boundary 
disputes in the Balkans, the new plans for offshore development raised new concerns 
about environmental protection of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. In Italy, the new plan 
established by the government in 2014 prompted numerous protests by environmental 
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NGOs, regional governments and important opposition parties such as the Five Stars 
Movement, which in the general election of 2013 received about 25% of the votes, 
making it the second most popular party in Italy. The strategy of offshore development 
in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas was also opposed by many local communities and local 
business involved in fishing and tourism. At the beginning of 2015, six Italian regions – 
four of which are Adriatic and Ionian coastal regions (Abruzzi, Marche, Puglia and 
Veneto) – appealed to the Constitutional Court against Decree ‘Unlock Italy’, which 
produced a recentralization of the decision-making process of upstream activities. 
Moreover, regional government leaders have made numerous statements against the 
national plan and in defence of their regions’ coastal sea and marine environments. The 
domestic protest paved the way for transnational dynamics when, in the wake of the 
launch of the Croatian offshore plan, many environmental NGOs and regional 
governments called on the Italian government to ask its Croatian counterpart to 
participate in the Strategic Environmental Assessment according to the directive 
2001/41/EC33 and the 2003 Kiev Protocol of the Espoo Convention. After some 
hesitation, the Italian Ministry of the Environment asked Croatia to be considered in the 
process, owing to the trans-boundary dimension of the Croatian offshore plan. Along 
with the Italian government, five Italian Adriatic coastal regions (Marche, Puglia, 
Veneto, Abruzzi and Emilia Romagna) – four of which had already appealed to the 
Italian Constitutional Court against the Italian plan –submitted their observations to the 
Croatian government. Slovenia and Montenegro also requested to be and were included 
in the Croatian strategic environmental impact assessment. As a result, the Croatian 
government decided to postpone the deadline for signing the contract with companies 
that had received licenses for offshore exploration from April to June 201534. The 
Croatian government was also confronting growing domestic protest from 
environmental organizations and local communities. Various environmental NGOs 
organized public campaigns against the plan, and some political parties and businesses 
involved in tourism opposed and criticised the plan. The socialist government 
emphasised the plan as part of its efforts to improve the country’s energy security, 
attract investment to stimulate the Croatian economy and gain international political 
attention in the EU energy map. However, in view of the general election to be held in 
November 2015, it decided to postpone the offshore plan35. This situation clearly 
illustrates the new, important role that environmental issues and their political 
repercussions play in current offshore development politics. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Traditionally, offshore policies and politics in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas have been 
played out by states and energy companies. The interests of states in developing their 
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offshore resources have been an important factor in the construction of the international 
legal regime of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. During the formative period of this regime, 
Italy, which had major interests and the economic and technical capacity to develop 
offshore hydrocarbon resources, took the lead in negotiating agreements with the other 
countries. However, the sea boundaries among the states of the Adriatic and Ionia Seas 
have been fragmented as a result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and disputes 
emerged, especially among its successor states. When offshore plans were relaunched in 
the wake of the 2008 economic crisis and EU energy security concerns, energy 
resources became an additional topic of contention, especially between Croatia and 
Slovenia and Croatia and Montenegro. However, it is worth noting that disputes were 
not caused by the competition for hydrocarbon resources per se, since no gas fields have 
been found in the contested areas. Instead, offshore plans have mainly created additional 
difficulties for maritime disputes that were already hard to solve, as demonstrated by the 
problems in the arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia. Where resources have been 
found at common borders between countries, such as in the case of Italy and Croatia, 
the countries have cooperated. Although traditional interstate dynamics have 
characterized the recent period since the relaunch of offshore plans in 2009-2014 and 
energy companies continue to play an important role in offshore exploration and 
exploitation, new types of political interactions have also emerged. Offshore plans in 
the region have prompted many domestic disputes, clashes along the centre-periphery 
divide and the mobilization of various environmental NGOs. Environmental issues have 
also triggered new transnational dynamics, strengthened by the new EU and 
international governance structures and norms and by growing awareness about the 
environmental effects of offshore hydrocarbon activities. The new politics of offshore 
development have not replaced traditional patterns of interstate interactions but added to 
them, resulting in a combination of old dynamics with new, emerging transnational 
trends. 
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SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. The rights of Coastal States over the economic resources of the EEZ and 
the CS. – 3. Coastal State jurisdiction over artificial islands and installations. – 4. The limits of the 
powers of Coastal States over offshore platforms in recent practice. – 5. Critical questions and risks 
connected with offshore activities in the Mediterranean and Adriatic seas. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The question of the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources at sea has 
become a matter of much discussion both in national and in international circles. 
On one hand, in fact, this is a sector which offers a high level of expansion in 
economic terms, especially when we consider the progressive exhaustion of the oil and 
gas resources on land. On the other hand, however, the experience already gained from 
land activities in the field, and also the still limited knowledge of the possible negative 
effects and the great risks inherent in this economic sector at sea, render its development 
more problematic. 
Widespread opposition to development in this economic sector at sea is found both 
within individual States and internationally, as a result, in particular, of protests and 
awareness campaigns conducted by the principal environmental NGOs. 
In fact, fears about the environmental impact of this activity have led to closer 
questioning on the nature and the extent of the coastal states’ powers than in the past, 
and also on the existence or otherwise of related obligations in the matter of the 
conservation of the marine environment, and the prevention of transboundary 
environmental damage. This last question does not enter into the scope of the present 
article. 
The aim of this article is to look at the international regulatory framework of the 
coastal states’ powers and of their limits, with particular reference to marine areas 
situated beyond the Territorial Seas (TS). 
So, we will proceed first of all to an analysis of the powers of the coastal state as laid 
down in the UNCLOS, both as regards the question of the exploitation of the economic 
resources of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Continental Shelf (CS), and 
as regards that of the creation of artificial islands and platforms in those areas. 
After having considered some aspects which have emerged from recent practice in 
connection with the limits of the powers of the coastal states, we will look at the 
specific cases of the Mediterranean and the Adriatic seas.  
 
 
2. The rights of Coastal States over the economic resources of the EEZ 
 
As is foreseen in the UNCLOS and in customary law, productive activities carried 
out by the coastal state, either directly by them or with their consent, within the TS, that 
is within 12 nautical miles from the base line, fall under the control of the state as 
regards both regulation and all the coercive activities which may derive from the 
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application of the state laws, in virtue of the almost absolute sovereignty the state 
enjoys. 
In fact, the right of innocent passage of the ships of third states through the territorial 
sea of a state cannot be invoked where the pre-eminent economic interests of the state 
impose either the banning or the restriction of navigation in areas close to fixed or 
mobile structures situated within the area for the exploitation of non-living resources of 
the seabed and its subsoil. Moreover, the passage within the territorial sea of foreign 
vessels interfering with the activity of the oil rig can be considered as non-inoffensive, 
and can be suspended in the areas adjacent to the platforms, if the interference is be 
considered as a threat to the security of the coastal state. 
Within the TS, the coastal state has wide and highly discretionary powers to regulate 
navigation by imposing limitations on navigation or traffic schemes and sea lanes to 
protect the safety of oil platforms, since the state is only required to take into account 
IMO recommendations and customary navigational uses within its territorial waters. 
As regards the maritime areas situated between 12 and 24 nautical miles, i.e. within 
the Contiguous Zone (CZ) if that is in existence as proclaimed by the coastal state, these 
come under the regulations foreseen for the EEZ and the CS, since the powers that the 
Coastal State can exercise within its CZ are limited to monitoring the observance of 
national laws regarding customs duties, taxes, and questions of health and immigration 
relating to the TS. No right to exploit resources is recognized to the coastal state within 
its CZ. Therefore, all economic activities, and the construction of artificial islands and 
platforms beyond the TS, come under the regulation for the EEZ or the CS. 
When oil exploration and exploitation activities are decided upon or authorized by 
the coastal state in areas beyond the 12 nautical miles, within the EEZ and/or the CS, 
these are to be considered legitimate in virtue of the sovereign rights of the coastal state 
over its economic resources according to Articles 56 and 77 UNCLOS, but the powers 
of coastal states to protect the rigs or to regulate navigation in the areas in proximity to 
the platforms appear to be more limited, as we shall see in the following paragraph.  
Article 56 provides for coastal states “sovereign rights” over the living and non-
living resources of its EEZ, as well as over other activities connected with the 
exploration and economic exploitation of the zone, and for “jurisdictional rights” over 
the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, over scientific 
research activities and the protection of the marine environment, thus introducing a 
distinction between “sovereign rights” over resources and the more simple 
“jurisdictional powers” attributed to the coastal states in the other domains.1 
Indeed, the rights, whether sovereign or jurisdictional, and the related duties of 
coastal states cannot be intended to be absolute, since due regard to the rights and duties 
of other states is expressly provided for by Articles 55, 56(2) and 58 UNCLOS.2  
Article 58(2) allows for the application of the provisions regarding the high seas and 
the pertinent rules of international law only if these are compatible with the EEZ 
regime. The controversial nature of the EEZ was well known to the drafters of the 
UNCLOS, who, with the introduction of Articles 56, 58, and 59, aimed to create a 
“permanent legal arrangement” for balancing the diverse interests inside the EEZ. 
                                                           
* This article has been written in the framework of the Cost Action IS1105 MARSAFENET. 
1
 For a deeper examination of the EEZ, see G. Andreone, ‘The Economic Exclusive Zone’ in D. R. Rothwell, A. G. 
Oude Elferink, K. N. Scott, T. Stephens (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 
2015) 159-180. 
2
 R. Beckman, T. Davenport, ‘The EEZ Regime Reflection After Thirty Years’ in H. N. Scheiber, M. S. Kwon (eds), 
Securing the Ocean for the Next Generation (Berkeley Publication, 2013) 13-68. 
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Indeed, Article 59 seeks to resolve possible conflicts over the attribution of residual 
rights and jurisdiction within the EEZ not attributed or covered by the UNCLOS, with 
reference, at the same time, to equity and to all relevant circumstances.3 Nevertheless, it 
does not offer a definitive solution to possible conflicts between coastal and third states4 
nor does it call for the assumption in favour of one freedom or power over another.5 
When the coastal state has proclaimed its EEZ, the legal regime of this zone will 
absorb the CS legal regime, since, according to Article 56 UNCLOS, coastal states’ 
powers are extended to the waters superjacent to the seabed and to the seabed and its 
subsoil up to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the coast. The CS legal regime will 
then be applied to the outer CS, if this is claimed by the coastal state and up to the limit 
fixed unilaterally by it and accepted by the Commission for the CS (Article 76 
UNCLOS). 
In the absence of the proclamation of an EEZ, the norms to be applied to the 
activities of exploitation of oil and gas resources are those foreseen by the UNCLOS for 
the CS (Part VI of the Convention), this being a zone automatically determined, 
requiring neither effective occupation nor an ad hoc proclamation on the part of the 
coastal State. This is nowadays a very rare hypothesis, relating to the minority of states 
which have not yet proclaimed their EEZ, among them many Mediterranean States. 
Even when a state has powers only over its CS, not having proclaimed its EEZ, or in 
the case of an outer CS, the power of exclusive exploitation is in any case limited by the 
right of third states to free navigation in the superjacent waters, and by the right to lay 
pipelines and submarine cables as foreseen by Articles 78 and 79 UNCLOS. 6 
Within the EEZ and on the CS the powers of non-biological resource exploitation 
belong exclusively to the coastal state, even if that state does not exercise them. It 
                                                           
3
 See D. R. Rothwell, T. Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Hurt Publishing, 2010) 97; I. Shearer, ‘Ocean 
management challenges for the law of the sea in the first decade of the 21st century’ in A. G. Oude Elferink, D. R. 
Rothwell (eds), Ocean Management in the 21st Century: Institutional Frameworks and Responses (Brill, 2004) 10. 
4
 According to some authors, the reference to equity in Article 59 substantially indicates that, in the case of a dispute, 
it is necessary to recur firstly to negotiations and to consensual means of settlement, before referring the dispute to 
judicial bodies. See R.R. Churchill, A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (III Ed., Juris Publishing Inc., 1999) 176; 
Beckman, Davenport (n 2) 12. 
5
 R. Virzo, ‘La convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer et la pollution provenant d’activités militaires 
dans la zone économique exclusive’ in G. Andreone, A. Caligiuri, G. Cataldi (eds), Droit de la mer et émergences 
environnementales (Editoriale Scientifica, 2012) 255, 257; S. Karagiannis, ‘L’article 59 de la Convention des Nations 
Unies sur le droit de la mer (ou les mystères de la nature juridique de la zone économique exclusive)’,  (2004) Revue 
Belge de Droit International 325, 392 and 402. 
6
 Article 78 UNCLOS deals with the Legal status of the superjacent waters and air space and the rights and 
freedoms of other States and in its first par states that “The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not 
affect the legal status of the superjacent waters or of the air space above those waters.” And para 2 states as follows: 
“The exercise of the rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf must not infringe or result in any 
unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other states as provided for in this 
Convention”. Article 79 UNCLOS, concerning Submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf, states “1. All 
States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf, in accordance with the provisions of 
this article. / 2. Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf, the 
exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from pipelines, the coastal 
state may not impede the laying or maintenance of such cables or pipelines. / 3. The delineation of the course for the 
laying of such pipelines on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal state. / 4. Nothing in this Part 
affects the right of the coastal state to establish conditions for cables or pipelines entering its territory or territorial 
sea, or its jurisdiction over cables and pipelines constructed or used in connection with the exploration of its 
continental shelf or exploitation of its resources or the operations of artificial islands, installations and structures 
under its jurisdiction. / 5. When laying submarine cables or pipelines, states shall have due regard to cables or 
pipelines already in position. In particular, possibilities of repairing existing cables or pipelines shall not be 
prejudiced”. 
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follows that the coastal state can regulate exploitation activities according to its own 
laws as also on the basis of its own economic policies and investments. 
The powers of enforcing compliance and related judicial powers which are to be 
considered inherent in the exercise of exclusive exploitation rights, are not specified in 
the UNCLOS. Even if it is most unlikely that a violation of exclusive non-biological 
resource exploitation rights within the EEZ and on the CS should occur, the possibility 
that some illegal interference on the part of third states may take place, either by their 
ships or in some other way, during exploration or exploitation operations, cannot be 
excluded. In particular, there may be interference with or damage to artificial platforms 
created for the purposes of the extraction of oil and gas.   
 
 
3. The jurisdiction of Coastal States over artificial islands and installations 
 
The expansion in exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources in the seabed 
has led to an increase in the number of artificial islands and structures in the seas, and to 
the proliferation of mobile structures positioned in marine areas which are subject to the 
jurisdiction of coastal states. 
If, on one hand, therefore, the coastal state has sovereign rights over resources, on 
the other hand, its powers over artificial structures seem to be more limited. The state 
appears to have exclusive powers to regulate exploration and exploitation structures, but 
must coordinate with the rights of third party states to navigate and exercise the freedom 
of the High Seas recognized within the EEZ and the CS. 
As for the coastal State’s jurisdictional rights on the establishment and use of 
artificial islands, installations, and structures, these are regulated by Article 60 
UNCLOS. The legal regime envisaged by this provision is then applied, mutatis 
mutandis, to the continental shelf in accordance with the requirements of Article 80.7 
The rights of the coastal state relating to islands and installations within the EEZ and the 
CS are similar, with the sole difference that in this latter zone they are far more limited,8 
since within the EEZ such islands and structures can be legitimately constructed and 
used for many other purposes, such as the exploitation of renewable energy. 
According to Article 60, an almost total exclusivity is accorded to the coastal state to 
authorize and regulate various kinds of offshore construction, their placement, and their 
use within the EEZ. The distinction between artificial islands, installations, and 
structures for all the authorized economic purposes expressly provided for in Article 56 
and “installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of 
the coastal states in the zone” is rather vague and often not reproduced in national 
legislation,9 but it seems to admit, in principle, the placement of such constructions by 
third states, as long as they do not interfere with the rights of the coastal state.10 
                                                           
7
 The power of establishing artificial islands or platform on the CS was already provided by the 1958 Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, which provided also for safety zones around the artificial islands for a maximum breadth of 
500 metres. 
8
 See Churchill,  Lowe (n 4) 168. 
9
 For national legislation not distinguishing among the different types of constructions, see Churchill, Lowe (n 4) 168; 
S. Kopela, ‘The ‘territorialisation’ of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Implications for maritime jurisdiction’ in 
International Boundary Research Unit on ‘The State of Sovereignty’, 20th Anniversary Conference of the 
International Boundary Research Unit on “The State of Sovereignty” (1-3 April 2009, Durham, U.K.), 
<www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/conferences/sos/s_kopela_paper.pdf>. 
10
 On this point, see E.D. Brown, The International Law of the Sea, vol 1 (Dartmouth, 1994) 243-244. The author 
argues that the construction of those installations by third states could be for military purposes. 
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The legal regime provided by Article 60 is identical for all these types of 
construction, in relation both to rights and to duties. It is expressly provided that the 
coastal state can exercise on those constructions exclusive jurisdiction with respect to 
customs, tax, health, safety, and immigration laws.11  
Moreover, according to UNCLOS, the coastal state, where it appears necessary, may 
establish reasonable safety zones around those constructions, with the aim of ensuring 
safer navigation, or the protection of the construction itself, to an extent fixed by the 
coastal state and not exceeding a radius of 500 metres around the construction.12 
In fact, the idea of instituting safety zones first arose during the work of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) on the legal regime of the continental shelf at the 
beginning of the fifties of the XX century. According to the ILC, the coastal states 
should be able to establish safety zones around their artificial installations to a 
reasonable distance, in order to protect them from navigation and in consideration of the 
extreme vulnerability of these constructions in the sea and of the activities of oil and gas 
extraction carried out by them. For these reasons safety zones were introduced into the 
1958 Convention on the CS in Article 70 which foresees their maximum extension of 
500 metres. The same disposition, however, imposes limits on the powers of the coastal 
states to institute such zones insofar as they might interfere with “recognized sea lanes 
essential to international navigation”. 
The 500 metre limit for the safety zone arose from an analogy with the safety zones 
foreseen for oil installations on land. Some studies, in fact, have noted that no particular 
attention had been paid or studies carried out within the ILC or successively by the 
states parties to the 1958 Convention on the CS to evaluate the applicability and 
usefulness of the 500 metre safety limit at sea.  
During the negotiations of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, the 
debate on safety zones and their extension intensified in consideration of the need to 
balance general interests with the freedom of navigation, and with the interests of the 
coastal state in protecting their own installations and extraction activities from the 
approach of more sophisticated and powerful ships, able to cover 500 metres in a few 
seconds. Many states, during the period of elaboration of the UNCLOS, raised the 
question of the need for a greater protection of artificial islands, particularly in the light 
of the rapid technological changes in the world of navigation, while others continued to 
lay emphasis on the need to preserve liberty of navigation.  
The fear that the coastal states might use the power to determine the extension of the 
safety zone around their artificial islands in an arbitrary fashion produced the result that 
the dispositions of previous international provisions remained untouched. So that the 
500 metre limit was confirmed by the UNCLOS, with the difference from the 1958 
Convention on the CS that there are no limits on the fixing of such safety zones, and, 
above all, that for the first time there is a provision for the possible extension of the 
limit indicated if a general consensus in that regard is reached.  
Indeed, Article 60(5) UNCLOS also provides for an extension of the safety zone if 
authorized by generally accepted international standards or as recommended by the 
competent international organization.  
                                                           
11
 Article 60(2) UNCLOS: “The coastal state shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, installations 
and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and 
regulations”. 
12
 Article 60(4) and (5). See A. Harel, ‘Preventing Terrorist Attacks on Offshore Platforms: Do States Have Sufficient 
Legal Tools?’, (2012) 4 Harvard National Security Journal 131. 
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The international organization to which this disposition refers is clearly the IMO, 
which has received many requests for authorization to extend the safety zone from 
coastal states since the UNCLOS entered into force. Over time, requests for 
authorization to establish more ample safety zones in case of necessity have been put 
forward, for example, by Canada, and by Brazil, which was initially supported by the 
USA, although the latter after more careful thought, preferred to withdraw the extension 
proposal. 13 Nevertheless, to date, the IMO has never accepted any proposal to agree on 
a more extended safety zone, even if the question of the need for extension has been 
brought to the attention of the General Assembly of the IMO. 
With its resolution of 19 October 1989 on “Safety zones and safety of navigation 
around offshore installations and structures” (No. A.271 (16)) the General Assembly of 
the IMO approved a series of recommendations addressed to states on the question of 
navigation in areas around offshore platforms. The resolution is principally directed 
towards flag states, which are bound to oblige their ships to respect the rules of 
navigation and prevention and to use the greatest caution and prudence while sailing in 
proximity to offshore platforms. In particular, flag states must ensure that their ships do 
not enter into safety zones unless explicitly authorized to do so. The resolution, 
furthermore, encourages coastal states to report all violations of safety zones under their 
jurisdiction to the flag state of the ship which has committed the violation.  
In spite of the ample debate and the explicit requests of some states, the IMO has 
never evaluated up to now the need or usefulness of extending, or in some special cases, 
providing for the extension of, the safety zone, still less has it considered it opportune to 
lay down guidelines in the matter of management of the platforms and their protection 
from accidents of navigation.  
If we look at national practices, we find that most coastal states have instituted safety 
zones of 500 metres, and only in a few cases does this limit seem to be exceeded in 
internal law. Some states, however, have not indicated any limit to these safety zones, 
implicitly referring them to the international regulations applicable. There is, though, a 
widespread tendency among some states to claim jurisdiction in the matters of safety up 
to a distance of 24 nautical miles from the coast. In such cases the claims of the state are 
aimed not only at protecting the islands and artificial installations, but also at obtaining 
wider powers to protect them from, and prevent, possible violent attacks in an area 
corresponding to the CZ. 
Clearly, however, these are claims which exceed what is acceptable in international 
law within the CZ, insofar as the states wish to apply in such zones laws which lie 
outside the realms of prevention and repression of smuggling, tax crimes, crimes 
relating to questions of public health or immigration committed within the TS. This 
national practice of claiming powers not foreseen by the UNCLOS in the matter of 
security beyond the TS does not seem to have led to the formulation of any new powers 
on the basis of customary law. In any case, it is not clear what would be the impact of 
such claims in the matter of security on the powers of the coastal states to protect 
offshore platforms situated within the EEZ or on the CS. 
The recent well known case of the Arctic Sunrise, which we will deal with in the 
next paragraph, has raised the question of the legitimacy of internal Russian regulations 
which provide for safety zones around their off shore platforms of more than 500 
metres, and has also brought to the attention of the international community the 
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question of the extreme vulnerability of offshore installations, and also of the weak 
powers the coastal states have to protect them. Not even this case, which up to today has 
already led to three decisions on the part of international tribunals, has convinced the 
IMO of the urgency and necessity of intervening on the question of the extension of 
safety zones and of introducing explicit guidelines on the powers of coastal states 
Turning now to the duties concerning artificial islands and installations, the coastal 
state is obliged to keep third states constantly informed about the placement of those 
constructions, as well as their falling into disuse, and also regarding all relevant 
technical aspects, in order to ensure the safety of navigation. Towards this end, Article 
60(3) specifically requires dismantlement to be performed according to general 
international standards established by international organizations, taking into account 
other possible implications concerning fisheries, protection of the marine environment, 
or other rights and duties of third states. 
Inevitably, the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over these spaces implies an 
assumption of responsibility on the part of the coastal state for all the activities and the 
events occurring on them. In this context, the position of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union is worth noting. The Court stated that, according to Articles 77, 60, and 
80 UNCLOS, an EU Member State has sovereignty (albeit functional and limited 
sovereignty) over the continental shelf adjacent to it, and exclusive jurisdiction over the 
artificial islands and installations positioned on it. Consequently, the “work carried out 
on these fixed or floating installations […] is to be regarded as work carried out in the 
territory of that state for the purposes of applying EU law” and in particular EU law 
provisions designed to ensure the freedom of movement of persons.14 
 
 
4. The limits of the powers of the Coastal State over offshore platforms in recent 
practice 
 
The features of artificial constructions at sea, as well as their legal implications, vary 
dramatically according to their characteristics and to the function to which they are 
destined. Looking, then, at oil, gas, or renewable energy platforms, the extent of the 
enforcement powers of coastal States over these items has recently caused concern and, 
in particular, the question of their protection and of their environmental impact is likely 
to lead to significant developments in the EEZ legal regime. The major and irreparable 
damage to the environment which occurred in the case of the 2010 explosion of the 
British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon platform in the Gulf of Mexico, drew attention to 
the particular vulnerability of such installations, including the possibility of terrorist 
attacks.15 
Then, the 2013 seizure of the Greenpeace vessel M/V Arctic Sunrise, and of the 
activists protesting against the Gazprom oil rig in the Russian Arctic EEZ, raised a 
number of questions about the extent of coastal state enforcement powers to protect 
offshore platforms.16 Indeed, upon the Netherlands’ request for provisional measures as 
the flag state of the M/V Arctic Sunrise, the ITLOS ordered that the Arctic Sunrise and 
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 Court of Justice of the European Union, A Salemink v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut 
werknemersverzekeringen, C-347/10, judgment of 17 January 2012. 
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 Harel (n 12) 131; S. Kaye, ‘Threats from the Global Commons: Problems of Jurisdiction and Enforcement’, (2007) 
8 Melbourne Journal of International Law, <law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/1683101/Kaye.pdf>. 
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 A. G. Oude Elferink, ‘The Arctic Sunrise Incident: A Multi-faceted Law of the Sea Case with a Human Rights 
Dimension’, (2014) 29 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 244, 250 and 256. 
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all detained persons be released,17 but did not rule on the merits of the dispute between 
the Netherlands and Russia or on the lawfulness of the seizure and detention of the 
vessel and of the 30 volunteers, most of whom were arrested on board the Arctic 
Sunrise outside the 500-metre safety zone established by Russia around its platform.18 
The order of the ITLOS did not deal with the merits of the dispute, that is to say the 
legitimacy of the coercive acts on the part of the Russian authorities towards the Arctic 
Sunrise and its crew, but this question lies at the heart of the arbitration procedure set in 
motion on 4th October 2013 by the Netherlands against the Russian Federation, in which 
the latter refused to take part.19  
On one side, in fact, the Netherlands complained of the violation of the freedom of 
navigation of the Greenpeace vessel within the Russian EEZ, and also of the violation 
of individual freedoms laid down in international law and human rights treaties. On the 
other, Russia, through some notes verbales, has asserted the full legitimacy of coercive 
actions within its EEZ if these are aimed at the protection of economic interests 
regarding the platforms, and resources of the seabed.  
Putting to one side the solutions offered by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Award on the 
Arctic Sunrise case that we will illustrate later, in the absence of any defense on 
Russia’s part, and also quite apart from the outcome of the appeals made by the 30 
Greenpeace activists to the European Court of Human Rights against Russia, for 
presumed violations of Articles 5 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
what comes to the fore in this matter is the vulnerability of off-shore platforms and the 
considerable uncertainty that exists regarding the extent of coastal State’s powers to 
regulate or protect them.  
The most difficult problem arising from the Arctic Sunrise case concerns the 
question of enforcement powers within the EEZ, and within the safety zone which can 
be instituted around a platform up to a maximum extension of 500 metres.  
The IMO General Assembly resolution of 19th October 1989 on “Safety zones and 
safety of navigation around offshore installations and structures” provided that, within 
the safety zone, States must take every possible measure to ensure that, unless 
specifically authorized to do so, their ships do not enter or cross safety zones 
legitimately instituted by coastal States within their own EEZs. This resolution also 
describes some measures which should be adopted by ships when they find themselves 
in proximity to off-shore platforms, such as prudence, the observance of safe speed and 
distance criteria etc.  
Although these measures are contained in a recommendation, they may be 
considered as “generally accepted international norms” on navigation in proximity to 
artificial islands as set out in Article 60(6) UNCLOS. 
                                                           
17
 ITLOS, ‘Artic Sunrise’ Case (Netherlands v Russian Federation), Case No. 22, Order of the 22 November 2013. 
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 According to Article 16 of the Federal Law on Continental Shelf, adopted on 25 October 1995, the Russian 
Federation established safety zones around its installations with an extension of not more than 500 meters 
(<www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/RUS_1995_Law.pdf>). However, the 
Netherlands has raised the illegality of Russia’s claim to a safety zone of three nautical miles, which would be 
inferred from Notices to Mariners No. 51/2011 published by the Russian authorities and also from the radio 
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 The first decision adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal was concerning the question of Tribunal competence: The 
Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v Russia) (Award on Jurisdiction) Case No 2014-02 (2014), <www.pcacases. 
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What raises the greatest doubts regarding interpretation, looking at disputes like the 
Arctic Sunrise case, is undoubtedly the fact that Article 60 gives no explicit description 
of the enforcement powers of the coastal State over ships which may represent a danger 
to exploitation activities and/or to the platform itself.  
The doctrine holds, however, that these powers must be understood to be very wide, 
since they derive from the exercise of full jurisdiction. 
Article 60(4), however, gives the impression of a limitation of enforcement powers 
within the safety zone, since it provides for the adoption of “appropriate measures” for 
the safety of navigation and of the installation within the safety zone and not outside it, 
and therefore not beyond a distance of 500 metres from the fixed or mobile installation. 
This provision means that the coastal State cannot be considered to enjoy all the 
coercive powers necessary to prevent and repress actions harmful or potentially harmful 
to the economic interests or safety of a platform which occur outside a radius of 500 
metres from that platform. Outside the safety zone, if one has been instituted, the State 
is thus obliged to guarantee freedom of navigation, and would not have any great 
margin of possible action to prevent interference with or attacks on its platforms. 
In any case, Article 60(4), with the term “appropriate measures” implies a high level 
of discretionary powers of the coastal State to evaluate the kind of measures necessary 
to eliminate the unauthorized presence of foreign ships in these areas, and to prevent 
any attempt at unauthorized access into the safety zones. Precautionary measures such 
as the confiscation of documents of a ship found in the proximity of a platform were 
adopted by Norway in 1993 in a case involving the Greenpeace ship Solo, which was 
engaged in peaceful protest activity against off-shore oil drilling.  
This interpretation of the enforcement powers of the coastal State seems to be 
confirmed by Article 111(2) UNCLOS which says “The right of hot pursuit shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to violations in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental 
shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations, of the laws and 
regulations of the coastal State applicable in accordance with this Convention to the 
exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf, including such safety zones”. 
Something may be deduced from the general principle according to which 
enforcement powers may be exercised as long as the ship is inside the maritime zone 
over which the State enjoys such powers. Since coastal States enjoy greater powers 
inside the safety zones than they do within the EEZ or CS, the State may be deemed 
unable to exercise enforcement powers over a ship when that ship is outside the safety 
zone. 
The ruling of the Arbitral Award in the Arctic Sunrise case of 14 August 2015 enters 
specifically into the questions just mentioned. In particular, the Arbitration Tribunal 
undertook to verify conformity with the dispositions of UNCLOS and general 
international law on the boarding, seizing and detention of the Arctic Sunrise, and its 
crew as an integral part of the ship, by the Russian authorities. 
With this intent, the Arbitral Tribunal analysed all the possible legal grounds which 
might justify the enforcement measures used by Russia against a ship flying the Dutch 
flag while the ship was exercising its right of free navigation within the Russian EEZ . 
   In the first place, the decision of the Tribunal excludes the hypothesis that Russia had 
claimed a safety zone around its platform of an extension not allowed by international 
law and therefore more than 500 metres. In fact, according to the Tribunal, Russia had 
instituted, and was exercising therein the rights appertaining to it, a safety zone of 500 
metres around the platform in question. 
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From the study of the regulations and the particular legal points applicable to the 
case carried out by the Tribunal, it emerges that the coastal state enjoys full coercive 
powers over foreign ships which violate their exclusive jurisdiction over artificial 
islands and platforms within the EEZ or on the CS, when these ships are in proximity to 
islands and platforms, or inside the 500 metre safety zone. Outside that limit, coercive 
powers over foreign ships may be exercised only with the consent of the flag State. 
Such coercive powers can be exercised, without the authorization of the flag state, in 
the case of hot pursuit which begins inside a safety zone situated within the EEZ or on 
the CS. The coastal state may pursue and seize a ship which has violated the ban on 
entering the safety zone of an offshore platform, if the pursuit begins in that zone and 
continues without interruption until the seizure is effected. In the case in point, the 
Tribunal excluded the hypothesis of hot pursuit since the pursuit was interrupted and the 
seizure of the Arctic Sunrise occurred only on the day following the violation of the ban 
on entering the safety zone. 
The Tribunal then excluded that the conduct of the Russian authorities was legal in 
virtue of the powers the coastal state enjoys in the matter of exclusive exploitation of 
biological and non-biological resources, since the behaviour of the Greenpeace activists 
and the ship itself had not led to any violation of the exclusive rights of the state, nor 
had it involved any risk to the resources of the EEZ and CS. 
From the perspective of marine environmental protection and risks of environmental 
damage arising from the protest activity against the extraction platform, the Tribunal 
excluded firstly, that any kind of spillage of environmental damage had occurred within 
the EEZ, and that consequently an appeal to Article 220 UNCLOS as a legal basis for 
the Russian coercive action was out of the question, and secondly it excluded the 
presence of any real risk of accident or other event damaging to the marine environment 
deriving from dangerous manoeuvres carried out in the course of the protest, so 
considering Article 221 UNCLOS equally inapplicable. 
According to the Tribunal, Russia should by that time have acquired a notable 
familiarity with the forms of manifestation of protest carried out at sea against offshore 
platforms in the Arctic Ocean, considering the previous cases of protest by Greenpeace 
within its maritime areas, and therefore, in the light of this experience, should have been 
able to avoid catastrophic repercussions as a result of the protest. But the decisive point 
and the one most convincing for excluding the hypothesis that possible environmental 
risk or accident were a sufficient legal base for Russia’s action lies in the fact that many 
hours had passed between the protest activity and the arrest and seizure of the Arctic 
Sunrise, so that the risk of accident was no longer impending at the moment of the 
boarding. 
Nor could the special measures foreseen by Article 234 UNCLOS be invoked in this 
specific case, since Russia does not consider the waters of the Barents Sea as falling 
into the category of ice-covered waters. 
Finally, among hypotheses of security breaches regarding the platform considered, 
excluding that of piracy which could not be invoked in this particular case, the arbitral 
decision admits that, in the case of terrorist attacks against offshore platforms, the 
coastal state may adopt all preventive and repressive measures necessary against suspect 
ships which are found within the safety zones, or outside it in the exercise of the right of 
hot pursuit according to Article 111(2). This hypothesis is also foreseen by the Protocol 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on 
the Continental Shelf (“SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol”). However, in the case in point, 
 The Powers of Coastal States over Offshore Oil Platforms 
 
 
201
the Tribunal not only excluded the hypothesis of hot pursuit, since the pursuit had been 
interrupted, but also excluded the idea that Russia could have had any well founded 
suspicion that they were dealing with a terrorist attack, both because the protest had 
been carried out in a peaceful fashion, and because of their previous experience with 
cases of protest by Greenpeace. 
Therefore, from this decision, by which Russia is judged liable for the violation of 
the freedom of navigation of the Arctic Sunrise, for not having sought the authorization 
of the flag state before applying coercive measures, there emerges a notable 
vulnerability of the offshore platforms and also a significant weakness of the coastal 
state as regards their power to protect them. 
 
 
5. Critical questions and risks connected with offshore activities in the 
Mediterranean and Adriatic seas 
 
Several critical aspects have emerged with regard to the exercise of the powers of 
coastal states over offshore platforms and to the balancing of states’ sovereign and 
jurisdictional rights with the freedom of navigation in the zones beyond the territorial 
seas. In particular, when difficulties in interpreting international rules occur, any 
possible negative impact they may have is much more evident and risky in the case of 
semi-enclosed and fragile seas. Furthermore it must be emphasized that in a semi-
enclosed sea, such as the Adriatic, a possible attack against operating offshore 
installations could have serious consequences and therefore should be prevented by all 
lawful means. 
The most critical issues regarding the activities of exploration for and extraction of 
hydrocarbons in the Mediterranean and Adriatic seas are the result partly of the lack of 
cooperation between coastal states in these semi-enclosed seas on questions of the 
prevention of accidents and environmental damage, and partly to the absence of any 
harmonization of state regulations or legislation concerning the matters of exploration, 
the extraction of resources and the installation and management of offshore platforms. 
As far as EU Member States are concerned, the processes of harmonization and 
technical coordination of offshore activities was consolidated in Directive 2013/30/EU 
on safety of offshore oil and gas operations.20 
There is no lack, however, also among Member States, of conflicts, either explicit or 
underlying, and even regarding oil and gas resources. For example, the determining of 
maritime borders creates tensions in the relations between states, as in the case of 
Slovenia and Croatia, whose controversy over the determining of their respective 
maritime zones remains unresolved to this day.21 
Relations between Malta and Italy, too, have been threatened by the existence of a 
latent conflict regarding the overlapping of some maritime areas already put into the 
hands of private companies for the exploration for and exploitation of hydrocarbons. 
From the perspective of regional cooperation for the protection of the CS, the fact 
that Italy is not one of the limited number of states that have ratified the two Protocols 
                                                           
20
 Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and 
gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC, in Official Journal of the European Union, L 178, 28 June 
2013, 66 ff. 
21
 The Arbitration Tribunal which had been called for by the Parties in November 2009 halted its work following the 
withdrawal of Croatia from the arbitral proceedings, on the 28th July 2015, because of the violations of the arbitral 
regulations committed by Slovenia.  
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of the Barcelona Convention relevant to the prevention of accidents and pollution 
deriving from offshore activities, is symptomatic of the low level of interest in the 
subject. These are the Protocol dealing with Co-operation in Preventing Pollution from 
Ships and, in Cases of Emergency, Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea (the 
so-called Prevention and Emergency Protocol) adopted on 25 January 2002 and which 
entered into force on 17 March 2004 and the Protocol for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of 
the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil ( the so-called Offshore Protocol), 
adopted on the 14 October 1994 and which entered into force on the 24 March 2011. 
The low participation in regional sectoral agreements regarding the specific matter of 
offshore activities would indicate that the theme of environmental security does not 
seem to be a priority of the Mediterranean States. 
As far as the Adriatic Sea is concerned, it is well known to biologists, and not only to 
lawyers, for the difficulties involved in marine living resources management and marine 
biodiversity conservation in disputed areas. These marine areas have recently been an 
object of interest to the scientific community which has launched a proposal for the 
creation of Marine Peace Parks.22 The creation of a Marine Peace Park in the Adriatic 
Sea could have some implications for the existing and future gas and oil offshore 
platforms in the area. 
There is another interesting development regarding the life of the offshore platforms 
which could interest the Adriatic Sea. The oil and gas rigs at the end of their use should 
be dismantled, as mentioned above. Nevertheless, it has been observed that the practice 
of abandoning the rigs, without dismantling them, has produced in some cases 
interesting consequences for the marine ecosystem and has raised the issue of the 
possible re-use of platforms as artificial reefs.23 Scientific discussion on the unexpected 
effects of accidental sinking or voluntary abandonment began after the tragic case of the 
wreck of the Paguro Agip platform, which sank in the northern Adriatic Sea in 1965.24  
Many years after this accident, thanks to the exceptional aquatic life which 
developed in the artificial reef, the wreck of the Paguro platform has turned into a 
popular destination for sport divers. Indeed, in some cases new and rare ecosystems 
have grown up around rigs which are themselves worthy of protection.25 
 
                                                           
22
 See P. Mackelworth, D. Holcer, B. Lazar, ‘Using conservation as a tool to resolve conflict: Establishing the Piran–
Savudrija international Marine Peace Park’, (2013) 39 Marine Policy 112. 
23
 M. Ponti, M. Abbiati, V. U. Ceccherelli, ‘Drilling platforms as artificial reefs: distribution of macrobenthic 
assemblages of the “Paguro” wreck (northern Adriatic Sea)’, (2002) 59 ICES Journal of Marine Science S 316. The 
authors argue as follows on the biological changes occurring to the ecosystem on the wreck of an oil platform: “The 
offshore wreck of the “Paguro” drilling platform also hosted a rich fauna, presumably reflecting a high structural 
complexity as well as its wide bathymetric range. […] This is important in light of potential re-use of 
decommissioned platforms as artificial reefs in the northern Adriatic Sea, because an appropriate disposal strategy 
should take into account these effects”. 
24
 The accident, during the drilling  for a new source of methane, caused the offshore platform Paguro to explode and 
sink to the bottom of the sea. This tragedy also caused the death of three persons. The sunk platform is located now at 
12 miles away from the port of Marina di Ravenna at a depth of 25 metres. 
25
 See also the idea of using the ENI offshore platforms in Adriatic by decommissioning them onto the seabed 
(sinking) in order to create a series of “hot spots of marine biodiversity” (see L. Vignoli, Disposal of the Adriatic 
Offshore Platforms: An Opportunity for the Protection of Nature and the Coastal Tourism, 
<www.projectaware.org/video/disposal-adriatic-offshore-platforms-opportunity-protection-nature-and-coastal-
tourism>). 
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1. Introduction 
 
The accident occurred, on 20 April 2010, on the Deepwater Horizon platform 
exploiting the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico, is not the first and, unfortunately, 
the last of such disasters to take place during offshore operations. But the explosion and 
fire of this platform have undoubtedly contributed to the awareness of the international 
community about the dangers inherent in such activities, now possible in increasingly 
difficult and, therefore, more and more dangerous and risky conditions. Worldwide, the 
Deepwater Horizon accident has revealed to the public opinion and stakeholders all the 
environmental challenges of offshore operations, and has pointed out the need to fight 
against subsequent marine pollution, both functional and accidental, improving 
industrial safety and response capabilities. This process of awareness rising was 
particularly important in the Mediterranean region.  
Up to now, the oil and gas industry is not as well established in the Mediterranean 
Sea as in other parts of the world, but the number of offshore installations is increasing 
and future perspectives exist. Furthermore, new deposits have been discovered that may 
be exploited, since deep and even ultra-deep drilling is now possible. But the risks 
involved in a fragile and semi-enclosed sea with seismic activity, as the Mediterranean, 
are even more important. Indeed, a disaster on a platform in the region would have a 
dramatic effect and irreversible consequences, because of the small size of the basin and 
the low rate of water renewal.1  
Obviously, these risks are also of great concern in the Adriatic Sea, a semi-enclosed 
sea in a semi-enclosed sea,2 and Ionian Sea, where offshore exploration and exploitation 
are already a reality.3 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Italia, Greece, 
Montenegro and Slovenia are involved as bordering States, as well as all Mediterranean 
States and the EU, since four of the seven riparian are also Member States, and as 
shown by the Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian seas.  
From the vantage point of legal governance, environmental challenges of offshore 
activities in the Mediterranean Sea, and especially in such a semi-enclosed sea as the 
                                                     
1
 On legal challenges, cf N. Ros, ‘Exploration, Exploitation and Protection of the Mediterranean Continental Shelf’ in 
C. Cinelli, E.M. Vásquez Gómez (eds), Regional Strategies to Maritime Security: a Comparative Perspective 
(Valencia, 2014) 101-132; N. Ros, ‘Quel régime juridique pour l’exploitation offshore en Méditerranée?’, (2015) 
XXXIII Annuaire de Droit Maritime et Océanique 205. 
2
 See A. Caligiuri, ‘La gouvernance de la mer Adriatique’ in N. Ros, F. Galletti (eds), Le droit de la mer face aux 
Méditerranées. Quelle contribution des mers semi-fermées au développement du droit international de la mer? 
(Napoli, 2016 – forthcoming). 
3
 See in this Volume, A. Prontera, ‘The Old and the New Policies and Politics of Offshore Hydrocarbon Development 
in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas’. 
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Adriatic Sea, or even in the Ionian Sea, are to be understood both according to 
International and EU law4. Of course, international law approach is mainly focused on 
environmental protection in a regional sea system (1), when EU law is more dedicated 
to industrial safety in an Economic Integration Organization (2). 
 
 
2. In international law: environmental protection in a Regional Sea System  
 
In order to face environmental challenges of offshore activities in the Mediterranean 
Sea, international law relies first on the conventional framework of the Barcelona 
System (2.1.), involving the twenty-one bordering States and the EU, and more 
specifically on the governance framework of the Offshore Protocol (2.2.).  
 
2.1. The conventional framework of the Barcelona System 
 
The Barcelona Convention and Protocols (a) constitute the legal dimension of the 
Mediterranean Action Plan, developed in the framework of UNEP, according to 
international law and United Nations cooperation principles.5 Dealing with offshore 
activities, the Mediterranean System appears really pioneering with a dedicated 
conventional act, the 1994 Offshore Protocol (b).  
  
a) Barcelona Convention and Protocols 
 The Barcelona Convention is an umbrella-treaty (i); it cannot be dissociated from its 
seven Protocols, with which it forms a global regional system (ii). 
 
i) An umbrella-treaty 
The first Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution 
was signed on 16 February 1976, and entered into force on 12 February 1978; at the 
time being, the Mediterranean System was the first to adopt a legal act in the framework 
of UNEP Regional Seas System. In the aftermath of the Rio Conference, the 
Contracting Parties have decided to negotiate an amended version of the text; the 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the 
Mediterranean, adopted on 10 June 1995 and entered into force on 9 July 2004, is an 
umbrella-treaty integrating all the Rio outcomes and intending to set up an 
environmental and sustainable governance. 
The Barcelona Convention especially refers to “the precautionary principle” (Article 
4(3)(a)), “the polluter pays principle” (Article 4(3)(b)), and to “environmental impact 
assessment” (Article 4(3)(c) and (d)), “integrated management of the coastal zones” 
(Article 4(3)(e)), “best available techniques” and “best environmental practices” 
(Article 4(4)(b)), and integrates the new requirements in the field of Public Information 
and Participation (Article 15). It intends to fight against all the forms of marine 
                                                     
4
 N. Ros, ‘La réglementation euro-méditerranéenne des activités offshore’, (2015) Diritto del Commercio 
Internazionale 121; L. Schiano di Pepe, ‘Offshore oil and gas operations in the Mediterranean Sea: regulatory gaps, 
recent developments and future perspectives’ in J. Juste Ruiz, V. Bou Franch (eds), Derecho del Mar y Sostenibilidad 
ambiental en el Mediterráneo (Valencia, 2014) 363-387; L. Schiano di Pepe, ‘International Marine Environmental 
Law and the EU: An Adequate Framework to Address Environmental Emergencies?’ in I. Govaere, S. Poli (eds), EU 
Management of Global Emergencies: Legal Framework for Combating Threats and Crises (Leiden/Boston, 2014) 
Chapter 14, 298-303. 
5
 See Mediterranean Action Plan official website: <www.unepmap.org>. 
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pollution, including Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the 
Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil as specified by Article 7,6 and “to 
protect and preserve biological diversity” (Article 10), in the framework of a global 
regional system. 
 
ii) A global regional system  
With its seven thematic Protocols, all in force since March 2011, it forms a 
comprehensive legal system, at the Mediterranean scale, addressing the different forms 
of pollution and environmental challenges. According to Article 29 of the Convention, 
the relationship inside the system is founded on a twofold principle: a Contracting Party 
to the Convention has to adhere to at least one of the Protocols; and conversely it is 
necessary to be a Contracting Party to the Convention to ratify one of the Protocols.  
The seven specialized Protocols develop the objectives and principles of the 
Convention: Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea by 
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, adopted in 1976 and entered into force in 1978;7 
Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Preventing Pollution from Ships and, in Cases of 
Emergency, Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, adopted in 2002 and 
entered into force in 2004;8 Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea 
against Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities, adopted in 1996 and entered 
into force in 2008;9 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological 
Diversity in the Mediterranean, adopted in 1995 and entered into force in 1999;10 
Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from 
Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil, 
adopted in 1994 and entered into force in 2011; Protocol on the Prevention of Pollution 
of the Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal, adopted in 1996 and entered into force in 2008; Protocol on Integrated 
Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean, adopted in 2008 and entered into 
force in 2011. 
 It is obvious that several of these Protocols can be applicable to oil and gas 
exploration and exploitation in the Mediterranean Sea, but one of them is even 
especially devoted to this specific issue: the 1994 Offshore Protocol. 
 
b) The 1994 Offshore Protocol 
The Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting 
from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its 
Subsoil is a dedicated conventional act (i) especially dealing with offshore activities, 
and an integrated conventional act (ii) in the Mediterranean System. 
 
                                                     
6
 Article 7 (Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its 
Subsoil): “The Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate, combat and to the fullest 
possible extent eliminate pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Area resulting from exploration and exploitation of the 
continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil”. 
7
 Indeed, the amended Protocol for the Prevention and Elimination of Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping 
from Ships and Aircraft or Incineration at Sea, adopted in 1995, is now the only one of the new Barcelona Protocols 
not to be in force7. 
8
 Replacing the Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and other 
Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, adopted in 1976 and in force since 1978. 
9
 Replacing the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, 
adopted in 1980 and in force since June 1983. 
10
 Replacing the Protocol concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas, adopted in 1982 and in force since 
1986. 
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i) A dedicated conventional act  
It’s important to point out that there is no universal convention on this topic, and that 
the Mediterranean Protocol is thus also one of the two only existing treaties in the world 
currently dealing with offshore activities. It is particularly interesting to note that the 
other conventional act relating to offshore operations is also part of a regional legal 
system adopted in the framework of UNEP Regional Seas Program. It is the Protocol 
Concerning Marine Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the 
Continental Shelf, adopted on 29 March 1989 and entered into force on 17 February 
1990, in the framework of the 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on 
the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, in the ROPME Sea Area,11 
including the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, a region where offshore issues are very 
important.  
This aspect reinforces the vanguard and pioneering dimension of the Protocol for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and 
Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil adopted in Madrid 
on 14 October 1994, and entered into force on 24 March 2011. The idea of such a 
protocol was first suggested in 1985, during the 4th Ordinary Meeting of the Contracting 
Parties to the Barcelona Convention (CoP 4), when offshore activities were not yet so 
developed in the region, and precisely in order to be able to anticipate future industrial 
developments and their environmental impacts, taking into consideration the extreme 
vulnerability of the Mediterranean Sea. A project was elaborated according to Article 7 
of the Barcelona Convention, and in 1993 the CoP 8 decided to convene an international 
conference in Madrid in 1994; thereby, the Protocol was conceived and adopted as an 
integrated conventional act. 
 
ii) An integrated conventional act 
This is part of the pioneering dimension of the Protocol, adopted in 1994 to be a 
component of the new framework integrating the Rio outcomes, and explains that the 
Offshore Protocol is integrated in the Mediterranean System, both normatively and 
institutionally. 
In addition to the Barcelona Convention and its Article 7, the Offshore Protocol also 
refers to two other Protocols, now replaced in their latest version by the 1995 
Convention, the 1995 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological 
Diversity in the Mediterranean, and the 2002 Protocol Concerning Cooperation in 
Preventing Pollution from Ships and, in Cases of Emergency, Combating Pollution of 
the Mediterranean Sea. As regards relationship with the Specially Protected Areas and 
Biodiversity Protocol, the cross-interpretation of the 1995 Protocol and the 1994 
Protocol implies that offshore activities are not on principle prohibited in specially 
protected areas; only protection measures may be taken, according to international law, 
and as provided for in Article 6 of the SPA Protocol12 or in Article 21 of the Offshore 
Protocol.13 Concerning the Prevention and Emergency Protocol, the synergy results first 
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 See ROMPE – Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment official website: <ropme.org>. 
Member States of ROPME are Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
12
 See especially, Article 6 (Protection Measures): “The Parties, in conformity with international law and taking into 
account the characteristics of each specially protected area, shall take the protection measures required, in particular: 
[…] (e) the regulation or prohibition of any activity involving the exploration or modification of the soil or the 
exploitation of the subsoil of the land part, the seabed or its subsoil”; and also Article 6(b), (f), (h) and (i). 
13
 Article 21 (Specially Protected Areas): “For the protection of the areas defined in the Protocol concerning 
Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas and any other area established by a Party and in furtherance of the goals 
stated therein, the Parties shall take special measures in conformity with international law, either individual or 
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from some cross-references with the Offshore Protocol, but proceeds primarily of the 
logical approach governing the fight against pollution, as suggested by Articles 16 
(Contingency planning)14 and 18 (Mutual assistance in case of emergency)15 of the 
Offshore Protocol, or Article 9(4) of the Prevention and Emergency Protocol.16 
Thereby, in case of emergency, the rules applicable in the field of offshore operations 
appear largely developed by analogy with the legal regime of maritime safety, older and 
therefore more complete.    
The systemic integration has also an institutional dimension, since the Offshore 
Protocol gives an operational role, in case of emergency, to the Regional Marine 
Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC).17 
REMPEC was established in 1976 in order to be the “Regional Centre” of the 
Prevention and Emergency Protocol;18 logically it has a strong experience in the fight 
against accidental pollution and emergency response. The Offshore Protocol gives an 
explicit role to REMPEC, regarding Mutual assistance in case of emergency (Article 
18)19 and Transboundary pollution (Article 26(3)).20 In practice, and despite the 
financial difficulties encountered by UNEP/MAP, REMPEC actually seems intended to 
play an even greater role within the governance framework of the Offshore Protocol. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
through multilateral or bilateral cooperation, to prevent, abate, combat and control pollution arising from activities in 
these areas. In addition to the measures referred to in the Protocol concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected 
Areas for the granting of authorization, such measures may include, inter alia: (a) Special restrictions or conditions 
when granting authorizations for such areas: (i) The preparation and evaluation of environmental impact assessments; 
(ii) The elaboration of special provisions in such areas concerning monitoring, removal of installations and 
prohibition of any discharge. (b) Intensified exchange of information among operators, the competent authorities, 
Parties and the Organization regarding matters which may affect such areas”.  
14
 See especially para 1: “In cases of emergency the Contracting Parties shall implement mutatis mutandis the 
provisions of the Protocol concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and other 
Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency”.  
15
 See in particular: “For this purpose, a Party which is also a Party to the Protocol concerning Cooperation in 
Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency shall 
apply the pertinent provisions of the said Protocol”. 
16
 “In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against 
Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil, each 
Party shall issue instructions to persons having charge of offshore units under its jurisdiction to report to it by the 
most rapid and adequate channels in the circumstances, following reporting procedures it has prescribed, all incidents 
which result or may result in a discharge of oil or hazardous and noxious substances”. 
17
 See REMPEC official website: <www.rempec.org>. 
18
 Article 1 Definitions (f) of the 2002 Prevention and Emergency Protocol: “‘Regional Centre’ means the “Regional 
Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea” (REMPEC), established by Resolution 7 
adopted by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries of the Coastal States of the Mediterranean Region on the Protection of 
the Mediterranean Sea at Barcelona on 9 February 1976, which is administered by the International Maritime 
Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme, and the objectives and functions of which are defined 
by the Contracting Parties to the Convention”. 
19
 “In cases of emergency, a Party requiring assistance in order to prevent, abate or combat pollution resulting from 
activities may request help from the other Parties, either directly or through the Regional Marine Pollution 
Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC), which shall do their utmost to provide the 
assistance requested”.  
20
 “If a Party become aware of cases in which the marine environment is in imminent danger of being damaged, or 
has been damaged, by pollution, it shall immediately notify other Parties which in its opinion are likely to be affected 
by such damage, as well as the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea 
(REMPEC), and provide them with timely information that would enable them, where necessary, to take appropriate 
measures. REMPEC shall distribute the information immediately to all relevant Parties”. 
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2.2. The governance framework of the Offshore Protocol 
 
 More than twenty years after its adoption, the Offshore Protocol appears a global and 
ambitious Protocol (a), because it is still pioneering and definitely oriented towards a 
legal governance (b) of these activities in the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
a) A global and ambitious Protocol 
 The 1994 conventional act comprises 32 articles and 7 annexes; it is characterized by 
a high level of requirements (ii) supported by the legal scope of the Protocol (i). 
 
i) The legal scope of the Protocol  
From the vantage point of geography, and contrary to what might suggest the 
reference to the continental shelf in the title of the Protocol, it encompasses all the 
Mediterranean areas likely to be affected by a pollution resulting from offshore 
activities. Article 2 sets the Geographical coverage comprising “the Mediterranean Sea 
Area”, as defined in Article 1 of the Barcelona Convention, that is to say all the 
maritime waters of the Mediterranean Sea, the continental shelf and the seabed and its 
subsoil, on the seaward and landward sides of the baselines, and extending in the case of 
watercourses up the freshwater limit, with the possibility for the Parties to include also 
area wetlands or coastal areas of their territory.  
As regards the activities, the Offshore Protocol adopts a holistic approach of offshore 
operations; pursuant to Article 1(d), the conventional definition of “activities 
concerning exploration and/or exploitation of the resources in the Protocol Area” is very 
broad including upstream and downstream operations: scientific research, all the forms 
of exploration (“seismological activities; surveys of the seabed and its subsoil; sample 
taking; exploration drilling”) and the global process of exploitation, from the 
establishment of an installation to its removal,21 from drilling to transportation 
(“establishment of an installation for the purpose of recovering resources, and activities 
connected therewith; development drilling; recovery, treatment and storage; 
transportation to shore by pipeline and loading of ships; maintenance, repair and other 
ancillary operations”).22  
Finally, “all mineral resources” are concerned, “whether solid, liquid or gaseous”.23 
Therefore, the Protocol is not only applicable to conventional oil and gas activities; its 
material scope would include, for example, methane hydrates and rare earths for which 
some serious prospects exist in the Mediterranean.  
In addition, the broad scope of the Offshore Protocol is associated with a high level 
of requirements. 
 
ii) A high level of requirements 
 Although the Protocol is now twenty years old and, therefore, cannot integrate the 
latest legal and technological innovations, or subsequent requirements, it still appears 
                                                     
21
 Article 20 is especially devoted to Removal of installations.  
22
 The definition of “installation”, in Article 1(f), strengthens this comprehensive approach: “‘installation’ means any 
fixed or floating structure, and any integral part thereof, that is engaged in activities, including in particular: (i) Fixed 
or mobile offshore drilling units; (ii) Fixed or floating production units including dynamically-positioned units; (iii) 
Offshore storage facilities including ships used for this purpose; (iv) Offshore loading terminals and transport systems 
for the extracted products, such as submarine pipelines; (v) Apparatus attached to it and equipment for the reloading, 
processing, storage and disposal of substances removed from the seabed or its subsoil”. 
23
 Cf Article 1(c). 
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pioneering and characterized by a high level of requirements for the Parties and 
operators. Indeed, it was conceived to be integrated in the new legal framework of the 
1995 Barcelona Convention, in conformity with the Rio contribution, and to anticipate 
the future industrial development of offshore operations in the Mediterranean. The legal 
ambition of the Protocol is still to be underlined, even if a lot of its dispositions are 
mere soft law, a common defect in the Barcelona System. Some examples of ambitious 
provisions can be cited, such as: written authorization for exploration and exploitation 
(Articles 4, 5 and 6); sanctions for breaches of conventional obligations (Article 7); use 
of the best available techniques and standards to minimize the risk of pollution (Article 
8); environmental impact assessments (Article 5(1)(a), and Annex IV); mutual 
assistance in cases of emergency (Article 18); removal of installations (Article 20); 
insurance and other financial security to cover liability (Articles 5 (1)(i), and 27).24  
 Actually, this high level of requirements is the reason of the low level of 
ratifications, particularly by European States, and it explains the late entry into force, 
especially because of the compulsory insurance; indeed, this disposition is the most 
criticized because most of the States are reluctant to increase the obligations of their 
industrial sector. Adopted in 1994, the Offshore Protocol has entered into force only in 
2011, with the six ratifications of Albania, Cyprus, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. 
Although the EU has now accessed to the Protocol, its Member States don’t manifest 
their intention to ratify the Protocol in the near future: Croatia, Greece, Italia, Malta, 
Slovenia, and Spain have signed, when France has neither signed nor ratified; and 
outside the EU, the situation is not so different, Israel and Monaco have signed, but 
Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Lebanon, Montenegro, and Turkey have 
neither signed nor ratified ... Nevertheless, the Mediterranean System is evolving 
towards a legal governance.  
 
b) Towards a legal governance  
 The 10th Meeting of the Focal Points of the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency 
Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC), convened a couple of weeks 
after the entry into force of the text, in May 2011,25 had already largely addressed the 
issue of the future of the Protocol (ii), but the implementation of the Protocol (i) 
initiated a year later is still ongoing. 
 
i) The implementation of the Protocol 
   The official process of implementation began during the CoP 17 of the Barcelona 
Convention, in February 2012, with the adoption of the Decision IG.20/12, Action Plan 
to implement the Protocol of the Barcelona Convention concerning the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of 
                                                     
24
 Concerning the Protocol and its legal contribution, cf E. Raftopoulos, Sustainable Governance of Offshore Oil and 
Gas Development in the Mediterranean: Revitalizing the Dormant Mediterranean Offshore Protocol, in MEPIELAN 
E-Bulletin, 19 August 2010, <www.mepielan-
ebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&CategoryId=4&ArticleId=29&Article=Sustainable-Governance-of-Offshore-Oil-
and-Gas-Development-in-the-Mediterranean:-Revitalizing-the-Dormant-Mediterranean-Offshore-Protocol>; L. 
Schiano di Pepe, ‘Offshore oil and gas operations in the Mediterranean Sea: regulatory gaps, recent developments 
and future perspectives’ in J. Juste Ruiz, V. Bou Franch (eds), Derecho del Mar y Sostenibilidad ambiental en el 
Mediterráneo (Valencia, 2014) 371-375. 
25
 N. Ros,’La dixième réunion des Correspondants du REMPEC’, (2010) XV Annuaire du Droit de la Mer 311.  
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the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil.26 This decision obviously urges all 
the Contracting Parties who have not yet done so to ratify as early as possible with the 
view to having the Protocol entering into force for all the Parties and beginning “to 
produce beneficial effects at the earliest possible moment”. More concretely, the 
Decision also establishes an ad hoc working group coordinated by REMPEC, in order 
to prepare an in depth assessment and stock taking analysis of the existing practical 
measures and mainly to develop a dedicated Action Plan.  
 Three meetings of the Offshore Protocol Working Group were convened, in June and 
December 2013, and June 2014. The 3rd Meeting has agreed on a revised draft Offshore 
Action Plan to be definitively adopted by CoP 19,27 tentatively convened in February 
2016 in Greece. The Action Plan and its future implementation are to be developed by 
reference to new environmental law principles, such as integration principle, prevention 
principle, precautionary principle, polluter-pays principle, ecosystem-based approach, 
principle of public participation and stakeholder involvement, sustainable production 
and consumption principle. The Action Plan states three general objectives, themselves 
detailed in specific objectives: setting-up a governance framework to support the 
implementation of the Action Plan and the adoption, enforcement and monitoring of 
regional standards, procedures and rules; defining commonly agreed regional offshore 
standards and guidelines to be integrated and used at national level; and develop, in 
conformity with EcAp28 and its relevant indicators, a regional commonly agreed 
reporting and monitoring for the Action Plan.29 
 On a recommendation of the 1st Offshore Protocol Working Group Meeting, 
highlighting the need for the establishment of a regular regional forum to address issues 
on offshore activities at the regional level, Decision IG.21/8 of the CoP 18 has 
established the Barcelona Convention Offshore Oil and Gas Group (BARCO-OFOG),30 
in order to serve as an advisory body to the Contracting Parties to the Barcelona 
Convention as regards the Offshore Protocol; primarily composed of representatives of 
the Contracting Parties to the Convention, designated by the MAP Focal Point as 
National Offshore Focal Point, BARCO-OFOG is to be financed through extra 
budgetary resources and is not yet constituted.  
 Moreover, in the current economic context, including the internal financial crisis of 
the MAP, it is not only the implementation but also the future of the Protocol that are 
conditioned by economical parameters. 
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 Report of the 17th Ordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean and its Protocols, Paris, France, 10th-12th February 2012, 
UNEP(DEPI)/MED IG.20/8, 14 February 2012, Part I, Annex II Thematic Decisions, Decision IG.20/12, 217-218. 
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 Report of the 3rd Offshore Protocol Working Group Meeting, Attard, Malta 17-18 June 2014, REMPEC/WG/35/6, 
31 July 2014. 
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 Ecosystem Approach in the Mediterranean Project (EcAp MED), Implementation of the Ecosystem Approach (EA) 
in the Mediterranean by the Contracting Parties in the context of the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment and the Coastal region of the Mediterranean and its Protocols, 
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 Reviewed Draft Offshore Action Plan adopted by the 3rd Offshore Protocol Working Group, Malta, 17-18 June 
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 Decision IG.21/08, Follow up actions regarding the Offshore Protocol Action Plan, Report of the 18th Ordinary 
Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal 
Region of the Mediterranean and its Protocols, Istanbul (Turkey), 3-6 December 2013 UNEP(DEPI)/MED IG.21/9, 
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 ii) The future of the Protocol  
 The future of the Protocol relies first on the effective adoption of this Action Plan in 
February 2016, during the CoP 19 of the Barcelona Convention and Protocols.  
 Some States, such as Israel, were initially in favor of a revision of the Offshore 
Protocol, considered to be obsolete; but since the 1st Offshore Protocol Working Group 
Meeting, there was a general consensus that such an option should not be considered as 
it would take too long time and move the Contracting Parties backward on the process 
of implementation. Nevertheless, and even if the language and content of the twenty 
year-old Protocol, can be interpreted in line of today’s best practices when the need for 
guidelines should arise, it seems necessary, without considering the revision of the 
Protocol, to update some provisions especially in the Annexes. In this context, the 3rd 
Meeting of the Offshore Protocol Working Group has recommended to mandate a 
correspondence group composed of the seven Contracting Parties to the Protocol, with 
the support of Contracting Parties to the Barcelona Convention which have not yet 
ratified the Protocol, to propose amendments to the Protocol and to the Annexes to be 
adopted by at least six Parties, corresponding to three-fourths of the Contracting Parties, 
respectively pursuant to Articles 22 and 23 of the Barcelona Convention.31 
Amendments should be rapidly adopted, while the number of Parties is still limited and 
the three-fourths majority vote, legally necessary, a priori easier to obtain, in order to 
enter into force afterwards automatically for each new Contracting Party. 
 Some issues are still pending, either deliberately excluded from the legal scope of the 
Action Plan, or not yet decided by the Contracting Parties. For example, taking into 
consideration that Article 27 of the Offshore Protocol only states an undertaking “to 
cooperate as soon as possible in formulating and adopting appropriate rules and 
procedures for the determination of liability and compensation for damages resulting 
from the activities dealt with in this Protocol”, it was originally decided not to include 
these issues in the scope of the Action Plan.32 The 3rd Offshore Protocol Working Group 
Meeting has only decided to mandate the UNEP/MAP Working Group of Legal and 
Technical Experts to assess the implementation of the Guidelines on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage Resulting from Pollution of the Marine Environment in the 
Mediterranean Sea Area, adopted in 2008 by CoP 15,33 to offshore exploration and 
exploitation activities.34 
 The future of the Offshore Protocol and its Mediterranean governance framework, 
including implementation activities, depends on budget issues and relies on the 
establishment of “a financial mechanism for the implementation of the Offshore Action 
Plan” as provided by Specific Objective 4 of the Action Plan.35 It has been proposed 
                                                     
31
 Report of the 3rd Offshore Protocol Working Group Meeting, Attard, Malta 17-18 June 2014, REMPEC/WG/35/6, 
31 July 2014, 5, para 31-32. 
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 On the actuality of these topics, see in this Volume L. Schiano di Pepe, ‘Liability and Compensation for Damage 
Caused in Connection with Offshore Oil and Gas Activities: A Work in Progress’.  
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 Report of the 15th Ordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean and its Protocols, Almeria, Spain, 15-18 January 2008, 
Annex V, Decision IG 17/4 Guidelines for the Determination of Liability and Compensation for Damage resulting 
from Pollution of the Marine Environment in the Mediterranean Sea Area, 133-140; see T. Scovazzi, ‘The 
Mediterranean Guidelines for the Determination of Environmental Liability and Compensation: The Negotiations for 
the Instrument and the Question of Damage that Can Be Compensated’, (2009) 13 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
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 Report of the 3rd Offshore Protocol Working Group Meeting, Attard, Malta 17-18 June 2014, REMPEC/WG/35/6, 
31 July 2014, 5, para 29-30. 
35
 Report of the 3rd Offshore Protocol Working Group Meeting, Attard, Malta 17-18 June 2014, REMPEC/WG/35/6, 
31 July 2014, 8, para 58-65. 
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that the Offshore Action Plan Fund structure could be managed by a Financial 
Committee and would exclusively be used for the implementation of the Action Plan, 
and not for liability and compensation; the first estimation of the budget is two million 
Euros, but obviously it should be carefully reviewed. This mechanism was compared 
with the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds financed by oil receivers 
through its Parties, and it was underlined that such process should not require any extra 
costs for public governance. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the financing of offshore 
governance cannot and should not be too heavily dependent on direct and indirect 
contributions of the oil and gas industry. 
 In this context, political and financial support of the European Commission is more 
important than ever, as the contribution of EU law. 
 
 
3. In EU law: industrial Safety in an Economic Integration Organization 
 
Obviously, this traditional approach of international law is complemented and 
reinforced by the legal contribution of the EU; but as an economic integration 
organization, EU is more focused on industrial safety challenges than on real 
environmental protection. Nevertheless, in order to cope with problems of marine 
pollution resulting from offshore activities, the European strategy requires the 
integration of the Mediterranean acquis into EU law (3.1.) and the application of EU 
law to Mediterranean governance (3.2.). 
 
3.1. Integration of the Mediterranean acquis into EU law 
 
 The EU is a founding member of the Barcelona System and a very involved Party, 
which has signed and ratified the Convention and all its Protocols except the 1996 
Protocol on the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. So, the Accession of the EU to the 
Offshore Protocol (a) is a very important decision, not only for the Union but also for its 
Mediterranean Member States, as shown by the legal consequences of the accession (b). 
 
a) Accession of the EU to the Offshore Protocol 
 The Decision of accession (ii) took place almost twenty years after its adoption, in 
the context of awareness rising subsequent to the accident occurred in the Gulf of 
Mexico in April 2010, and as the result of a strategic change of mind (i).  
 
i) A strategic change of mind  
Prior to its adoption, in 1992, the Commission had proposed to the Council to sign 
the Protocol,36 but it was then deemed more appropriate to work further on a 
Community regime for environmental liability rather than anticipate it through an 
international agreement. The current situation is clearly the result of a strategic change 
of mind occurred, in the aftermath of the accident in the Gulf of Mexico, on the 
Deepwater Horizon platform, on 20 April 2010, when the EU became more aware of all 
the potential for resulting risks, especially in the Mediterranean. The scale and gravity 
                                                     
36
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of the Deepwater Horizon accident prompted the Commission to launch, in May 2010, 
an urgent assessment of safety in offshore oil, as well as gas, exploration and production 
activities in European waters, combined with a review of applicable European 
legislation and consultations with industry and Member States’ competent authorities. 
A Commission Communication adopted on 12 October 2010, and titled Facing the 
challenge of the safety of offshore oil and gas activities, recommended to re-launch the 
process towards bringing into force the Offshore Protocol, in close collaboration with 
the Member States concerned and the REMPEC.37 This proposition was supported by 
the Parliament in its resolution of 13 September 2011 on facing the challenges of the 
safety of offshore oil and gas activities,38 while the Protocol was already entered into 
force.  
One month later, on 27 October 2011, the Commission published a Proposal for a 
Council Decision on the accession of the EU to the Protocol for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea against pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the 
continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil.39 This proposal participates of the 
strategic evolution established within the EU. The risks involved by offshore operations 
are first prioritized in a global legal framework including the development of EU law. In 
this context, the European Parliament has finally consented to EU accession to the 
Offshore Protocol, on 20 November 2012,40 as a preliminary to the Decision of 
accession.  
 
ii) The Decision of accession 
The Decision of accession, adopted by the Council on 17 December 2012,41 is the 
logical consequence of the procedure initiated in 2010. The Council Decision appears to 
be closely connected with its context: offshore exploration and exploitation activities 
are expected to increase after the discovery of large fossil fuels reserves in the 
Mediterranean; and an accident on a platform, such as in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, 
would have immediate adverse transboundary and environmental consequences in the 
Mediterranean Sea due to its semi-enclosed nature and special hydrodynamics. So, the 
accession of the EU to the Offshore Protocol is a step forward in a process of awareness 
and implication of the Union and its Member States in order to manage effectively the 
risks and challenges involved by these industrial operations, and it is to be understood in 
close connection with current developments of EU law. 
The Council Decision provides that “the accession of the European Union to the 
Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution resulting from 
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 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Facing the challenge of the 
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 Safety of offshore oil and gas activities, European Parliament resolution of 13 September 2011 on facing the 
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exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil is 
hereby approved on behalf of the Union” (Article 1), taking into consideration that “this 
Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption” (Article 3), and with all the 
legal consequences of the accession.  
 
b) Legal consequences of the accession 
 Due to the Decision of 17 December 2012, the EU is now a Contracting Party to the 
Offshore Protocol, with new legal obligations arising according to EU law (i), 
especially for Mediterranean Member States (ii). 
 
i) According to EU law  
Indeed, EU accession to the Offshore Protocol implies its integration into the EU 
legal order. The immediate legal effects are twofold because the Offshore Protocol may 
be rightly considered to enter into the legal framework of Article 216 TFEU. This 
disposition states that “the Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third 
countries or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the 
conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of 
the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for 
in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope” 
(para 1); and such “agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of 
the Union and on its Member States” (para 2).  
Anyway, after the accession of the EU, and the integration of the Offshore Protocol 
into EU law, the obligations relating to its implementation are not only incumbent upon 
the EU, but also largely upon its Member States, which have to transpose its provisions 
into domestic law even though they have not ratified the Protocol. Furthermore, EU law 
shall contribute to reinforce the contribution of the Offshore Protocol, through the 
acquis and the new role assigned to the European Maritime Safety Agency initially 
established by Regulation (EC) No. 1406/2002 of 27 June 2002.42 Indeed a new 
Regulation (EU) No. 100/2013, adopted on 15 January 2013,43 extends EMSA 
competencies, both from the material and geographical point of view, first to response 
to marine pollution caused by oil and gas installations, and second to States applying for 
accession to the Union and European neighborhood partner countries, which include 
Mediterranean non-Member States. Therefore, EMSA is able to be involved in the 
implementation of certain aspects of the Offshore Protocol and may even collaborate 
with REMPEC44, what can be of particular interest especially for Mediterranean 
Member States.  
 
ii) For Mediterranean Member States 
 Obviously, the Decision of accession has also consequences for the eight 
Mediterranean Member States of the EU, due to their legal status of Parties to the 
Barcelona System. This should encourage or incite Mediterranean Member States to 
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 Regulation (EC) No. 1406/2002 establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency, in Official Journal of the 
European Communities, L 208, 5 August 2002, 1 ff. 
43
 Regulation (EU) No. 100/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2013 amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 1406/2002 establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency, in Official Journal of the 
European Union, L 39, 9 February 2013, 3 ff. 
44
 On this issue, see Safety of offshore exploration and exploitation activities in the Mediterranean: creating 
synergies between the forthcoming EU Regulation and the Protocol to the Barcelona Convention-. Final report, May 
2013 64-89, <ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/international-cooperation/regional-sea-conventions/barcelona-
convention/pdf/Final%20Report%20Offshore%20Safety%20Barcelona%20Protocol%20.pdf>. 
 Environmental Challenges of Offshore Activities in International and EU Law 
 
 
 
215
ratify, although they remain the most fervent opponents to the Protocol. In December 
2012, the Decision of accession provided that “in addition to Cyprus, some other 
Member States that are Contracting Parties to the Barcelona Convention have 
announced recently their intention to also ratify the Protocol”;45 but more than three 
years later, and even though some of them have announced their intention to ratify 
(France, Italy, Malta), implement (Greece) or transpose (Slovenia);46 the status quo 
remains … and Cyprus is still the only EU Member State Party to the Offshore 
Protocol.47  
 However, ratification by Mediterranean EU Member States is not unnecessary, 
furthermore at the Mediterranean level where the Protocol needs more ratifications, and 
a better balance between EU and non-EU Member States. This evolution seems 
necessary in order for the Protocol to become more effective in the whole 
Mediterranean basin, and enhance cooperation and environmental protection, including 
developing mutual assistance in cases of emergency (Article 18), providing scientific 
and technical assistance to developing countries (Article 24), and sharing mutual 
information (Article 25), in order to fight against transboundary pollution (Article 26), 
as required by the Protocol.  
 As Mediterranean Member States are so reluctant to ratify the dedicated Protocol of 
the Barcelona Convention, the application of EU law to Mediterranean governance 
appears to be another option in order to face environmental challenges of offshore 
activities in the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
3.2. Application of EU law to Mediterranean governance 
 
 Adopted on 12 June 2013, the Directive on safety of offshore oil and gas operations 
(a) is characteristic of EU law as developed in an economic integration approach; 
despite its shortcomings and an inevitably partial applicability in the Mediterranean 
basin, it is a step forward that must contribute to the participation of EU law to 
Mediterranean governance (b). 
 
a) Directive on safety of offshore oil and gas operations  
 Materially, the contribution of the Directive is a positive development, especially 
because there exist some synergies with the Offshore Protocol (ii), but formally the 
legal instrument is the result of a disappointing evolution, from a proposed regulation to 
a directive (i). 
 
i) From a proposed regulation to a directive 
The normative process at the origins of the Directive on safety of offshore oil and gas 
operations, adopted on 12 June 2013,48 is specifically European, but as the Decision of 
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accession to the Protocol, it stems from the awareness resulting from the Deepwater 
Horizon accident, and the aforementioned Communication from the Commission of 
October 2010. The urgent assessment of safety in offshore activities in European 
waters, the review of applicable European legislation, and the consultations with 
industry and Member States’ competent authorities, have enabled the Commission to 
identify, since the month of July 2010, five main areas where action was needed to 
maintain the safety and environmental credentials of the EU: “thorough licensing 
procedures; improved controls by public authorities; addressing gaps in applicable 
legislation; reinforced EU disaster response, and; international cooperation to promote 
offshore safety and response capabilities worldwide”.49 
 For the first time, the adoption of a comprehensive legislative framework is planned 
at EU level; to this end, the Commission made, on 27 October 2011, the initial and 
ambitious choice of a regulation, directly binding upon Member States, in order to 
establish a harmonized EU system, automatically incorporated into the domestic legal 
order of all the Member States.50 The proposed Regulation took into consideration the 
considerable disparities and fragmentation amongst Member States’ laws and practices, 
the virtual absence of international law instruments and the gaps in relevant EU law, 
with the objective to reduce the occurrence of major accidents related to offshore 
activities in EU waters and to limit their consequences, both environmental and 
economical. 
 On 3 December 2012, the ambitious strategy of the Commission was definitely 
challenged in the Council, at the instigation of the States particularly concerned by 
offshore activities. By 21 February 2013, the European Parliament and the Council 
reached a political agreement and recommended the adoption of a directive, a 
disappointing option, much less ambitious, since it only establishes objectives and 
leaves the Member States free of the means to achieve them during the transposition.  
 The Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and the Council on safety of 
offshore oil and gas operations was finally adopted on 12 June 2013, developing some 
synergies with the Offshore Protocol. 
 
ii) Some synergies with the Offshore Protocol 
The Directive and the Decision of accession to the Offshore Protocol must be 
considered in close relation. In practice, this complementarity is even necessary in the 
perspective of a regional governance.51 As underlined by European Environment 
Commissioner Janez Potocnik, during the accession procedure to the Offshore Protocol: 
“This proposal complements the legislative proposal for the safety of offshore oil and 
gas activities. It will allow us to work hand in hand with our non-EU Mediterranean 
partners, ensuring better protection of this sea for all its users”. On the one hand, the 
Council Decision of 17 December 2012 states that “(11) The Commission is also 
proposing a Regulation on safety of offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and 
production activities (the ‘proposed Regulation’). (12) The Offshore Protocol concerns 
a field which is in large measure covered by EU law. This includes, for instance, 
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elements such as the protection of the marine environment, environmental impact 
assessment and environmental liability. Subject to the final decision of legislators on the 
proposed Regulation, the Offshore Protocol is furthermore consistent with the 
objectives thereof, including those concerning authorization, environmental impact 
assessment and technical and financial capacity of operators”.52 On the other hand, the 
Directive of 12 June 2013 recalls that “in relation to the Mediterranean Sea, in 
conjunction with this Directive, the necessary actions were undertaken for the Union to 
accede to the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 
Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed 
and its Subsoil (the Offshore Protocol) to the Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (the Barcelona 
Convention), which was concluded by Council Decision 77/585/EEC”.53 
The accession Decision and the Directive have a common purpose, but they are not 
of the same generation and have specific objectives and focus, with rather different 
geographic and functional scopes. The Protocol has a profile of international law, 
dedicated to environmental protection and fight against pollution of the Mediterranean 
Sea; it’s a legal instrument of regional cooperation, with the broad objective to protect 
against pollution from offshore activities, and a holistic approach, including the whole 
process of offshore activities, scientific research, exploration and exploitation, and all 
the mineral resources of the continental shelf. The Directive has a profile of EU law, 
focused on economic integration and industrial safety. It has a more specific scope than 
the Protocol, that is to ensure the safety of offshore activities, excluding research and 
transport, and is limited to the oil and gas operations,54 in the maritime areas under 
Member States jurisdiction. Its main objective is to prevent major accidents and limit 
their consequences, by establishing minimum safety requirements likely to contribute to 
an indirect improvement of environmental conditions and health of workers.55  
The Protocol and the Directive both aim at regulating offshore oil and gas activities, 
and in that regard provide for many synergies, but they also present real differences of 
approach or formulation, as legal instruments. When such differences exist or may 
occur, national additional measures may be necessary to ensure parallel implementation 
and compliance. For example, it can be required with respect to such important topics as 
authorization systems, monitoring, definition of competent authorities, wastes and 
harmful or noxious substances and materials, removal of installations, contingency 
planning, insurance or other financial security to cover liability. This set of synergies 
and differences is very important regarding Mediterranean Member States of the EU, 
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because in the future they will normally have to transpose and implement 
simultaneously the Protocol and the Directive in their national legislation; therefore, 
they are also particularly concerned by the participation of EU law to Mediterranean 
governance. 
 
b) Participation of EU law to Mediterranean governance 
 To be able to cope effectively with environmental challenges of offshore activities in 
the Mediterranean region, the EU Directive must be considered not only a real but 
disappointing normative contribution (i) but also a future contribution with geographical 
limits (ii).  
 
 i) A real but disappointing normative contribution  
 Complementary to the Directive, the EU acquis is relatively important; it 
encompasses fifteen European legal acts, in the field of environment (Council Directive 
92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna 
and flora; Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with regard to the prevention 
and remedying of environmental damage; Directive 2009/147/EC on the conservation 
of wild birds; Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of 
certain public and private projects on the environment), including marine issues 
(Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental 
policy), safety and health of workers and civil protection (Council Directive 92/91/EEC 
of 3 November 1992 concerning the minimum requirements for improving the safety 
and health protection of workers in the mineral-extracting industry through drilling; 
Council Decision of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection 
Mechanism), and industrial safety (Directive 94/9/EC of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 23 March 1994 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
concerning equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive 
atmospheres; Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-
accident hazards involving dangerous substances; Directive 97/23/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 May 1997 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States concerning pressure equipment; Directive 2006/42/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on machinery, and amending Directive 
95/16/EC; Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals; Directive 2008/98/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain 
Directives; Regulation (EC) No. 1272/2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of 
substances and mixtures), including the oil industry (Directive 94/22/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting 
and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons). Three relevant conventions can also be considered to be part of the EU 
acquis: UNCLOS of 10 December 1982; Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) of 25 February 1991; and 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) of 25 June 1998. 
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 As regards the Directive, it is developed with an economic integration perspective, 
and is obviously more focused on industrial safety than on environmental protection; its 
main objective is threefold: to reduce as far as possible the occurrence of major 
accidents relating to offshore oil and gas operations; to limit their consequences, thus 
increasing the protection of the marine environment and coastal economies against 
pollution, establishing minimum conditions for safe offshore exploration and 
exploitation of oil and gas and limiting possible disruptions to Union indigenous energy 
production; to improve the response mechanisms in case of an accident.  
 Obviously, it is a step forward, but it’s far below initial expectations. Indeed, the 
lobbies of the oil and gas industry, as well as States particularly involved in offshore 
activities, such as Denmark, Netherlands, or United Kingdom, have not only worked in 
favor of a directive rather than a regulation, but also to reduce the scope of the text that 
appears really very disappointing. Overall, the established rules lack clarity and provide 
only partial solutions to global problems; most of the provisions are mere soft law ... 
and no independent monitoring and supervision role was granted, including to EMSA.56 
Member States’ latitude of action was preserved, what is more conducive to 
development and profits of the offshore industry than to effective safety of oil and gas 
operations, and above all to environmental protection, whose preoccupations and 
challenges remain in the background.57 Furthermore, and as regards the Mediterranean, 
the Directive is also a future contribution with geographical limits. 
 
ii) A future contribution with geographical limits  
In the case of a directive, transposition is required. Ratione temporis, and as regards 
States, the transposition supposes to “bring into force the laws, regulations, and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive” within a period of 
two years, “by 19 July 2015” (Article 41(1)). Regarding the industry, owners and 
operators, the Directive distinguishes the cases of planned and existing installations; a 
three years period is granted in the case of planned installations or operations, “by 19 
July 2016” (Article 42(1)58), and a five years period in relation to existing installations, 
“by 19 July 2018” (Article 42(2)).  
Ratione personae, the scope of the Directive varies according to circumstances. Only 
coastal Member States having offshore oil and gas operations carried out in the waters 
under their jurisdiction shall transpose the whole Directive. Other coastal Member 
States shall be obliged to bring into force only those measures which are necessary to 
ensure compliance with three articles: Article 32 dealing with transboundary emergency 
preparedness and response of Member States without offshore oil and gas operations 
under their jurisdiction, Article 34 on penalties, and Article 20 regarding offshore oil 
and gas operations conducted outside the Union. Article 20 mentions the eventuality of 
a report in case of a major accident occurred during offshore oil and gas operations 
conducted outside the Union, and it is the only provision that shall be transposed even 
by landlocked States according to Article 41(4). But pursuant to Article 41(5), States 
where no offshore company is registered in are not concerned by this requirement, and 
shall be obliged only as from 12 months following any later registration of such a 
                                                     
56
 See Article 10 (Tasks of the European Maritime Safety Agency). 
57
 See for example, Article 4(6), or as regards the specific case of the Arctic, Article 33(3) and Recital 52. 
58
 Article 42(1) refers to “owners, operators of planned production installations and operators planning or executing 
well operations”. 
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company. The Commission has underlined the risks associated with this precedent, both 
as regards the integrity of EU law and in terms of possible circumvention.59  
Ratione loci, the transposition is only an obligation for offshore operations conducted 
in the maritime areas under the jurisdiction of Member States. In the Mediterranean, it 
concerns only eight States and the areas under their jurisdiction, so it could lead to a 
fragmentation of the legal regime, a fortiori when there are little or no convergences 
with the Protocol. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In the Adriatic and Ionian seas, as in the whole Mediterranean, international and EU 
law have to be used together in order to face environmental challenges of offshore 
activities. Solutions should arise at the crossroads between a Mediterranean Protocol 
dedicated to protection against pollution from offshore activities, to which EU Member 
States remain largely refractory, and the logic of economic integration and industrial 
safety, initiated by the European Directive, which is functionally more restrictive and 
applies only to Member States.  
But we have to be realistic… given the current economic and systemic crisis, power 
of lobbies and receptivity of policymakers, the balance between short term benefits and 
long term objectives is far from addressing environmental challenges of offshore 
activities in a fragile semi-enclosed sea. We just have to hope that an effective 
improvement will be possible without the occurrence of disasters, both ecological and 
human, unlike maritime navigation with Erika and Prestige shipwrecks.  
 
                                                     
59
 Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and 
gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC, in Official Journal of the European Union, L 178, 28 June 
2013, 66 ff., Statement by the Commission. 
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SUMMARY – 1. Liability for damage arising out of offshore accidents... as a measure of last resort? – 2. 
Civil liability for offshore oil and gas activities at the global level ... or not? – 3. Directive 
2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil and gas operations: what room for the polluter pays principle? – 
4. Civil liability and compensation for offshore activities a work in progress under EU law ... – 5. … 
and international law as well. 
 
 
1. Liability for damage arising out of offshore accidents ... as a measure of last 
resort?  
 
As with any human activity likely to cause sudden or persistent environmental 
degradation, also offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation are nowadays subject 
to a considerable body of international (of both global and regional scope of 
application), European and national rules. A comprehensive assessment of the relevant 
norms goes clearly beyond the scope of the present contribution; suffice it to say that 
differing views exist on the completeness of such normative system and the 
adequateness of the level of protection accorded by it.1 
What can be observed in relation to this specific area of the law is that, undoubtedly, 
legislative efforts have so far focussed especially on accidents prevention and response 
rather than on liability and compensation. In a sense, this is understandable for at least 
two main reasons. On the one hand, as it is well known, the principle of prevention 
which forms an integral part of environmental law at all levels, requires that, first and 
foremost, measures are put in place in order to prevent the occurrence of accidents 
likely to cause environmental damage or, at least, to minimise their impact. On the other 
hand, whilst it may be (relatively) easy to agree on (and, conversely, impose on the 
relevant operators) a set of preventive rules – as these will be broadly speaking based on 
a common ground of practical knowledge and technical expertise – the same may be 
less true of liability and compensation regimes.2 
                                                        
1
 For a general outline of the subject, with particular regard to the prevention aspects, reference can be made to L. 
Schiano di Pepe, ‘Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in the Mediterranean Sea: Regulatory Gaps, Recent 
Developments and Future Perspectives’ in J. Juste Ruiz, V. Bou Franch (ed), Derecho del mar y sostenibilidad 
ambiental en el Mediterráneo (Valencia, 2014), 363. 
2
 The debate around the question of liability for damage arising out of offshore accidents has been quite active, as 
demonstrated for example by contributions such as the following: R. Abeyratne, ‘The Deepwater Horizon Disaster – 
Some Liability Issues’, (2010) Tulane Maritime Law Journal 125; B. J. Bush, ‘The Answer Lies in Admiralty: 
Justifying Oil Spill Punitive Damages Recovery Through Admiralty Law’, (2011) Lewis & Clark Law School 
Environmental Law 1255; M. Davies, ‘Liability issues raised by the Deepwater Horizon blowout’, (2011) Australian 
& New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 35; K.G. Engerrand, ‘Indemnity for Gross Negligence in Maritime Oilfield 
Contracts’, (2011-2012) Loyola Maritime Law Journal 319; V. J. Foley, ‘Post-Deepwater Horizon: the changing 
landscape of liability for oil pollution in the United States’, (2010) Albany Law Review 515; T. Kurtz-Shefford, 
‘Liability for offshore facility pollution damage after the Deepwater Horizon? What happened to the global 
solution?’, (2012) Journal of International Maritime Law 453; K. Noussia, ‘The BP Oil Spill – Environmental 
Pollution Liability and Other Legal Ramifications’, (2011) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 98; A. 
D. Paul, ‘Rethinking Oil Spill Compensation Schemes: The Causation Inquiry’, (2011) Loyola Maritime Law Journal 
137; T. J. Schoenbaum, ‘Liability for Damages in Oil Spill Accidents: Evaluating the USA and International Law 
Regimes in the Light of Deepwater Horizon’, (2012) Journal of Environmental Law 395; T. Scovazzi, ‘Maritime 
Accidents with Particular Emphasis on Liability and Compensation for Damage from the Exploitation of Mineral 
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Examples of such an approach are provided by the 1982 UNCLOS,3 as several 
provisions contained therein require contracting parties to establish global and regional 
rules to prevent marine environmental degradation with particular reference to activities 
such as drilling and the operation of offshore installations. More on point, at the 
regional level, significant results have been achieved in the North East Atlantic and, to a 
lesser extent (as it shall be seen), in the Mediterranean Sea, as demonstrated, 
respectively, by the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the North East Atlantic4 (Article 5 and Annex III thereto) and the 1994 Protocol for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and 
Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil,5 part of the so-
called “Barcelona system” made up of (what is now) the 1995 Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean and 
its seven thematic protocols.6 
More recently, and in the same vein, Directive 2013/30/EU of the European  
Parliament and of the Council, of 12 June 2013,7 purported to introduce a set of rules 
establishing “minimum requirements for preventing major accidents in offshore oil and 
gas operations and limiting the consequences of such accidents”. 
The very wording used by the Directive’s Article 1, reproduced above, reminds us, 
however, that sometimes the occurrence of an accident simply cannot be excluded, 
notwithstanding the existence of sophisticated, state-of-the-art preventive regimes, and 
that some damage is likely to occur when the relevant rules of prevention are not 
complied with or fail to meet their objective for other reasons. 
This demonstrates the pressing need for a specific liability regime to function not 
only as an additional deterrent for operators but also as a tool to ensure that victims are 
adequately compensated if and when one of such accidents occurs. In this respect, 
liability and compensation should not be seen only as a measure of last resort or as a 
“mere” safety net to come into play... just in case something goes wrong but, rather, as a 
complementary instrument working hand-in-hand with preventive regimes. 
Within the present contribution, an attempt will be made to analyse existing and 
proposed legal regimes relevant to offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation 
activities, at the international and EU level, having liability and compensation for 
damage that may derive therefrom as the main viewpoint. In this vein, after a brief 
overview of the most pertinent international instruments at the global and regional 
levels, attention will be paid to some of the recent developments occurred within the EU 
legal system (and in particular to the virtues and flaws of the already mentioned 
Offshore Directive) and, finally, to the on-going efforts to equip the international 
community with a set of rules specifically focussed on liability and compensation for 
offshore accidents. As it will appear in due course, the process at stake can with no 
hesitation be defined as a “work in progress” and, for this reason, deserves the attention 
and contribution of all relevant stakeholders at a time when crucial decisions are being 
made with a view to addressing in an efficient and balanced manner the operations of an 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Resources of the Seabed’ in A. De Guttry, M. Gestri, G. Venturini (eds), International Disaster Response Law 
(Springer, 2012) 287. 
3
 Adopted on 10 December 1982; entered into force at the international level on 16 November 1994. 
4
 Adopted on 22 September 1992; entered into force at the international level on 25 March 1998.  
5
 Adopted on 14 October 1994; entered into force at the international level on 24 March 2011. 
6
 Adopted on 10 June 1995; entered into force at the international level on 9 July 2004. 
7
 Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on safety of offshore oil and gas operations 
and amending Directive 2004/35/EC, in Official Journal of the European Union, L 178, 28 June 2013, 66. 
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industry at the crossroads of enormous economic and environmental interests and 
concerns. 
 
 
2. Civil liability for offshore oil and gas activities at the global and regional level ... 
or not? 
 
As it was authoritatively noted in 2011, liability and compensation issues in relation 
to offshore oil and gas activities are not properly dealt with by any international law 
instrument of global of regional application.8 As a starting point, despite the moving 
nature of many offshore platforms, a successful liability and compensation regime such 
as the one jointly established by the 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damage,9 on the one hand, and the 1992 International Convention on 
the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage,10 on the other hand, are clearly not applicable insofar as the “object” involved 
does not fall within the definition of ‘ship’ provided thereby, viz., according to Article 
I.1 of the former, “any sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever 
constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, provided that a ship 
capable of carrying oil and other cargoes shall be regarded as a ship only when it is 
actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any voyage following such carriage 
unless it is proved that it has no residues of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard”. 
A more pertinent instrument, the 1977 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources11 
(designed to apply to the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean), 
whilst containing provisions channelling the liability towards the operator and entitling 
the latter to limit such liability to a certain monetary amount, has not entered into force 
so far and is highly unlikely to do so in the future. 
Other instruments, such as the Mediterranean Offshore Protocol12 touched upon 
above, whilst mentioning the need for a liability and compensation mechanism, have 
fallen short of devising a comprehensive regime to that effect. The Protocol’s Article 
27(1), in fact, merely requires contracting parties to “cooperate as soon as possible in 
formulating and adopting appropriate rules and procedures for the determination of 
liability and compensation for damage resulting from the activities dealt with in [the] 
Protocol”. 
                                                        
8
 See, for example, L. Chabason, Offshore oil exploitation: a new frontier for international environmental law, 
IDDRI Working Paper No 11/11, <www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-
debat/WP%201111_chabason_offshore.pdf>. 
9
 Originally adopted on 29 November 1969 and entered into force at the international level on 19 June 975; 
subsequently replaced by a new version thereof adopted on 27 November 1992 which entered into force at the 
international level on 30 May 1996.  
10
 Originally adopted on 18 December 1971 and entered into force at the international level on 16 October 1978; 
superseded by a new version thereof adopted on 27 November 1992 which entered into force at the international level 
on 1 May 1996. 
11
 Adopted on 1 May 1977 and never entered into force. 
12
 On which see also T. Scovazzi, ‘UNEP: The Fifth Protocol to the Barcelona Convention on the Protection of the 
Mediterranean’, (1995) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 543, as well as E. Raftopoulos, 
Sustainable Governance of Offshore Oil and Gas Development in the Mediterranean: Revitalizing the Dormant 
Mediterranean Offshore Protocol, MEPIELAN eBulletin, 19 August 2010 <www.mepielan-
ebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&CategoryId=4&ArticleId=29&Article=Sustainable-Governance-of- Offshore-Oil-
and-Gas-Development-in-the-Mediterranean:-Revitalizing-the-Dormant-Mediterranean- Offshore-Protocol>. 
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In the meantime, “pending development of such procedures”, parties are called upon 
by Article 27(2), on the one hand, (a) to “take all measures necessary to ensure that 
liability for damage caused by activities is imposed on operators, and that they shall be 
required to pay prompt and adequate compensation” and, on the other hand, (b) to “take 
all measures necessary to ensure that operators shall have and maintain insurance cover 
or other financial security of such type and under such terms as the Contracting Party 
shall specify in order to ensure compensation for damage caused by the activities 
covered by [the] Protocol”. 
The position within the Barcelona Convention system in general is, to say the truth, 
not much more advanced, if one considers that the only instrument existing on liability 
and compensation is currently represented by (non-mandatory) guidelines adopted by 
the 16th Meeting of the Contracting Parties in January 2008.13 
As a consequence of the (late) entry into force of the Offshore Protocol, which is 
now binding for six States plus the EU, we now face a situation which is, in all fairness, 
not less uncertain and fragmented than it used to be in the past, at least from the 
standpoint of liability and compensation for damages caused in connection with 
offshore oil and gas activities. Admittedly, for those States that are contracting parties to 
the Offshore Protocol (as well as for the EU) we have clearly moved from a scenario 
where no international regime (of regional character) existed to one which is indeed 
subject to a definite set of rules devoted to exploration and exploitation activities of the 
continental shelf, its seabed and its seafloor. 
If we look at the substance of such rules, however, it has to be recognized that, far 
from having introduced a uniform legal regime (comparable to the 1992 Civil Liability 
Convention and 1992 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Convention that 
have been mentioned above), the Offshore Protocol heavily relies on the legislation of 
its contracting parties for the purpose of ensuring, first, a certain degree of cooperation 
for the formulation and adoption of “appropriate rules and procedures for the 
determination of liability and compensation”. Second, and on an interim basis (i.e., 
pending the development of the relevant procedures), operators are required to pay 
“prompt and adequate compensation” (to what extent, according to what standards and 
for what kind of damage is not clarified, though), should an accident occur, and an 
“insurance cover or other financial security” shall be set up “of such type and under 
such terms” ... as the contracting party concerned itself shall specify!  
The current scenario is, in addition, legally fragmented, too, if one considers that the 
above rules only apply, within the Mediterranean Sea area, to a handful of coastal 
States, giving them a competitive disadvantage in the lucrative offshore oil and gas 
business vis-à-vis States that have not yet ratified the Offshore Protocol. This is bound 
to potentially negatively impact on the success of the Protocol in two different (although 
interrelated) ways: first of all, by possibly discouraging Mediterranean States from 
becoming parties to the Protocol and, secondly, by driving those that may decide to 
become parties towards the adoption of liability standards and compensation rules that 
are not particularly stringent.  
The above considerations, which apply to the Mediterranean Sea as a whole, are 
particularly significant in sub-regional contexts which feature the presence of EU as 
                                                        
13
 See, in this respect, T. Scovazzi, ‘The Mediterranean Guidelines for the Determination of Environmental Liability 
and Compensation: The Negotiations for the Instrument and the Question of Damage that Can Be Compensated’, 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online (2009) 183.  
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well as non-EU Member States, which is notably the case of the Adriatic and Ionian 
Seas with specific regard to the position of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Montenegro. Indeed, especially due to the increasing interest for offshore activities in 
that part of the Mediterranean Sea, one may see the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (also) as 
an appropriate framework for ensuring a prompt ratification process of the Offshore 
Protocol (to which Albania, but not the two other non-EU Member States, is at present a 
contracting party). 
 
 
3. Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil and gas operations: what room for 
the polluter pays principle?  
 
Given the unsatisfactory situation that currently exists at the international level, as 
briefly represented in the previous section, it is important to ascertain whether or not the 
EU has been able to take the lead towards the establishment of more adequate liability 
and compensation rules in the field of offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation. 
Reference has therefore to be made, in this respect, to the already mentioned Directive 
2013/30 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations. 
At the outset, however, it is appropriate to recall that, as widely know, Article 191(2) 
TFEU, provides that the environmental policy of the EU shall, inter alia, be based on 
the principle that the polluter shall pay. Such principle is generally considered to imply, 
on the one hand, a prohibition of environmental State subsidies and, on the other hand, 
the enactment of appropriate liability and compensation rules.14 
The principle has been implemented in several pieces of secondary legislation and 
has been addressed in a comprehensive manner through the adoption of Directive 
2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedy of environmental 
damage.15 
In a paper which is the process of being published, I have taken the view (which I 
maintain here) that, so far, the EU has failed to properly implement the polluter pays 
principle into its offshore oil and gas legislation.  
On the one hand, in fact, it appears from the wording of the Offshore Directive 
(including its recitals) that the EU (and its institutions as co-legislators) are fully aware 
of the intricate liability issues that are likely to arise out of an accident occurred in 
connection with the running of an offshore installation, especially when such accident 
happens to have transboundary implications. On the other hand, however, in this 
author’s opinion, no significant substantive measure has been provided for by the 2013 
Directive in order to address such issues, perhaps due to the apparent urgency to adopt 
at least a set of minimum preventive rules, which brings us back to the considerations 
that have been developed in the first section of the present paper concerning the (wrong) 
perception of liability as a measure of last resort. 
It is interesting to recall, by way of an example, that recital No. 9 of the Directive 
recognises the limits of the existing (national) liability regimes, by pointing out that 
                                                        
14
 Cf J. H. Jans, H.H.B. Vedder, European Environmental Law After Lisbon (Groningen, 2012) 41 ff., for an 
authoritative discussion of the principles of European environmental policy, including in particular the polluter pays 
principle. 
15
 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability 
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, in Official Journal of the European Union, L 
143, 30 April 2004, 56. 
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under such regimes “the party responsible may not only be clearly identifiable and may 
not be able, or liable, to pay all the costs to remedy the damage it has caused”. Later on, 
it is also stated that “as no existing financial security instruments, including risk pooling 
arrangements, can accommodate all possible consequences of major accidents, the 
Commission should undertake further analysis and studies of the appropriate measures 
to ensure an adequately robust liability regime for damages relating to offshore oil and 
gas operations, requirements on financial capacity including availability of appropriated 
financial security instruments or other arrangements” (recital No. 63). 
The result is that, under Article 39 of the Directive, the Commission is required, by 
the end of 2014, to submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report “on 
the availability of financial security instruments and on the handling of compensation 
claims, where appropriate, accompanied by proposals” and that, in turn, by 19 July 
2015, the Commission shall submit to the same institutions “a report on its assessment 
of the effectiveness of the liability regimes in the Union in respect of the damage caused 
by offshore oil and gas operations”, along with an “assessment of the appropriateness of 
broadening liability provisions”, to be accompanied again, “where appropriate, by 
proposals”. 
At a closer scrutiny there appears to have been only one (limited) intervention of 
substance operated by Directive 2013/30, consisting in the amendment of the 2004 
Liability Directive in order to take into account some of the peculiarities of the offshore 
oil and gas sector. 
Article 38, in this respect, extends the scope of application of the said Directive also 
to damage adversely affecting the environmental status of “waters, the seabed and 
subsoil on the seaward side of the baseline from which the extent of territorial waters is 
measured extending to the outmost reach of the area where a Member State has and/or 
exercises jurisdictional rights, in accordance with the [UNCLOS], with the exception of 
waters adjacent to the countries and territories mentioned in Annex II to the Treaty and 
the French Overseas Departments and Collectivities”. 
The Environmental Liability Directive, however, is in itself open to criticism 
especially due to the limited role accorded to individuals as opposed to public 
authorities.16 
It is therefore unfortunate that the Offshore Directive confines itself to requesting to 
Member States, “[w]ithout prejudice to the existing scope of liability relating to the 
prevention and remediation of environmental damage pursuant to Directive 
2004/35/EC”, to “ensure that the licensee is financially liable for the prevention and 
remediation of environmental damage as defined in that Directive, caused by offshore 
oil and gas operations carried out by, or on behalf of, the licensee or the operator” 
(Article 7).17 
The Offshore Directive was to be implemented by 19 July 2015 according to its 
Article 41(1). At the time of writing, however, at least according to information that has 
been made publicly available, three States – Germany, Greece and Romania – one of 
which is clearly a Ionian Sea coastal State, appear to have missed the relevant 
deadline.18 
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 Article 3(3): “Without prejudice to relevant national legislation, this Directive shall not give private parties a right 
of compensation as a consequence of environmental damage or of an imminent threat of such damage”. 
17
 For a critical account of the Directive from the perspective of marine environmental protection, reference can be 
made to S.M. Carbone, F. Munari, L. Schiano di Pepe, ‘The Environmental Liability Directive and liability for 
damage to the marine environment’, (2007) Journal of International Maritime Law 341. 
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4. Civil liability and compensation for offshore activities: a work in progress under 
EU law … 
 
Within the on-going normative process that has been described in the previous 
section, a report dealing with “civil liability, financial security and compensation claims 
for offshore oil and gas activities in the European Economic Area” was published on 
behalf of the European Commission on 14 August 2014.19 
The study, based on the analysis of the legislations of 20 “Target States” (18 EU 
Member States and two EEA Member States), was intended to assist the Commission in 
the preparation of the two reports provided for by Article 39 of the Offshore Directive 
by assessing, for each and every State concerned, the effectiveness of existing liability 
regimes for bodily injury, property damage and economic loss (so-called “traditional 
damage”), the handling of compensation claims and the availability of financial security 
instruments for compensation of the above heads of damage from offshore oil and gas 
operations. 
The conclusions reached by the report are quite discomforting. The point is made, in 
particular, that, should an accident such as the Deepwater Horizon disaster occur in 
European waters, there would be no liability, in most Target States, for many third-party 
claims for “traditional damage” as well as no regime, in the vast majority of Target 
States, to handle compensation payments. 
The grounds on which such conclusions have been based are of various nature, and 
include the non-recognition of liability for pure economic loss (i.e. loss which is 
independent from a bodily or otherwise physical damage) in a number of jurisdictions 
or, alternatively, the existence of general tort law criteria that may render difficult (and 
sometimes almost impossible) for the criteria themselves to be met in pure economic 
loss cases. In addition, the geographical scope of application of the laws of some Target 
States is sometimes doubtful, as it is not sure whether accidents occurring on the 
continental shelf or in the exclusive economic zone would be covered or not. 
One might have expected that the findings of the above-mentioned study would have 
prompted the European Commission to propose a series of amendments to the 
Directive, with a view to fill the liability loopholes identified in the previous sections of 
the present contribution.  
This has not happened, though, as demonstrated by the most recent development at 
EU level, certainly represented by the publication, in September 2015, of a report from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “on liability, compensation 
and financial security for offshore oil and gas operations” pursuant to Article 39 of the 
Offshore Directive.20 
The report is of particular interest for two different reasons: on the one hand, it sets 
out the Commission’s view on the achievements and shortcomings of the Offshore 
Directive – a view, as it shall be seen, that is open to some scepticism and criticism. On 
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 BIO by Deloitte, Stevens & Bolton LLP, Civil liability, financial security and compensation claims for offshore oil 
and gas activities in the European Economic Area, Final Report, 14 August 2014, 
<ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/201408_offshore_oil_and_gas_activities.pdf>. 
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the other hand, it also indicates possible development trends in the field, both at the EU 
as well as at the national level. 
In its analysis of what the Offshore Directive has accomplished, the Commission 
makes the point that “the [Offshore Safety Directive] channels [liability for offshore 
accidents] unequivocally to offshore licensees, i.e. the individual or joint holders of 
authorizations for oil/gas prospection, exploration and/or production operations”.21 
Whilst the statement is not directly supported by a reference to the pertinent provision 
of the Directive, one gathers, from a subsequent section of the same Report, that the 
Commission’s position is that Article 4 in general, and its para 3, in particular, justifies 
such a position.22 
Undeniably, Article 4 of the Offshore Directive requires the competent national 
authorities to take a number of significant steps, including in particular, to preliminarily 
assess the prospective offshore licensee’s “financial capabilities … to cover liabilities 
potentially deriving from the offshore oil and gas operations in question including 
liability for potential economic damages where such liability is provided for by national 
law” (Article 4(2)(c)). It also requests that the licensing authority “does not grant a 
license unless it is satisfied with evidence… that the applicant has made or will make 
adequate provision, on the basis of arrangements to be decided by Member States, to 
cover liabilities potentially deriving from the applicant’s offshore oil and gas 
operations”, that Member States establish “as a minimum (…) procedures for ensuring 
prompt and adequate handling of compensation claims, including in respect of 
compensation payments for transboundary incidents” and, finally, that they also 
“require the licensee to maintain sufficient capacity to meet their financial obligations 
resulting from liabilities for offshore oil and gas operations” (Article 4(3)). 
The provision, however, certainly falls short of providing a proper channelling 
mechanism towards offshore licensees and this for at least two main reasons. First, the 
Directive merely refers to the existing civil liability and compensation regimes in 
individual Member States, as made very clear by the use of expressions such as 
“liabilities potentially deriving from the offshore oil and gas operations”, “potential 
economic damages”, “where such liability is provided for by national law” and “on the 
basis of arrangements to be decided by Member States”. To put it differently, 
compensation and liability are covered by the Directive only and to the extent that they 
are dealt with by the applicable national law to which the Directive itself refers. 
Secondly, no proper channelling is present because the liability of the licensee is, at 
least apparently, not exclusive in nature, contrary to the situation that is typically 
present in the field of liability and compensation for oil pollution damage from ships, 
regulated by an international legal regime which provides, under normal circumstances, 
for the liability of the registered shipowner only.23 It goes without saying that the two 
circumstances are strictly intertwined, since no proper channelling can exist in the 
absence of a uniform or at least fully harmonised set of rules. 
Whilst there is no room, in the context of the present contribution, to discuss the 
features of a possible, future European liability offshore regime in any detail, it has to 
be noted that in the past European legislators have been unable to agree on crucial 
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issues such as the notion of recoverable damage, the standard of liability, the 
establishment of a compensation fund and other relevant aspects. This has been the 
case, for example, in the context of the proposed (and later abandoned) European-wide 
oil pollution liability regime to supplement the one in place for ship-source pollution at 
the international level.  
More recently, the project to insert civil liability provisions into the 2004 Liability 
Directive also failed, thus rendering the Liability Directive a “public law” instrument 
(as already discussed at the end of the previous section of the present contribution). 
Whilst one has to hope that better results can be achieved in the field of offshore oil and 
gas activities, the diverging legal traditions and approaches of the various Member 
States may well turn out to be an insurmountable obstacle.  
Such a sceptical approach is confirmed if one turns to the other reason of interest of 
the Commission’s report, i.e. its description of existing and potential evolutionary 
trends in the area. After a detailed discussion of the possible introduction of criminal 
sanctions for some particularly serious instances of offshore accidents, the report 
concludes that the need for these will emerge in due course from an evaluation of the 
effects of the Directive, as implemented by Member States.  
It also concludes for the inappropriateness of broadening liability provisions through 
EU law on the basis of two circumstances, namely that environmental liability (within 
the meaning of the Environmental Liability Directive) is already available for offshore 
accidents and that although there is at present no uniform regime dealing with civil 
liability, EU-wide rules on conflict of laws and jurisdictions “prevent differences in 
national regimes from disadvantaging claimants”.24 No mention is made, though, on the 
need to ensure a greater degree of certainty through the adoption of a uniform system of 
substantive rules.  
In fact, the weak point identified by the Commission, rather than being represented 
by the substantive rules in place, appears to be the unavailability of financial security 
instruments “to fully cover the more infrequent and costly offshore accidents in the 
[EEA]”. The Report therefore concludes that if the availability of financial security 
instruments is not improved as a consequence of the operation of national legal systems, 
the Commission “will reassess whether and what further EU action could achieve these 
objectives”.25 
Particular emphasis is put by the Commission on the role of the EU Offshore 
Authorities Group (EUOAG) as a forum within which experience will have to be shared 
on the whole range of relevant issues that has been briefly mentioned here, including the 
various kinds of liability that are currently (un)available for offshore accidents and ways 
to ensure the possibility to rely of appropriate financial instruments. 
 
 
5. … and international law as well 
 
A few closing remarks are needed in respect of possible developments at the 
international level. The lack of an ad hoc instrument dealing with liability and 
compensation for offshore accidents is perceived as being clearly unsatisfactory by an 
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increasing number of observers and may be overcome in the future especially thanks to 
the efforts carried out by prominent non-governmental organizations.  
For example, the Institut du Développement Durable et des Relations Internationales 
(IDDRI),26 based in Paris, has put the issue of offshore activities at the top of its agenda 
since at least five years, which has led to a series of events and publications calling for a 
strengthening of the framework regulating offshore oil and gas activities that have 
significantly contributed to the debate. 
With particular regard to the liability implications, the Global Oceans Commission, 
in addition, has set forth a specific proposal (out of a total of eight) concerning offshore 
oil and gas and, in particular, the establishment of “binding international safety 
standards and liability”, highlighting its support for “the elaboration of an international 
convention regulating liability and compensation” covering “economic loss and 
ecological damages”, providing for “strict liability of operators”, including “provisions 
for a shared liability between licence holders and their subcontractors”, binding “States 
to ensure that operators have adequate financial capacity to pay for possible 
compensation” and setting “a liability cap at a level that can ensure the recovery of costs 
associated with environmental remediation and compensation and losses born by public 
and private entities, as well as a compensation fund to address major disasters that are 
likely to exceed the liability cap”. 27  
Last but not least, the long-standing Comité Maritime International (CMI) has set up 
an International Working Group on “offshore activities” that, pursuant to the well- 
established CMI “method”, has produced a questionnaire for national maritime 
associations (which has received eighteen replies so far) and three interim reports. Work 
is still going on, also in co-operation with the IMO (on which see immediately below), 
and is likely to bring about significant results in terms of possible recommendations to 
the international community in the near future.28 
With regard to IMO, it is important to recall the action taken by the Government of 
Indonesia, already in 2010, by filing a proposal at the 97th session of the Legal 
Committee of the Organization with a request that the Committee should include in its 
future programme of work an item concerning liability and compensation arising from 
transboundary pollution resulting from offshore oil exploration and exploitation.29 The 
move, as it is well known, was taken in the aftermath of the two very serious accidents 
occurred, in 2009, at the Montara oilfield in the Australian EEZ - and seriously 
affecting Indonesian coastline and population – and, in 2010, at the Deepwater Horizon 
platform in the Gulf of Mexico. 
The proposal, as it also well known, did not get through, not only because of the 
argument according to which offshore installations, being not ships, cannot be 
considered as falling within the terms of reference of the Legal Committee, but also 
because there was no agreement among members of the Committee on the existence of 
a “compelling need” for the proposed instrument.30 
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The response of the IMO has been negative with regard to the prospect of drafting a 
new international convention, but co-operative in a more general perspective.  
The Legal Committee, meeting at its 100th session, did in fact encourage delegations 
to “work intersessionally to facilitate further progress within the Committee”.31 An 
International Consultative Group was therefore set up,32 under the leadership of 
Denmark and Indonesia, within which discussions have been held, inter alia, in April 
and July 2015, at the IMO headquarters and in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, respectively, and 
which has led to the finalisation of a document setting out “Guidance for 
Bilateral/Regional Arrangement/Agreement on Liability and Compensation Issues 
Connected with Transbounary Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Offshore Oil 
Exploration and Exploitation Activities” that has in the meantime filed with the IMO.33 
According to its para 1.4, the purpose of the document is “to assist IMO Member 
States to formulate national legislation, bilateral, regional, or international instruments 
pertaining to liability and compensation connected with transboundary oil pollution 
damage resulting from offshore exploration and exploitation activities”. For this reason, 
its structure is not one that would be typically used for the purpose of drafting a model 
convention or legislation: the wording is illustrative and explanatory rather than 
prescriptive and the main focus is on a number of “examples” or “elements” that “may 
be included in bilateral/regional arrangements or agreements” – as the title of its para 2 
indicates. 
I will critically discuss, in very brief terms, some of the suggested elements and 
examples in order to evaluate if and how they contribute to the on-going debate on the 
process towards the establishment of an adequate body of rules on liability and 
compensation for damages arising out of offshore accidents, with a particular focus on 
the guidance document’s coverage of the proposed scope and on the liability rules of 
future arrangements or agreements. 
Indications as to the potential scope of a national, bilateral or regional instrument 
relate first of all to the facilities “intended to be covered” and examples are given that 
include offshore facilities, artificial islands and ancillary units that are engaged in 
relevant activities. 
“Damage wanted to be covered” and “types of claim” are also suggested as key 
elements of a definition of the scope of any arrangement or agreement, bearing in mind 
that the guidance document is intended to deal with “transboundary” pollution damage 
only. 
Considering the nature of this guidance tool, some more clarity would be perhaps 
beneficial. The distinction between the two elements is, first of all, not self-evident, as 
the type of claim covered will necessarily be strictly connected to the damage sought. In 
addition, the examples given with regard to these components are, arguably, not fully 
consistent. As a matter of fact, only “damage to coastline or related interests of one or 
more States, which requires emergency action or other immediate response” is 
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identified as a type of damage whereas “damage to living or non-living natural 
resources in the public domain by public authorities” as well as “damage to individuals 
o legal persons” are mentioned as possible claims. 
A definition of “incident” is also recommended, presumably in order to exclude 
operative pollution from the scope of application of the proposed instrument. 
Liability-related elements are contained in paragraphs 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 of the 
guidance document. It is thereby assumed that the polluter pays principle will be part of 
the arrangement or agreement and it is also indicated that the extent of its coverage will 
have to be defined, for example, so as to include also the cost of further incident 
prevention, community loss and environmental recovery. 
No mention can be found, however, either here or elsewhere in the document, of the 
channelling principle stricto sensu as explained earlier on in this paper, although 
consistency with existing international agreements, which is mentioned as one of the 
relevant parameters to be taken into account, would indicate that this is indeed a 
possibility. Also not mentioned is the basis of liability although, once again, consistency 
with existing international agreements would require this to be strict in nature (as 
opposed to fault-based). 
The above solution would be particularly justified should the relevant regime – as it 
is also assumed – provide for limited liability. Liability limitation, although acceptable 
in principle within the context of a global legal framework, poses special problems in 
relation to national, bilateral or regional agreements or arrangements. It is indeed 
suggested that this particular aspect should be handled very carefully in order to be sure 
not only that the agreed cap is able to effectively cover the consequences of a major 
accident whilst at the same time sustainable for the insurance market, but also that a 
situation is not put in place whereby different regimes in different regions or sub-
regions may determine a condition of competitive advantage for certain operators. 
The question of the availability of appropriate compulsory insurance coverage or 
other financial security instruments is also rightly highlighted by the guidance 
document, this being the only way to ensure that any regime of whatever nature and 
geographical scope of application, turns out to be effective and that the victims of the 
offshore accident receive prompt and adequate compensation. 
Finally, the reciprocity element that has been built into the document (at para 2.6) 
underscores the intention of the drafters to minimize the risk of a differentiated 
treatment with the indirect effect of raising the level of protection available to victims of 
offshore accidents. 
The document submitted by Denmark and Indonesia will be reviewed, commented 
and decided upon by the Legal Committee, whose 103rd session is scheduled for early 
June 2016. 
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SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 1.1. Adriatic Sea and its properties. – 1.2. Causes of oil slicks and lookalike 
signatures. – 2. Available data and methods. – 3. Results and discussion. – 4. Conclusions. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Adriatic Sea and its properties 
 
The Adriatic Sea is a small semi-enclosed sea covering the total area of 138 600 km2, 
with its longer axis in a NW direction 800 km long, and up to 200 km wide. It is 
connected to the greater Mediterranean through the Otranto strait. Its coasts, including 
those of thousands islands is about 6200 km long. Croatian marine environment is 
larger than its land area.  
Surface circulation in the Adriatic is prevalently cyclonic.1 Such circulation is due to 
that the Adriatic Sea as a dilution basin, with major fresh water input from the Northern 
and Northeastern Adriatic rivers, and advection of saltier Mediterranean waters in the 
south. Circulation is strongly influenced by the winds and alternates between winter and 
summer wind regimes.2 The winds and circulation features exhibit interannual 
variability due to climate conditions over the area wider than the Adriatic3 which 
influence the rate of water exchange with the greater Mediterranean causing periods of 
stronger and lower intrusion of the Mediterranean waters. The conditions in the Otranto 
strait are connected to the Ionian Sea and its bimodal oscillation pattern.4 
The Adriatic Sea ecosystem is influenced by input of nutrients coming from the Po 
River, which accounts for 80% of the freshwater input, and includes sewage of the large 
Italian cities as well as drainage from agricultural fields along its catchment area, and all 
similar influences from both coasts. 
Pollution risk comes also from waste water of different kinds of ships, especially 
tankers. Due to intensive ship traffic the oil spills accidents are potential threats for the 
Adriatic. Drilling for oil in the Adriatic, pipelines, oil refineries and LNG terminals on 
both coasts pose risk to the environment. If accidents occur, these could produce 
damage especially to tourism and fisheries and jeopardise the economy of the 
population along the Adriatic coasts. The recent study of the Institute of Oceanography 
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and Fisheries,5 has shown that fish spawning grounds cover most of the open sea 
bottom. If we wish to protect fish resources and have sustainable fisheries, probably 
more Adriatic areas should be excluded from drilling for oil.  
From a geopolitical point of view the Adriatic Sea it is extremely interesting for 
Central, Southern and Eastern Europe as a mean of transport communication for people 
and goods. The transport includes passenger ships between east and west coasts on the 
routes Pula-Venice, Zadar-Ancona, Split-Ancona, Dubrovnik-Bari, Bar-Bari and 
Durres-Bari and also numerous lines between the east coast and its islands.  
The lines exist also between Italian ports Venice, Ancona and Bari to Greek ports 
Patras and Igoumenitsa. All these lines are intensified from May to October season. 
 Large number of ships navigate along the main transport routes and fishing areas. 
Such intensive traffic is presented for the years 2013 and 2014 in the Fig. 1 and 2. 
Transport routes of tankers and cargo ships are concentrated along the long Adriatic 
axis, while fishing areas are dispersed both in the coastal and open sea. The intensity of 
ship traffic is represented by color, the most intensive by red-yellow, which clearly 
marks the ship routes. Other place with intensive ship traffic occurs near the Italian 
coast, where oil rigs are installed in the sea (Rospo Mare, Elsa and other oil and gas 
fields). Middle to small oil slicks/spills occur in areas of oil and gas 
production/transportation. Slicks occur also in areas of local and regional ferry lines 
connecting Rijeka, Zadar, Šibenik, Split, Makarska and Dubrovnik with the Croatian 
islands. Small oil spills associated with routine ship operations can be frequently found 
everywhere in the Adriatic. 
 
1.2. Causes of oil slicks and lookalike signatures 
 
The possibility to detect oil spills/slicks is disturbed by the so-called look-alike 
signatures,6 similar features caused by different phenomena.7 For example, several 
hydrodynamic phenomena could be seen at sea surface and mistaken for oil slicks. 
These may be currents, upwelling zones, SST (Sea Surface Temperature) variations or 
internal waves.8 
Potential sources of mistakes come from meteorological phenomena in the lower 
atmosphere due to wind stress, precipitation or atmospheric gravity waves.  
Also, a lot of biological phenomena leave traces at the surface, can be mistaken for 
slicks. These are biogenic slicks, algae blooms, floating seaweeds, or sperm and eggs of 
marine animals. Such slicks are usually thin stripes and may be visible at lower wind 
speeds. 
The shipmade turbulence can also give a wrong impression of a slick. Even the areas 
with shallow bottom topography are sometimes mistaken for spills. This list of potential 
look-alikes is not complete and an effort is needed from experienced analyst to 
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determine what kind of substance is seen from the SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) 
images.  
In addition to these, while very strong winds (> 12 m/s) cause mixing of the water 
and make the spills to disappear, there must be some wind in the area for the spills to be 
detected and distinguished from other similar features at the surface.  
Here also some smaller slicks are visible as well as the ships wakes. On Fig. 3, there 
are examples of a few oil spills of different shapes and dimensions. Seen is one large 
slick (24 km2) (Fig. 3a) with feathered edges caused by the wind, interrupted from 
another ship that passed over. Fig. 3b shows one (9 km2) fresh slick modified probably 
by local currents. Fig. 3c shows one large and long slick (74 km2) with feathered edges 
caused by a longer action of the wind. Fig. 3d shows large slick (46 km2), prolonged in 
a thin slick towards south east, indicating the ship direction.  
Oil spill detection is only possible within a narrow range of wind speeds (Bern et al., 
1992). At low wind speeds < 2 m/s the contrast relative to the background sea is lost. 
The minimum wind speed of 2-3 m/s allows creation of sufficient brightness on the 
SAR images and optimal wind speed is between 3-6 m/s,9 but spills may still be visible 
even at speeds of 10-12 m/s.10  
Natural spills occur when the liquid hydrocarbons leak out from the underwater 
deposits where oil has been accumulated through the geological past. The seeps are 
usually triggered by a local seismic activity. There are some evidences of such seeps in 
the Adriatic Sea. Natural seeps come to the sea surface in different forms, depending on 
the amount and duration of the leaking phenomenon.  
The detection of natural leakage as well as detection of slicks in general, requires 
thorough investigation of a suspected particular area for a longer time.11 Such seeps 
usually appear in a sickle like form.  
Oil slicks may occur in different forms and dimensions, depending on the amount of 
oil, the structure of winds and currents and the time passed from leaking. They could be 
amorphous, sometimes perturbated or strait, with fethered edges or diffused. Fresh and 
old slicks differes from each other, while spills caused by different oil fractions have 
also different recognizable shapes.  
 
 
2. Available data and methods 
 
In this paper few examples of SAR images and the analysis of larger data sets were 
presented, that were used in our previous published works.12 
                                                           
9
 T. I. Bern, T. Wahl, T. Andersson, R. Olsen, ‘Oil spill detection using satellite based SAR: Experience from a field 
experiment’, (1993) 59 Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing 3. 
10
 Ivanov (n 7); K. Litovchenko, A. Ivanov, ‘Monitoring of oil spills in the North Caspian Sea using SAR imagery 
and multi-sensor satellite data’ in M. Oluić (ed), Proceedings of the First International Conference on Remote 
Sensing Techniques in “Disaster Management and Emergency Response in the Mediterranean Region” (EARSeL, 
2009) 267-272. 
11
 K. N. Topouzelis, ‘Oil Spill Detection by SAR Images: Dark Formation Detection, Feature Extraction and 
Classification Algorithms’, (2008) 8 Sensors (Basel) 6642. 
12
 M. Morović, A. Ivanov, ‘Oil Spill Monitoring in the Croatian Adriatic Waters: needs and possibilities’, (2011) 52 
Acta Adriatica 45; M. Morović, A. Ivanov, M. Oluić, Ž. Kovač, N. Terleeva, ‘Distribution and sources of oil slicks in 
the Middle Adriatic Sea’ in Ocean Remote Sensing for Sustainable Resources – Proceedings of the 12th Biennial 
Conference of Pan Ocean Remote Sensing Conference (PORSEC)(2014) 1-8; M. Morović, A. Ivanov, M. Oluić, Ž. 
Kovač, N. Terleeva, ‘Oil spills distribution in the Middle and Southern Adriatic Sea and intensive ship traffic’, (2015) 
56 Acta Adriatica 143. 
 Mira Morović, Andrei Ivanov, Marinko Oluić, Žarko Kovač, Nadezda Terleeva 
 
236 
The large ESA archive of Envisat SAR images was available in the frame of the ESA 
research project 19234 (Principal investigator M. Oluić), while Radarsat-1 SAR images 
were provided by RDC Scanex in the frame of the joint Croatia-Russia pilot project. 
The area of interest was the open sea in the Middle and Southern Adriatic. The 
quicklooks were examined through the EOLISA catalogue for the period 2003-2011. 
Images with pronounced oil spills were ordered from ESA for further analysis. After 
analyzing the images visually, considered were properties like size, shape, and contrast. 
The wind conditions during the image acquisition was also taken into account. Images 
with inappropriate wind conditions (too strong wind or no wind) were excluded from 
analysis. Wind data (10 min averaged wind speed, direction and gust data) were 
obtained thanks to the State Hydrometeorological office in Zagreb.13 The wind data 
were available from several stations in the Adriatic islands. 
The raw raster images were imported to the NEST program, processed (geo-
referenced) with the NEST ESA SAR ToolBox to geographical grid and exported to 
GeoTIFF format. Each image was in details observed to determine oil slicks and 
enlarged to get clear view of a particular slick. After that, the images were imported to 
the GeoMixer program.14 GeoMixer is a software and geo-portal for storage, 
integration, visualization, interactive analysis, and publishing of SAR data (and other 
remote sensing data) and results of analysis using the on-line GIS (Geographic 
Information System) tool. In it, it is also possible to integrate SAR images with other 
geospatial data about oceanography, meteorology, offshore oil-and-gas infrastructures, 
digital nautical charts, bathymetry, marine boundaries, ship lines and other useful 
information.  
Collection of many data and information about marine basin in such an application 
allows identification of oil spills and discrimination of them from look-alikes, with a 
very high confidence level, although there may be uncertainties in oil spill 
determination on SAR images, without additional airborne survey or sampling. The 
SAR images enable ship detection, as ships on high resolution SAR images appear as 
small bright spots.15 
 
 
3. Results and discussion 
 
From about 300 examined SAR images, after inspection, only about 30 (from both 
Envisat and Radarsat-1) showed clear oil spill signatures. All selected Envisat SAR 
images were integrated in GeoMixer together with geographical map. The coverage by 
images from our analysis is shown on the Fig. 4.  
On a number of these images a large number of ships were visible along the main 
transport routes that concentrate along the long Adriatic axis, and in fishing areas that 
are dispersed both in the coastal and open sea.16 Our analysis of Envisat and Radarsat-1 
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SAR images and oil spill distribution maps for the Adriatic Sea confirms general 
opinion from other seas that most oil pollution occurred along the main ship routes.17 
Summary maps of large and medium oil slicks of different man-made nature detected 
in the period 2003-2011 in the Adriatic Sea is analysed through GeoMixer technology. 
The results of SAR images revealed many large oil slicks in the Adriatic Sea, especially 
in its central part, along the main transport routes. We can observe the location of spills 
comparing Fig. 5 to Fig. 6. Large spills are mostly found in the Croatian Fishery and 
Ecological Zone.  
The slicks/spills extended from 9 to 108 km2 (Fig. 7).18 Some had feathered edges, 
indicating the presence of different oil fractions (see also Fig. 3a and 3c). Such slicks 
may come into the water during routine tank washing operations and are dispersed in 
the course of time and under the action of wind and currents. It is very probable that 
most spills were intentionally released during night, since were detected in SAR images 
acquired during descending morning passes of satellite between 05:00-09:00 UTC.  
Analysis of distribution of large oil spills revealed that tank washing occurred 
frequently in the central Adriatic Sea like in the Central Black Sea. Most probably some 
of these spills were produced by multipurpose chemical tankers, which transport liquid 
substances of different toxicity including crude oil and oil products. Hydrocarbons and 
products retrieved from them are toxic for marine life and most of them are 
carcinogenic. The fate of these substances is not studied in the Adriatic, but a lot of 
them ended in a food chain and could harm humans as well.  
These liquids together with emulsifiers and surface active substances used for tank 
cleaning can form different surface-active films on the sea surface. Although the 
Adriatic Sea is declared as a PSSA according to the MARPOL Convention, tank 
washing is sometimes legal.19 
The highest amount of largest oil spills are detected in the open sea, at the boundaries 
of the Italian and Croatian sectors. These slicks are not necessarily produced by crude 
oil. Other medium ship-made oil spills can be produced by ballast waters, tank washing 
residues or oil mixtures from the engine room and bilge waters and even oily fish 
wastes, some of it produced during routine fishing boats operations.  
Although it would be possible to track ships that caused such types of pollution, 
since the satellite images are not yet accepted as proves in the court, it would be 
difficult to press charges to any suspected ship. 
There is a reasonable doubt that oil slicks/spills occur very frequently, and all cannot 
be observed by satellites. Also quantity and quality of spilled oil and oily products 
                                                           
17
 M. Gade, W. Alpers, ‘Using ERS-2 SAR images for routine observation of marine pollution in European coastal 
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Remote Sensing 5513.  
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remains unknown. Even with the new satellite Sentinal with coverage of every second 
day over the mid-latitudes, a lot of spills would pass undetected due to other reasons.  
Some specific areas in the Adriatic Sea are put under protection by legislation. These 
are a number of national parks, special reserves, significant landscapes and monuments 
of nature.20 Ecological network of marine protected areas encompasses 16,39% of 
Croatian seas and covers 5205 km2. It is composed of hundreds of polygonal or point 
areas important for the conservation/preservation of species and habitat types. 
Concerning the entire Croatian marine area, protected is less than 10% of the area, and 
at the Italian side also about the same. Although human activities are limited in the 
protected areas, such measures cannot protect these areas from accidental oil pollution 
that may occur in the vicinity.  
It is very important to define marine borders of the states surrounding the Adriatic 
Sea for the reason of their obligations concerning protection, search and rescue and the 
rights for exploration of underwater hydrocarbon resources. However, as in the earlier 
period, the delimitation agreements are still pending ,21 between Slovenia and Croatia 
about Savudrijska vala (or Piran Bay). The agreements are still missing between 
Montenegro and Croatia in the South Adriatic, and border is not completely clear 
between Bosna-Hercegovina and Croatia in the Neum-Klek Bay. All these are the 
results of undefined marine borders between the republics of the former federation of 
Yougoslavia. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The area of interest was the open sea in the Middle and Southern Adriatic. The 300 
quicklooks were examined through the EOLISA catalogue for the period 2003-2011, 
while positive determination of slicks was at about 30 images.  
Summary maps of large and medium oil slicks of different man-made nature detected 
in the period 2003-2011 in the Adriatic Sea is analysed through GeoMixer. The results 
of SAR images revealed many large oil slicks in the Adriatic Sea, especially in its 
central part, along the main transport routes. Large spills are mostly found in the 
Croatian Fishery and Ecological Zone.  
Analysis of distribution of large oil spills revealed that tank washing occurred 
frequently in the central Adriatic Sea like in some other seas.  
After presented information, it is certain that we must be worried for the fate of the 
Adriatic Sea in terms of ecosystem and economy. The Adriatic is a small semi-enclosed 
sea with increasing rate of transport of petroll and a perspective to increase even more if 
new oil deposits would be found. And, increased transport is correlated to risk from 
accidents.  
The existing control is inefficient and the possibility to protect from pollution a long 
Croatian coasts with more than thousands islands is insufficient. The pollution does not 
obey national borders nor human regulation, but will follow the currents. Therefore, 
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these coasts are potentialy endangered from ongoing and future activities at the sea, 
especially from transport and drilling for new hydrocarbon deposits. 
If we wish to protect fish resources and have sustainable fisheries, probably more 
Adriatic areas should be excluded from drilling for oil. 
We can only hope that recent increase of interest in exploration of undersea oil and 
gas resources in the Adriatic would raise awareness for the necessity of continuous 
monitoring of oil slicks via SAR images and other means and that this would increase 
our efforts to prepare for potential larger accidents during future exploitation and 
transportation of oil. 
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Fig. 1 – Traffic density in the last three months of 2013.  <www.marinetraffic.com> 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 – Traffic density in the last three months of 2014.  <www.marinetraffic.com> 
 
 
 Possible Oil Pollution in the Adriatic Sea 
 
241
 
 
Fig. 3 – Excerpts from Envisat SAR images with large ship-made oil spills of different shapes and 
dimensions acquired 15.04.2003 (A), on 10.05.2008 (B), on 19.07.2008 (C) and on 11.09.2008 (D).  
Wind smearing of the patches (so-called, feathered edges) indicates the presence of different  
fractions of the oil in the releases during tank washing (from M. Morović, A. Ivanov, M. Oluić,  
Ž. Kovač, N. Terleeva, ‘Oil spills distribution in the Middle and Southern Adriatic Sea and  
intensive ship traffic’, (2015) 56 Acta Adriatica 143). © ESA 
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Fig. 4 – Coverage of the Adriatic Sea by archived Envisat SAR images acquired in the period  
2003-2010 joined in the GeoMixer application. © ESA, SCANEX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 – Blue-Croatian Fishery and Ecological Zone, green-search and rescue under  
Croatian jurisdiction, red-county borders. 
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Fig. 6 – Summary map of oil slicks of different nature detected in the SAR imagery of the Adriatic Sea 
(according to Morović et al. 2015). Extension of oil pollution along the main shipping routes is clearly 
seen. © SCANEX 
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Map  1 – Delimitation of continental shelf between Italy and SFRY (Successor States: Slovenia, Croatia 
and  Montenegro) according to the Agreement of 8 January 1968. The red line defines the new 
delimitation in the Gulf of Trieste according to the Italian-Croatian Technical Agreement of 2005. 
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Map 2 – Delimitation of continental shelf between Italy and Albania  
according to the Agreement of 18 December 1992. 
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Map 3 – Delimitation of continental shelf between Italy and Greece  
according to the Agreement of 24 May 1977. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maps 250
 
 
 
 
Map 4 – EUSAIR area. © <www.adriatic-ionian.eu> 
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Map 5 – The Southern Adriatic and Northern Ionian Seas (Central Mediterranean Sea) 
with indication of the main fishing harbours. 
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Map 6 – The “no-take zones” identified along the Italian coasts and  
particularly in the Southern Adriatic Sea. 
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